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Theory of Subecumenics: Originality of Eastern Cultures
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 April 2024
Extract
Our thinking is still the captive of the dichotomy “national/ international.” The reaction to nationalism takes the form of an abstract internationalism, and reaction to internationalism leads to the rebirth of nationalism. However, this dichotomy was only true (and that relatively) in 19th century Europe, or at the latest, at the beginning of the twentieth century, when subnational cultures seemed on the way to disappearing, and everything European was considered “universal” (two hypotheses that the facts prove to be untrue). As H. Frey observes, “Today, the decline or decadence of the West is part of the contemporary view of the world, like the electron or the dinosaur.” The linear outline of progress, with Europe at the head, did not withstand the test of the First World War. The year 1918 marked the beginning of the end of Europeanism. Since then, we have begun to speak of “areas of civilization” (Splengler), “civilizations” (Toynbee), “cultural coalitions” (Lévi-Strauss). The existence of “areas of civilization” (regions) is commonly admitted today; it has entered journalistic language and even the structure of regional commissions and agencies of the United Nations (Europe, Near East, Southern Asia, South-east Asia, and the Far East). New communities have inserted themselves between nations and humanity. What do they represent? Are they something unique, or are they divided into a certain number of types in opposition to each other because of some characteristic? And in what way have they modified our view of universal history?
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © 1979 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)
References
1 Ossip Mandelstam's poem, "Nostalgia for a World Culture," shows no interest in India, China and Japan. The nostalgia in question concerned only European culture. Inversely, Indian historians speak of "European civil wars" referring to the First and Second World Wars. For them Europe is not the universe.
2 H. Frey, " ‘The Decline of the West' by Oswald Spengler," Daedalus, Cam bridge, Mass., 1974, Vol. 103, No. 1, p. 7.
3 T.S. Eliot also had very interesting comments to make with respect to the interdependence of subnational, national and supranational cultures, in Notes Toward the Definition of Culture, London, 1948.
4 Throughout the remainder of the text we will use the more euphonic term "bi-ecumenic."
5 See our article, "The Decline of Buddhism in Medieval India," Diogenes, No. 96, pp. 38-66.
6 In the history of Islam the Koran progressively takes a place greatly resembling the second hypostasis in the Trinity: it is co-eternal with Allah and precedes Heaven and Earth.
7 Yin and Yang—the two principles of Being in Chinese metaphysics— correspond to the masculine and the feminine. There is sexual, but not erotic, at traction—in other words, not individualized love such as exists between Cupid and Psyche.
8 See the works of E.V. Zavadskaia, "V.M. Alekseev o filosofskoesteticheskom areale slova," in Literatura i Kultura Kitaia, Moscow, 1972.
9 As various inquiries have shown, modern Indians still confuse nationality (Bengali, for example) and djati (caste).
10 N.B. Jansen and L. Stone, "Education and Modernization in Japan and England," Comparative Studies in Society and History, The Hague, Vol. 9, No. 2.
11 Claude Lévi-Strauss, "Dynamique culturelle et valeurs," Approches de la science du développement socio-économique, Paris, 1971, pp. 282-284. "Europe at the beginning of the Renaissance was a place of encounter and fusion of the most varied influences. On the contrary, cultural contacts in pre-Columbian America were very limited. As a consequence, it accumulated fewer ‘behavior models,' 'Lacunae' were produced in its development, and because of this it was unable to respond to the challenge of the Spanish invaders. The disposition to progress is ordered by the ‘form of community' (the ‘way of being together’). ‘Cumulative history… is the historical form characteristic of those social super-organisms that make up social groups, while stationary history… is the sign of the inferior type of life that is that of solitary societies."
12 The expression is that of L.N. Gumilev. According to him, the movements that caused history to advance are the doing of impassioned natures, passionarii. Men who follow them group themselves into consortii (as in marriages for love). In time, passion is extinguished, and the consortii are transformed into convixii, which are maintained only through inertia—until the next flare up of passion. This concept is well applied to the birth and decadence of tribal unions or to the expeditions of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, but it does not explain why the barbarian passionarii succumbed to the passionless world of the subecumenical cultures. See L.N. Gumilev, "Etnognez i etnosfera," Priroda, Moscow, 1970, Nos. 1 and 2; M.I. Zand, Chest Viekov Slavy, Moscow, 1968.
13 It happens, however, that filial civilizations forget their cultural affiliation, as was the case with the Aryans in India, with the Chinese and with the Byzantines.
14 This complex is visible in today's Japan and is expressed in its relations with China.
15 Here we include Russia.
16 Japan, Viet-Nam and Korea are quite dynamic.
17 It dispersed the Mongol fleet.
18 From which may be inferred both Chinese wisdom and Indo-Buddhist wisdom.