“QUEI DUE CHE ’NSIEME VANNO”. IDEE PER UN’ONTOLOGIA DELLA RELAZIONE

Abstract

The “activities” of a subject, like – for Barack Obama – being the 44th President of the United States or being married to Michelle and being the father of Malia and Sasha, seem to be definable ontologically as indispensable dispensabilities. It cannot be denied that Obama would be who he is even if he had done another job or had met another woman, yet there are reasons of the heart that make this result difficult to accept. Considering the theory of relationships of Duns Scotus, the author proposes a double device of inscription/ascription, such as at least to cast doubt on the two following affirmations:
T1 It is the same thing to be Barack Obama and to be the son of his parents, born in Honolulu in August 1961
T2 It is not the same thing to be Barack Obama and to be married to Michelle.
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