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How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness

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Abstract

A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, P.O. Box 0119, San Diego, CA, 92093-0119, USA

    Rick Grush

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  1. Rick Grush
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Correspondence to Rick Grush.

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Grush, R. How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness. Synthese 153, 417–450 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9100-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9100-6

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