Abstract
Psychiatrist Stuart Grassian has proposed the term “SHU syndrome” to name the cluster of cognitive, perceptual and affective symptoms that commonly arise for inmates held in the Special Housing Units (SHU) of supermax prisons. In this paper, I analyze the harm of solitary confinement from a phenomenological perspective by drawing on Husserl’s account of the essential relation between consciousness, the experience of an alter ego and the sense of a real, Objective world. While Husserl’s prioritization of transcendental subjectivity over transcendental intersubjectivity underestimates the degree to which first-person consciousness is constitutively intertwined with the embodied consciousness of others, Husserl’s phenomenology nevertheless provides a fruitful starting-point for a philosophical engagement with the psychiatric research on solitary confinement.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For the purposes of this enquiry, I have bracketed out the reasons why an inmate might end up in supermax confinement, but it is important to note that there are many different paths to the SHU, including possession of contraband, suspected membership in a gang, and protection against threats of violence from other inmates. African-American and Latino inmates are over-represented in supermax units, in part because of policies concerning perceived gang membership, and mentally ill or developmentally-disabled inmates are also overrepresented due to “behavioral” differences that are interpreted as misbehavior (Haney 2003: 127; Arrigo and Bullock 2008: 633). Once an inmate has landed in SHU, it can be extremely difficult to get back into the general prison population; cases are reviewed internally by prison administration, and even a minor infringement of prison rules can result in further isolation.
See Libby v. Comm’r of Corr., 432 N.E.2d 486 (Mass. 1982). The court ruled that the conditions in Block 10 “did not offend the Eighth Amendment because its inmates were provided adequate food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and communication with others” (Libby, 385 Mass. at 431–432). See Dayan’s (2005) critique of the way cases claiming “cruel and unusual punishment” have for the most part worked against the interests of prisoners rather than protecting them. If the context of Grassian’s research raises any doubts about its scientific neutrality, these doubts should be allayed by the consistency of his research with nearly every study of the psychological effects of solitary confinement. See Kupers (1999), Haney and Lynch (1997), Haney (2003). A dissenting voice in this literature comes from Bonta and Gendreau (1990), Canadian researchers who argue that while there is clinical evidence for the detrimental effects of long-term solitary confinement, there are few, if any, negative effects produced by solitary confinement under 10 days; but Bonta and Gendreau’s research has been criticized for relying on evidence from voluntary solitary confinement rather than coerced solitude in prison. I have chosen to focus on Grassian’s research in particular because he offers the most extensive and detailed reports of prisoners’ first-person testimony.
The effects of prolonged solitary confinement overlap to a great degree with the effects of sensory deprivation (see Heron et al. 1956). It seems significant that the intensity of SHU syndrome at Walpole Penitentiary increased dramatically after the steel doors were shut, and the minimal stimulation of light, air and a view to the outside, was eliminated. In this paper, I focus on the importance of a bodily relation to others for constituting and sustaining a sense of Objective reality, but a further phenomenological exploration of the connection between sensory deprivation and solitary confinement is clearly warranted.
I will focus in particular on the cluster of cognitive and perceptual symptoms in SHU Syndrome, temporarily bracketing the affective symptoms such as anxiety, panic, obsession and paranoia. While these affective symptoms are extremely important, and while a full exploration of their interrelation with the cognitive and perceptual effects is my ultimate aim, I focus on Husserl for this preliminary phenomenological investigation of solitary confinement both to provide a groundwork for further work and also because his insights into the relations between self, other and world are exemplary in their clarity and sophistication. The work of phenomenologists such as Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre would be better suited than Husserl to teach us about the affective dimensions of SHU syndrome.
“[T]hat is to say: I obviously cannot have the “alien” or “other” as experience, and therefore cannot have the sense “Objective world” as an experiential sense, without having this stratum in actual experience; whereas the reverse is not the case” (Husserl 1991: 96).
Later in Cartesian Meditations, he calls this proto-world of the solitary subject “the first, the “immanent” world,” while the Objective world is “”secondarily” constituted” (Husserl 1991: 134).
For a perceptive reading of prison memoirs in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment, see Doyle (2006).
Of course, once the sense of other egos has been constituted, I can have relationships with others whom I never meet in person, who are accessible to me only through words or images, but Husserl’s point is that the basic sense of “alter ego” or another person is constituted through bodily relations. My question is: Can this sense be maintained indefinitely without the support of regular, concrete experiences of other embodied consciousnesses, or does it dissolve to some degree through prolonged solitary confinement?
References
Arrigo, B. A., & Bullock, J. L. (2008). The psychological effects of solitary confinement on prisoners in Supermax units: Reviewing what we know and recommending what should change. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 52, 6(December), 622–640.
Bonta, J., & Gendreau, P. (1990). Reexamining the cruel and unusual punishment of prison life. Law and Human Behavior, 14, 347–366.
Dayan, C. (2005). Cruel and unusual: The end of the eighth amendment. Boston Review: A Political and Literary Forum (October/November) at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.5/dayan.html. Accessed 22 September 2009.
Doyle, L. (2006). Bodies inside/out: Violation and resistance from the prison cell to The Bluest Eye. In Dorothea, O., & Weiss G. (Ed.), Feminist interpretations of maurice merleau-ponty. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press.
Grassian, S. (1983). Psychopathological effects of solitary confinement. American Journal of Psychiatry, 140(11), 1450–1454.
Grassian, S. (2006). Psychiatric effects of solitary confinement. Journal of Law & Policy, 22, 325–383.
Haney, C. (2003). Mental health issues in long-term solitary and “supermax” confinement. Crime & Delinquency, 49, 124–156.
Haney, C., & Lynch, M. (1997). Regulating prisons of the future: A psychological analysis of Supermax and solitary confinement. New York University School of Law Review of Law and Social Change, 23(4), 477–570.
Hermberg, K. (2006). Husserl’s phenomenology: Knowledge, objectivity and others. London: Continuum.
Heron, W., Doane, B. K., & Scott, T. H. (1956). Visual disturbances after prolonged perceptual isolation. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 10(1), 13–18.
Husserl, Edmund. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology: An introduction to phenomenological philosophy (trans: Carr, D.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, Edmund. (1973). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlass (Vol. 13–15). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, Edmund. (1989). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: Second Book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution (trans: Rojcewicz, R. & Schuwer, A.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserl, Edmund. (1991). Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology [CM] (trans: Cairns, D.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
King, R. (2010). Experience: I spent 29 years in solitary confinement. http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2010/aug/28/29-years-solitary-confinement-robert-king.
Kupers, T. (1999). Prison madness: The mental health crisis behind bars and what we must do about it. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1986). Phenomenology of perception (Trans. C. Smith). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Sumell, J., & Wallace,H. (2006). The house that herman built. Stuttgart: Merz & Solitude.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Guenther, L. Subjects Without a World? An Husserlian Analysis of Solitary Confinement. Hum Stud 34, 257–276 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-011-9182-0
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-011-9182-0