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On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic

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Abstract

There are two fundamental classes of terms traditionally distinguished within moral vocabulary: the deontic and the aretaic. The terms from the first set serve in the prescriptive function of a moral code. The second class contains terms used for a moral evaluation of an action. The problem of the relationship between the aretaic and the deontic has not been discussed often by philosophers. It is, however, a very important and interesting issue: any normative ethical theory which takes as basic one set of these concepts should justify such choice and establish, at least implicitly, the logical relation with the other set. This paper is organized around the criticism of Stocker’s ‘sameness thesis’ (Stocker 1973): the claim that ‘good’ or ‘right’ mean the same thing. It is first presented in Stocker’s own formulation and criticized as implausible in that form. Some friendly modifications to his idea are suggested and then further discussed with the skeptical conclusion: no matter how close we bring deontic and aretaic notions, the gap between them will remain and any attempt to define or even explain one set of terms in another will leave something behind.

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Notes

  1. The exact opposite of the axiological theory would be, for example, Ewing’s position that goodness depends on rightness.

  2. This will be seen from the following discussion. Also, establishing relations within each set seems to be an easier thing to do than doing so between the terms from the two sets.

  3. “The right act is the one that which if I were omniscient I should see to be my duty” (Ross 1967), p.7.

  4. We call a stockerian someone who denies that there is a fundamental distinction between deontic and aretaic terms.

  5. For example: “(…) good things can properly be regarded simply as right to bring about.” (Stocker 1973, p. 93), “The difference between rightness and goodness here clearly depends solely on the standpoint from which the general welfare is regarded: from the standpoint of bringing it about, it is right; from that of an existent or part of a situation, it is good” (Stocker 1973)

  6. Of course, the sameness thesis is stronger than that: not only is the act right when the associated situation is good, but vice versa too.

  7. "The sameness thesis maintains only that insofar as there is a difference in rightness between such acts or any other acts, there is the ‘same difference’ of goodness between situations involving these acts, and conversely” (Stocker 1973, p. 94)

    “ (…) an act involving situation is a situation at least partially constituted by an act.” (Stocker 1973, p.93)

  8. The latter implies that the entities described as good\bad and right\wrong are paradigm cases of states of affairs and actions, and that there are no independent grounds for distinguishing between those entities. This is probably far fetched.

  9. I follow Parsons in referring to processes, states, and events as ‘eventualities’.

  10. From now on we will understand ‘right’ as ‘permissible’.

  11. Some philosophers deny this, e.g., (Ladd 1957).

  12. A quantum quality is a quality that is only available for possession in a single, fixed amount. This term was introduced by Jerry Levinson (Levinson 1978).

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  1. York University, 4700 Keele St, Toronto, M3J1P3, Canada

    Jarek Gryz

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  1. Jarek Gryz
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Correspondence to Jarek Gryz.

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Gryz, J. On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 14, 493–501 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9258-3

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