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Is it possible to delete a philosophical consciousness? Metaphysical aspects of Ssearle’s neurobiological approach of free will

Grujić Snežana (Filozofski fakultet, Odeljenje za filozofiju, Beograd, doktorand)

In an effort to adjust his theoretical comprehension to the existing natural-scientific paradigm, Searle develops neurobiological naturalism, an approach which should rely on basic facts obtained from the neuroscience researches of living organisms when solving basic philosophical problems. This paper briefly presents this view’s theory leading to the argumentation that Searle’s point of view is of metaphysical characteristics which is exactly what he was trying to avoid. The metaphysical character of Searle’s neurobiological naturalism has been seen through the problem of free will resulting from his understanding of consciousness. The argumentation is based on an analysis of the concepts, the gap and the self, as well as on possible solutions of the problem of free will (hypothesis 1 and 2).

Keywords: free will, consciousness, the gap, self, neurobiological naturalism