
THE STRUCTURE OF A METAPHYSICAL
INTERPRETATION OF SCIENCE OF HISTORY

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this research is to reconstruct a metaphysical interpretation of the philosophy of history with regard to the spirit of historical thinking. The spirit of historical thinking is to emphasize the relation between what happened in the past and historical thinking about the past in the present. However, current philosophies of history, which are largely epistemologically oriented, have not adequately explored this relation. In order to investigate the relation between past and present, I refer to an Aristotelian philosophy of practice and politics, and adapt it to the domain of the philosophy of history, and argue the case for a metaphysical science of history. A metaphysical science of history contains two primary parts. They are the part on *physis* and the part on *technê/phronēsis*. With regard to *physis* that metaphysically investigates the natural generating progress of entities, I argue that the existence of historical events can be understood as a natural developing progress in which the events are ordered in a chronological sequence. Such chronological sequence is essentially the *physis* of history in the metaphysical sense (I characterize it as '*Ordnungszeit*'). For the part on *technê/phronēsis*, I demonstrate that Aristotelian knowing is for itself an action of knowing, which is located beyond a given temporal position in the past to both the past and the thinking present, and indicates the fundamental Beingness of history (I characterize it as '*Geschehenszeit*'). Finally I conclude that the historical *eudaimonia*, namely the pursuing of the completeness of historical knowledge, is the final presentation of actualizing *Geschehenszeit*, as it bridges the past and the present in accordance to the spirit of historical thinking.



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Chapter 1 – The spirit of historical thinking, and epistemological historicization

The philosophy of history studies not the subject matter of historical thinking, or even the meaning of historical thinking, but the activity of historical thinking and the reason for it. Therefore, the philosophy of history is distinct from historiography and the history of historiography. The philosophy of history is a philosophy, as philosophy is originally about the most fundamental reasons for the world and human beings.

1.1 Different levels of the spirit of historical thinking.

When we study a history, what are we actually doing? Are we discussing things that happened in the past and regarding them as the subject matter of a certain discipline named 'history'? Are we considering the so-called 'historical thinking' as a mental activity involving particular cases in the past? More fundamentally, are we equating 'historical' with 'temporal' events since both are used to describe the happened status in the past that may be distinguished from the happening status in the present, which indicates a change from where we were to where we are. This kind of question can be referred to a debate about the fundamental method of such 'historical' investigations, and even about the fundamental judgement on the nature of the 'historical' itself, and leads us into the realm of **the essential spirit of historical thinking**. This theme may be discussed depending on the extent of the ontological presuppositions of construing the knowing and the meanings of or in history. Saying 'historical thinking' rather than 'philosophy of history' or 'historiography', in this introductory section, regarding the general aim of the thesis, indicates that I am going to discuss the spirit of historical thinking in the broadest sense, which relates to its fundamental relation to philosophy. 'Spirit', though somehow is easy to misuse or misunderstand as a characterized abstractness of a given period of time or era (like the famous '*Zeitgeist*' (time spirit)), is still an appropriate characterizing term to describe the common or universal existence of our mental world in a non-temporal or atemporal sense, though of course it is also possible to relate to time. By discussing the 'spirit' of historical thinking, I attempt to sketch the perspective, or the 'form', of our

mental concentration when we and our ancestors think of the 'thinking' activity in regard to historical knowledge, and we will see it indeed essentially relates to time, though the 'spirit' of historical thinking for itself is independent from time but synchronizes with thinking.

Regarding the relevance of history to philosophy, nearly seventy years ago, Karl Löwith offered his famous argument on the spirit of historical thinking:

The historical consciousness cannot but start with itself, though its aim is to know the thought of other times and other men, different from our times and ourselves. History has time and again to be recovered and rediscovered by the living generations. We understand – and misunderstand – ancient authors, but always in the light of contemporary thought, reading the book of history backward from the last to the first page. (Löwith, 1949, p.2)

In my view, this argument perfectly describes how the spirit of historical thinking can be generally grasped as **bridging the gap between the past and the present, and between the historical happened and contemporary thinking about what happened.** Similar to Löwith's argument focusing on bridging the gap between the past and the present, Eric Voegelin also claimed that the historical dimension "was not a piece of 'past history' but the permanent presence of the process of reality in which man participates with his conscious existence" (Voegelin, 1978, p.10), though I think that both these arguments need further demonstration, especially in responding to those already-given and still-in-development in modern and contemporary philosophies of history.

However, different interpretations of historical thinking may be derived from different interpretations of the significant aim and character of philosophy. For example, one of the most famous characteristics of philosophy indicates that philosophy – irrespective of whether it is being differentiated as many disciplines – naturally investigates things in a historical way, and, conversely, history is naturally concerned as a constituent of philosophy. Considering the relation between philosophy and history in the broadest sense,¹ I think the spirit of historical thinking has at least three different levels.

¹ On this theme, anyone cannot ignore Voegelin's work, 'Eternal Being in Time', in which he examined history not as a given object of analysis but as four relations with philosophy. Voegelin, 1978, p.116. Besides, I agree with Louis O. Mink's comment on Voegelin that Voegelin finally

These levels can be regarded as three different highlights given by 'philosophy of history' since they discuss the nature of history in a philosophical way, but it is not unacceptable that we may resist calling them 'philosophy of history' since they discuss history beyond the modern and contemporary form, namely, the form as a differentiated discipline. However, it is this paradox that presents the predicament of investigating the relation between history and philosophy, that is, as far as we see history not as a given object to analyse but as a world of reality in which philosophy also participates and where we are living with the relations between history and philosophy. It could be hard for us to stand to one side and investigate another, though this could make the investigation easier since this is the way we always do in the non-mental and material sciences. Even though, I still try to clarify the basic characters of these levels of the spirit, since these different but mutual relevant levels of the spirit of historical thinking may essentially have an impact on, and even may fundamentally determine, the nature of the philosophy of history – as a differentiated discipline.

The first level of the spirit regards history as, though not the essence, the necessary way of philosophical thinking. For philosophers like Plato, the task of philosophy is to experience the tension between the poles of temporal mortals and eternal immortal² being. In the process in which the temporal mortals attempt to experience the eternal being, the mortals transform their material existence into the spiritual existence, in which the field of history emerges, since the mortal beings – generation by generation – naturally expand the experience of things to the field of a temporal dimension by constructing the antecedent-succeeded relation in time. This field, in the form of a temporal process, is the history of man's existence, which is constituted

abandoned his original scheme on a linear developmental interpretation of Western history and believed that any unitary interpretation of history is intractable, though I also think that we should distinguish two activities in the similar name of philosophy of history, that is, the one in which we investigate the principles of a science that concerns history, and the one in which we investigate the possible meanings of history itself rather than the way we concern history. See Mink, 'Is Speculative Philosophy of History Possible?', in Pompa, L. and W. H. Dray ed., *Substance and Form in History: A Collection of Essays in Philosophy of History*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981, 107.

² In this research, this pair of terms, the mortal and the immortal, should not be endowed with any theological meaning like the divine and the evil; rather, it is referred to describe the traditional philosophical tension between human's own existence and consciousness and a greater world the order of which is without human's interference. For philosophers like Plato, this tension is synchronized with a smaller tension between human's body and soul, which further indicates that only can soul approach the eternal existence beyond the temporal existence.

by philosophy. In this sense, a philosophy is naturally and essentially a philosophy of history, just like that influential one which claims that a philosophy is naturally and essentially a political philosophy (Strauss, 1976). Indeed, the fundamental sense of the aim of philosophy (for example, Plato's philosophy) presents its characters in both these ways, since it really discusses the basic nature of human beings – as both temporal mortal beings and mutually supported public beings. It can even be argued that this sense will result in the view that philosophy is history and history is philosophy, and there is no 'relationship' between them, since a relationship requires at least two differentiated things. This level of the spirit of historical thinking has appeared many times in different philosophies, irrespective of whether they refer to philosophy in a general or pure sense, or the philosophy of history as a differentiated discipline. But a conclusive example which clearly explicates this spirit without any other interpretation may be Plato and his *Gorgias* and *Symposium*. Somehow, we can also list St. Augustine for his work harmonizing the past and the future, and of harmonizing historical mortals and holy immortals; however, strictly speaking, the Christian tradition or the Roman world provides only a new form of ordering the human world, rather than a totally new spirit that separates philosophy from history.

The second level of the spirit indicates the differentiated disciplines. In one way, it may succeed the first level in the sense that it still resists the objectivization of history (done by the third level) and insists on the philosophical experiencing of history; however, it goes further in that it attempts to structuralize the experience and establish an intellectual process of history from the past to the present, and then, probably, to the future. This process of history is initially not the same as the one from the temporal mortals to the eternal being in the first level, but it gradually sets up an intellectual analogue upon the first one. The knowledge of the real world is divided into pieces by identifying the temporal before and the temporal after, or by identifying different domains of the subject-matters of research, so that the knowledge can be operated in the form of intellectual structuralization. Though it does not reach the extent of objectivization, since it still serves the holistic aim of human beings themselves rather than objects, it does result in the independence of history as one differentiated

philosophy (*epistêmê*) which is parallel to other philosophies (*epistêmai*), rather than as a general sense philosophy. Many examples of this level can be offered, but one of them, that of Aristotle, is more remarkable, not only because of Aristotle's teleological interpretation of ethical life (which may further indicate a historical life), but also, even more significantly, because of his constructions of the **differentiated disciplines**, which make the knowledge of real world **analysable** by soul for the first time, rather than merely **sensible** by soul for Plato.

The third spirit presents historical thinking in a modern form of 'philosophy of history', which totally inherits and **enhances the principle of the differentiated disciplines**. This enhancement shows that, no matter how we persist with 'historical' as a necessary way of philosophical thinking itself, 'history' inevitably becomes the objective subject matter of philosophical thinking, and, conversely, the philosophical thinking of history, even the term 'philosophy of history' becomes an approach of objectivization. Indeed, this objectivization scheme has many forms and sometimes does not explicitly regard history as a clear subject-matter for philosophical research (and in the form of philosophical research). However, it spiritually changes the task of philosophy, so that the equivalence between history and philosophy in the first level, which denotes that the field of history is recognized as the tension between the mortal and the eternal itself, cannot be adopted any longer. History as a notion is interpreted for the aim of other demonstrations of notions, which often come from political philosophy, especially in the case that a political idea is recovered and rediscovered by generations in the light of each generation's contemporary concerns, which makes the notion of history nothing more than an equivalent of 'development'. For example, for Hegel (in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*), world history is essentially a development of the notion of freedom in which freedom realises itself. This spirit also affects Marx's philosophy of history (in his *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* and *Communist Manifesto*) in the sense that the historical movement is the constituent of a progressive political movement toward communism.

Most of modern and contemporary philosophies of history are exemplifications of the third level of the spirit of historical thinking. Though there are some traces or sections

presenting a concern which indicate something of the first level, however their main does not present their final aims this way. Philosophical thinking, for them, is not as high as in the first level of the spirit, which investigates the tension between temporal mortals and eternal being; rather, it practically, even pragmatically, is concerned merely with the critical nature of the thinking, which reversely makes philosophy merely a method of critical thinking rather than the bridge between the human and the holy. This means that for these philosophies, what is important is not the graceful tension existing in the historical and philosophical forms, but the subjectivism *ego* thinking of historical objects (which I will later characterize as ‘epistemological historicization’). Indeed, this is not to say that the third level of historical thinking is full of mistakes; it does have a developed philosophy of history and increases (but does not improve) our understandings of history. But do we have any other options of the philosophy of history?

This research aims to reconstruct the outlines of the philosophy of history in accordance with the spirit of historical thinking in the sense of a harmonized synthetic result of the first, the second, and even the third levels, that is – just as Löwith argued – focusing on **the relation between historical events in the temporal past and historical thinking in the temporal present**. In this research, I will mainly argue that the tension between the past and the present is the significance that most current philosophies of history have attempted unsuccessfully to clarify, since this is the task for the first and the second level, whereas they are constructed in the third level. This tension between the past and the present will lead the ‘science of history’ (my term to denote a metaphysical philosophy of history) to generate its own essence.

To demonstrate this, I will firstly outline a background of dominant philosophies of history (in the narrow sense as a differentiated discipline) from the modern birth to the contemporary fruits, and will present some of the epistemological characteristics, so that the case for the need for a metaphysical alternative of the philosophy of history can be offered (Chapter 1, from Section 1.3). I will then claim that the metaphysical alternative, the ‘science of history’, contains two primary parts, which may relate to the significance of the essence of history, namely, the part on the *physis* of history and the part on the *phronēsis* and *technē* of history (Chapter 2). For the first part on the *physis* of history, I will

show that the order among historical events performs a chronological nature of history (I call it '*Ordnungszeit*') in the sense that historical events develop into a science of history according to the temporal antecedent-succeed sequence, and that this nature metaphysically conducts the development from historical events to the science of history as the development from material cause to formal end cause (*telos*). But this interpretation of the *physis* of history shall be transformed into an interpretation ('*Geschehenszeit*') about the fundamental Being of history and the function of such a Being, which calls for the second part on the *phronēsis* and *technē* of history (Chapter 3). For the second part, I will argue that to understand the Being and the function of history, we must expand the original ethical philosophy on knowing to a range of historical dimensions. To achieve that, I will suggest that historical knowing is for itself an action of knowing ('historical deliberation'), which is located beyond a given temporal position in the past to include both the past and the present thinking. This demonstration will refer to some traditional notions like *eudaimonia* and deliberation, and also to *poiesis and praxis*; however, all notions like these will be reinterpreted in a historical dimension and regarding the temporal tension between the past and the present. This process may complete the whole perspective of actualizing *Geschehenszeit* (Chapter 4). Finally, I will conclude this whole perspective from *Ordnungszeit* to *Geschehenszeit* as the fundamental logic of the science of history (Chapter 5).

1.2 On the general method of this research.

Before outlining the perspective of epistemological historicization, I would like to discuss further the method of this research. What kind of method can be appropriately applied to the philosophy of history in that it investigates the essential characters of itself as a whole rather than of its contents? Actually, regarding the 'research method', what we really presuppose is not an internal method of an individual discipline that may be called 'the method of researching the philosophy of history', but a 'general' method that may also be applied to other disciplines and which concerns their themes in a 'philosophical' way as well. For example, a research method in the realm of political philosophy (and history of political thought) may also be adopted into the philosophy of history, since both

political philosophy and the philosophy of history in the broad sense – in their first spirit – correspond to the approach of focusing on the tension between the temporal and the immortal, which reversely makes both disciplines deal with their own themes in a common ‘philosophical’ way. What I am going to clarify is based on this sense. (There is another reason for the homogeneity between political philosophy and the philosophy of history, that is, the fact that these two disciplines are all the practical sciences which are conducted by a general, universal ‘theoretical science’, namely, metaphysics. This is a very significant argument in this research in the sense that it supports the metaphysical structure of the essential nature of the philosophy of history, and it will be demonstrated thoroughly in Chapters 2 to 5.) Therefore, I will next offer some contemporary examples of different kinds of research methods which have already been mainly adopted by political philosophy and the intellectual history of political thought. Some kinds of these methods are not completely concerned with the philosophy of history, but the philosophy of history – if we do not limit its boundary and its depth – may be reconsidered with these kinds of methods.

(1) Systematically philosophical: By using ‘philosophical’ in the sense of referring to a ‘system’, this kind of research demonstrates the internal logics inside a philosopher’s work or set of works that denotes a complete philosophical system, which further presents the normative values and inspirations, or mistakes and misunderstandings of this work (*e.g.*, John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*).

(2) Hermeneutically philosophical: A hermeneutical research also attempts to investigate the self-compatibility of a philosophical work, but it focuses more on the ‘real’ meanings under texts, and does not pursue the systematic construction. (*e.g.*, Leo Strauss, *The City and Man*)

The two kinds of method above are the ones mainly adopted in this research. To establish a metaphysical interpretation of the ‘science of history’, I will thoroughly discuss the essential characters, contents, and structure of ‘metaphysics’ by hermeneutically referring to Aristotle’s philosophy, in the sense of both the special terms and the whole philosophical system. Somehow, it can be said that these two methods – as being widely practised in the realm of political philosophy and the history of political thought – have

already been practised from the modern birth of the philosophy of history, the most famous example being Hegel's philosophy of history. However, if I may argue again, the significance of the spirit of the philosophy of history is greater than the choice and practice of certain methods (which shows that, in philosophical research, the methodology fundamentally serves the significant argument). Hence, in this sense, it is necessary for us to reinvestigate the spirit of not only Hegel, but also of all the given philosophies of history, so that we can continually discuss whether we need a metaphysical alternative and how we achieve that.

There are some other methods applied in political philosophy. They are probably adopted into the philosophy of history since they investigate concepts and thoughts beyond the limitation of differentiated disciplines. In this research, I will also adopt some of these methods in particular demonstrations, but I will not view them as the basic and fundamental method of this research, since it is hard to say that the studies applying these methods can lead what I argue about the spirit of the philosophy of history to a holistic view that responds to the enquiry on the essence of historical thinking and its relevance to philosophy. As we will see, some of the examples of these methods attempt to pursue the accuracy *de facto* of the formation of a notion, and some present a character critical of the so-called *de facto*, both of which, for me, are beneficial for increasing the knowledge and the understandings of history (if they are adopted into the philosophy of history). However, they are still inadequate as they fail to provide a systematic interpretation of historical thinking.

- (3) Conceptual: A conceptual work analyses the relevance and mutual communication between texts by which the development of a certain concept of an idea can be clarified (*e.g.*, Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*).
- (4) Cultural: Cultural research regards the change of thought as a part of the change of the social culture (but the former is not definitely the result of the latter) (*e.g.*, Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History*).
- (5) Ideological: This kind of research focuses on the social position and the class background of a philosopher, and criticizes the ideological features of his or her

thought (e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*).

Indeed, not only in this research, but in all similar studies, these methods (and those unlisted) can be used in a synthetic form. Some works combine the contextual method and a kind of the biographical method (like O'Sullivan's research on Oakeshott), and some integrate the cultural into the ideological. Even the first two philosophical works are concerned with the others in particular cases. These methods indicate restricted principles neither of a differentiated discipline, nor of general principles across disciplines.

Besides, some could argue that I have not listed analytic philosophy as a method. In my opinion, especially in this research, wherein the philosophy of history is discussed in a contemporary context, analytic philosophy is regarded neither as a method that is in parallel with other methods, nor as a special tradition that comes from and embodies the specifically philosophical trait from Wittgenstein to logical positivists, which can be described as traditional foundationalism (in Charles Taylor's words) that claims the rigorous logic of language as a foundation. Contemporary analytic philosophy, which has been widely accepted in divergent philosophical themes, is regarded as an emphasis on the rigorous logic of basic concepts involved in the demonstration of philosophical argument. In this sense, any philosophical work that investigates the presupposition of a certain argument before directly entering into the argument is somehow analytic, since it will inevitably examine the logical chain of the conditions – in the most rigorous sense that concerns the issues of whether it can be known and of how it can be known – of the possibility of the argument. Also, this is the reason that contemporary philosophies of history are given in a form of normative philosophy. Therefore, as will be seen below, although I will examine the tradition of a debate between 'speculative theory' and 'analytic/critical theory', I doubt whether the name 'analytic/critical theory' is appropriate, since even the 'speculative theory' somehow refers to the analytic method and position in the sense that it investigates the rigorous condition of historical thinking to a certain extent. Analytic philosophy has kept and will continue to keep the diversity of its applicability, however, due to which it goes beyond a specific method, but becomes

instead a general and basic principal requirement of philosophical research.

1.3 A short introduction to epistemological historicization.

I will now outline a perspective of epistemological historicization as a preliminary explanation of the need for a metaphysical reconstruction of the philosophy of history. The rest of this chapter illustrates an epistemological nature of (some representatives of) the philosophies of history from Hegel to contemporary theories. This epistemological nature accompanies the birth, the development, and the peak of philosophies of history, and essentially, corresponds to the **third** level of understanding of the spirit of historical thinking, that is, the objectivization of history, as the epistemological objective of a subjective *ego*. As I have argued, this means that no matter how we persist in viewing 'historical' as an essential character of philosophy (as Collingwood and Oakeshott attempted to argue), it inevitably becomes the object of philosophical thinking, rather than the harmonizing of philosophical experiences of the tension between the temporal and the immortal. Giving the conclusion firstly, epistemological historicization is successful since it has deepened people's understanding of historical knowledge; however, it is not enough – in terms of the lack of systematic explanation – to respond some certain intrinsic, original, and accompanied-with-philosophy concerns about the nature of history and historical thinking, the latter of which consists of the essence of philosophy of history.

Though some efforts against the epistemological tendency (like Rorty's historical pragmatism and Ankersmit's attempt to revive the historical experience) have been discussed thoroughly and are still influential in the academic research on historical thinking, the limitations led by epistemological historicization have not been characterized as a clear set of notions or a kind of descriptions of current philosophies of history. A possible reason for this ignorance could be the inappropriate relation between 'pure philosophy' and 'philosophy of history' as two differentiated and even totally separate disciplines. For example, Rorty offered a plausible demonstration of the characters of a Cartesian epistemology within modern philosophy (Rorty, 1980), which, however, has not been explicitly adopted into any analysis of the epistemological

path-dependence of philosophies of history from past to contemporary times. Indeed, Rorty regarded his anti-epistemology work – in the domain of ‘pure’ philosophy – as a ‘historical’ work, which is similar to, in his words, Wittgenstein’s or Heidegger’s attempt that somehow succeeds in the spirit of regarding philosophy as a historical work and *vice versa* (Rorty, 1980, pp.9-10). But it is inevitably noticed that the demonstration at the level of pure philosophy – no matter how successful it is in terms of reminding us where the current philosophies come from – is still too general to introduce the perspectives of philosophies of history: by simply referring to the critiques against the epistemology at the level of pure philosophy, philosophers of history (remember that most of them are theorists thinking about their own themes inside the differentiated and even separated discipline called ‘philosophy of history’) cannot naturally provide a description of epistemological historicization; rather, they may push the side of ‘pure philosophy’ further away since it is no help in increasing historical knowledge. Some of them may notice, then debate, and then hold discussions, but they will always be temporally later than the discussions of a ‘pure philosophy’, since they believe the implicit claim of the secondary role of the philosophy of history in the intellectual hierarchy.

But as far as we are going to consider what has already happened to philosophies of history, following the thinking logics of philosophers of history, we should grasp the characters of epistemological historicization within the current philosophies of history, rather than establishing the structural interpretation of the relation between history and philosophy directly, though the latter is the final aim of this research. We should move step by step.

Firstly, I should clarify the meaning of the term ‘epistemology’. The significance of this term is derived not from the definition, but from the usage of it. Indeed, the usage may be expanded to contextual research about the history of different usages; here, I just grasp it in general and focus more on the modern Cartesian sense. Though ‘epistemology’ comes from Ancient Greek and means ‘to know’ (in the next chapter, I will explore its linguistic roots to clarify that the original meaning of this term is concerned more with the ‘science’ and the ‘knowledge’ in a systematic sense than with the subjectivism of knowing in the modern sense), in the modern and contemporary context of philosophy, it

has been referred to in the Cartesian tradition, from Descartes himself, to Kant and to the contemporary philosophies, even in works against epistemology (like Kant's transcendentalism overcoming Cartesian epistemology but still accepting the Cartesian literal meaning of it). In modern contexts, most epistemologists hold the view that the subjectivist *ego* as the knower should put him or herself outside both observed reality and the subject of knowledge, namely, his or her own featured characters. In this way, a neutral and undistorted human science (namely, the philosophy in modern contexts) could be possible, rather than the classic view like Plato's and Aristotle's view that philosophy deals with the nature of realities straightforwardly (though for them, it is merely the necessity but not the final task of philosophy). For Descartes, philosophers should abandon the classic ambiguous enterprises of subject-object interpenetration, since for him, an Aristotelian position, which may call for the universe of the *eidos* ('ideal form') of the subject and the object, cannot provide a firm foundation of the certain knowledge to distinguish the falsity from the truth, and the appearance from the reality. This view was even attacked by Kant, who focused not only on distinguishing the subject from the object but also on discovering the conditions for the subject to experience the objectively known. This epistemological principle has a great impact on Kant's masterpieces, as the transcendental *ego* characterizes the reality as experience bound together by transcendental rules, and thus relates as representations, which generate the peak of the whole developing progress of traditional epistemology. In short, epistemology has explored a long road concerned primarily with the fundamental inquires by which we ask how we come to know, rather than the traditional metaphysics that deals with the presuppositions of the activity of coming to know.

The traditional Cartesian epistemology soon after emerged in other fields, if we at least accept the given fact of the existence of differentiated disciplines. Though we could claim that the honour for this should go to Vico, who originally proposed a philosophy of history as a theory investigating the 'scientific' method of studying history,³ if we do not

³ For an introductory research on the pre-modern historical theorists, see Avis, 1986. Through the author's argument, we can see that, as the relative end of the former theorists, Vico's historical theory generated an initial form of modern philosophy of history in the sense that it attempted to achieve the 'pastness' of the past and thus the human nature in a historical dimension, though it did not accord to the modern account of the inquires and the characters of the philosophy of

include the historical writings in the ancient world, which gave rise to arguments on the purposes of writing, then we can see that a real internally coherent and systematic philosophical structure of history was established by Hegel. It was with this that the transcendental *ego* in pure epistemology was supplanted by a totally new scheme of **historicization**. This was a greater scheme than all the previous schemes of epistemological philosophy, since the subject of epistemology, the self-given and self-explained and thus self-responsible 'I' (irrespective of whether the 'I' is abstract or concrete), was for the first time integrated into a temporal absolute – though such so-called a temporal absolute was not connected to a real temporal process which expanded in time but only a logical meaning like a metaphor. Anyway, such a temporal absolute was symbolized finally as the spirit of humanity, and as the purposive end of epistemology, having been given the name 'history', and hence it allowed the purely epistemological enterprise to continue into and inside the historical approach.

Logically, I should move to introduce the definition of epistemological historicization. However, as any rigorous definition is essentially exclusive, attempting to give a definition is inappropriate for sketching the whole perspective of the **development** of epistemological historicization. Actually, epistemological historicization presents its characters differently, as these have varied from the early metaphorical meaning to the later analytical meaning and even to the post-modern 'no-meaning', and somehow have become a synthetic result of the above. These characters in general can be divided into at least three obvious waves of enhancement of epistemological historicization, that is, the wave of an **intellectualization tendency**, of **individualization**, and of **fragmentation**. Each of these three waves contains both the enhancement itself and the efforts against it: the theorists against epistemology unfortunately (at least, unfortunately for those who focus on the deep interaction and inter-abandonment between pure theoretical knowledge and a practical moral-social constitution, since the atomistic tendency brought by the traditional epistemology is still a contemporary problem for the political and social philosophy that aims to establish a preconditioned foundation of normative

history, namely, the epistemological concerns.

construction)⁴ have enhanced the epistemological character with the opposite attitude. The three waves together have promoted the third level understanding of the spirit of historical thinking in the sense that they have enhanced objectivization as the fundamental role of history, by which epistemological historicization moves itself, at least itself as a philosophy of history, further away from the synthetic spirit of historical thinking that focuses on **the relation between historical events in the temporal past and historical thinking in the temporal present.**⁵

1.4 The first wave: an intellectual beginning established by Hegel and Dilthey.

It may be a common view that our modern concept of history has come from specific historical accounts of social or political progress and regress, especially given that modern western civilization has developed ‘successful’ bourgeois constitutions to strengthen its unique modernity, which comprises most of the significant ideological elements – even they themselves were incoherent – and reorganizes them into an optimistic linear progress. However, beyond the simplified appearance of a ‘developmental’ history, modern philosophies of history have absorbed the spiritual nutrition from relatively earlier philosophies of history (even earlier than Hegel and Dilthey as the beginning of modern philosophy of history) – or, more precisely, philosophies of temporality in a historical form, which essentially affected the later, but actually the real beginning of modern philosophies of history. Different from the historical writings in ancient Greece or China, which have been regarded as merely simple ‘chronicles’ by modern historical theorists,⁶ some Christian philosophers, like St. Augustine, established a new foundation of historical thinking. It has been identified as having an essential distinction from other ‘chronicles’ by establishing structural theories

⁴ For example, see Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*, especially the former parts on the critique of utilitarianism and intuitionism as a theoretical preparation of the latter normative constructions.

⁵ Ironically, the holistic trend of the development of epistemological historicization is dialectical, which happens to be, to a certain degree, in accordance with Hegel’s original design of the philosophy of history: a retrospectively dialectic. Of course, for the later neo-Hegelianists, Hegel’s final end of world history has been abandoned, but generally speaking, even in recent decades, philosophers of history have still walked along a Hegelian path of epistemological historicization – like a metaphor rather than a science.

⁶ In the next chapter, I will clarify the difference between a common usage of ‘chronicle’ and my specific term ‘chronological (character)’. Here we do not need to refer that too much but just use as normal.

about **organizing or reorganizing historical events** in a wider temporal length, wider than the period of such historical events, and interpreting the organized events as aiming to achieve an end beyond themselves. This foundation in a fundamental sense gives rise to further investigations into the nature of historical knowledge, since it means that by using a historical structure – though later we will see it varies widely – historical events can be investigated as categorical kinds of previous formats, which thereby relate to the similarity to or the difference from another temporal situation that may include any other historical eras, and even the present situation, so that a universal character of historical knowledge may be inferred. In terms of organizing historical events fundamentally, historical structure in its broad sense must itself be exhibited in the presence of experience, since it essentially corresponds to the situation that the subjective knower understands. To this extent, it can be said that the philosophy of history – even in an immature form – is internally and intrinsically concerned with the first spirit of historical thinking. This is in line with what Koselleck has argued, that is, that “the historical declarations on temporality that Augustine made are not distinguished by their linear form and substantial determinations ... Augustine theologically articulated an internal experience of temporality which made it possible for him to relativize the entire domain of earthly experience” (Koselleck, 2004, p.100).

But the modern philosophy of history has its own origin from which it has developed its own characters, and this has affected the later philosophies of history in a fundamental sense rather than in the sense of Augustine’s principles as actually a part of divine providence. Here, two names have offered totally new – epistemological – theories on organizing and interpreting historical events: Hegel and Dilthey. Generally speaking, for the formation of the first wave of epistemological historicization, Dilthey’s epistemological philosophy on the historical consciousness gradually replaced Hegel’s metaphysical (in the sense of its structure), political (in the sense of its politicalized character), but also metaphorical (in the sense of its final form) Spirit of World History. This replacing was to some extent also accompanied with the academic conflict between people who supported the idealism of a philosophical interpretation of history, and who insisted on the empirical study of the experience of history. For the theorists of history

(not even specifically philosophers of history) who have sympathy with idealism philosophy, Ranke's principle of *Geschichtswissenschaft*, 'researching how things actually were', was more or less meaningless especially in confronting the problems of the empirical research of history. However, rather than the theorists in the second wave, who focused on the differentiating work between speculative theory and critical theory⁷ and who to a certain degree supported critical theory and held a strong position of pure epistemological inquiry into history, philosophers in the first wave, especially Hegel, were still under the shadow of traditional holism in pursuing a systematic condition of historical knowledge. In turn, this still led these philosophers to attempt to embed the philosophy of history into a complete philosophical system. For Hegel, a holism philosophy may result in a phenomenon whereby the difference between him and classical philosophers, like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, is smaller than the difference between him and the following philosophers in the 20th century. Though Hegel abandoned the traditional metaphysical inquiry on Beingness as the presupposition of knowing, and adopted the epistemological ones on knowing (as far as in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, he argued that the development of the consciousness is taken to reflect the subject's maturity of knowing), Hegel still attempted to harmonize the interpretation of a determinate form of history and the real experience reflected in different histories, the spirit of which was continued from the classical Christian philosophies. Not only Hegel, but both Hegel and Dilthey relied on a similar contemporary (for them) background in which many materialist historians and scholars of historiography began to discuss the presupposed conditions of historical science. Some proposed the possibility and means of so-called neutral scientific history and its methods, and some began to be concerned with the choice, or the conflict, but rarely with the harmonization between idealism and empiricism.

Generally, both Hegel and Dilthey attempted to harmonize these two sides; however, although Dilthey, to a certain degree successful in Hegel's recommendation to establish a relation between individual consciousness and worldwide history, did not follow Hegel's whole scheme on harmonization, but instead, selected some elements that could be

⁷ In this research, the 'critical theory' means the opposite of the 'speculative theory' rather than the critical Frankfurt schools.

critically expanded. Dilthey argued that there is meaning in history, Hegel that meaning is imposed on it retrospectively. In Dilthey's view, this pushed Hegel to the extreme side of pure idealism. This could be an important reason why it is Dilthey rather than Hegel who led the harmonization between idealism and empiricism to the first peak of epistemological historicization, though without Hegel, this approach is incomplete.

1.4.1 Hegel's epistemological tendency in his philosophy of history.

The important thing to remember here is that Hegel's view of philosophy is encapsulated in his famous quote regarding the owl of Minerva, and also in the *Lectures on the philosophy of history* regarding the elimination of contingency. Hegel's 'speculative' philosophy of history as a whole is **not** an epistemology, but indeed has an epistemological tendency on particular demonstrations. If we may put textual disputes aside and just focus on a prevailing version of Hegel's *Reason in History* (known as the introduction of *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*),⁸ we quickly grasp a viable epistemological basis for harmonizing historical experience and traditional idealism. This epistemological foundation is established upon, as he argued, the 'characters' that a historian should have, rather than the well-known metaphoric World Spirit as the result of the foundation and the following deductions. These 'characters' focus especially on the relation between the historian and the events which he or she writes about. To demonstrate their impact on the epistemological tendency, I am going to expand this theme on two levels. The first one will investigate the general aim of Hegel's philosophy of history, and the second one will be about his specific demonstrations of these characters in the philosophy of history.

Firstly, if I were required to sum up the basic character of Hegel's philosophy of history in one sentence, I would say that his philosophy of history aims to sketch a **developmental** perspective of the notion of freedom and the principle of it in which freedom has realized itself. It is not difficult to illustrate a certain similarity between his

⁸ Hegel, 1970. The introduction of it is also titled as *Reason in History*. Some good English translations are: *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, H. B. Nisbet transl., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975; *Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, R. S. Hartman transl., Indianapolis, 1953; *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, J. Sibree transl., New York, 1944. More explanations on the textual problems can be seen in George D. O'Brien, 1971, p.301.

scheme and the Christian interpretation of history, especially since both integrate earthly historical events in a developmental order aiming towards a relatively enclosed end. For Christians, the final redemption is in the 'future' (in both the temporal and the historical/theological sense), while for Hegel, it is the self-realization of freedom (in both the historical and the political sense). Hegel's sketch of an outline of such a development is, apparently, based upon a transition from the oriental civilizations to the western civilizations. He never attempted to write a chronicle or a 'real' history of the notion of freedom. The meaning of 'developmental' is not equivalent to 'teleological'. On these terms, I agree with Goldstein's argument that teleology means 'the end is contained in the beginning', whereas developmental merely describes the general trend that, in Hegel's case, every moment of philosophical history has its own integrity, which is affected by the previous moment (Goldstein, 1981, p.42).⁹ Hegel never claimed that the initial beginning of so-called freedom, like the emperor in ancient China who is the only one who has freedom (according to his words), has already contained the fundamental principles of the universal process of the notion of freedom. The antecedent-succeeded mutual relevance of each stage demonstrates that rather than any linear necessity, a character of contingency, which makes the end – the modern notion of freedom – is never contained in the beginning.

Therefore, for Hegel, the first difficulty after claiming the modern meaning of the notion of freedom by reconstructing the philosophy of history is that if he attempted to clarify what freedom had become and what it is now, and more importantly, why it must be what it is now, then he would have to overcome the contingency of history. He began from the modern, namely, his contemporary era, rather than the 'beginning of history', to investigate what can be included and what cannot, since rather than pursuing any material necessity, the demonstration of a notion (like the notion of freedom) is essentially making what happened and happens known **intellectually – by contemporary thought**. For him, overcoming the contingency of history does not mean explicating a possible trace inside history, but means elucidating the characters of the notion which is determined by the contingency of its history (Goldstein, 1981, pp.52-53

⁹ And this is also the reason that I refuse calling Aristotle's work as so, since the formal cause can be but also can be not contained in the material cause. Needless say Hegel.

and 55). History, in the sense of rendering the intellectual knowledge of what happened, is the **presenting** (rather than already-presented) status of the actualisation of a notion of what happened.

This fundamental featured aim of Hegel's philosophy of history, namely, rendering an intellectual demonstration of the notion of freedom, naturally requires the same kind of intellectualized constituent, rather than the so-called *de facto* materials, to support such a demonstration. This intellectualized constituent begins with the discussion of the character of historians in Hegel's words. In the first draft of the *Lectures*, Hegel claimed three different modes or stages of historical thinking/writing, that is, original history, reflective history, and philosophical history. On these modes and their meanings, especially on the difference between original history and reflective history, Hegel distinguished between the character of what an author examines and the character of what an author uses to describe what he or she examines, though this discrepancy is itself a developmental process, which means it is implicit in the first stage, that is, the original history. Speaking about the original history, Hegel stated that historians "have themselves witnessed, experienced and lived through the deeds, events and situations they describe, have themselves participated in these events and in the spirit which informed them" (Hegel, 1975, p.12). In this stage, the character of the historian and the character of the events (as the 'spirit' in his words) are overlapped. In this sense, though it might be the case that the writer misunderstands the spirit of the living era or distorts the 'truth' of what people experience, the historian's own intellectualized experience, including his subjectivism understanding of what happened and happens, even the misunderstandings and distortions, is the subject matter of historical thinking. This stage does not require a retrospective investigation on any specific history of notion, since the development of a notion is also overlapped by the presenting status of the notion itself. This stage, though in the name of 'original history', is a present tense of living experience and is thus difficult to regard as 'history' in the normal sense of referring to the past.

However, this overlapping subjectivism – and its convenience for historians – becomes impossible in reflective history, since reflective history

depicts not only what was present and alive in this or that age, but that which is

present in spirit, so that its object is in fact the past as a whole ... the most important thing about it is the way in which it treats the historical material, for the writer approaches it in his own spirit, which is different from the spirit of the object itself. (Hegel, 1975, p.16)

By establishing a developmental progress of historical thinking, he continued to explicate reflective history as a development from the universal form to the pragmatic form, then to the critical form, and finally, to the specialised form. Thus, Hegel distinguished the spirit of history as a fact in the past, or *res gestae*, and from the spirit of the historian who thinks and writes in the present, or *historia rerum gestarum*. This attempt to identify and then bridge the gap between past historical fact and present reflecting activity, in a form of a dialectical development, for Hegel, means continually aiming at the next stage of the philosophy of history, that is, the 'philosophical history', in which the World Spirit will be presented. Reflective history, which is located between original history and philosophical history, on the one hand, expands the temporal range of original history (in terms of discussing the situation whereby the historian may not be temporally inside the history investigated by him or her), and on the other hand, providing the preliminary foundation of philosophical history.

But for us, the significance of Hegel's scheme is specifically inside the progress of reflective history, rather than merely the broader progress from the original to the philosophical. In the dialectical development of reflective history, the epistemological tendency for the first time emerges accompanied by historical thinking. This tendency, as I mentioned above, is in a form of intellectualization. As one of the sub-forms of reflective history (the others are the universal form, the pragmatic form, and the specialised form), the critical form concerns the philosophy of history in a similar way to the latter-days of critical theorists of history, which is the way that regards the subjectively knowing capacity of historical knowledge as the basic and core significant enquiry of the philosophy of history, rather than the enquiry of the essence or the reality of historical knowledge (since they, the latter-day critical theorists of history, believed that the authenticity of the reality of history depends on the preconditioned subject's knowing). As Hegel himself argued, "[Critical history] does not constitute history as such [like

pragmatic history], but rather the **history of history**; it evaluates historical narratives and examines their authenticity and credibility” (Hegel, 1975, p.22).¹⁰ It should be emphasized that the critical form is not one of the options of reflective history, but is one of the necessary steps of reflective history. This means that without the subjectivism enquiry, in the critical form, into the activity of thinking in historical thinking, reflective history cannot complete itself and will fail to lead to the final philosophical history. The critical form of reflective history consists of a necessary stage of the whole dialectical retrospective progress, and makes it possible to investigate the whole being as a *Geisteswissenschaften* rather than a *Naturwissenschaften* – the former for its own term requires an epistemological self-investigation in an intellectual way.

Indeed, Hegel himself noticed the different meaning of ‘history’ referring to the happened past or the thinking present, and he made his choice by emphasizing its present status, namely, its subjectivism character, to support the final philosophical history. As he argued:

In our language, the word ‘history’ combines both objective and subjective meanings, for it denotes the *historia rerum gestarum* as well as the *res gestae* themselves, the historical narrative and the actual happenings, deeds, and events – which, in the stricter sense, are quite distinct from one another. But this conjunction of the two meanings should be recognised as belonging to a higher order than that of mere external contingency: we must in fact suppose that the writing of history and the actual deeds and events of history make their appearance simultaneously, and that they emerge together from a common source. (Hegel, 1975, p.135)

In this sense, “The [critical] historian must place subjective notions of interpretation in a framework of other historians’ thoughts in the course of historical writing” (O’Brien, 1971, p.310). The historian in the critical form of reflective history does not regard past actions as current objective subject matters of a historical study; instead, the critical historical study, on which the subjective principle has an impact, regards as the elements of historical study the intellectualized ideas and notions which are generated from the

¹⁰ Hartman adopts the translation ‘history of historiography’, which was not used by Hegel himself. The original text is “Es ist nicht die Geschichte selbst, welche hier vorgetragen wird, sondern eine **Geschichte der Geschichte** und eine Beurteilung der geschichtlichen Erzählungen und Untersuchung ihrer Wahrheit und Glaubwürdigkeit”, in Hegel, 1970, p.18.

abstracting activities of the history of the notions themselves, and thus forms Hegel's argument above, that is, the "history of history". Therefore, the end of Hegel's scheme of the philosophy of history, the philosophical history, in which the World Spirit will be presented, is necessarily an intellectualized result of the former processes of history. Historical knowledge in this final sense is the synthetic result of the self-epistemological knowledge, and thus is the actualization of the self-realization of the notion of freedom, since the self-epistemological knowledge is based on the intellectual presence of the individual's own will.

There is a more important impact of this epistemological principle in the form of an intellectual tendency. Hegel's new scheme of epistemological historicization opens the possibility of the third level understanding of the spirit of historical thinking, though he still attempted to concern historical thinking with the first two spirits by identifying the need to distinguish and then bridge the past and the present. By speaking of the 'possibility' of the third level in which a philosopher regards history as an objectivism subject matter of philosophical research, I mean that Hegel's own approach to the philosophy of history does not clearly explicate this essential character; rather, his philosophy of history, though as a differentiated discipline for himself, should still be examined as one of the parts of the whole philosophical system.¹¹ However, if we focus specifically on his philosophy of history rather than the whole system, we can easily discover, as I have argued above, that his understanding of history aims to support the demonstration of the self-realization of freedom. This is not a rigorous sense of the notion of historical thinking but rather a core notion of political philosophy, which, conversely, reduces the philosophy of history to a historical retrospective of a political notion, and further, a political philosophy. Though in the broadest sense of the first level of the spirit, I have argued that both political philosophy and the philosophy of history are essentially a philosophy investigating the tension between the temporal and the immortal; under the view of a political philosophy the final aim of which is demonstrating the uniqueness of the self-realization of our time's freedom. However, any enquiry on the essence of history has to become an approach of objectivization to meet the need of political

¹¹ Some may argue this system does not include *Philosophy of Right*. See Goldstein, 1981, p.50.

demonstrations, the latter of which has the priority to the former in an essentially political philosophy. And thus, it has fallen down into the third level of the spirit of historical thinking, though this was a long progress which was implicit for Hegel but was clearly explicated by Dilthey.

1.4.2 Dilthey's epistemological scheme of his philosophy of history.

Based on Dilthey's writings¹² it can be noticed that in a general scope, Dilthey was thoroughly aware of the epistemological historicizing work initiated by Hegel, and that this epistemological tendency, in Dilthey's view, has been undermining the structure of Hegel's philosophy of history. But this does not mean that Dilthey directly adopted an opposite approach, such as, for an assumed example, pure empirical historicization, to rectify what Hegel had failed to achieve; rather, he attempted to still follow Hegel's principle on a subjectivism historicization and then revise the particular demonstrations, switching the basement of philosophy of history from Hegel's three stages of history to his argument of the individual's consciousness. Dilthey rejected Hegel's speculative philosophy of history in favour of identifying the meaning in history. Also, being influenced by his contemporary debates between the idealism position and the material method of historical study, Dilthey adopted a similar approach with Hegel in the sense of harmonizing these two trends, though neither of them regarded a materialism grasp of the experiences as the significant foundation of the philosophy of history (whereas Marx did so). For both of them, the notion of the experience is an abstracted idea of concrete circumstances as a whole rather than referring to each single specific knowledge of facts inside the circumstances, and it points not to the material condition or data of social research but to one of the stages, probably a basic but not a fundamental stage, of the mind's intellectual process. In this sense, Dilthey developed an important notion from the notion of experience, that is, 'historicity'. Just as Gadamer concluded, for Dilthey, "The structure of the historical world is not based on facts taken from experiences which then acquire a value relation, but rather on the inner historicity which belongs to experience

¹² Dilthey, 1973. Some good English translation are: *Meaning in History: W. Dilthey's Thoughts on History and Society*, H. P. Rickman transl., ed., and introduced, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961; *Selected Writings*, H. P. Rickman transl., ed., and introduced, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

itself" (Gadamer, 1979, p.195).

The emergence of historicity actually promoted the real peak of the first wave of epistemological historicization, since by interpreting historicity from the already-abstracted experiences upon which people generate the relevance between their subjectivism selves and the world of the realities (which Hegel had attempted to demonstrate by discussing reflective history but he had not developed the notion of historicity even in the stage of philosophical history), the knowledge of historical thinking will inevitably be constructed and construed in an intellectualized form. This notion, though it has endowed history with an opposite value compared to the unclearness of the fiction or the myth and denoted that the essence of a history is the actuality of the history, has also endowed the philosophy of history with a necessary path-dependence of an intellectualized form, since this notion has become constituted to the significant argument of the philosophy of history. And this dependence on intellectualization conversely enhanced the role of the individual's consciousness in constructing the subject of historical thinking: "The first condition of possibility of a science of history is that I myself am a historical being, that the man who is studying history is the man who is making history" (Gadamer, 1979, p.195; Dilthey, 1973, p.278).

The intellectualization was enhanced by extending the individual's sensed experience to a historical broadness. Dilthey's emphasis on the role of experience has been thoroughly discussed by many theorists; for example, Gadamer argued, "The ultimate presupposition for knowledge of the historical world, in which the identity between consciousness and object – that speculative postulate of idealism – is still demonstrable reality, is experience" (Gadamer, 1979, p.196). But for Dilthey, the work of historicization – though it generally appears in an intellectualized form – still needs to be linked to the experience based upon an individual's consciousness. Suppose a solution whereby a history is meaningful (as one of the arguments of historical thinking) only when the history has been reflected in an individual's current experience that he or she is actually experiencing in his or her life. To extend individual experience from a progressive sense to a historical broadness, he or she elaborates the idea of a continuity of life as the constitutive supposition of a historical continuity to the historical experience, which

suggests that historical knowledge is known through the continuity of life that appears in every individual particular experience. But far more than a solution that initially aims to expand the individual's experience into a historical broadness, this argument also suggests that there is not any universal spirit of history (in the sense of Hegel's philosophical history) but only historical individuals. This point forms an important step for Dilthey's epistemological historicization, since actually, there is no historical continuity currently experienced by any living individual at all. This is to say, the subject of a possible historical experience is not a real living individual, but an intellectualized subject. And a historical subject cannot be 'tested' like a scientific subject in psychology; rather, a historical subject is a hermeneutical being which is supported by a variety of intellectualized notions and meanings, since this being has to be a temporary synthesis of the notions that come from different temporal periods beyond the limitation of an individual's own experience. In this sense, it is reasonable that Dilthey argued that life itself has a hermeneutical structure, since when it is prepared to be interpreted for the individual's extension towards historicity, for its own self it belongs not only to the current present but also to the past, which is described and interpreted by notions, as far as the materials of the past have already decayed.

1.4.3 A short conclusion of the first wave of epistemological historicization: intellectualization.

Hegel originally attempted to sketch a developmental outline in which the philosophy of history was designed to demonstrate the modernity of his era, that is, the self-realization of the notion of freedom. To support this scheme, he specifically outlined three progressive stages from original history, to reflective history, and to philosophical history, to illustrate the uniqueness of his era's own featured freedom: where the modern notion of freedom comes from and why it must be so. For Hegel himself, these stages formed a complete system of historical thinking even in the sense of identifying and then bridging the historical past and the thinking present (though this sense of the thinking of history is merely a by-product of the demonstration of political philosophy rather than an intended aim); however, for latter-day philosophers of history, his demonstrations,

especially on reflective history, also offered an epistemological approach to historical thinking, namely, the subjectiveness of the 'character' of the historian, which had rarely been discussed in a thorough sense previously. This epistemological approach, as far as the initial stage, was still immature, since it had not generated a clear principle on the individual's reflection of history but merely a basic distinction on the subjects between the past and the present. It indeed is a fact that though Hegel wrote a theory on the phenomenon of spirit and a theory on the reason of history **respectively**, he never attempted to make a firm relevance between these two systems.¹³

This relevance – it is essentially the reflection of history upon an individual's consciousness – was finished (in terms of the mutual form) by Dilthey, who discussed the notion of historicity as the actuality of temporal experience that expands one's own life into a historical broadness. The significance of this progress is that the historicity is constructed and construed in an intellectualized form as a notion which generates itself from its own history, which means that the greatest character of the first wave of epistemological historicization is **intellectualization**. For Dilthey, and also for Hegel to a certain degree, historical knowledge in the form of intellectualization is thus self-knowledge, since the historically expanded subject's consciousness investigates the realities and their experiences necessarily by the subject's interpretation, which has been derived from the history of the subject. As Gadamer concluded, "Consciousness has shaken off authority and is seeking, through reflection and doubt, to attain to valid knowledge," the realities of life, like the tradition of morality and law, need to be re-established upon a firmer basis, which can be traced by the history of itself. And this tracing work has to be done intellectually, as it is the notion rather than the materials that generates the modernity (for Hegel) and the historicity (for Dilthey) and their projection upon the individual's consciousness.

Since this is the first wave I am going to consider, I think it is better to state that I agree with the view that "Philosophy of history shows the essential necessity of the actualization of the right order" (Strauss, 1976, p.53). But when we delve into the specific demonstrations of a philosophy of history – as not only a philosophical thinking but also a

¹³ A similar later example is Edmund Husserl.

differentiated discipline – any interpretation of the ‘right order’ becomes dependent on the path where the history comes from, and thus becomes dependent on the epistemological question of a Hegelian ‘*Geschichte der Geschichte*’, or ‘history of history’. In this sense, the modern philosophy of history, in the formation of the first wave of epistemological historicization, has inevitably been endowed with the attempt at intellectualization as a significant character.

1.5 The second wave: an individualized tendency resulting from distinguishing the ‘critical theory’ from the ‘speculative theory’.

People could be puzzled that I have not analysed some great philosophers of history, like Croce, Collingwood and Oakeshott, who lived and wrote between the first and the second wave. The reason is given in the aim of this research, which as I state again, is to explore a new interpretation that bridges the history in the past and the historical thinking in the present. This new scheme of interpretation will investigate existing philosophies and history and characterize them as epistemological historicization (as I am doing so right now), but will not totally abandon the epistemological approach. Rather, by suggesting a ‘metaphysical alternative’, I think that epistemology and metaphysics support each other, and presuppose each other (Mink, 1981, p.111), which means I will argue that a metaphysical alternative is **not** for replacing epistemological historicization but for supplementing it. Without the fruits of epistemological historicization, any new interpretation – no matter what it is, metaphysics or something else – will have no firm basis, since it will have no idea of what has already happened, or what has already been dealt with. In this sense, and in the several particular demonstrations in the next chapters, which are based on my own understandings of their thoughts, I think that their works present a character that regards metaphysics and epistemology as mutually supportive, though they had their own understandings of the meaning of metaphysics.¹⁴ Conversely, using a holistic view to explore the retrospective of epistemological historicization, I attempt to outline what has had a constant impact in the past, and even now, on contemporary philosophies of history, which means that I am obliged to characterise the

¹⁴ These philosophers defined metaphysics differently from the traditional philosophers like Aristotle and even Kant.

thoughts of those who strongly exhibit a tendency to lead to the path of philosophy of history. And in this sense, I think that the 'critical theorists', as opposed to the 'speculative theorists', explicated the epistemological tendency to the greatest degree, and thus deserve the attempt to characterize their principles and influences.

The second wave of epistemological historicization was accompanied by an attempt to re-harmonize Hegel's 'speculative' approach to the philosophy of history (in the words of the critical theorists) and Dilthey's subjective historical consciousness. Indeed, rather than being accompanied, the second characterized wave came from the intellectualization, that is, the individualization of epistemological historicization. The reason is that the second wave theorists (mainly the critical theorists since they claimed to abandon the so-called speculative theories) regarded the discrepancy between Hegel and Dilthey as a developmental progress of the philosophy of history. This means, though probably they did not intend it to do so, that critical theorists gradually symbolised Hegel's philosophy of history as speculatively providing the meaning or pattern of history, rather than discussing the individual's relevance to a history, the latter of which, considered and elaborated by Dilthey, became a more plausible and reasonable resource of their own theories of history. Further, the second wave critical theorists enhanced the character of individualization which existed in the first wave implicitly, and dealt with it as the main significant character of their philosophies of history: in terms of that, they attempted to establish the philosophy of history upon an epistemological basement, namely, the individual consciousness, rather than Hegelian metaphysics.

To demonstrate such an individualized philosophy of history, critical theorists, following Dilthey, argued for the importance of the difference between the historical knowledge of the past and the thinking present (in the sense that it is also correct that they go beyond Hegel's reflective history, though they did not explicate it). Regarding the detailed arguments on this difference, though M. Mandelbaum might have been the first one who distinguished 'interpreting history itself' from 'the problem of historical knowledge' (Mandelbaum, 1984, p.73), a clear structure of such differentiation was given by W. H. Walsh. In his *An Introduction to Philosophy of History*,¹⁵ Walsh claimed that there

¹⁵ W. H. Walsh, 1967a. This is the third revised edition. The first edition is published in 1951 with

are two possible fields of philosophy of history, that is, the one called speculative philosophy of history, concerns the totality of past human action, the other one, called the critical philosophy of history, concerns the narrative or account we construct of them now (Walsh, 1967a, p.16). Dray adopted them and explained later, “The speculative seeks to discover in history, the course of events, a pattern or meaning which lies beyond the purview of the ordinary historian; the critical endeavours to make clear the nature of the historian’s own inquiry, in order to ‘locate’ it, as it were, on the map of knowledge” (Dray, 1964, p.1). However, both Walsh and Dray listed the principles of speculative philosophy of history in relatively fewer pages, somehow making their analysis too simple in comparison with the pages on critical philosophy of history. On speculative philosophy of history, they simply argued that these philosophers were concerned with the meaning and purpose of the whole historical process with ‘true’ significance and ‘essential’ rationality (Walsh, 1967a, p.26). It is obvious that the principle of critical philosophy of history is more important than the speculative one for Walsh and the theorists who support the differentiation between the two, since any differentiation always points not merely to the differentiation itself, but aims to identify and to emphasize one of them.

Therefore, next, I will introduce the critical philosophy firstly, and then return to the speculative philosophy but from the perspective of the critical theorists. Though both Walsh and Dray, and many supporters of the differentiation, introduced a variety of different speculative philosophies of history (for example, both Walsh and Dray analysed Hegel in their books), none of them analysed the characteristics of the speculative philosophy of history. This work was done by Danto, who actually wrote not during but after the second wave of epistemological historicization. Anyway, the term ‘wave’ does not indicate any strict period of time or specific people, but merely the characteristics of epistemological historicization, which may differ from each other.

1.5.1 The epistemological principles of the critical philosophy of history.

According to Walsh, there are four main groups of questions that the critical

the same title; but the second edition is titled as *Philosophy of History: An Introduction*, published in 1960 in New York.

philosophy of history considered significant.¹⁶ These four groups, supporting and integrating each other, presented an attempt to constantly inherit the epistemological tendency from the first wave, and also presented new epistemological characteristics enhanced specifically in the second wave.

First of all, a critical theorist should be willing to discover the very nature of historical thinking by judging whether the historical knowledge is *sui generis*. In the view of critical theorists, historical knowledge should not be called perceptual knowledge like scientific knowledge, since, not only the knowledge of an individual historical affair cannot be perceptual in the immediate present, but also— at least for critical theorists – a historian should also pursue the knowledge of the **reason** of what happened rather than merely the fact of what happened. This is not about the nature of the speculative or the critical philosophy of history; for them, this is the natural curiosity of all historians. But it is due to the attempt to know the reason for what happened that an attempt has been made to establish a possible connection between the historical events and the interpretation of a scientific causality in a broad and implicit form. Indeed, the scientific way of seeing the facts in the past as the exemplifications of general laws has been abandoned by the critical theorists, but for them, the speculative form of history is still an implicit attempt (it may be explicit for the positivism theorists of history, most of whom discuss the covering-law). And, refusing the assumed ‘universal’ speculative form of history, the critical theorists emphasized particularly the research of histories, since for them, historical knowledge is in essence the individual’s knowledge: history is in the very different circumstances, and historical knowledge deals with every particular individuality (Walsh, 1967a, p.47). A critical philosophy of history will in essence be required to refuse any metaphysical structure which, in their view, imposes itself on the historical knowledge and results *a priori* in history.

Secondly, if the nature of historical knowledge is equivalent to the individuality of historical fact, then what is the nature of historical fact? Critical theorists, like others, are also concerned with the truth and fact in history. But rather than an immediate and presented fact, which is perceptual in the present, a historical fact is in the past and is no

¹⁶ Here I follow the sequence presented in the introduction rather than the sequence of the chapters.

longer accessible to an immediate perceptual inspection. In the view of critical theorists, a historian has to determine the range for digging a 'plausible' fact from a variety of events and also has to determine in what sense such 'plausibility' can be defended, the latter of which is based on the historian's subjectivism presupposition composed of the enquiries of his or her capacity for knowing, rather than on a given 'objective science', which suggests that the truth has already been given elsewhere, and what we need to do is merely discover it. That is why Walsh argued that "historical facts have in every case to be established: they are never simply given" (Walsh, 1967a, p.20). Therefore, opposite to the scientific opinion like covering-law, it is impossible to test (if there may be) any truth of/from a historical judgment by the individualized historical fact, since a historical fact, according to the first principle that it is generated by and for itself in the individualized form, can never be the scientific data which provide an unchanged testable basis of the scientific general laws. If there is any 'criterion' of historical truth, the only form it takes shall be the internal coherence of our presupposed beliefs about our subjectivism reconstruction of the relation between the different individualized historical facts.

Therefore, thirdly, can history be objective without a scientific criterion of truth? Walsh gave us two positions on this question (Dray also expressed a similar opinion in his own words). On the one hand, to a certain degree, most historians work on the same platform, which supports them with a common understanding of their work, that is, that the research of history is a primarily cognitive activity that is "concerned with an independent object, the past, whose nature they had to investigate for its own sake" (Walsh, 1967a, p.21). However, beyond this basic platform, historians also hold different and inconsistent views of what might be the **canons** that principally conduct our interpretations of history. To deal with this situation, critical theorists claimed that, in accordance with the subjectivism 'criterion' of historical facts and truth, the attitude of the whole discipline of history should also be subjectivist, as every historian is affected by subjective factors: the disputes over history depend not on the degree of knowing an objective truth, but on the degree of a historian's own desire of understanding the knowing activity. From this perspective, history is recognized emotively rather than cognitively, and is construed as relying more on the individual's consciousness than on an

external metaphysical/speculative aim, which somehow inherits from Dilthey's scheme the idea that the individualized historical consciousness of a historian gradually replaces the general consciousness of a Hegelian general philosophical history. Therefore, following the thoughts of the critical theorists, it may be argued that, if any 'objective' study really exists in *Geisteswissenschaften*, it has to be based on an objective study of human nature – the notion of which in itself is not 'objective' but has its own interpreted, intellectualized history. What is 'objective' is only the fact that *Geisteswissenschaften* should be hermeneutical. That is the reason that the critical theorists, though they argued for the 'objectivity' of history, claimed that such objectivity is different from the one in natural science: historical objectivity is similar to the objectivity of artists in terms of changing the theme implicitly to a certain degree, and getting beyond the dispute of the cognitive or emotive essence of a historian's knowing. The action by which a person communicates what he or she takes to be a vision or insight into the nature of a certain thing is objective.

Fourthly and most conclusively, the central problem for the critical theorists is about the nature of the explanation of a history. Critical theorists have suggested that the nature of a historical explanation is peculiar, since in contrast to the natural sciences, where the scientists embed the particular events into general laws by the inductive method and then abstracting conclusions, a historical understanding is a concrete notion explicated in every particular historical situation. As Walsh argued, "Historians do not attempt to illuminate particular situations by referring to other situations of the same type" (Walsh, 1967a, p.24). To demonstrate this concrete character of historical understanding, Walsh claimed a notion of 'historical colligation', which suggests that historical events should be divided into many single separated processes, and such processes do not form any piece or part of a united universal process (which, again, rejects Hegel's scheme on the development from original to philosophical history). In addition, the task of a historian is locating and interpreting the historical events in the context provided by the colligation to which the events belong, rather than in a non-existing context of a universal plan of history (though Hegel himself might respond that the development of the stages of history is located in a context, a context of the modern notion of freedom, in the form of

distinguishing itself from the other civilizations' context of the notion of freedom. His distinction between the real and mere existence is the criterion of what contributes and what does not to history).

As a brief conclusion, it can be seen that in the second wave of epistemological historicization, the critical theorists discussed their philosophies of history in a way that can be characterized as, in its main form, **individualization**. An individualized scheme of interpreting history deals with historical events in a unique way (but not separately since connections are made among events in every colligation), and a historical event can be interpreted thoroughly due to its dependency on the circumstance to which the event belongs, instead of the previous dependency of a preliminary purposive 'pattern' of a universal history, which provided legitimacy to the speculative philosophy of history (in the view of the critical theorists). Under the investigation with the principle of individualization, those speculative or substantive philosophies of history were regarded as nonsensical and futile since they exceeded the prophecy of the future that existed beyond the epistemological restriction of historical knowledge generated in the thinking present.

1.5.2 The speculative philosophy of history against individualization: in the view of the critical theorists.

For the critical theorists, the most significant problem of the speculative philosophy of history (or the 'substantive' philosophy of history in A. C. Danto's words) is that the speculative theory is an approach that attempts to describe a historical event beyond its limited temporal context, namely, beyond the real time when the event happened. This does not mean that the speculative philosophers have made anachronistic faults in a contextual sense; rather, for the critical theorists, speculative philosophy in fact projects the interpretation of a history beyond the history itself but to an arbitrary prophecy of a future in the form of a necessary end of the history.

In his *Narration and Knowledge* (Danto, 1985), Danto sketched a general but characterized outline of the speculative philosophy of history. He distinguished the whole of history from the whole of the past, the latter of which, for the speculative theorists, is

included in the former. The whole of the past is at best the ideal data, which could be furnished and completed by the conceptual theories of the notion of the whole of history. Such conceptual theories, being similar to the scientific development from Kepler to Newton, can be divided into the descriptive and the explanative theories of history. On the one hand, descriptive theory is based on the observation of historical materials, just like Kepler's principles of planetary motion that were based on Tycho's observations. In addition, the significance of descriptive theory is that it seeks to demonstrate a pattern amongst the historical events which make up the whole past, and to project this pattern into the future (Danto, 1985, p.2). On the other hand, explanative theory accounts for this pattern in causality. History in the observation sense is merely a data-gathering enterprise of the past, whereas the speculative philosophy of history attempts to explain the future historically, and hence has to adopt the explanative form to construe the pattern in causality. Therefore, any philosophy of history attempting to interpret the sequence of happened events has to be based on the explanative form of a narrative structure, which calls for the 'meaning' of history, since what a speculative philosophy of history comes to interpret is not only the happened event itself, but also its possible recurrence in the future: history is a historical rehearsal of the future. Thus, the reason Danto cited Löwith is to suggest that, for the speculative/substantive philosophy of history, historical events are composed of a larger temporal structure of the past, the present, and the future: "a systematic interpretation of universal history in accordance with a principle by which historical events and successions are unified and directed towards an ultimate meaning" (Danto, 1985, p.7). In this sense, Danto considers Löwith's argument that the whole of history is essentially theological as reversely reasonable since the ultimate meaning is attributed to a broad sense of an external enterprise of the interpretation of history which cannot be illustrated only from history itself. The temporal future is thus a *fait accompli*: it has already occurred.

Further, in the view of the critical theorists, for the speculative philosophy of history, an external meaning of history may lead a historian into some philosophical difficulties which, overcome by the critical theorists, result in the incompatibility between the historian's own individual knowing process and the external meaning. For the critical

theorists who inherited Dilthey's individualization tendency on the hermeneutical interpretation of historical knowledge, an individualized and peculiar historical colligation of events calls for a relatively isolated meaning of itself. This means that if there is a certain meaning appearing in the context of such a colligation (even in the form of the historian's own subjectivism valuating and meaning-endowing), it should be an internal meaning of history referring only to the history itself, rather than an external one referring to the whole of history from the past to the future. For the critical theorists, the central problem of the speculative philosophy of history, in a kind of scheme against the individualized meaning of each history, is that the speculative form naturally endows history with the meaning that comes from **the external, often non-historical, context**, and it further suggests that the philosopher of history does not necessarily abstract meanings from every historical event: on the contrary, a historical event is 'meaningful' only when it is able to be embedded into the external meaning.

The development from the first wave to the second wave of epistemological historicization was a process involving British scholars' adoption of German philosophies of history. The intellectualized philosophies of history in the first wave were thoroughly adopted and further enhanced in an approach of individualization. For the critical theorists, individualization offered different kinds of historical thinking a minimum but common platform on which some basic natures of historical knowledge can be acknowledged and thus be characterized. In their view, this platform cannot be provided by the speculative philosophy of history, since the speculative theorists attempted to provide a maximum theory that aims to give a holistic interpretation of the meaning of and outside history.

1.6 The third wave: the fragmentation tendency in the destruction and re-enhancement of epistemological historicization.

The formation of the third wave was more complicated than the first two waves, since, in the view of a large range, that is, crossing thirty to fifty years, this wave was developed in a dialectical retrospective form, that is, its formation was initiated by rethinking and deconstructing the result of its previous effort. Then, however, it was

finally returned to the main trace of epistemological historicization with a relatively new approach. The third wave contained an explicit effort against the individualization of the second wave, while it also absorbed some principles from the individualization. This initiating work was done by Richard Rorty, who investigated the epistemological tradition in the realm of a general sense of philosophy rather than a differentiated philosophy of history (due to his belief in the edifying philosophy against the systematic philosophy). And, as one of the most representative examples, Ankersmit returned to epistemological historicization and promoted it in a different form, though it also resulted in fragmentation as a by-product.

Similarly, there were some great philosophers writing about historical thinking between Walsh's era and Rorty's era, such as Collingwood and Croce between the first and the second wave. The reason I chose Walsh and Rorty rather than the others is merely because they argued using clear and featured examples of the character of epistemological historicization. The impacts of theorists, especially in the contemporary academic world, do not follow a linear succession but are mutually relevant, and it is both inappropriate and impossible to argue that it is one certain theorist who determines the characteristics of epistemological historicization.

1.6.1 Rorty's critiques on epistemological philosophy in general.

In Rorty's view, at least in his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, philosophies before him in the 20th century can be characterized as mainly belonging to a kind of epistemological philosophy of language. This modern epistemological philosophy regards language as a representation of the reality, like a mirror held up to nature. According to his investigation, modern epistemological notions of truth presupposed a set of concepts of language as a proposition of philosophical thinking, which resulted in an idea, or sometimes a belief for the linguistic epistemologists, of the so-called 'foundations of knowledge' (Rorty, 1980, pp.155-163) that requires a neutral background (*tertium quid*) as a conditional foundation. Just as Rorty's specialists also refer to his words, this foundationalism of the linguistic epistemology is an approach by which "we understand all there is to know about the relation of beliefs to the world when we understand these

causal relations to the world; our knowledge of how to apply terms such as ‘about’ and ‘true of’ is the fallout from a ‘naturalistic’ account of linguistic behaviour” (Voparil and Bernstein, 2010, p.154). This foundationalism, then, is an attempt to simplify (even cancel) the hermeneutical process of the relation between one’s knowing and the real world, and, replacing the former, implicitly refusing the history of each individual case of knowing but describing the case merely by grasping the internal usage and the pre-given meanings of the language.

Rorty challenged this argument. For him, language is neither a thing as representation nor a medium between humans and the world. The notion of knowledge, in the sense of the foundationalism, as the assemblage of accurate representations, is essentially not a necessary but an optional notion for the understanding of one’s relation to the world of the realities. However, a more significant problem, considering the relevance to our research of historical thinking, is that foundationalism in the form of linguistic epistemological philosophy actually eliminates the possibility of a **historical** relation between an individual’s knowing and world of realities.

Rorty demonstrated his criticisms of the foundationalism in a broader sense relating to all kinds of philosophical thinking other than the specific sense of the philosophy of history as a differentiated discipline. However, he offered in detail a historically based argument against foundationalism. He called this concern a ‘pragmatism position on historicism’.¹⁷ To a certain degree, he regarded ‘historical thinking’ in a similar way to the traditional spirit of it, that is, ‘history’ is not merely a subject matter of philosophical research but is the essential nature of philosophy, which indicates that philosophy is naturally historical research and *vice versa*. Of course, rather than the sense of how he explicated the relevance of his thought to Davidson’s pragmatism, he did not specifically explicate this relevance to historical thinking. We may assume that, in the sense of this level of the spirit of historical thinking, a contextual relevance of Rorty’s position can be

¹⁷ Please note the difference between ‘historism’ and ‘historicism’. The former emphasizes on a kind of research that investigates the history, the process (in the sense of both progressive and regressive) of the development of a notion or a set of ideas; whereas the latter believes that history develops in the accordance with some certain speculative laws and will definitely meet the final end, *telos*, in future. I, though have introduced Dilthey’s notion of the historicity, hardly use the term ‘historicism’ in this research, to avoid any possibility of symbolizing one’s thought in which misunderstandings may happen.

traced also to Heidegger, who demonstrates a similar sympathy by claiming to be a 'historicist' in philosophical research. However, what I intend here, and what I really need to do, is just sketching the basic perspective of his view on a historical approach against epistemological foundationalism, probably without a rigorous retrospective look at the development of his thoughts. In his view, the foundation of knowledge, the language, even as the most fundamental basis for foundationalism, is still a historical result and should be historicized, since the language, as I have mentioned, presents a tendency to simplify the relation between one's knowing and a variety of realities. This changes the issues of the relation, which is based on and comes from its own history regarding the issues, and relies on the linguistic descriptions of a progressive movement towards the future, whereas historicism is an effort that rejects progressivism. Rorty demonstrated this historicism's rejection of the language by arguing that, with a historical investigation, the use and the meaning of language are totally different, and most of the linguistic philosophy is at best based on the use of language rather than the meaning of language, since the meaning of language will inevitably require investigation of the historical context of the language, which is dismissed by linguistic philosophy's principles. Therefore, regarding the use rather than the meaning of language, linguistic philosophy is not so different from speculative philosophy (if we use this term as the critical theorists do), since it also creates a metaphor of philosophy that can be understood only from its use and has no implicit meaning except its literal meaning (Rorty, 1980, p.260 and 303). Rorty's critiques of foundationalism regard the linguistic philosophy and the speculative philosophy on the same epistemological level in that both of them attempted to rationalize history into a symbolized metaphor.

This resulted in a circle. Historicism destroyed the basic argument of foundationalism, which in its narrow sense is the linguistic philosophy, and in its broad sense is the epistemological philosophy. However, as historicism itself is 'stronger' than the rationalized approach that attempts to set up the fundamental basis of the logic in the sense that the logic can be historicized and historically reconstructed, is a philosophy of history possible, especially after Rorty demonstrated that the rationalized attempt is futile? Though Rorty – if my observation is correct – was concerned with history and philosophy in the first

level of the spirit of historical thinking, my aim is to argue that the three levels are not used to identify philosophers categorically, but instead, emphasize a possibility that concerns different dimensions of historical thinking: as the philosophy of history as a differentiated discipline has already been given as a fact, we have no reason to ignore or even eliminate the fact; rather, we should still think whether one's general argument – even in a general philosophical sense against a rationalized discipline – can be considered relevant to the differentiated discipline.

Rorty himself probably refused this possibility of a philosophy of history, not only because, as he clearly claimed, his anti-epistemology work itself is a historical work beyond the disciplined limitation (Rorty, 1980, introduction p.9), but also because he thought that a retrospective of a historicized rationale is more possible than a scheme of a rationalized history, namely, a philosophy of history. Historism, for him, is at most the historiography of philosophy. In his later article *The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres* (Rorty, 1984, p.49), he distinguished the historical reconstruction (of philosophy) from the rational reconstruction (of history) by indicating whether we restrict a philosophical meaning to a limited range of texts and contexts to avoid anachronism (the former) or not (the latter). For him, the moral of historism is finally methodological. And this rejection can be conclusively traced to his belief in the edifying philosophy against the systematic philosophy.

Therefore, after this destruction of epistemological foundationalism, it is not hard to imagine that historical theories were created in a variety of different attempts, with each different from the others and different from the traditional path, which is very unlike the situation of the second wave, shortly after which the main stream of philosophies of history mostly followed the critical epistemological path. One of the best examples may be Hayden White's *Metahistory*, in which he implicitly responded to Rorty's destruction of linguistic foundationalism by emphasizing the literary metaphor rather than the linguistic structure in historical writings (White, 1974).¹⁸ However, this kind of humanist research on the rhetorical impact in historical writings finally calls for a return of a kind of philosophical approach, since research in the humanities, in its broad sense according

¹⁸ There are also some contemporary works discussing the relation between language and history, but in a different meaning from White's; for example, Roy Harris, 2004.

to the principles of edifying philosophy in Rorty's words, finally does not aim to offer historical thinking with a systematic interpretation of the essential nature of history.

1.6.2 Ankersmit's epistemological historical experience in a non-traditional philosophical sense.

One of the representative examples of this philosophical return of historical thinking was offered by Ankersmit, who in his early career, pointed out that White's emphasis on the literary metaphor best displayed the tension between the historical subject and the way the subject is being represented, and thus displayed a self-referentiality of a historical narrative rather than a philosophy of history (Ankersmit, 1986, pp.19-20). Ankersmit finally attempted to construct a philosophical interpretation on the nature of history. This work was mainly processed with a philosophical interpretation of the **historical experience** in his *Sublime Historical Experience* (Ankersmit, 2005), though this 'philosophical' is not in the traditional sense as we will see later. Again, there were several decades between Rorty's critiques and Ankersmit's rebirth of the philosophy of history, just like the long period between Hegel and Dilthey. This latest rebirth of the philosophy of history, in the form of interpreting the historical experience, may be regarded as a concrete response to Rorty, and, for Ankersmit, it was "in agreement with the nature of historicism" (Ankersmit, 2005, p.69), though, for me, it was somehow an unsuccessful attempt that resulted in the fragmentation of epistemological historicization.

In general, Ankersmit – at least in his latest *Sublime Historical Experience* rather than his earlier works – was not interested in cognitive historical knowledge. It can be seen that, as he claimed in the beginning sections of his book, to a certain degree, he accepted Rorty's broad critiques on the foundationalism of epistemological philosophies, though he also doubted Rorty's argument of the impossibility of a philosophy of history. Indeed, to a certain extent, he agreed with Rorty that it is inappropriate to pursue a rationalized approach to history since the cognitive form of historical knowledge will inevitably result in the simplification of the historical complex. In this sense, Ankersmit, absorbing Huizinga's thoughts, argued a different approach to the philosophy of history, preferring a broader scope than the traditional rationalized philosophies of history, that is, an

emphasis on experiences as **immediacy** (rather than a logical abstracted) constituent of history. Reversely speaking, Rorty did not explicate his refusal of the possibility of the immediacy experience, but if we follow his investigation into foundationalism, we can in a minimum sense suggest that any access to and possession of the immediacy experience has already been blocked by language. With language as the basis, even after foundationalism was challenged, a new philosophical approach can hardly inherit a tradition of experience and regard it as the basis of a new philosophy in a holistic and systematic sense for Rorty.

But Ankersmit did not attempt to construct a holistic and systematic philosophy of history based on the immediacy experience. He did not return to the traditional way in which the notion of experience is intellectualized and then characterized as one of the logical bases of further philosophical deductions. Instead, he regarded the notion of experience as merely a description of every individual but concrete situation in which a historian, or just a person, for him or herself, feels and understands the past of itself and the historical objects from the past which still affect the present experience of the historian or the person. Because of this, it is named the 'immediacy' experience. He responded to our concern about the predicament of differentiated disciplines by emphasizing the original experience of historical thinking, refusing the second-hand rationalized notion of experience, as he wrote, "They [historians] should realize that the best, the most sophisticated, and the most finely tuned instrument that they have at their disposal for understanding the past is themselves and their own experience insofar as this experience is not yet infected by the disciplinary historiographical epidemics that having infected the majority of their colleagues" (Ankersmit, 2005, p.67). For him, the immediate experience should not be contaminated by the normative approach abstracting such an experience, which makes the operated experience no different from the representative role of the reality in foundationalism: an operated experience returns to be representative of the reality rather than the original grasp of the reality itself. In this sense, Ankersmit further argued that historical experience, which may immediately grasp the real past, comes only from the historian's immediate experience of 'the past itself', and not from historical materials nor from a speculative scheme of history. This notion of

historical materials does not refer to those historical objects that still exist in the present, but merely refers to the materialistic interpretation of history. Instead, the notion of historical objects, which was indeed endowed with a meaning by Ankersmit for the present historical experience, indicates a process in which the historical experience moves from the temporal past into the surface of the present: “historical experience is, in this way, a ‘surface’ phenomenon: it takes place on the surface or interface where the historian and the past meet each other” (Ankersmit, 2005, p.121). This argument seems similar to Collingwood’s re-experiencing of the past, though Ankersmit’s point here is the experiential union between the past and the present.

However, a significant but negative (for him) feature can be characterized from his further explanation of the historical consciousness that affects the present grasping of the past historical experience, as far as the historical experience which is elaborated as having a temporal length must be integrated into a historian’s experience of immediacy in the present. According to him, historical consciousness appears from and works on the experiential compatibility between the past and the present. This experiential compatibility or the effort of bridging the past and the present, without a very clear and explicit demonstration, gives rise to a subjectivism category, which is reversely used to understand the historical experience, that is, the quality of ‘sublime’. This categorized ‘sublime’ in the fundamental sense eliminates the possibility of cognitive historical knowledge, and results in the quality of a felt issue of the historical experience. In a general scope, the quality of ‘sublime’ turns the trend of the traditional philosophies of history that attempt to transform a cognitive (though also epistemological) structure of historical experience to an aesthetic historical thinking (though still in the name of a ‘philosophy’ of history) that denotes a non-structure: the traditional significant argument on the authenticity from the past and appearing (or not) in the present now becomes a possibility of self-awareness of the aesthetic in a psychological sense (concerning the trauma in the historical experience). This approach is due to the fact that Ankersmit attempted to draw on all the contemporary notions of experience (Roth, 2007, pp.71-72), and emphasized on a clear psychological issue to the categorized ‘sublime’, as he claimed that “in sum, trauma can be seen as the psychological counterpart of the sublime, and the

sublime can be seen as the philosophical counterpart of trauma” (Ankersmit, 2005, p.338).

This psychological and aesthetic approach of the historical experience – and, more accurately, of the historical consciousness that grasps the historical experience – is apparently similar to the individualization of epistemological historicization, as far as the latter also discusses the quality that each individual historical situation is understood by the individual’s subjectivism knowing that deals particularly with historical event, rather than by integrating the historical experience into a speculative ‘pattern’. Also, as far as he regarded his work as still a philosophical work of history which necessarily and essentially calls for the investigation of the internal logic and the external relevance to other philosophical logics, it cannot be denied that his work, though arguing a psychological dimension, succeeded in the broadest sense of inquiry given by the epistemological philosophies, that is, how we come to know history in the past. His work in this sense finally inherited the subjectivism solution for integrating the history into the individual’s consciousness in the present by individually historicizing the past (and this individualized historicization can also be traced to the earlier intellectualization work).

However, Ankersmit’s scheme on the philosophy of history, in the form of his emphasis on the historical experience, presented its own character, represents the third wave of epistemological historicization, that is, fragmentation. Fragmentation is the extreme form of individualization. By highlighting the immediacy experience, historical experience, though logically integrated into an individual’s consciousness, does not generate any process of representing or reflecting itself onto one’s cognitive consciousness (which overcomes the traditional epistemologies). Instead, historical experience itself exists inside one’s specific consciousness of felt issues, which reversely requires psychological self-awareness: history no longer needs a historicized process to be understood by the subject’s individual consciousness, as the subject’s consciousness of itself is the history. In this sense that the historical experience posits, the apparent individualization of epistemological historicization is actually pushed to a more extreme extent. It is not even an overlapping of an individual subject and an individual history; it actually becomes a fragmented status of historical thinking: every historical experience is

the reality of the subject, that is, the historical thinker him or herself. Indeed, it can form a collective memory by making relevant impacts; however, in essence, it exists only for its own sake and does not indicate any holistic or comprehensive (in that even though a philosophy of history is not speculative, it is meaningful to the plural form people) scheme of history, that is to say, speculative history. A psychological-aiming historical experience is meaningful only to the thinker, in the rigorous singular form of him or herself. And in this sense, I am not sure whether Ankersmit was restricted to following Rorty's critiques of the epistemological foundationalism, or, of course, without being aware of it, somehow promoted the epistemological tendency to an extreme form so that even epistemological historicization itself can no longer exist.

1.7 Conclusion and reason for metaphysics in general.

In this introductory and preliminary chapter, I firstly argued that the general aim of this research is to reconstruct a metaphysical interpretation of the philosophy of history with regard to the spirit of historical thinking. I have claimed that the spirit of historical thinking has at least three levels. The first level of the spirit regards history as the necessary method of philosophical thinking, the second indicates the differentiated disciplines between philosophy and history, while the third enhances the second and demonstrates that 'history' inevitably becomes the objective subject-matter of philosophical thinking. Then, I argued that any metaphysical interpretation should be in accordance with the spirit of historical thinking in the sense of a harmonized synthesis of the first, the second, and even the third levels, which emphasizes **the relation between the historical happened in the past and the historical thinking in the present.**

To support this scheme, in the rest of this chapter, I sketched the outlines of current philosophies of history, and characterized them as three waves of epistemological historicization. They are **the intellectualization, the individualization, and the fragmentation.** The first wave is focused on the transformation of Hegel's epistemological concerns in his reflective history of Dilthey's understanding of subjective historical consciousness. In this process of the transformation, the initial concerns of the philosophy of history were ascertained in terms of an intellectualized epistemology. The

second wave of the 'critical' theorists, such as Walsh, Dray, and Danto, stood in a contrasting position to the earlier 'speculative' theorists. For the critical theorists, individualization offers a philosophy of history in terms of a minimum foundation that acts as a common platform upon which certain basic aspects of historical knowledge can be acknowledged and clearly described. The third wave can be unpacked via the writings of F. Ankersmit. He was clearly open to, for example, Rorty's critique of contemporary epistemology. However, he still pushed the idea of historical experience a few steps further on, thus inheriting the epistemological principles. The enhancement of individualized consciousness eventually made historical consciousness utterly fragmented and pushed the historical experience into the domain of either aesthetics or psychology, rather than the philosophy of history.

The intellectualization, the individualization, and the fragmentation together form a relatively complete perspective of epistemological historicization. In terms of the formation and development of the philosophy of history as a modern differentiated discipline, epistemological historicization covers most of the fundamental principles of this discipline, and to a certain degree, forms a path-dependent phenomenon, which is successful in that it offers a variety of modern philosophical concerns to the domain of history, the latter of which was originally the realm of materialist historians. However, by arguing and enhancing the epistemological character and even valuing it as the essential and, indeed, only way of historical thinking, it also limits the possibility of the philosophy of history. The bridging between historical happened and present thinking has to be based only upon the individual's historicization of the consciousness.

As I mentioned in the research method, some other fields can provide new schemes, though they should be examined regarding whether they are appropriate to be adopted or absorbed. One of those fields is political philosophy. Political philosophy (and probably the history of political thinking) accompanies the general sense philosophy from its origins even to the present day, and the first level of the spirit of historical thinking is similar to what political philosophy claims, that is, 'a philosophy is naturally and essentially a political philosophy'; we should have sufficient confidence to refer to political philosophy and investigate its quality of conducting a similar structure of the

relation between philosophy and history, similar to the structure of the relationship between philosophy and politics. In this sense, a metaphysical interpretation which has been adopted specifically to explain politics with metaphysical knowledge may be needed, since the investigation of the relation between two realms is founded upon the understanding of the whole structure of human beings' knowledge.

Even in a narrow sense of simply the philosophy of history as a differentiated discipline rather than a wider sense of the whole system of knowledge, a metaphysical interpretation (concerning political philosophy) may also be needed. Within the principles of epistemological historicization, some 'speculative' or 'futile' but actually fundamental inquiries are ruled out. For example, is there any affiliation between the view of a progressing time from past to future and the view of a progressing history? I do not suggest accepting the chronicle view of history without any queries; rather, this question may refer to a deepening inquiry on the essential temporal being of history. To this extent, one could argue that Heidegger demonstrated a relation between temporality and historicity, but I should say that this demonstration is an attempt at categorizing history to meet the needs of a philosophy of time. Meanwhile, my concern regarding any substantial research of the essential being of history, at least, should accord the theme of a philosophy of history rather than a philosophy of time. This is also the reason why my concern with a temporal essence of history differs from Danto's doubts about the temporal exceeding of a speculative form of history. I am not going to be extending history into a temporal length by which history is designed as a progressive scheme to reach the future, but merely discovering and describing a temporal essence of history which already exists inside what happened in the past.¹⁹

In the beginning of the next chapter, I will continually analyse the limitation of epistemological historicization, as it initiates the demonstration of metaphysical alternative of the philosophy of history. But before that, I may initially introduce the reason for metaphysical alternative in general, especially in regard to the first spirit of historical thinking that may respond to philosophical thinking.

¹⁹ In the beginning of the 21st century, some theorists did rethink the possibility of an ontological interpretation of the philosophy of history as an attempt to overcome epistemological historicization. For example, see Tucker, 2001, p.37; Bentley, 2006, p.349.

'Philosophia (love-wisdom)', rather than simply *'sophia* (wisdom)', denotes the route towards the knowledge rather than simply given or concrete contents of the knowledge. By philosophical thinking, we do not definitely possess any knowledge, but only have the desire and search for the knowledge. And in this sense of a thinking activity rather than a possession, philosophy calls for a self-examining investigation on the nature of itself. Therefore, according to *'philosophia*' rather than simply *'sophia*', a philosophy of history also searches for the way that we think of the knowledge of history, rather than simply exclusive, speculative, and ultimately definite form of history.

However, as I have investigated in this chapter, traditional philosophies of history assume the object of historical knowledge separated from the philosophical thinking. In the words of Leo Strauss, under the scheme of epistemological historicization, history is alienated as a separated 'field', "a 'world' of its own fundamentally different from, although of course related to, that other 'field', 'Nature'" (Strauss, 1976, p.60). That is to say, epistemological historicization is ultimate a scheme in which the search for the nature of philosophical thinking is historically conditioned, or is taken place by numerous different but respectively characterized uniqueness of times or eras. Obviously, such scheme does not offer any reason for searching for nature of philosophical thinking, since even the thinking is historically formed and conditioned. Therefore, within a presupposed scheme of epistemological historicization, it is hard to claim any self-examining investigation of the nature of thinking (no matter whether philosophical or historical). As a fundamental feature, 'historically conditioned' is for its own self the highest regulation of any knowledge of itself including both philosophical thinking and historical thinking. However, it is indeed a tautology. The nature of historical thinking now depends on the historical condition of the thinking, while the historical condition provides not the nature of historical thinking in a general and universal sense but the legitimacy of the existences of historical objects in particulars and in circumstances, which conversely leads the historical condition not to the nature of thinking but to the objects of thinking. Nature of both philosophical and historical thinking is not discovered or approached for its own sake.

To avoid the tautological demonstration on the nature of historical thinking (and also

the predicaments of epistemological historicization), we need a kind of investigation that depends on nothing else but only the self-examining reason. That is to say, that kind of investigation must deal with the nature for its own sake. It must investigate the reason for the knowledge not for the existence of others but only for itself. In order to meet such need, metaphysics, or exactly speaking, Aristotelian metaphysics, is probably one of the best options among normative theories, as it searches for the highest form of knowledge for its own sake but also studies the relevance between its own reason and other knowledge: most of other normative theories do not care about whether the nature of knowledge is *causa sui*.

There are numerous masterpieces on explaining or interpreting Aristotelian metaphysics (including the book *Metaphysics*, and other books about the theoretical knowledge like *Physics* and *De Anima*²⁰, and even *Nicomachean Ethics*). They can be listed in terms of both specific themes and general introductions. In latterly particular demonstrations I will refer to those specific explanations, while here I would like to refer to some opinions on the general scope and position of Aristotelian metaphysics, so that we may initially be clear about the reason for metaphysics as an alternative. As I have just mentioned, ‘philosophy’ emphasizes the route towards knowledge rather than the possession of knowledge, which gives birth of the fundamental character of philosophical thinking as *causa sui* or ‘for its own sake’ rather than for the sake of its practical consequences. Like Politis argues (Politis, 2004, p.24), in the view of Aristotle, this kind of *causa sui* knowledge is ‘furthest removed from the senses’ (*Metaphysics*, 982a25)²¹ and thus corresponds to the principle of *philosophia* rather than simply possession of *sophia*, since this kind of non-perceivable knowledge is always hard to attain. However, as it regulates the basic direction and structure of the attaining ways of other knowledge, this kind knowledge is indeed the highest form of the whole knowledge. Therefore, for Aristotle and broad sense Aristotelian philosophy, this kind of *causa sui* knowledge, in the name of ‘metaphysics’, naturally and essentially corresponds to and even equalizes to philosophy or philosophical thinking, since it attempts to uncover the route towards

²⁰ Namely *On the Soul*. Here and hereafter I follow the Latin translation of this book which may be accepted more widely than the English translation among the specialists of Aristotle.

²¹ Due to the different versions of Aristotle’s works, all the citations correspond to the ‘Bekker (August Immanuel Bekker) number’.

wisdom in the highest sense. According to Politis's sub-title, metaphysics offers 'the ultimate explanations of all things' (Politis, 2004, p.23), whereas epistemological theory (like epistemological historicization but also pure epistemology) offers 'the most-related-to-me explanations of all things'.

However, it is on the argument 'of all things' that metaphysics is still hard to distinguish from other normative theories, even other sciences including natural sciences, as that other normative theories and sciences also study or interpret things in a general level more or less. Somehow the applicability of the general is presented in accordance with Kuhn's argument on development and relative replacement of the paradigms: though the old paradigm is not applicable any longer to explain the general in broader or even the broadest scope, it is still applicable to explain the general in smaller environment or context. However, for metaphysicians, such applicability of explaining the general falls into the trap of the relativism: due to the different presupposition of paradigms, the knowledge of relatively general is searched as definitely opposed to another and prepared to replace another. While metaphysics investigates things in a completely and ultimately general way, which is also, somehow, fundamental, as it just simply presupposes each thing as a being: any relative paradigm cannot deny the basic existence of a being. No matter whether the paradigm or normative theory studies things based on perception, or experience, or ideal form, or something else, the being of things is already a given foundation or a minimum common platform. Metaphysics never dismiss the function of perception or experience, or even ideal form (though in a different explanation from Plato's); it also studies them, though it ultimately studies the being and the reason for it.

Therefore, we probably are able to understand, at least initially or in a minimum sense, why metaphysics can be and indeed is equalized to philosophical thinking in terms of '*philo-sophia*' rather than merely '*sophia*'. Rather than other normative theories that attempt to give exclusive explanations of things (in both natural sciences and mental/'social' sciences, or in my preference, in both *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*), metaphysics never attempt to do so, since it never attempt to possess any exclusive knowledge in a definite sense. The reason for metaphysics studying

being and being *qua* being is merely that being is the common and the most general way towards the knowledge of other things.

In the beginning section of the next chapter, I will emphasize the conclusion of limitations of epistemological historicization and the reason for metaphysics again but in a more particular way. Frankly speaking, I indeed feel that metaphysics as an alternative still needs more 'positive' evidences rather than simply listing the negatives of epistemological theory. But I also feel that hereafter particular demonstrations on metaphysical scheme are relatively successful to complete this work of providing such 'positive' evidences.



Chapter 2 – The general structure of a metaphysical science of history: An Aristotelian scheme of ‘practical sciences’

2.1 Limitation of epistemological historicization, and introduction of a metaphysical alternative.

In the previous chapter, by clarifying three levels of the spirit of historical thinking, I argued that the most significant spirit of historical thinking should focus on **the relation between the historical events that happened in the past and the historical thinking in the present**. However, the dominant tradition of the philosophy of history as a differentiated discipline, which may be characterized as epistemological historicization, to a certain degree, fails to establish a historical thinking upon this basis. Epistemological historicization is at best an attempt to explore the range of the knowing capacity that concerns history as its subject matter, that is to say, it focuses only on the nature of the subjectivism *ego* of historical knowing in the present, without any essential concern of the happened in the past. This dominant path is generated and enhanced by at least three waves of epistemological historicization. They are the intellectualization, the individualization, and the fragmentation. These three waves have formed a relatively complete tradition of the modern and the contemporary routine of the philosophy of history, in the sense that the philosophy of history is elaborated upon – somehow, only upon – a scheme of the historicization of the individual’s consciousness.

Though in the previous chapter I have initially introduced how epistemological historicization rules out other possibilities of historical thinking, I am glad to argue more that the limitation of epistemological historicization can be outlined in two levels, which are both related to the spirit of historical thinking. Firstly, I have mentioned that the significance of historical thinking should be focused on the relationship between the past and the present, which means that neither only the past nor only the present can support the completeness of historical thinking. The emphasis on the relation requires a dynamic investigation on the interactivity and the interpenetration of both sides, rather than

simply summarizing the two isolated systems of both sides respectively, especially in the sense that these two sides do not exist in the same temporal dimension. However, epistemological historicization essentially regards the happened past as an affiliated object of the thinking present, which means that, without the subjectivism thinking activity in the current present (irrespective of whether it is a philosophical thinking), the past alone is meaningless, and it is not plausible to prove the existence of itself. Even for the beginning form of epistemological historicization, namely, Hegel's World Spirit, in which the epistemological character was not so obvious, the fundamental aim of a philosophical approach to **histories** is not focused on the diversity and the different identifications of civilizations in the past, but on the self-awareness of the unique modernity, namely, the freedom, which did not exist in and does not need to be verified by the past histories, but merely serves the modern, present existence of freedom, though the meaning of the notion of freedom is generated as a historical result of itself. The other following philosophies of epistemological historicization succeed in this tendency, that is, a tendency in which the happened past for itself does not deliver any character, any structure, or any meaning to the historical thinking in the present; reversely, it is in the thinking present that philosophers and historians are concerned with the happened past and endow the past with meaningful interpretations – meaningful to the present people rather than people directly involved in the events in the past. This phenomenon means epistemological historicization organizes the philosophy of history as a differentiated discipline in an order against the natural temporal sequence: the subjectivism thinking activity in the present has priority over all the real happened histories in the past.

The first limitation may result in a second one. As epistemological historicization establishes a priority of historical thinking in the present over real historical events in the past, any specific scheme that narrows down historical thinking to a differentiated disciplined philosophy of history is initiated and expanded upon in the interpretation of the totally present thinking activity in which the 'structure' or the 'essence' of **history** is less possible than the structure or the essence of **historical thinking**. This may be due to a presupposition that, for modern epistemological philosophies, only the present perceptual knowledge from the mental activity is available and achievable. This further

results in a limited understanding of the discipline 'philosophy of history', that is, though the philosophy of history is thus named, the philosophy of history is actually a philosophical thinking of the historical thinking in the present, rather than a philosophical thinking of the history or the histories in the past. Indeed, as I argued at the end of the previous chapter, epistemological historicization is successful since it offers a variety of modern philosophical concerns and notions to the domain of the study of history, and changes the original materialist tradition of historical writings. However, this success is not the reason for ignoring the initial concern of the philosophy of history, that is, a concern that, though in a philosophical form, cares about the tension between the past and the present, rather than merely the present. By distancing itself from the speculative and the substantive philosophies, epistemological historicization actually rules out a kind of discussion on **the essential nature of history**, which indeed, had been an origin of the broad sense of historical thinking in the beginning of philosophy – though in later days, it was characterized as a certainty and a narrowed sort of the speculative form by epistemological historicization.

Therefore, in general and in short, the predicaments of the philosophy of history under an epistemological historicization scheme can be outlined as the following two: the ignorance of the structural generating of history in the past (in terms of the related historical thinking in the present relatively), and thus the ignorance of **knowing** such structural generating of history (in that the aim of philosophical thinking is focused on the relation between the essence and the knowing of it). In accordance with the subjectivism and individualism principles of epistemological historicization, the dominant philosophies of history rarely attempt to investigate themes like these two, which may be related to the original concerns of the tension between history and philosophy in a temporal dimension, namely, regarding the tension between the past and the present. By arguing about the traditional tension between the historical mortals and the philosophical immortals (just as I introduced as the first spirit of historical thinking in the beginning of the previous chapter) in a temporal dimension, philosophers may endow their thinking activity in the present with a possible interpretation that retrospectively is concerned with what they or their ancestors did in the past, what those activities have

affected, and how they were known by the present philosophers, in the process of which, history is established as a philosophical science. That is to say, an alternative philosophy of history – if we want to enjoy the fruits of but also improve epistemological historicization – has at least two fundamental groups of questions about history: What is the essential nature of history in the past?, and How can the present philosopher know nature in the past?

In order to deal with these two groups of fundamental questions, in the rest of this research, I will refer to a traditional political philosophy and adopt it to the domain of the philosophy of history. This traditional political philosophy is an Aristotelian ‘science of *polis*’ but, more importantly, is also an Aristotelian ‘practical science’, in terms of the Aristotelian three kinds of sciences, namely, theoretical science, practical science, and producing science. Regarding the science of *polis*, I will argue that the science of history (a rigorous term for the philosophy of history according to metaphysics) is another possible practical science, which, together with the science of *polis*, shall be conducted by ‘theoretical science’, namely, metaphysics.

In the rest of this chapter (Chapter 2), I will firstly clarify the reason for referring to an Aristotelian metaphysics rather than the others by narrowing down the scope of ‘metaphysics’ from a revisionary version to a descriptive one, and then clarify some English translations related to this theme as preparation for the subsequent investigation. I will discuss the position and the meaning of practical science in terms of the metaphysical knowledge system and its relation to metaphysics/theoretical science, and will then demonstrate that the metaphysical alternative of the philosophy of history, namely, the ‘science of history’, contains two primary parts, in accordance with the two parts of the science of *polis* conducted by metaphysics/theoretical science. They are the part on *physis* and the part on *technê/phronēsis*. In this chapter, I will briefly explain the basic concern and the significance of each respectively, and will thoroughly demonstrate the principle structures in the next two chapters.

In Chapter 3, for the first part on *physis* (using the title ‘on *physis*’ suggests the interpretations about the natural development and the four causes), I will argue that the developmental process of history accounts for the developmental process of *polis*, both of

which agree with the metaphysical developmental process from the material cause to the formal end cause (*telos*). The science of *polis* regards the citizens' association as the material cause of itself and the constitution of *polis* as the formal end cause. The science of history adopts a similar process, but in a temporal dimension. Historical events perform a chronological nature of history (I characterize it as '*Ordnungszeit*'), in the sense that historical events in the past as the material cause develop into the science of history in the present as the formal end cause according to the temporal antecedent-succeed logic. However, I will also argue that mere developmental interpretation is not enough to sketch the whole perspective of historical thinking since historical events as the material causes are not eliminated even after the knowledge of history in the present is generated; rather, an essential interpretation that investigates the combination of past events and present knowledge is also needed. This interpretation demonstrates that historical events and the science of history together form the understandable historical thinking as a whole and hence become actualized, in the sense that *Ordnungszeit* transforms into *Geschehenszeit* (*ousia* of history), though this transformation also needs the second part, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.

In Chapter 4, for the second part on *technê/phronēsis*, I will argue that, to understand the *ousia* or the fundamental Beingness of *polis*, or the *Geschehenszeit* of history, we must expand the original ethical philosophy on knowing to include the relevance to practical science. To achieve that, I will demonstrate that the Aristotelian knowing is for itself an action of knowing, which on the one hand, with *polis* characterizes the different roles of citizens – citizens have the virtue of *technê* since they generate the *polis* and also have the virtue of *phronēsis* since they practise the political life, and on the other hand, with history, is located beyond a given temporal position in the past to both the past and the thinking present. This demonstration will refer to some Aristotelian concepts like *eudaimonia* and deliberation, and also to *poiesis and praxis*, which are originally explained by Aristotle himself, though all these concepts will be reinterpreted within a historical dimension and regarding the temporal tension between the past and the present.

Finally, in Chapter 5, I will conclude that the historical *eudaimonia* is the final presentation of actualizing *Geschehenszeit*. Also, like the science of *polis*, the science of

history is essentially the actualization of a complex entity in the practical sciences that finally aim to harmonize the universal and the particular. By meeting political philosophy, the philosophy of history may bridge the gap between the real world and the epistemological representations of the real world, just as a *polis* does upon a citizen by combining his or her individual *eudaimonia* with the *eudaimonia* of the whole in which he or she lives and dies.

2.2 Preparing discussion: meanings and translations of ‘metaphysics’ and other terms.

Before presenting the strict meaning of metaphysics, as I have already begun to use the term ‘science of history’, I would firstly like to clarify the term ‘science’. All the ‘science’ I use in this research corresponds to the traditional meaning of ἐπιστήμη (*epistêmê*). *Epistêmê* is the singular form of *epistêmai*, the latter of which can be translated as ‘knowledge’, but which refers more to ‘theoretical knowledge’ than to practical knowledge. However, this is not to say that *epistêmê* is concerned only with theoretical knowledge; rather, *epistêmê* – as it **studies** only theoretical knowledge– is **concerned** also with practical knowledge, and thus forms a comprehensive and systematic grasp of both the theoretical and practical knowledge of a thing, that is, a philosophy of a thing. In this way, the theoretical knowledge has priority over the practical knowledge, since the former drives the latter. Therefore, for example, the ‘science of *polis*/history’ may be equivalent to the ‘philosophical knowledge of *polis*/history,’ in which the theoretical knowledge is studied firstly, then the practical knowledge. It can be seen that, in this sense, the term ‘science’ will never be the same as the modern term ‘scientific methods’, which refers to the neutral quantitative methods in the domain of political or historical studies. A clearer explanation of the difference and the relation between the theoretical science/knowledge and the practical science/knowledge will be given after the following prepared discussion.

2.2.1 A descriptive metaphysics, not a revisionary metaphysics.

Can a metaphysical science of history – in a similar form to a metaphysical science of *polis* – offer a ‘better’ interpretation of history? Or, in other words, is there a ‘real’

philosophy of history which can totally replace epistemological historicization by establishing a comprehensively new purposive end of human beings, rather than merely describing an already-existing structure of the world of history? The answer is no. Or to answer more precisely, metaphysics should not have this as an aim. Even in the minimum sense that providing not a comprehensively purposive end but merely an end without progressive deduction, it is also impossible. It is not only due to the overestimated ambitions on a 'completed' philosophy which aims to establish a grand unification theory (just like the one in contemporary physical science); actually, it is also due to the misunderstanding of the essential task and fundamental feature of philosophy and metaphysics. In terms of the fundamental feature of metaphysics, Hegel's famous metaphor, the owl of Minerva, endows metaphysics with an appropriate meaning; that is, as the highest mental experiencing of the real world, metaphysics is always generated **after** things have happened in the real world. That means that metaphysics neither attempts to predict the future, nor offers a perfect or even a better scheme of given existing things; it describes only the happened past and happening present. Some contemporary specialists on metaphysics, like P. F. Strawson, have made clearer demonstrations of this 'falling behind' character (in terms of the real world) of metaphysics by distinguishing between two kinds of metaphysics, that is, revisionary metaphysics and descriptive metaphysics. According to Strawson, revisionary metaphysics, like Cartesian metaphysics (using the term 'metaphysics' in a broad sense), aims to create a better or even a perfect scheme of the real world, which does not require concrete reformation of the real world, though it does require a revision of the real world in which the structure of the real world is mentally fragmented and reorganized. In contrast, descriptive metaphysics is content merely to "describe the actual structure of our thought about the world" (Strawson, 1961, p.9). Descriptive metaphysics, as it investigates the actuality of reality rather than any potentiality, offers the most fundamental groups of concepts and structures which are used to explain the already-given existing world. These groups of concepts and structures for themselves are merely the descriptions and no more, which is to say, any further explanation aiming to achieve a potential or better scheme may be based on these descriptions (since a better

scheme may also refer to these concepts) but may never be the descriptions themselves: descriptions cannot be made of any potential and essentially non-existing (at least when the descriptions are being made) things.

An important argument given by descriptive metaphysics locates the relation between the general and the particular, especially in terms of the traditional philosophy that metaphysics as the theoretical science conducts the other practical sciences: does metaphysics conduct the science of *polis*/history in merely the general scope or in every particular case? In the historical or political world where the historical or political events have already happened and become the given realities, in contrast to the revisionary metaphysics, which comes from and aims to reform the conceptualized results of the general framework of potentiality, descriptive metaphysics is the conceptualized result of the actuality. This actuality is formed from the generalizing grasp of the particulars, and it is in the particulars that the practical sciences study and work. Therefore, any descriptive metaphysics that deals with the actuality where the practical sciences have real subject matters, like political and historical events (in terms of this, revisionary metaphysics deals with potentiality and does not involve real subject matter), naturally comprises both the general grasp and the particular cases. However, this does not mean that descriptive metaphysics must investigate every particular case, since descriptive metaphysics conducts the studies of particulars in general. When one needs to investigate a particular case, descriptive metaphysics can be applied since it conducts this kind of particular investigation, whereas revisionary metaphysics cannot, since it is the result only of the generality. As Strawson argued,

Each of us is, at any moment, in possession of such a framework – a unified framework of knowledge of particulars, in which we ourselves and, usually, our immediate surroundings have their place, and of which each element is uniquely related to every other and hence to ourselves and our surroundings (Strawson, 1961, p.24).

Even in the science of history, though we cannot experience most historical events in the perceptual sense, we can still investigate the particular knowledge of history, since a descriptive metaphysical framework of history (and the theoretical knowledge of it)

provides us with the presupposed condition of epistemological demonstrating (which may be related to the perception) and locating ourselves in a certain reference point in the perspective of the whole of history. It is in this sense that a metaphysical science of history, just like a metaphysical science of *polis*, which has already been argued by Aristotle, is restricted as a descriptive rather than the revisionary one: a science of history does not create history, but only describes history. As long as the real world has already been given – has already been the reality rather than any potentiality in a metaphysical sense – it is impossible for a ‘better world’ to become the real.

But thus, questions arise. Though revisionary metaphysics are ruled out, and descriptive metaphysics will be concerned with the relation of itself to the science of *polis*/history as ‘practical science’, it still needs to be clarified why an Aristotelian philosophy (in terms of the unity of the metaphysics and the practical sciences) deserves the first consideration rather than a Platonic or a Kantian philosophy. These two kinds of philosophy also offer a descriptive perspective of the real world rather than any better scheme (except Kant’s idea of perpetual peace). Indeed, by mentioning an ‘Aristotelian philosophy’ rather than ‘Aristotle’s philosophy’, I am not going to construct any systematic interpretation of the philosophy of history based upon his own words and arguments on the theme of history. Instead, I will construct the interpretation upon the fundamental spirit of his systematic philosophy, which is meaningful not only for his own self, but also has had a significant impact on almost all the philosophies after him. So, in the following sections, I am going to clarify the character of Aristotelian philosophy by distinguishing it from a Platonic or other descriptive philosophy, and then discuss whether Aristotle himself had any comment on any ‘science of history’.

2.2.2 An Aristotelian descriptive metaphysics, not a Platonic one.

In my investigation on the difference between the Aristotelian philosophy and others, the two most important points are that (1) for Aristotelian philosophy, an experiencing world and a conceptual or ‘abstract’ world are the same world, especially in terms of a historical world in which historical events as realities have already been given: what happened in the past is the actuality for the present world rather than any potentiality;

and that (2) the scope of an Aristotelian metaphysics covers the broadest sense of the relation between itself and others. And these reasons, though they can be concerned as immediate preparations of a science of history, are still needed to relate to a basic problem, that is, (3) whether Aristotle himself had argued for a science of history.

(1) Different from Plato, who demonstrated metaphysics as a reasonable system of a world of *eidōs* ('ideal forms'), Aristotle argued that metaphysics is a natural system of an experiencing world which comprises perceivable entities and one non-perceivable entity as the final reason. In terms of the essence of their metaphysics, both Plato and Aristotle adopted an apriorism structure of metaphysics, which means our conceptual world is **from** – be careful, as there is no acting verb here – our experience of daily life through a systematic, essentialist, and absolutist theoreticalization. This 'from' for Plato is 'abstract', since for him, real philosophers (people who own real knowledge rather than opinions) abstract the experience and 'push' the abstracted conceptual world of ideal forms to an opposite position of the experiencing world as a counterpart, which finally generates two different (but related) worlds. Meanwhile, for Aristotle, the theoreticalization world and the experiencing world is the same world, since the naturalism system of entities is discovered, described, and demonstrated (note, not the 'revisionary' verbs like 'create' or 'established') in our current daily experiencing world. Therefore, as I am going to establish a metaphysical interpretation of a science of history, of a world of already happened things which are mentally being studied in the present, it is inappropriate and even impossible to create an abstracted but different world of ideal forms that exists in an atemporal dimension. The link between the past and the present, as the fundamental theme of the science of history, though it corresponds to the spirit of Platonic philosophy regarding the tension between the mortal and the eternal immortal, will finally be against the systematic frameworks of the *eidōs*. This is because such a detailed demonstrated system of *eidōs* regards the atemporal eternal immortal as a higher world than the temporal world, rather than an equal world which can be experientially applied by temporal beings. Two worlds – one with eternal atemporal *eidōs*, the other with temporal beings – may lead to conflict when there is a hierarchy among them.

(2) The scope of an Aristotelian metaphysics is beyond the usual understandings of

metaphysics as a limited or isolated demonstration of priorism. An Aristotelian metaphysics should be investigated under a holistic view crossing the metaphysics itself; the physics (in its classical sense, namely, 'the science of thing for its own cause and sake'); the theories of practical affairs, which comprises the science of ethics, economics (in the classical sense of household rather than modern economics); politics; and perhaps the science of history, which I am attempting to demonstrate in this research. For an Aristotelian philosophy, metaphysics is not an isolated *epistêmai*; it comprises several interactive relations to the other sciences, which together consist of the fundamental structure of the system of Aristotelian philosophy as a whole, rather than an individually disciplined metaphysics: an Aristotelian metaphysics is the *epistêmê* in a holistic sense of a set of *epistêmai*. I will expand upon this point regarding the relation between the theoretical science and the practical sciences later.

(3) However, it is difficult to conclude that Aristotle himself had developed any science of history, even in the general sense of philosophical thoughts of history rather than a discipline. Some contemporary specialists have argued that he did have historical theories; however, actually, most of these 'theories' have been regarded as supplementary demonstrations of the science of politics in a historical form, rather than the 'historiography' or 'philosophy of history' in the modern sense (Raymond, 1977, p.202). For Raymond Weil, one of the specialists who study Aristotle's thoughts on history, Aristotle did have a historical vision of theoretically grasping the events of his and his ancestors' era, which is different from the traditional Greek historians, like Herodotus, who merely established the order of historical facts, or Thucydides, who studied the power conflicts among countries in the vision of political history. Rather, it is possible to trace clearly how Aristotle's metaphysical concepts, like essence and accident, were implicitly adopted in his historical writings, though such theoretical hints had not been developed into any individual historiography, but rather, historically corresponded to Aristotle's political categories in *Athenia Constitution* and *Politics*. Weil also noticed that there may be an implicit accordance of the metaphysical four causes in the political-historical example of Solon's constitution (and also the discrepancies between the similar but finally different explanations of this case from *Athenia Constitution* and

Politics). However, rather than offering evidence of the development of history for its own sake, this example was demonstrated as an empirical suggestion of political teleology which argues for a possible progress (surprisingly, or a decline) of a constitution. Aristotle paid attention to the historical difference by identifying two different historical periods, the past and the present, so that he could illustrate the development from ancient times to the modern and his own period, which finally corresponded to his political philosophy on the development from household to city-state. However, the political development from household to city-state is not very coherent with his theory on the relationship of citizens to the city-state, especially in terms of his own empirical explanations of the history of constitutions. Therefore, as Aristotle himself never mentions a science of history (not even an empirical one), those incoherent historical cases should be regarded at most as the complementary conceptions of political philosophy rather than the unchanged historical facts – as realities – from which the philosophy of history begins. At least Aristotle himself conceded that there are several ways of achieving the end of a city-state according to different circumstances. Relatively speaking, compared to the science of politics, Aristotle had not developed any theory discussing the nature, the task, or the end of the science of history.

However, this does not mean that we cannot explore the nature of a possible science of history based upon an Aristotelian philosophy (which is different from Weil's argument). Actually, it returns to the discussion on the scope of the science of history. When people mention the theme 'history' in philosophical vocabularies, what they implicitly suggest may be a meaningful end of history (irrespective of whether a general end or ends of particular histories) like Hegel has done, or conversely, a none-end that destroys the presupposed meaning; they can also investigate the nature of the enquiring actions of historical knowledge rather than history itself, in the sense in which the critical theorists have developed forward the approach to a science of history rather than what the speculative theorists of history did. However, we should also keep firmly in mind that our discussion in this research is investigating the fundamental nature of the science of history rather than history itself, which means that if there is a discussion about the nature or the meaning, it is definitely the nature or the meaning of the science studied by

philosophers who are concerned comprehensively with history (so that it develops into the science) by the present thinking. It is not the nature or the meaning of the subject matters of history, namely, mere historical events, studied by **historians** who are concerned only with the given or located circumstances in the event's own time and place. If I establish a theoretical investigation in an Aristotelian sense and define it as studying the nature or the meaning of the science of history, such a nature or meaning is not the nature or meaning of a particular history or histories, and not even of a general history; it is the nature or the meaning of the science itself. Therefore, though Aristotle himself never developed any 'science of history' in a strict sense of a discipline, we can in the broadest sense demonstrate a science of history in accordance with an Aristotelian philosophy of a science, since those principles are applied to the science itself, and not to the subject-matters of the science.

2.2.3 Translations and a basic explanation of the term οὐσία/*ousia*/entity: primary and secondary instances.

As the last but not the least important preparation in demonstrating a science of history, in the following, I am going to explicate some English translations, especially of the term οὐσία, which constructs the primary (*prōtē*) instances of the philosophy of Being that conducts the primary structure of a metaphysical science of history. These translations refer not only to Aristotle's own usages, or Aristotelian usages, but also in the most general scope to the common contemporary usages, which means I will revise or even abandon some certain special usages that may cause confusion for specific readers of the philosophy of history rather than traditional philosophy. Besides, since some original Greek terms, which had been inappropriately translated into the Latin language (then the English with same linguistic root as the Latin rather than the Greek), have already become widely acceptable nowadays, I will to the most general extent keep the Latin or English forms of those concepts, and will revise only when necessary.

The most (and perhaps among the contemporary Anglo-American world, the only) significant analysis of Aristotle's and Aristotelian usages of οὐσία has been given by Joseph Owens (Owens, 1978, Chapter 4). In ancient Greek, οὐσία as a noun is derived

from the Greek verb εἶναι, which means ‘to be’. Its present participle is οὔσα (Being). According to Owens, the most exact English translation of οὐσία as a noun is thus ‘Beingness’ rather than ‘Being’, though in modern English, they correspond to each other equivalently. However, the problem of Beingness is that in the English philosophical context (though there is no such a word in English), Beingness expresses an abstractive tendency, whereas Aristotle denoted οὐσία in a very concrete and individual sense: “Nothing common or universal can be οὐσία” (Owens, 1978, p.137; *Metaphysics*, 1038b34-1039a2, 1042a21-22). Beingness cannot serve a relation between the abstractiveness notion and οὐσία in English. Is there an alternative?

There are two Latin-origin terms that have been used very often as the equivalents of οὐσία in modern philosophical English, specifically, ‘substance’ and ‘essence’, both of which were developed from the Latin and Christian philosophical tradition. Similar to οὐσία, the original Latin term expressing ‘Beingness’, namely, *entia* (*essentia*), as a noun, is generated from the verb meaning ‘to be’, namely, *esse*, and its neuter plural participle *ens* (*essens*). However, far beyond the linguistic similarity, the Latin rendition of Greek οὐσία enlarges and even distorts the original meanings in Greek contexts. According to Owens, it was in the fourth century that *essentia* was fixed in the meaning of *natura*, which expressed *causa sui*, like φυσικς (*physis*) had done in Greek, and in the meantime, the term *substantia* was equivalent to *essentia*. Specifically, at that time, Quintilian preferred to use *substantia* to denote something ‘standing under’ accidental characteristics, whereas Seneca denoted the permanent ones, while both of them used *substantia* in correspondence to the secondary significations of the Aristotelian οὐσία (Owens, 1978, pp.141-142). In the fifth century, St. Augustine regarded *substantia* and *essentia* as very nearly the same as *natura*, which further proved the impossibility of expressing the primary meaning of οὐσία, namely, the Being in its pure and unchangeable state. In the sense that *substantia* denotes changeable things (more or less, depending on the context), initially and linguistically speaking, *essentia* can be the Latin equivalent of οὐσία, unless it fails to keep a distance from *natura*, which denotes *causa sui* as the secondary and changeable reason rather than the unchangeable state. Therefore, though *essentia* may be the exact translation of οὐσία, we can hardly regard it as the equivalent in

the modern context due to its own history of usage (especially given that later, Locke denoted substance/*substantia* with a stronger tendency of ‘standing under’), and even the use of Latin transliteration rather than Latin translation.

Then the English term ‘essence’ has not been used as an equivalent of other notions in English, and has kept the immediate original form of ‘to be’ (*esse*). However, Owens argues that the English ‘essence’ implies some kind of contrast to ‘existence’, which is not expressed in the Greek οὐσία (Owens, 1978, p.147).²² Besides, and in some ways more importantly, he also argues that English essence is used to express the peculiar εἶναι (to be), which actually corresponds to the dynamic acting phrase τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι rather than to the stationary noun οὐσία (Beingness). These two expressions may refer to the same thing in terms of the primary instances of οὐσία, which indicates the pure unchangeable Being; however, they may be totally different in terms of the secondary instances: οὐσία can denote the matter of thing, whereas τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι can **never** do so. English essence expresses only the pure unchangeable Being, which is merely one part of the whole of οὐσία.

Owens gives us a plausible set of principles of English translations of οὐσία, especially in the case of no suitable English translations being found and thus the transliteration, ‘ousia’, is acceptable. According to him, what is required is an English word that (1) implies no prejudices in favour of any post-Aristotelian theory of Being; (2) is more abstractive in form than ‘Being’; (3) can denote the individual, both concrete and incomposite; and (4) expresses to English ears an immediate relation with Being (Owens, 1978, pp.148-149). Following these principles, perhaps the English term ‘entity’ may be the relatively best translation of οὐσία, especially in the sense that it denotes both the abstract and the concrete thing and applies to both essence and existence, although it has not been used as an ordinary translation of the Aristotelian term in terms of the transliteration accordance. I also prefer to use ‘entity’ as an equivalent of οὐσία (but may use ‘first entity’ to refer to the primary instances, to the fundamental Beingness, or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, of οὐσία), since as well as the above, it also expresses a clearer structure that **comprises both primary and secondary instances** of Beingness than do all other

²² In my view, Heidegger also noticed this contrast in English, but he demonstrated it in a relatively ambivalent way rather than directly explain the contrast.

translations, which may be significant to our following research: we want to discuss the fundamental Being of history by attempting to discover a metaphysical science of history, but must discuss the *physis* and *phronēsis* of the Being in the sense of secondary instances of Beingness, rather than the Beingness itself in the primary instances, since according to Aristotelian metaphysics **the fundamental τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι can only be ‘grasped’ from functional (*ergon*) descriptions but not from presenting itself.**

Therefore, as the embodiment of this research is English, I will mostly use ‘entity’ as the equivalent of οὐσία, which denotes the Being of both abstract and concrete things (for ‘entity’ itself, it refers to an individual, but as we will see later, ‘complex entity’). In addition, since I will discuss mostly the secondary instances of οὐσία rather than the primary instances to describe the practical characteristics of history as a complex entity, in the remainder, I will not mention the difference between ‘entity’ and ‘first entity’ every time. What we should remember is merely that the ‘first entity’ is the equivalent of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι in the sense of primary instances which makes a thing be itself, whereas **the ‘entity’ comprises both primary and secondary instances and emphasizes the secondary ones**, since the secondary ones (like *physis* and *phronēsis*) consist of the descriptive structure of such an entity. Sometimes, I will use Latin transliterations of some certain notions, like *physis* and *phronēsis*, for example, to express the original meaning in the Aristotelian *constellation* philosophy, whose original Greek forms are not widely acceptable or have different meanings in the modern context of the philosophy of history. I will also use some transliterations similar to *ti ên einai* rather than τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι just for convenience, as long as it does not cause serious confusion like *substance* did.

In addition, I would like to say more about *physis* and ‘physics’. We should be very aware that the term ‘physics’ in this research is totally different from its modern usage, which refers to the modern science, and, indeed, is different from the ‘equivalent’ Latin, *natura*: actually, they are not equivalent to each other. The original Greek of ‘physics’ is φυσικη, which comes from φυσικς meaning ‘growing from itself and for its own cause’. The Latin **transliteration** of φυσικς is *physis*, which can be used as equivalent to φυσικς. However, the Latin **translation** of φυσικς is *natura*, the meaning of which has been extended, like the ‘nature’ of ‘great nature’ and ‘essential characteristics’, for example, and

cannot be found in the Greek original φυσίς. Also, *natura* has been used as an equivalence to *essential* and *substantia*, as I have argued above, and causes the confusion between the primary instances and secondary instances of ούσία.²³ More unfortunate than the case of ούσία and its English translation (first) ‘entity’, in modern English, we cannot find any word expressing the exactly equal meaning to the Greek φυσίς without the contaminates from the Latin *natura* and the English ‘nature’. Therefore at best we use the original form, or at most the Latin **transliteration** ‘*physis*’, to express the meaning of ‘for its own cause’, ‘self-causing’, or *causa sui*.

2.3 Science of history as a practical science but also concerning the theoretical science/metaphysics: the primary structure.

Now, a metaphysical interpretation of a science of history based upon those preparations can be introduced. As I have argued, the fundamental character of such a science of history is that it is a practical science, especially in terms of how it studies the practical affairs, but also is concerned with the theoretical structures. The relation between practical science and theoretical science may be concluded as, in short, the theoretical science conducting the practical science(s), and reversely the practical science(s) corresponding to the theoretical science. Therefore, what is a ‘practical science’? And in what sense does it account to theoretical science?

This sort of questions should be asked with particular reference to the fundamental principle of Being, namely, that we can ‘**grasp**’ the primary instances of Being as ‘entity’ only by investigating the secondary instances of such an entity, like *physis* and *technê/phronēsis* which present the functions (*ergon*) of such an entity, since the primary instances entity or the ούσία defines the thing to which the entity belongs, but the primary instances entity cannot be defined by other definitions in the same primary instances level. The primary instances entity can be described – rather than be defined – only from the secondary instances level. Here, I would like to add one note about the ‘primary’ to avoid any potential confusion: the ‘primary’ of ‘primary instances’ refers only

²³ Analysis of the philosophical consequence of Latin translation *natura* can be seen in Heidegger’s ‘The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics’, in his *An Introduction to Metaphysics*; and ‘On the Essence and Concept of φυσίς in Aristotle’s *Physics* B, I’, in his *Pathmark*.

to the fundamental Being, whereas the ‘primary’ of ‘primary structure’ is based on my attempt to construct a metaphysical science of history that is used as a relative counterpart of secondary structures (on *physis* and on *technê/phronēsis*). Strictly speaking, the primary structure which initially conducts the contents of a practical science in a metaphysical sense actually corresponds to the secondary instances of the studies of Being, since such contents, like *physis* and *technê/phronēsis*, are described in terms of the secondary instances of entity. Therefore, the distinction between primary structure and secondary structure is made based only upon the contents of a practical science – we introduce a science by introducing its general scope firstly and then the particular cases – rather than the essentially characterized distinction between the primary instances and the secondary instances of entity.

Now, the focus shifts to the ‘practical science’. Here, I use ‘practical’ in a totally different sense from the contemporary contexts, especially from the modern tradition of ‘philosophy of practice/se’ which may include Marx, Arendt, Bourdieu, *etc.* Though some of them did actually expand ‘practice’ to the sense of the sciences-differentia, which is derived from Aristotle’s theory, they are still concerned with ‘practical science’ differently from the Aristotelian philosophy. Of course, this is not to say we **must** accept the Aristotelian definition firmly without any change; rather, I would prefer to say that we **can** do that since it defines the particular domain of what we are going to investigate. In this sense, we need to define a ‘practical science’ beyond, even against, the contemporary changed meanings.

Aristotle was the first²⁴ to make a rigorous division but also mutual relevance between ‘theoretical science’, ‘practical science’, and ‘productive science’. (*Metaphysics*, 1025b18 and 1026b4) As we are at the initial stage of this theme, what we should currently know is that theoretical science,²⁵ also known as ‘primary philosophy’, studies being *qua* being, whereas practical and productive sciences study the principles of motion

²⁴ Aristotle’s division may possibly be inherited from Plato, who distinguished cognitive sciences from practical sciences, though with ambiguity about the definition of each and the boundary between each. See Newman, 1887, pp.4-5.

²⁵ The knowledge of such theoretical science, namely, the ἐπιστήμη (*epistēmê*) I have highlighted, is often translated into ‘scientific knowledge’ in various versions like Loeb’s. Actually, the translation itself is no problem but please remember its different context from the contemporary one, and its relevance to the other notions in the metaphysical system.

in which the reason of motion is either inside or outside the originator of motion respectively. Now I will discuss the characterized differences in detail, by regarding theoretical and practical science as differing (1) in subject matter, (2) in aim, (3) in the faculty employed, and (4) in method.²⁶ I will then discuss the relevance.

2.3.1 Characteristics of practical science as differing from theoretical science.

(1) In subject-matter. The final aim of this research is to establish a new interpretation of history with the consideration of political philosophy. History, being similar to politics, is the history of and by mankind, just like politics is of and by mankind; but which science is the one that **the science of mankind** should belong to? A common answer may be practical science, since mankind, according to the common understanding of the definition of practical science, has the agency to act and indeed, does act which corresponds to the subject-matter of practical science. However, this answer misses some implicitly characterized theoretical elements which are located within practical science. To illustrate the theoretical elements of a practical science, I should firstly clarify that there are three different theoretical sciences. According to Aristotle, there are three different sub-disciplines of theoretical science: the 'things self-existent, unchangeable and separable from matter', namely, metaphysics; the 'things unchangeable and separable from matter only in logical conception', namely, mathematics; and the 'things inseparable from matter and subject to change', namely, physics (*Metaphysics*, 1026a5). By investigating its definition, it can be seen that the science of nature, that is, physics, is apparently closest to practical science, since though the principles of physics are within and not outside physics, the character of the subject matter of physics is changeable, which is in accordance with the practical science that deals with the changeable things acted by mankind. Meanwhile, one more important element of such a science of nature, physics, is that mankind is itself also the subject matter of physics. This point can be understood by one of the principles of physics, that is, the source of nutrition and growth, which is the inner cause of mankind and which corresponds to physics. However, when an individual takes an action, he or she as an originator of the action is not the subject

²⁶ I agree with Newman's conclusions and my own analysis followed each. Newman, 1887, pp.6-10.

matter of physics, since the principles of the action are outside the action: the principles of an action belong to the individual, not to the action itself. Therefore, the individual who is at the immediate point of acting is the subject matter of practical science. However, we should be very careful. This is not to suggest any 'progress' from the theoretical science to the practical science to understand the acting agency of mankind; rather, it is saying that, the opinion that an individual who has taken the action (irrespective of what it might be) cannot be understood from the theoretical level any more, is misunderstood. If politics and history are two of the subject matters of the sciences of mankind, the *to ti ên einai* or the Being of politics and history should be the subject matter of theoretical science, and the agency of man of (in) politics and history should belong to practical science, since the latter corresponds to the purpose of the completeness of human goodness. Hence, a science of politics or history concerns both theoretical and practical science, though it belongs to and directly studies the latter.

(2) In aim. Practical science can be distinguished from theoretical science by their different aims, as Aristotle argued:

Our present study [practical science], unlike the other branches of philosophy, has a practical aim (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for the sake of knowing what it is, but in order that we may become good, without which result our investigation would be of no use), we have consequently to carry our enquiry into the region of conduct, and to ask how we are to act rightly (*bonus*); since our actions, as we have said, determine the quality of our dispositions. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103b26-29)

From this famous argument above, it can be seen that the final aim of practical science is prompting the good (*bonum*), especially the particular good since it accounts to each particular action. However, this is not to say that practical science is concerned only with a particular action; on the contrary, "It is the special mark of one who studies any subject philosophically, and not solely with regard to its practical aspect, that he does not overlook or omit any point" (*Politics*, 1279b12-14), which means that, as a practical science investigating the affairs of mankind, the science of *polis* or history is not concerned only with the particular sense of an action whereby a *polis* has been generated

or a history has been given, but also calls for its theoretical presuppositions, which are about the **knowledge** of a 'rightly' action, which belongs to the domain of metaphysics and physics in the general sense. Theoretical science, including metaphysics and physics (and even mathematics), aims to promote the general knowledge of things, whereas a practical science aims to promote a particular good, though without a pre-understanding of theoretical science, it is incomplete.

(3) In the faculty employed. According to the division made by Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139a1-15), the soul of man can be divided into two parts: rational and irrational. And the rational part of soul contains also two parts. One is 'scientific' (ἐπιστήμη), which deals with the unchangeable existence, namely, the subject matters of theoretical science, and the other is 'calculative',²⁷ which deals with changeable existence, namely, the subject matters of practical science. The faculties employed in the two sciences correspond to the two parts of rational soul respectively, which determines the order of the two sciences themselves. Firstly, both theoretical and practical sciences involve achieving true knowledge; however, the truth of theoretical science is pure and unconditional, whereas the truth of the latter should be that of a true correspondence to the right desire, that is, it is conditional on the circumstances (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139a30, and the three elements in the soul in 1139a 18-20). Secondly, theoretical science is merely about the intellect, since it is without any relevance to any action, whereas practical science corresponds to both intellect and desire, since "man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect", (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139b5-7), and hence man needs the scientific part of the rational soul but belongs to the calculative part of the rational soul. These two steps of the faculty of the soul, for both Aristotle and Aristotelian philosophies, have successfully established an order between theoretical science and practical science in a deeper sense that enhances the former two points. The aim of theoretical science is restricted to itself by the faculty of its part of soul; therefore, theoretical science can exist alone and the intellectual part of the soul to which theoretical science belongs is superior. In contrast, the aim of a practical science is outside itself in accordance with its part of the soul. Thus, the principles of an action

²⁷ Aristotle said it is equal to 'deliberation'.

belong to the originator, and therefore, any research of the action should be performed upon the research outside itself, namely, upon the originator, who has been the subject matter of theoretical science since its inner causes, *physis*, are the subject-matter of physics. Then practical science must regard theoretical science as its foundation, and the calculative part of the soul to which a practical science belongs is inferior, which is also demonstrated in the tenth book of *Nicomachean Ethics*: the life of intellectual faculty, or in other words, speculative wisdom or contemplation, is the highest life (even higher than the life of man!) (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a19-25 and 1177b27) and “The life of moral virtue is happy only in a secondary degree” (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1178a12)

(4) In method. In theoretical science, the study of an intellectual entity is merely a study of itself as an already-given definition: though we can investigate the generating process of a definition, we do not necessarily need such a process to support any determinative metaphysical argument, since it is not a science of the history of thoughts or concepts, but merely a science of logics. However, in practical science, we must consider the whole process from the point when the originator was taking an action to the point when the action has been generated, since the cause of the action is outside itself but belongs to the subject matter of a practical science, namely, mankind. For Aristotle, the study of theoretical science begins from the study of the four causes, namely, the material cause (matter), the formal cause (form), the power cause, and the end cause (*telos*),²⁸ and then moves to the essence or the being *qua* being of entity, as knowledge in a general sense. But these four causes cannot be arranged into one linear process, since they are intellectual definitions of an entity which is used to describe the entity rather than to determine the entity. That is to say, these four causes will **not** disappear even after the generation of an entity has already been done. For example, how is it best to understand such a sentence: “A seed is the material cause of a tree”? When the tree has grown up, this seed itself disappears. Is this to suggest the disappearance of the material cause of this tree? The answer is no, because the disappeared seed is still one of the

²⁸ Aristotle also claimed that the last three causes can be united into one cause, for “the essential nature of a thing and the purpose for which it is produced are often identical (so that the final cause coincides with the formal), and moreover the power cause must bear some resemblance in ‘form’ to the effect (so that the power cause too must, so far, coincide with the formal)”. (*Physics*, 198a25-29)

reasons for the tree's current being. For the tree that has been generated, the seed is its eternal cause and should be studied in a static sense that relates to the general knowledge of the theoretical definitions. On the contrary, the study of practical science begins from the study of the generating process of an entity. Analysis shows that the entity has become its current being by whatever action has been done or was done. Therefore, the knowledge of such a finished or still finishing action, namely, the results of theoretical science, especially physics, are required **before** we discuss how to achieve the good (*bonum*) by endowing the action with meanings. The order between 'to know' and 'to do' truly does exist, and in the Aristotelian tradition, 'to know' is logically and temporally superior to 'to do'. Theoretical science stops at exploring knowing, whereas practical science should correspond to both knowing and practice.

2.3.2 Fundamental relevance between the theoretical science and practical sciences.

For Aristotelian philosophies, and in the broadest sense, for philosophers who investigate the tension between the temporal mortals and the eternal immortal, irrespective of the differences between theoretical science and practical science shown above, the ultimate aim (rather than the immediate aim presented in the previous sub-section) of all kinds of science, including both unchangeable and changeable knowledge, is *eudaimonia*, namely, the 'final good' or the 'ultimate good'.

To demonstrate the meaning of *eudaimonia*, Aristotle preliminarily introduced the concept of the **function** (*ergon*) of human beings as being to achieve a good life, which is explicated in the level of both theoretical science and practical science. In general, continuing the topic of the difference between the primary instances and the secondary instances of *ousia*,²⁹ the function of human beings in the domain of practical science, like politics, is the only perceivable basis by which the primary instances of the Being of such a domain can be grasped, though such a function is essentially the secondary instances of the Being rather than the primary, since it presents the *physis* and *phronēsis* rather than the *ousia* of the practical domain, the latter of which is strictly limited to the domain of theoretical science. However, this is not to say that the function of human beings in

²⁹ See section 2.2.3.

practical sciences is irrelevant to theoretical science. On this theme, some specialists of both Aristotle's and Aristotelian philosophies, such as Irwin, have already argued for the relevance between theoretical science, especially metaphysics, and practical sciences in a fundamental sense,³⁰ though few of them have developed any demonstration of such a relevance into a more holistic one that may specifically conduct the structure of practical sciences like the science of *polis* or of history. Either way, it is still worth considering what Irwin has discussed about the relevance in general.

For Irwin, *ousia*, or the entity (Irwin chooses 'substance' as the English translation in his article) in the sense of the primary instances, is the most basic reality in the world, and it becomes what it is due to its form rather than its matter. The form of a natural *ousia* is the reason for the characterized function of such an *ousia*, and this form is presented by its structural relevance to the others, rather than its apparent structure (Irwin, 1980, p.38). Therefore, the reason for such a natural *ousia* applies not only to nature itself but also to human beings, since the structural relevance of form is also presented by the function of human beings, especially in the sense that, according to Aristotle, for human beings, the soul is the form of the living body and the body is matter (*De Anima*, 412a16-21), and the ultimate goal of such human beings' entity is the *eudaimonia* of him or herself, which is presented by the soul as form. To this extent, it is not surprising that for the ancient philosophers like Aristotle, psychic states are viewed as types of goal-directed activity rather than material states, with the latter often described as one of the starting points of modern philosophies, like Cartesian philosophy. Irwin also made a comparison between these two tendencies of philosophies especially regarding the transparency characteristic (if there is one) of self-consciousness (Irwin, 1980, pp.42-43). For Descartes, soul and body are totally different entities so that the mental states are given totally for their own mental cause such that the transparency of self is completely irrelevant to the material body: I myself as an *ego* am meaningful if and only if I currently and actually know this as doing *cogito* – the body is not necessary for my awareness of myself or for my essential existence. For Aristotle, however, the soul as the *ousia* of a

³⁰ For a famous example, see Irwin, 1980, p.35. Some scholars who are not specialists on Aristotle also make similar suggestions on the relevance between metaphysics and practical sciences, for example, see Reiner Schurmann's short analysis on Aristotle in a footnote of his research of Heidegger. Schurmann, 1990, pp.328-329, footnote 32.

human being in the essential sense endows the meaning of a crucial need to the material body and provides the functional end (achieving the *eudaimonia*) to the material body, so that soul and body “are causally relevant to a teleological explanation of the movement of a living organism” (Irwin, 1980, p.43).

This demonstration emphasizing the relevance between the principles of metaphysics and their practical applications (in terms of the applications to human beings) can initiate further explorations of a metaphysical interpretation of practical science, though it has not become a theme of practical science in a strict sense since it does not even belong to the science of ethics but merely to a broad sense of science of the agency of human beings. Either way, it may eliminate at least one of the misunderstandings of practical science, that is, a practical science could be organized in the most restricted sense so that all the principal regulations of such a science must follow the metaphysical progresses one by one. For example, historical events must be arranged into several progressive stages as subordinate material causes in terms of a strict teleology which serves an ultimate goal. However, a practical science does not need to behave like this. Actually, this relevance, or the metaphysical application in practical science, is more dynamic than our misunderstanding leads us to believe. Indeed, specifically referring to the domain of history in which the temporal relation is concerned rather than merely the domain of politics, in some cases, this relevance between metaphysics and the science of history may suggest a progressive interpretation of several historical ‘stages’. Nonetheless, these progressive stages are not arranged in every particular material cause – if the metaphysical concepts of material and formal causes are applied; rather, the term ‘stages’ under a metaphysical interpretation should be understood as a progress of a logical thinking by which people conceptualize different particular materials and then abstract them as notions, that is to say, not as the progress of history itself, but as the progress of **the thinking** of history.

Of course, this dynamic character of the relevance between metaphysics and practical science, namely, the function-leading/presenting of *ousia*, has been deliberated well in the science of ethics (rather than the science of *polis*) by Aristotle himself. Following Aristotle’s own writing sequence on the theme of soul and body in *De Anima*,

we can notice that the regulations of the broad sense of the science of the agency of human beings are gradually narrowed down into specific principles of the science of ethics, though the core or the final end of the principles was thoroughly presented not in *De Anima* but in *Nicomachean Ethics*, that is, as was mentioned in the beginning of this sub-section, *eudaimonia*. In short, the function of human beings belongs to practical science, whereas the theme of *ousia* belongs to metaphysics; however, *eudaimonia* makes them meet up together. For Aristotle, as far as the soul is the *ousia* of living beings, the desire of *eudaimonia* is thus a part of the human *ousia*, since whether the desire is rational defines whether an *ousia* is a human *ousia* or just an animal *ousia*: only the one for *eudaimonia* is rational. *Eudaimonia* is explicated in the meaning of a comprehensive or overall good which is probably no better than any other good under the current circumstances, but it must be considered for the whole of the living life. It may not be satisfied by the goal of an individual good arising from immediate experience, but may be satisfied by the goal of a good which includes other goals of others' goods arising from not only the immediate experience but also from the knowledge – the knowledge of not only the particular but also the general. For Aristotle, the *ousia* of animals, namely, their souls, fails to present such a rational ability as the fundamental function of achieving a non-immediate good for the overall or ultimate good for themselves, and are without any knowledge of the general; and rather than the apparent descriptions, it can be seen that Aristotle – and in a broad sense, the Aristotelians as succeeding this principle – actually regarded the ethics of human beings as primarily differing from the function of animals, which means that the different functions of practical entities are given not for their own sake, but for the *ousia* that is fundamentally beneath them. Therefore, referring to practical sciences like the science of *polis* and history, to understand them in terms of not only their subject-matters but also their comprehensive structure, that is, how the science studies rather than what the science studies, we must investigate the fundamental regulations of their *ousia*.

2.3.3 General conclusion of the characteristics of practical science: science of *polis* as an example.

At the level of the principles rather than the detailed contents, what I have described above aims to show the characterized features of the structure of practical sciences. In short, a practical science should be established in the most comprehensive sense that concerns both its metaphysical regulations and its own practical subject matters. In terms of its structure, it should point to the *ousia* of the domain of itself, like the *ousia* of *polis* in the political science, or the *ousia* of history in the science of history, though it does not need to directly explicate the definition of such *ousia* since *ousia* cannot be defined by others but only define the others in the sense of referring to the primary instances of *ousia*. This implicit indicating of the *ousia* should be explicated by investigating its functional-leading presentations of *eudaimonia*, which belongs to the interpretation of the secondary instances of *ousia*, and should be expanded upon in the discussion of the *physis* and *technê/phronēsis* of the *ousia* when the *ousia* is applied beyond the theoretical science but to practical sciences.

In the domain of the science of *polis*, it may be possible to explicate this featured structure of practical science by interpreting Aristotle's *Politics* with a metaphysical concern, as far as Aristotle's own interpretation on ethics is merely an initial application in terms of the practical applications of metaphysics. The metaphysical foundation of ethics needs to be expanded and then be investigated in a wider and deeper domain of mankind's practical affairs, that is, politics and history. Indeed, there is an opinion that the writing of *Politics* was a lengthy process in which Aristotle changed the original aim and scheme several times (Jaeger, 1934), but actually in this research (and in the researches by broad sense Aristotelians), the significance is not how *Politics* was written; rather, the significance is how his political philosophy was established as a whole. It is in this sense of a holistic interpretation of Aristotle's thoughts and Aristotelian philosophies that his works present a productive comprehensiveness in terms of both structure and content, which further requires a cross-discipline-boundaries investigation rather than several mutually irrelevant studies on different particular themes, though the latter have indeed promoted the academic development and have led to the differentiated modern sciences. For those I have referred to above (though they have not been discussed clearly) and for me, this comprehensiveness or wholeness of *Politics* is conducted by the

metaphysical principles of *polis*. In this way, the three fundamental parts of *Politics* can be clarified: the pure natural constitution (in accordance with the *physis* of *polis*), the adjusted *polis* by *phronēsis* (in terms of the *polis* itself), and *technē* (in terms of citizens), and the harmonizing work, namely, *eudaimonia* between the former two. In particular, the *physis* of *polis* denotes a scheme whereby the citizens' association³¹ of freemen is the material cause of a *polis*, the constitution is the formal cause of the *polis*, and the two together consist of the whole process of the *physis* of the *polis* but in merely the purest sense. (*Politics*, Book I-III) This pure process of the *physis* of the *polis* needs to be adjusted by *technē/phronēsis* since a pure *physis* cannot maintain itself eternally and has potentiality to destroy itself (in terms of the 'corrupt constitutions') (*Politics*, Book IV-VI). These two parts of a *polis* should be harmonized in the final sense that the *bonum* (good) of an individual freeman as a citizen should be combined with the *bonum* of the *polis* by educating the citizens. This principle is meaningful for both, especially due to the fact that when the *polis* is generated, it will have its own *telos* and its own *bonum*, rather than directly adopting the *bonum* of citizens (*Politics*, Book VII & VIII).

Similarly, a science of history can be established as a practical science by clarifying its characteristics as, on the one hand, such a science of history is a science of and by mankind so that it is a practical science by definition, and it deals with temporal practical affairs like historical events and experiences in given circumstances, just like the science of *polis* dealing with non-temporal but practical affairs, while on the other hand, a science of history fundamentally corresponds to the essential regulations of a practical science. Thus, again, like the science of *polis*, the *ousia* of history itself is grasped by presenting its function, with the latter containing a part of the natural generating process of itself and a part of mankind's understanding of and adjusting to such a process. Therefore, a science of history in such a sense should be established and researched by investigating, **firstly, the *physis* of its *ousia* on the purely theoretical and metaphysical level as a foundation, and then, secondly, the *technē/phronēsis* of its *ousia* on the practical level relating to mankind's understanding of and adjustment to it.** With these two

³¹ Namely *κοινωνία*. The Latin transliteration is *koinónia*. Some alternative English translations may include 'participation', 'communion', and 'fellowship'. I personally think 'society' is not a good translation due to its modern background and context.

fundamental steps, a science of history will finally respond to the enquiry regarding the tension between the *bonum* of history itself and the *bonum* of human beings by conducting and then harmonizing them into a historical *eudaimonia*. Under such a scheme, if a science of history is a practical science which calls for theoretical research on the fundamental nature of its 'Beingness', then it is not only a 'philo-sophy' in terms of the original meaning, namely, 'love-wisdom', but also in a Platonic sense, a true 'knowledge' in terms of differing from 'opinions', since such a science of history is not an intellectual pleasure for the few philosophers who are curious about the theme of history, but a necessary theme for the majority of philosophers who are willing to understand human beings: "It is on the essence that the philosopher must grasp the first principles and causes" (*Metaphysics*, 1003b19).

2.4 On the *physis* of the science of history: one of the two secondary structures.

This section and the next, Section 2.5, will be expanded upon in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. The sections in this chapter offer basic descriptions – in accordance with descriptive metaphysics – of the principal regulations of the science of history as a practical science, which will be expanded into detailed descriptions of the *physis* and *technê/phronēsis* of the science of history in the next two chapters respectively.

This section is about the *physis* of history and the science of history in a general descriptive structure (in terms of the next chapter). Any interpretation of *physis* can and should be based upon the original and the basic explanation of the term *physis*. Most of the distorted meanings of *physis* (due to modern translations like '*natura*' in Latin and 'nature' in English) have been clarified in the section about the translations and the transliterations (2.2.3). Here, I would like to repeat and emphasize the original explanation that may conduct the following logics of the structure of practical science. Actually, this explanation of the meaning of the term *physis* was discussed by Aristotle in his *Physics* but was not very conclusive or clear, and so it was re-examined and re-expressed in accordance with its original Greek contexts by Heidegger. That is, *physis*, as one of the second instances denoting the function of the *ousia* of an entity, means **being the entity itself** and suggests a **process of becoming and remaining itself**,

which is observable and understandable for us as human beings (Heidegger, 1959, p.14). For Aristotle and broad sense Aristotelians, the most general perspective of this concept indicates a **combination of the material cause and the formal end cause** (*Metaphysics*, 1026a31), which should be interpreted and understood as both a **dynamic developmental process of being** and a **static status of being**. These two principal interpretations of *physis* can be the metaphysical foundations of the science of history, just like the metaphysical structure conducting the science of *polis*.

The problem quickly appears. Why are there two kinds of interpretation? The reason is the way the material cause and the formal end cause are combined. Most of the investigations on the mutual relevance of the four causes begin from the nature of theoretical knowledge, namely *epistêmai*. *Epistêmai* deals with the formal cause rather than the material cause, since the formal cause is unchangeable when it becomes actuality, whereas the material cause is changeable and a mere potentiality. No matter what the subject-matter of a science on earth is, the knowledge of science must be the knowledge of actuality. Therefore, if I am going to study the *ousia* of history as a theme of practical science but also concerning theoretical knowledge (since history is a practical affair, but *ousia* belongs to theoretical/metaphysical knowledge), what I will study is the actuality of the science of history, since only when history becomes actuality can it be grasped by mankind's knowing activity.

However, it is in the way the potentiality becomes the actuality that interpretation becomes difficult. By saying difficult, I think that the real case of such a process is more complicated than we would imagine, as it supposes that 'a simpler case' (as in Aristotle's own words in *Metaphysics*, 1045a24), that is, for a single entity, 'from the material cause to the formal end cause' is equal to 'from the potentiality to the actuality'. Giving the conclusion firstly, this simpler case indicates a development of the generating process by simply regarding the material cause as the beginning and the formal end cause as the result, which cannot be very appropriate to be fully applied in the science of history, since history is not a single entity but a complex entity (I will explain the reason in 2.4.2). However, this is not to say that the development from the material cause to the formal end cause is a mistaken interpretation of the generating process of an entity like history;

rather, this developmental interpretation is the first step of a full understanding of the *physis* of a complex entity. Without the developmental interpretation, the next interpretation discussing the static status, namely, the case that the above two ‘from and to’ are not equal to each other, cannot stand. Either way, regarding the combination of the material cause and the formal end cause to investigate *physis*, whether in the general sense or in a particular sense, the existence of history is not a given result of the existence of particular historical events, since historical events provide only the material causes of history: a history cannot be understood in the present by merely knowing the historical events in the past.

Therefore, in this section, I will describe two relevant interpretations of the combination of the material cause and the formal end cause. I will firstly argue that a generating process of the science of history is a metaphysical development from the material cause (that is, the historical events in the past) to the formal end cause (that is, the science of history in the present). Then, I will argue that such a science of history in the present is a time-crossing complex entity combining the science/knowledge of history in the present (namely, the developmental result of itself) **and** historical events in the past (which should be simply the material causes in the previous interpretation but, in this one, still exist even after the formal end cause is generated). Finally, I will suggest that they support the understanding of *physis* together as a whole. As I have mentioned, this general perspective will be given in full detail and will be fully related to the theme of history in the next chapter by clarifying the modern appearance, the logical position, and the logical reason of historical events and history, all of which are presented in the examination of *physis* as a function of the first entity of history.

2.4.1 Developmental interpretation: from the material cause to the formal end cause.

The first thing that I need to mention is the use of the term ‘formal cause’ and the term ‘formal end cause’ since I have already used them many times without any clarification. Actually, they refer to the same thing. Though Aristotle argued for the existence of four causes, namely, the material cause (matter), the power cause, the formal cause (form), and the final-leading/purpose cause (*telos*), as the reason for any growing

and self-movement of an entity, the latter three causes can be considered as one cause, specifically, the formal end cause; as Aristotle himself argued:

In many cases, three of these causes coincide; for the essential nature of a thing and the purpose for which it is produced are often identical (so that the final cause coincides with the formal cause), and moreover the efficient cause must bear some resemblance in 'form' to the effect (so that the efficient cause too must, so far, coincide with the formal). (*Physics*, 198a25-27)

Describing the development from the material cause to the formal cause in general is relatively easier than describing the static status, since in this case, 'The material cause becomes the formal end cause', which is equal to 'the potentiality becomes the actuality', which suggests that the material cause is the potentiality and the formal end cause is the actuality. This accordance and its process form the foundation of *epistêmai*, since *epistêmai*, firstly, deals with the formal cause, which is unchangeable, and secondly, the formal cause comes from the material cause. For the first one, science deals directly with the form rather than with the matter; for example, in the science of *polis*, the maintaining of a *polis* depends on whether the constitution of such a *polis* for itself is firm, rather than whether the citizens of the *polis* support the *polis*. In this sense, a science of *polis*, namely, the *epistêmai* of *polis*, is actually and finally a science of the formal cause of *polis*, namely, a science of the constitution. It is the same for a science of history. The science of history, if it is designed as a practical science, will be essentially about the formal cause of history, specifically, the one which is investigated as the result in the present, since it denotes the philosophical spirit of time, rather than the material causes, namely, the historical events in the past that merely present their existence without any meaning for people in the present. However, for the second one, the form comes from the matter, so the formal cause cannot become itself by itself: any science of a formal cause must be initiated by investigating the beginning of the formal cause, that is, the material cause. Even a science of history aims to see the history as the formal end, so it needs to be investigated from the beginning, since the nature of the end is within the beginning. This process is in accordance with mankind's knowing process; in Aristotelian philosophy, that knowing

begins from particular materials rather than general forms, which is called 'induction'.³² Therefore, any investigation that relates to the essence of the formation of knowledge, though in the domain of practical science, like the essence of constitution, or the essence of historical thinking, will be inevitably initiated by investigating its metaphysical principle: How can the material cause become the formal end cause?

In general, a world of given existence of formal end causes, that is, a world of *telos*, is the world of the relevance of forms. This relevance suggests a mutual correspondence between the material cause and the formal cause, and, more importantly, a mutual correspondence between the potentiality and the actuality (though these two correspondences are equal only in the case of a single entity). On the one hand, the formal cause is the end, *telos*, of the material cause, which means such *telos* is the necessary destination of the material cause. On the other hand, the material cause is the necessary condition of the formal end cause, which means that without the material cause, the formal end cause can never become the actuality. By the mental action of induction, the knowledge of, for example, the *polis*, can be generated as the process in which the material cause/potentiality develops into the formal end cause/actuality. This process is not a concept based upon the logical hypothesis of given descriptions; rather, this process is based on the real sort of the description of movement. It is by clarifying the nature of movement that the development from materials to form can be clarified and a conclusion drawn regarding whether it is a necessary development or just a development by chance. As Aristotle argued, "It is clear when the physicists [philosophers of *physis*] discuss the necessity, they should limit the term to what is inherent in the material cause, and should recognize the movement towards *telos* imposed on the material cause as a distinct addition to its inherent qualities" (*Physics*, 200a31-33). In the science of *polis*, when the movement of a *polis*, that is, the movement in which the constitution has been generated, comes naturally from the movement of the citizens, that is, the movement in which a freeman becomes a citizen by ethically relating to other freeman, and thus forms an association of citizens, then it can be said that such a formal end cause, the constitution, **is**

³² This is one of the features of traditional philosophy which have been attacked by a variety of modern philosophies. For a famous example, Hobbes, as an influential philosopher against the Aristotelian tradition not only in the domain of ontology or epistemology but also in political philosophy, argued that the 'real' knowing process is 'deduction'.

from the material cause, the citizens. But this accordance does not always happen following the right movement of the material cause. Movement can be generated also from slaves and this then prohibits the natural development towards a constitution due to the lack of freemen's ethicalness. In this latter case of a *polis*, though it still has a formal end cause (since it still has a constitution of slaves), such a formal end cause does not correspond to the movement of a natural association of freemen, and thus is not from the right material cause. Therefore, besides the material cause itself, movement, or more precisely speaking, 'right' movement, which naturally links the material cause to the formal end cause, is the necessary condition for the right accordance between the material cause/potentiality and the formal end cause/actuality. And this right movement is the development of the *physis* of an entity (though in this case, it is merely about the single entity).

The problem with this soon becomes apparent. Is this movement a movement *sua sponte* (prompting oneself in accordance to its own cause), namely, inside the material cause, or a movement the prompter of which is outside the material cause? This question relates to the clarification of *physis*, since the former, namely, the promoter of a movement is the movement itself, is definitely in accordance with the definition of *physis*, whereas the latter is not in – at least by definition. However, this argument on the clarification of a natural movement (the movement in accordance with *physis*) does not necessarily result in a conflict between natural and unnatural movements, since this clarification is merely established upon the definition rather than the application in specific circumstances. Some Aristotle specialists, such as Ernest Barker, argued that, irrespective of whether the promoter is inside the movement and hence of whether the movement is natural/in accordance with *physis*, *physis* for its own self cannot generate movement, and movement for its own self is not the direct result of *physis* (Barker, 1959, p.221). Rather, *physis* internally exists inside the material cause and is going to be developed by the movement which begins from the material cause. In this sense, *physis* is actually a process of a thing or, precisely speaking, an entity: it is constituted by the step of a natural material cause, the step of a movement from the natural material cause to the formal end cause, and the step of a natural formal end cause.

This understanding of *physis* as a developmental process is very important for us, especially in the sense that we are going to investigate the metaphysical structure of practical sciences. In the science of polis, because a natural formal end cause is developed from a natural material cause and its natural movement, it can be argued that the only real beginning of a polis is necessarily a citizens' association, since only a citizens' association, as an ethical mutually related unity of freemen, is for its own self natural. It is impossible that slaves, isolated people, even householders (who are widely believed to be the so-called 'natural' beginning of a polis) are the material cause of a polis, since they metaphysically disobey the regulation of a material cause. A citizens' association naturally requires the development from itself to a polis, since it is in its essence, a unit of freemen attempting to pursue *eudaimonia*, which can be actualized necessarily by a polis. And such a polis coming from the natural material cause and natural movement will be definitely natural – though it may but also may not maintain its natural essence.

Similarly, a science of history should also consider its *physis* as a natural developmental process, if it is going to establish its *epistēmai* by investigating its own nature firstly. Like the science of polis, as far as *epistēmai* investigates the knowledge of form rather than matters, the science of history investigates the understandable generated form of history which exists as a result in the present, rather than historical events in the past that present only the characters of their own time or circumstances. In the science of history, historical events in the past are at best the material causes of the generated history in the present, which is the formal end cause of such a developmental process. In this sense, it can be stated that the historical events, the movement from historical events to a history as a form in the present, and the understandable knowledge of the history in the present, are the three steps of the natural generating process of a history which denotes the *physis* of such a history.

In particular (as we will see in the next chapter), this specifically characterized *physis* of history can be defined as *Ordnungszeit*, which means the time in which things are ordered. *Ordnungszeit* suggests the temporal structure as the nature of history, since the relationship between historical events in the past and history as a form in the present is at first a temporal relation, that is to say, events in the past can never be the formal cause

which is generated in the present. This basic temporal regulation of the *physis* of history, or the *Ordnungszeit*, is a metaphysical description of the chronological character of history, based on which some secondary interpretations of the logical position and logical reason of historical events and history can be expanded, though they still need another understanding of *physis* as introduced below.

2.4.2 Understanding the formal end cause: not the only result of the development.

I have described and suggested how the relatively simpler perspective of *physis*, for a single entity, that is, 'from the material cause to the formal end cause' is equal to 'from the potentiality to the actuality'. In this developmental process, the function of a formal end cause (*telos*) can be clarified as it naturally conducts the generation of an entity. In such a developmental interpretation, the meaning of the material cause depends on the meaning of the formal-end cause, which suggests that the latter is superior to the former by both definition and chronology. By definition, for example, a seed cannot be defined without a tree that has already grown up: we never say "This is a tree of 'xxx seed'" but say "This is a seed of xxx tree". Also, for Aristotelians, the common life cannot be defined without the understanding of *eudaimonia*: life is meaningless if it does not pursue *eudaimonia*. In this sense, we define things by their forms rather than their materials. By chronology, an embryo as the material cause of an animal cannot be generated without the mature animal as the formal end: it is always a mature animal that generates the embryo, rather than the reverse. Indeed, people may argue that the natural developmental process from an embryo to a mature animal could suggest that the mature animal is chronologically after the embryo. But this is not to say that the embryo hence has a logical priority over the mature animal; rather, Aristotelian metaphysics emphasizes that the embryo is not necessarily about to be the animal. An embryo has the potential to be a mature animal, and also not to be. The significance is that, conversely speaking, when a mature animal exists as its own being, it necessarily comes from the embryo, and in such a case, the mature animal is chronologically after the embryo, and necessarily has the logical priority over the embryo. In the case that the embryo does not develop into a mature animal, there is no formal end cause or movement of *physis*, and hence there is no need to say

which is superior to the other.

However, most entities exist not as a single form, but as a complex form. Merely investigating the correspondences between the material cause and the potentiality and between the formal end cause and the actuality is not sufficient to support the final actualization of a complex entity, since these correspondences cannot explain, for the complex entity, the reason that the material cause still exists even after the formal end cause is generated. Different from a single entity for which the material cause will be eliminated when the entity comes into being, **a complex entity is the complexity of the materials AND the form**, which means that the former material cause will become part of the components of the generated result (namely, the actualization), and together with the form, will make the generated result complex, though the complexity is still an individual existence.

Let us make this argument clearer by referring to the science of *polis*, as this argument is very important to understand the essence of most of the practical affairs like *polis* due to their qualities of being complex entities. In the developmental interpretation of *physis* (as I have described in the above sub-section), a constitution is the natural end of the natural movement initiated by a citizens' association for their own natural purpose (achieving the *eudaimonia*), and hence presents the *telos* of itself as the end of such a natural developmental process. The *telos* is the destination of the movement of the material cause, and hence leads the movement to an enclosed process rather than any other possibilities. In other words, the developmental interpretation can explain the generation, the process, the components, and even the meaning of a *polis*; however, it cannot explain the reason for the actualization of the *polis*: the citizens' association, from which a *polis* is generated, will not be eliminated even after the *polis* comes into being. Rather, the citizens' association will become part of the *polis*. Therefore, though by definition the science of *polis* investigates the knowledge of the constitution as a form rather than as the knowledge of the material citizens, now it has to investigate also the constitution's relation to the citizens, since the citizens may have an impact on the constitution as they still exist even after generating the constitution. This is the reason that in the later parts of *Politics*, Aristotle discussed why a constitution corrupts and the

methods for avoiding corruption.

This example in the science of *polis* is a practical representative of the metaphysical regulations of a complex entity. As I have argued, an entity comprises both primary instances (namely, the 'Beingness') and secondary instances, and emphasizes especially the secondary ones like *physis* and *technê/phronēsis*, which support the descriptive structure of the function of such an entity. By describing a practical example of a complex entity, we can more or less understand why – in terms of not only the practical affairs but also the metaphysics – the correspondences between the material cause and the potentiality and between the formal end cause and the actuality do not necessarily happen. In his metaphysics and theories of ethics and *physis* (rather than just the book *Metaphysics*), Aristotle identified four kinds of existence of an entity, that is, the existence by being one's self (*to ti ên einai*), the existence by accidentality, the existence by truth (or false), and the existence by potentiality and actuality, and he also argued that the existence of a complex entity corresponds to the principles of the last one, namely, potentiality and actuality. For the case of a complex entity, the material cause has a quality of 'will be', which means that, on the one hand, the material cause will become the formal cause, but on the other hand, by arguing its quality, the material cause for its own self is already an actuality. For example – and not even an example of a complex entity but of a general sense entity – a boy is the material cause of a man, and for the man, the boy is the potentiality, whereas for the boy himself, the boy is the actuality: the boy is not a conceptual hypothesis of the man but a real existing boy. For a single entity, this example seems not necessarily to demonstrate those applied metaphysical principles of *physis*; however, for a complex entity, it does matter, since we cannot say, 'The citizens are not the actuality since they've developed into a constitution': both the citizens and the constitution exist as one combined actuality.

Similar to the developmental interpretation in which the formal end cause is superior to the material cause by both definition and chronology, in this interpretation – I may define it as an 'essential interpretation' as far as it finally investigates the reason for existence – the actuality is superior to the potentiality also by both definition and chronology. Indeed, I may add a third, that is, by existence. The argument that the

actuality is superior to the potentiality may mean that, in the very exact status that an actuality has already been generated, the actuality can exist without any potentiality, since all the potentialities at this moment do not exist any longer; however, conversely speaking, without the actuality, any potentiality is meaningless and can never exist. This principle may be applied precisely to a complex entity. A complex entity comes into its own being by the only form of itself, and such a form as an individual is the reason for its existence as an actuality. For example, a *polis* as a complex entity may have people, trade, tax, troops, rulers, land, and many other things which in the view of the modern philosophers are the components of a 'city-state'; however, only by having a constitution can a *polis* can be defined as an existing *polis* as an actuality. Those components are merely the potentialities of the *polis*. Without the constitution, those components are nothing.

Not only the science of *polis*, but a science of history may also apply this metaphysical design especially in terms of the knowledge of history in the present is also a complex entity. On the one hand, from the perspective of a developmental interpretation, it will be easily demonstrated that, according to the metaphysical regulations of the *physis* of an entity, a science of history is a developmental process in which a historical event in the past is the material cause, and an understandable knowledge of a history in the present is the formal end cause, and the developmental movement from the former to the latter denotes the natural character of history as the *Ordnungszeit* of history. On the other hand, however, it cannot be denied that the historical events which were happening in the past are currently also the subject-matters for a science of history in the sense of that those events may deliver the uniqueness of their time in every different past to the understanding in the present. In this way, tension is generated between the past and the present which corresponds to the philosophical spirit of historical thinking. Therefore, the difficulty is that the philosophical understandings directly applied to those historical events in the past also need to be theoreticalized into a rigorous science of history, or in other words, need to be embedded into the science of history which naturally investigates the knowledge only of the formal cause, namely, the knowledge of a history in the present. To correspond to the basic metaphysical regulation of *epistêmai* that investigates only the

formal cause, a historical event must be conducted as a combined element with the formal end history together, as far as the event on the one hand is the material cause of a history, which means it has the quality of 'will be', but on the other hand, is the actuality of itself. I may define this essential interpretation that investigates the essence of history as a complex entity, and as regards the temporal character, as *Geschehenszeit*, which means the time in which history happened. *Geschehenszeit* denotes the *ousia* of history in the primary instances rather than the *physis* of history in the secondary instances, though it is initiated in the study of the *physis* of history in the secondary instances. In section 3.5.2 I will specifically clarify this point in terms of understanding the secondary instances of *ousia* of history comprehensively.

2.4.3 Relation between the developmental and the essential interpretations, and their historical applications (*Ordnungszeit* and *Geschehenszeit*) in general.

By claiming a developmental interpretation and an essential interpretation, I have sketched two main perspectives of the combination of the material cause and the formal end cause. The first suggests a dynamic developmental process of a being that investigates the material cause, the movement, and the formal end cause of the being, while the latter suggests a static status of the being especially in the case that the being is actualized by combining the material cause and the formal end cause. When these two interpretations are applied to a practical science, like the science of history, the developmental one will denote a quality of a temporally ordered sequence of historical events that further generate the *physis* of history, which may be defined as *Ordnungszeit*. Meanwhile, the essential one will be presented as a description of the static relation between happened historical events in the past and understood history in the present, which can be called *Geschehenszeit*. However when we enter into the study of the essential interpretation or *Geschehenszeit* of history, we actually begin to study the presentation of the primary instances of the *ousia* of history rather than mere the secondary *physis* of history (see section 3.5.2 and 5.3). These two interpretations 'about' the *physis* of history (as far as *Geschehenszeit* does not purely belong to the *physis*), though still in the level of structure, can be summarised as follows:

<i>Physis</i> of history	Developmental interpretation (Purely belongs to the secondary instances of the <i>ousia</i> of history and presents functions)	Essential interpretation (Shall be regarded as serving to the primary instances of the <i>ousia</i> of history)
It emphasizes...	The process from the material cause to the formal end cause.	The status of the complex entity of the material and the formal cause.
It supposes...	Historical events in the past are the material cause; the science of history as understandable knowledge is the formal end cause.	Events will not disappear even after the science of history has been generated. Rather, events and the science together as a whole get actualized.
It can be characterized as...	Dynamic and progressive.	Static.
Its temporal application can be presented as...	<i>Ordnungszeit</i> (time in which historical events are ordered).	<i>Geschehenszeit</i> (time in which history happened).

On the final actualization of an entity, especially in terms of a practical entity, I may add one clarification. Indeed, besides the final actuality that makes the complex entity be itself, there are still other actualities that come from different potentialities. For the example of the science of *polis*, those actualities may be the rulers of a *polis*, who indeed rule the *polis* and present the function of the constitution, which is in accordance with the metaphysical regulation that the essence of the being (in the sense of the primary instances) is presented by the function of the being (in the sense of the secondary instances), namely, the formal cause. However, only one pair of potentiality and actuality is the highest and the fundamental existence of an entity – no matter whether it is a single or a complex entity – that is, the pair that makes the entity come into being by itself, since it is that pair of potentiality and actuality that provides *to ti ên einai* to the entity. In the science of history, though historical events provide understandable knowledge to the present historical thinking by being temporally combined with the present science of history, they are not the fundamental pair of potentiality and actuality that actualizes a

history, since they for themselves are essentially an individual existence in the past and do not aim to generate a history in the 'future' (in terms of the events in the past).

But by examining the two interpretations about the *physis* of history, I might be considered to be giving an inappropriate suggestion. Am I suggesting that the essential interpretation is a supplement of the developmental interpretation, since the former investigates more complicated cases than the latter, in terms of the complex rather than the single? Actually, I would rather argue that these two interpretations are independent (but not separate) from each other, and hence together make an enclosed perspective of *physis*. The suggestion that the essential one is more complicated than the developmental one might inevitably indicate that the former is superior to the latter. For the example of the science of *polis*, the highest good, or *eudaimonia*, of a *polis* is **not** supposed by a developmental interpretation and then demonstrated by an essential interpretation – if it were, then it would not have been a descriptive metaphysical philosophy. In other words, an essential interpretation does not demonstrate the generating process of an entity but merely – and importantly – demonstrates the reason for the existence of the entity: the reason that a *polis* becomes itself is unequal to, even independent from, the process whereby the *polis* comes from the citizens' association and forms the constitution. This actually denotes that the book *Politics* aimed not only to show 'how politics works' but also 'what politics is', as does a science of history. By investigating both the developmental and the essential perspectives about the *physis* of history, I am not going to then demonstrate the highest aim of history; rather, the essential interpretation about the *physis* of history is about to demonstrate the **reason** for the current existence of an understandable knowledge of history (hence it essentially belongs to the primary instances of the *ousia* of history). It should always be remembered that the science of history is a practical science, which means the originator of history is mankind. This further requires that, just like the science of *polis*, the research of the *physis* of history finally serves the understanding of human beings themselves, rather than the theoretical knowledge of metaphysics: supposing and demonstrating a logical concept involves returning to the theoretical science since it is not merely concerned with describing the structure of the knowledge but with creating new metaphysical relevance of the

knowledge.

So far, I have sketched the first perspective of a metaphysical structure of the science of history. It is based on two independent but not completely distinct interpretations about the *physis*. These two interpretations, the developmental and the essential interpretation, structurally regulate further applications of the science of history. But as I have argued, *physis* is merely the first aspect of the functional grasp of *ousia*. Any investigation of a complete perspective of *ousia* of a practical science must be also concerned with the domain of practice itself; that is, it must also investigate the *technê/phronēsis* of such *ousia*, as such a practical science can return to its essential quality of being a science of and by mankind.

2.5 On the *technê/phronēsis* of the science of history: the other of the two secondary structures.

This pair of concepts, *technê and phronēsis*, is another fundamental element of practical science. Different from the *physis*, which regulates practical science in the theoretical level, *technê and phronēsis* emphasize the practical applications of theoretical regulations. In this section, I will generally introduce the position and the meaning of *technê and phronēsis*, and then describe their functions by referring to the science of *polis* as an example, so that it can be outlined how a science of history as also a practical science can be designed.

Again, different from *physis*, which calls for two independent but mutually related interpretations, *technê and phronēsis* will be interpreted from a relatively single perspective, that is, together they are virtues that are related to mankind's activities as a whole. Defining *technê and phronēsis* may be easy, as the former is the virtue involved in the producing activity in which the producer is not equal to the production, whereas the latter is the virtue involved in the practice activity in which the one who practises for him or herself is the end of the practising activity. However, this definition is meaningful only when its general position, with its relevance to *physis*, is clarified beforehand, especially for us, who need to investigate the relation between the theoretical and the practical science in the general scope.

2.5.1 The relative position of *technê/phronēsis* in terms of *physis*.

It is well-known that in Aristotle's philosophical system, *technê* and *phronēsis* are the last two of the five virtues by which the soul approaches true knowledge. In general, the first three virtues, namely, *sophia*, *epistēmê*, and *noûs*, are applied to the grasp of the theoretical knowledge and hence deal with the knowledge that is naturally generated from itself, namely, according to its own *physis*, irrespective of whether mankind is about to have that knowledge. While the last two virtues, *technê* and *phronēsis*, are directly applied to the knowledge which is generated from mankind's activities. In this sense, in accordance with Aristotelian philosophy concerning the tension between the eternal and human beings, I claim that these last two virtues are applied as the 'supplement' to *physis*.

In the previous section, I have argued that the generating process of a practical entity is conducted by *physis* (in both the developmental and the essential sense), and such a process is an **enclosed** process with a clear beginning and end. However, I have never argued that due to its quality of being enclosed it is thus **complete and self-consistent**. A natural development is self-consistent **only** when it aims at and achieves the final *eudaimonia* of human beings. That is to say, if a development, which is natural and hence complete, but does not achieve *eudaimonia*, then it is not fully beneficial to the welfare of human beings, and hence, is not self-consistent, since by claiming to be complete and self-consistent, it must be consistent to the end of humankind and thus forms the completeness of human beings. It is only by *physis* that this completeness is achieved accidentally rather than necessarily. Why? Why does a natural result not necessarily aim for *eudaimonia*? That is because when a natural result is generated, it becomes an entity with its own *telos*, which is logically different from the *telos* of the generator of the entity. For example, a *polis* is the natural result of the *telos* of citizens since it is by achieving *eudaimonia* that the citizens generate the *polis*. However, when the *polis* comes into being as an individual actualization of its own self, it will have its own *telos*, that is, maintaining the existence of its form, the constitution, rather than the *telos* of citizens, their *eudaimonia*. Therefore, there is a logical distinction between the *telos* of citizens and the *telos* of *polis*, and this practical example shows the need for 'something' harmonizing the

two *telos*. And that 'something', for Aristotelian philosophy, is the virtues of *technê* and *phronêsis*.

Regarding the application of the science of history, therefore, *technê* and *phronêsis* are needed to deal with the inconsistency between the historical events in the past and the science of history as a form of knowledge in the present – yes, this gap or bridge between the past and the present appears again and has a significant impact on the understandings of such a science itself, since it is this gap, again, just like the essential interpretation of a complex entity that combines the same two, that, besides the *physis* of history emerging in the natural process, mankind's grasp of the *physis* of history is also located, by regarding mankind's understanding as a **knowing action** that relates to both *technê* and *phronêsis* (I will define it as historical deliberation in the fourth chapter, by first dealing with the demonstration of *physis* in history).

Further demonstration is needed. If the above argument is applied, then it can be suggested that a science of history as a form of knowledge in the present cannot necessarily maintain its natural result, and hence needs *technê/phronêsis* to 'supplement' the natural result. But the logical problem is, if the generating process of a history from events to the present form is all natural, why cannot such a history as a natural result necessarily maintain its quality of being natural or of corresponding to *physis*? The reason is related to the essential interpretation. As I have argued, a complex entity in the science of history is the complexity of historical events and the present knowledge of the science itself, with the latter generated from the former. Therefore, whether the final actualization of the science of history is natural depends on whether the material cause, the movement, and the formal cause are natural – so far as it is the same as the developmental interpretation – **and** whether the combined historical events, which are essentially the combined material causes as also the actualities, are natural. That seems like a tautology since the material cause has been discussed twice, that is, in the developmental process and in the static combination respectively. However, though they may be the same thing, it depends on the different interpretation of the logical and the philosophical position whether the material cause can be thoroughly investigated, especially when the final actualization of an entity is not necessarily natural due to the

possibility that the combined material cause may be corrupted.

This metaphysical principle is easier to understand by referring to the example of the science of *polis* as Aristotle himself studied the reason and ‘rectification’ of corrupt constitutions in *Politics*. A natural constitution (whether ruled by one, or few, or a majority) as the formal end cause is the natural result of the generating process that arises from the citizens’ association, which aims to pursue *eudaimonia*. But when the constitution is generated, the citizens’ association is not eliminated; rather, it is combined with the constitution, and hence its own *eudaimonia* needs to be harmonized with the *telos* of the constitution by physical and musical education (in the accordance to the body and the soul). If it is harmonized so well that the citizens’ *eudaimonia* is identical to the end of the constitution, then the constitution can be regarded as a natural actualization which maintains its internal self-consistence. However, if the citizens’ association is going to corrupt even after the constitution has been generated, though the constitution has come from the citizens who used to be natural, the final actualization of such a complex entity is no longer natural, since the combined element, the citizens, is no longer natural. There are various reasons why the citizens become corrupt, mostly due to the conflict between the citizens’ understanding of natural justice and the justice according to *nomos* (which may be translated into ‘artificial laws and traditions’ as it emphasizes that it does not occur naturally³³) (*Politics*, 1301a27-b6) Therefore, in general, though the generating process from the citizens to the constitution is conducted by *physis*, it is the citizens’ association that determinatively affects whether the final actualization of the constitution as a complex entity is natural. If the citizens become corrupt, the constitution, which is already combined with the citizens, will subsequently become corrupt, and thus *technê/phronēsis* are needed to rectify the situation and to return to the natural. In the science of *polis*, *technê* and *phronēsis* also vary, but they generally aim to deal with the conflict between *physis* and *nomos*. For example, one of the famous ‘political *technê*’ is keeping up an appearance of democracy to maintain an essential monarchy (*Politics*, 1294a3-16). Therefore, by referring to the political example, it may be claimed that *technê*

³³ This perhaps is a linguistic reason that Aristotle argued that *nomisma* (money) comes from *nomos*. See *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1133a29-32; and *Politics*, 1256b31. Though he also argued that *nomisma* is not against to *physis* when it aims to help people achieving *eudaimonia*.

and *phronēsis* together serve to improve the understanding of a complex entity in practical science.

The position of *technê/phronēsis* in a science of history may also be demonstrated by following a similar logic. Though a science of history as understandable knowledge in the present is the formal end cause that is generated from historical events in the past, historical events will not be eliminated, but will temporally combine with the present science of history. However, it is due to this that the science of history in the present is not necessarily natural, since, like citizens, historical events may also be corrupted, that is, the misunderstandings of historical events, just like different understandings of natural justice and the justice of *nomos*. The logic – in accordance with all practical science – can be summarised as follows:

- (1) If historical events as the material cause are natural, that is, generated from their own selves **AND** are able to maintain the quality of being natural, that is, being rightly understood without distortion, then the present science of history as the formal end cause will necessarily be natural, **and** the complex entity of the formal end and the events will be necessarily natural and be actualized correctly. In this case, there is no place for *technê* and *phronēsis*.
- (2) If historical events are natural **BUT** cannot maintain their quality of being natural, then the present science of history will necessarily be natural, **but** the complex entity of the formal end and the events will necessarily be unnatural due to the combination of the natural and the unnatural, and thus will not be actualized correctly. In this case, there is a need for *technê/phronēsis* to rectify the unnatural understandings of the events.

Therefore, it can be seen that in this sense of the science of history, the essential function of *technê/phronēsis* is about the understanding, or the knowing action of human beings, especially about the historical applications of the metaphysical principles of the knowing action, that is, the historical deliberation (just as I have argued above and as I will demonstrate in the next chapter). However, before I introduce the application of *technê/phronēsis* in the form of historical deliberation, I would like to clarify one more preliminary theme, that is, the relation between ‘I’ and the activities applying

technê/phronēsis, since it is 'I' who essentially grasps the understandable knowledge of the science of history.

2.5.2 Am I a producer applying *technê*, or a practiser applying *phronēsis*?

For Aristotelian philosophies, and even for the broad sense philosophies that more or less follow Aristotelian philosophical principles, such as Heidegger's and Arendt's philosophy, clarifying *technê* and *phronēsis* is directly related to the definition of *poiesis* ('producing/making') and *praxis* ('practice/action'). This distinction can be valued as one of the most influential arguments that regulate the way philosophers establish theories on acting or the conduct of human beings. According to Aristotle's own definition, it is easy to differentiate between the two by arguing that the end of or the reason for producing is the producer, which is outside the production, whereas the end or the reason of practising is the practiser him or herself. Reversely speaking, the cause of, or the reason for the existence of a production is due to the purpose of the producer rather than the production itself, whereas for a practising activity, there is no difference between the practiser and the be-practised. And the virtues, *technê* and *phronēsis*, are applied to the producing activity and the practising activity respectively.

However, this clarification does not mean that the practical science applies only *phronēsis* and the producing science applies only *technê*. Even in terms of a single activity, it is only the latter, that is, 'the producing activity that applies only *technê*', that makes complete sense: a practising activity applies not only *phronēsis* but also *technê*. And speaking regarding the width of practical science rather than a single practical activity, this characteristic that practice applies not only *phronēsis* becomes more obvious and offers significance to the whole structure of practical science. Firstly, Aristotle's own argument should be re-examined. Again, it is about the general position of the virtues, as he said:

The class of things that admit of change³⁴ includes both things produced and actions practised. But producing is different from practising, the distinction of which we may accept from extraneous discourses. Therefore, the rational quality concerned with

³⁴ It means the things that exclude unchangeable theoretical knowledge.

practising is different from the rational quality concerned with producing. Nor is one of them a part of the other, for practising is not a form of producing, nor producing a form of practising ... It follows that *technê* is the same thing as a rational quality, concerned with producing, that reasons truly. **All *technê* deal with bringing something into existence; to pursue *technê* means to study how to bring into existence a thing which may either exist or not, and the efficient cause of which lies in the producer and not in the thing produced, for *technê* does not deal with things that exist or come into existence of necessity, or according to *physis*, since these have their efficient cause in themselves. But as practising and producing are distinct, it follows that *technê*, being concerned with producing, is not concerned with practising.** And in the sense that *technê* deals with the same objects as chance, for as Agathon says, "Chance is beloved of *technê* and *technê* of Chance", *technê*, therefore, as has been said, is a rational quality, concerned with producing, that reasons truly. Lack of *technê* is a rational quality, concerned with producing, that reasons falsely. Both deal with that which admits of change. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140a1-24)³⁵

This famous citation may suggest two important points to us:

(1) In the purely natural domain in which things are generated in the rigorous – thus simple – accordance with *physis* from the material cause to the formal end cause, there is no obvious need for *technê*, nor for *phronêsis*. But this rigorous and simple principle becomes complex when it is applied in practical science. In the science of *polis*, it is the citizens who generate the constitution and thus, in the view of the citizens, it is the citizens who produce the constitution by applying their virtues of producing, that is, *technê*. Therefore, though it can be said that a polis is generated for its own self and becomes itself in strict accordance with *physis*, since its material cause, movement, and final form are all natural, a polis is also the result of mankind's activity, which inevitably leads to an apparent paradox in that even a natural domain with only *physis* also needs the rectified understanding achieved by *technê*. Similarly, in the science of history (if what

³⁵ Bold type is made by me. This citation is translated partly by me with consideration of Rackham's translation (in *Loeb Classic*), and Ross's translation, and Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins's new one in 2011.

I assume about such a metaphysical science of history is possible), it is real people rather than the concept of human beings, who generate historical events, and hence from their very being, that is, the material cause, are part of the natural generating process of history. Therefore, it also results in the apparent paradox that even in a purely natural domain, again, *physis* needs *technê*.

I say 'apparent', as actually, it is not a real paradox since it applies different angles of the perspective of a complex entity. On the one hand, regarding citizens or people in historical events, they logically stand 'outside' the *polis* or the historical knowledge, since it is the citizens or the people who **produce** the *polis* or the historical knowledge respectively. On the other hand, regarding such a *polis* or historical knowledge, citizens are the material causes of the *polis* and are combined with the constitution, and thus, together, form the complex entity. Similarly, the people in historical events combine with the present knowledge of history, both of which give no indication that citizens stand outside the *polis* or the people outside history, but suggest they are 'inside' such a *polis* or history. In this sense of the 'inside' and being the material causes, citizens or people in events do not require any outside efficient/powerful cause as the promoter of the development towards *eudaimonia*: the citizens' association generates the constitution *causa sui*, or, events with those within-people generate history *causa sui*. Therefore, logically speaking, a purely natural constitution or a present understandable knowledge of history does not require an outside *technê* since it finishes itself *causa sui*. However, it is in this sense that I must argue, with the science of *polis* as an example, that a constitution as a natural result satisfies the end **only** of itself, rather than of itself **and** citizens, though the original aim of citizens in producing the constitution is to satisfy the end of themselves. Why? The reason is that the constitution of the *polis* is a natural result, which means that it has **its own end** beyond **the end of its producer**. Therefore, for Aristotle, the reason for further discussion about unnatural regimes in *Politics* may emerge: the end of a constitution is not necessarily equal to the end(s) of its citizens. And at this point, *technê* is needed to rectify the heterogeneity between the natural and the unnatural. In a rigorous but also direct angle, the scope of *technê* is wider than the scope of *physis*, and *technê* is excluded from *physis*, since the result of *physis* is only the natural

constitution (in the domain of politics), whereas the objects of *technê* comprise many possibilities as accidentalities, just in accordance with Aristotle's regulation about accidentality: accidentalities are more than necessities. This is to say, though *technê* has the aim of maintaining or returning to *physis*, there is no room inside *physis* for *technê*.

(2) It can be also noticed that *technê* is the virtue of producing (*poiesis*) rather than of practising (*praxis*). It has been argued many times that the biggest difference between them is whether the cause of a changeable thing is *causa sui*. Production is for the end not of itself but of the producer, whereas practice is for the end of its own self. Therefore, by arguing thus, I immediately have to deal with a predicament when interpreting the complex entity in practical science: If 'participating in politics', or 'living historically', is a practice the cause of which is inside the political participators or the historical people and the end of which is also for the end of the participators or the people themselves, then it seems logical that political or historical *phronêsis* is functionally the same as political or historical *technê*, since political or historical *technê* has the aim of maintaining and returning the natural sense constitution or present knowledge of history that satisfies the *eudaimonia* of citizens or historical people. But if this description is true, then, is this to say that practice is essentially the same as producing? Why do we still need the distinction between *poiesis* and *praxis* in a practical science?

The reason is related to the previous argument on the different angles. In the science of *polis*, the description 'participating politics is a political practice/action in which virtue is *phronêsis*' is true **only** when this description is taken from the perspective of the citizens themselves, namely, taking the view that citizens regard themselves as being about to generate a constitution. In other words, this description is true since the only reason for citizens to participate in politics is based upon citizens themselves. However, this description is posited on the position of the individual person rather than of the *polis*, which suggests that it essentially belongs to the science of ethics, such as in *Nicomachean Ethics* (which considers politics as being ultimately for the good of the individual person) rather than the science of *polis*, such as in *Politics* (which concerns politics as being ultimately for the good of the *polis* and the citizens' association in a collective sense). When we discuss the natural process from the material cause to the formal end cause of a

polis, what we are actually dealing with is not based upon the angle of the individual, that is, not the angle of internal citizens; it is actually posited upon the external observation of a *polis* as a whole. Therefore, the previous true description about a 'political practice' is actually a *technê* for such a *polis*, since the promoter of a constitutional *polis* is actually producing the constitution, if we focus on the *polis* rather than on the citizens. Moreover, in a *polis*, every citizen can practise for his or her own good, and such practice requires the application of the virtue *phronêsis*; however, only the statesman, or the ruler, who has both the theoretical knowledge of the *polis* and the practical knowledge of being a citizen as the fact that he or she has been a freeman in such a *polis*, is able to judge whether and why such a *polis* is no longer natural, and thus is able to find the proper *technê* to return the *physis* of the *polis*. For this statesman, political activity is not only a *praxis* ('practice' for one's own good/end) like the one done by citizens to achieve their own but individual good, but is also a *poiesis* ('produce' for the good of the production rather than the producer), which is done to achieve the good of the whole of the *polis* beyond the individual good of the statesman. Therefore, politics is both a practical and productive science for him, whereas for the other citizens, it is only practical.³⁶

Similarly, as a practical science, the science of history aims for the *eudaimonia* of human beings in the historical dimension, that is, the completeness of historical knowledge, rather than the partial knowledge of historical events generated by people in the past. That is to say, if a person in the present applies some certain *technê* to maintain the partial knowledge of historical events in the past, what he or she actually attempts to maintain is not the completeness of the generated history as a whole in the present, but the *bonum* of the past – in the form of separated historical events. That person could accidentally be aware of the present science of history as a whole perspective; but could also not be aware since that person does not aim at understanding the present but at the separated knowledge of events in the past. Only in the present, will the understandable knowledge of history as a form of science mean the person's own historical consciousness makes an effort to maintain such a history: he or she for his or her own self is practically

³⁶ Some specialists of Aristotle like Reeve has also argued that politics is an architectonic virtual science that all theoretical, productive and practical combine together. Though for him politics is the only one. See Reeve, 1992, section 12.

deliberating the history (see Chapter Four). Therefore, it can be argued that such a person is a historian. In the science of history, a historian owns both the theoretical knowledge of the generating process, namely, the *physis* of history from past to present, and the practical knowledge of being a person who is about to know the history in the present. When a historian learns about the theoretical knowledge of history, he or she will achieve not only the separate knowledge of events in the past, but also the knowledge of the whole – irrespective of whether he or she can pursue the completeness of historical knowledge.

Therefore, for any practical science that concerns theoretical knowledge but studies practical affairs (for Aristotle himself, the science of *polis* and the science of ethics are the only two, but for me, it includes the science of history), to understand the relation between *poiesis* and *praxis*, and between *technê* and *phronêsis*, is to understand the distinct but related two angles of a changeable practical entity. *Technê* and *phronêsis* are not totally opposed to each other in the practical science that deals with both human beings themselves and their natural result comprising human beings; they depend on different angles by which the aim of a science may be established: the science of ethics is established upon the angle of individuals, whereas the science of *polis* is established upon the angle of the natural result of those individuals, namely, a *polis*, while these two angles actually refer to the same process of a development from a citizens' association to a *polis*. Therefore, it is not true to say that the science of *polis*, or the science of history are established in a similar way, with only the virtue of *phronêsis*, though *phronêsis* is regarded as the practical virtue of *eudaimonia*-aiming at life in the public or temporal sense. As long as people start to **study** the science of their public or temporal life, rather than **merely live or experience** their public or temporal life, life is considered with not only *phronêsis* but also *technê* since it is descriptively produced as a science.

2.6 Conclusion: actualizing historical *eudaimonia*.

So far, I have described the general structure of a metaphysical science of history as a supplementary alternative to epistemological historicization. Philosophies of history, even including epistemological historicization, in the broadest sense, aim to investigate

the gap between the past and the present, especially between the happened historical events in the past and the understandable knowledge of history generated in the present. A metaphysical science of history also follows this fundamental regulation.

In this chapter, I firstly claim that this metaphysical interpretation concerns the science of history as a 'practical science' in terms of Aristotelian philosophy on the three kinds of science, in the sense of which I adopt Aristotle's political science (the science of *polis*) as an additional, but also, the most relevant practical science to help with interpretation. Regarding the metaphysical regulations, I demonstrate that an entity (*ousia*) should be understood, firstly, in the primary instances that denote the fundamental Being (*to ti ên einai*) of the entity, and then, in the secondary instances that denote the function of the entity. However, since the fundamental Being cannot be defined by others, but can only define others, the primary instances cannot be grasped directly but can only be known by investigating the secondary instances. The secondary instances of the entity are established upon the interpretation of the *physis* and *technê/phronêsis* of entity.

Therefore, I argue next that a metaphysical science of history as a practical science shall be constructed upon two levels, on the *physis* of history and on the *technê/phronêsis* of history. In the *physis* part of history, I suggest that the development from historical events in the past to knowledge of history in the present is conducted by the metaphysical principle of the development from the material cause to the formal end cause, just as in the science of *polis*, the citizens' association is the material cause and the constitution is the formal end cause. But this developmental interpretation alone is not enough to sketch the whole perspective of historical thinking since historical events as the material causes are not eliminated even after the knowledge of history in the present is generated; rather, an essential interpretation that investigates the combination of past events and present knowledge is also needed. This interpretation demonstrates that historical events and the science of history together form the understandable historical thinking as a whole, and hence, they are actualized.

In the part of *technê/phronêsis*, I argue that these two virtues are needed as the supplement to maintain the *physis* by providing the way human beings capture the *physis*

of history; that is, by applying *technê/phronēsis*, human beings regard historical knowing as a practical action. And this practical action of knowing finally conducts historical knowing to historical *eudaimonia*, just as in the science of *polis* the constitution exists to actualize citizens' *eudaimonia*.

It should be emphasized again that, for Aristotelian philosophy, all the practical sciences finally aim to achieve the *eudaimonia* of human beings, rather than the finalization of the science itself. *Eudaimonia* is the ultimate and best end (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094a14-16 and 1176b30-31), and is also the unconditional end (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1097b1 and 1139b1-4) of all the practical sciences and of human beings. In the science of *polis*, as I have argued, since the end of citizens and the end of the generated *polis* are not necessarily correlated to each other, *technê* and *phronēsis* are applied to harmonize the two different *telos* by educating the citizens who have been combined with the *polis* but who may still hold unnatural opinions on justice, which come not from *physis* but from *nomos*.

In the science of history, this harmonizing work will be done not by educating but by actualizing historical *eudaimonia*. As a similarly constructed practical science except regarding the temporal and chronological nature (*Ordnungszeit*), the science of history expands the political and ethical meaning of *eudaimonia* to a temporal dimension, which means the science of history that investigates the relation between the happened events in the past and the historical thinking in the present is a temporal transition of political science that investigates the relation between the citizens and the *polis*. Political and ethical *eudaimonia* is an approach that actualizes the theoretical knowledge of the highest good of mankind's life by emphasizing the quality of conducting the particular knowledge of a different good into general knowledge as a whole, in the process of which the five virtues are applied and the theoretical science is harmonized with practical affairs in the actualization of every different circumstance. This process towards *eudaimonia* can thus be understood as pursuing the completeness of the knowledgeable life of human beings. These characteristics presented by the science of *polis* shall be understood as being presented by the general structure of practical science and hence shall be adopted by the science of history. The science of history also pursues the completeness of knowledge but

focuses specifically on the historical knowledge of human beings themselves. In this sense, historical *eudaimonia* indicates an attempt that, by deliberating about the past to the present mind, historians in the present may mentally re-enact the past as present understandable knowledge and hence regard the process from the past to the present as a relatively complete history.

Finally, retrospectively speaking, regarding the most significant spirit of historical thinking, the concept of historical *eudaimonia* may be a good alternative that helps us overcome the limitation of epistemological historicization. As I argued in the beginning of this chapter, by demonstrating the tendencies of intellectualization, individualization, and fragmentation, epistemological historicization brings two fundamental predicaments to the essence of historical thinking, that is, the ignorance of the structural generation of history in the past (in terms of the related historical thinking in the present relatively), and thus the ignorance of knowing such a structural generation of history in the past (in that the aim of a philosophical thinking is focused on the relationship between the essence and the knowing of it). In short, these two predicaments of epistemological historicization are because epistemological historicization pays attention merely to the thinking activity applied to historical knowledge and does not aim to solve or just investigate the highest, philosophical relation between the temporal mortals and the eternal immortal beings. Meanwhile, the concept of historical *eudaimonia* emphasizes that the thinking of historical knowledge – as practical knowledge – finally aims to achieve the *bonum* of human beings who take the activity of thinking rather than the thinking itself. That is to say, the concept of historical *eudaimonia* and the metaphysical science of history return to the beginning of philosophy and ask the original question again: Is a philosophy necessarily historical thinking? Or reversely, is historical thinking necessarily philosophical? By asking questions like these, philosophies of history – and I am now referring to the most common sense of this term – may be reinvestigated: this will involve reinvestigating not the subject-matter of such a philosophy, but the reason for studying history.

Chapter 3 - On the *physis* or *Ordnungszeit* of history: the first secondary instances

3.1 Introduction.

When it comes to the science of history, the path we are following – from the goal of the science, to the function of the concept of time within that science, and from there to the structure of the concept of time – may seem like a detour. In this science, we might more readily reach our goal by recalling that its methodology includes a special auxiliary discipline concerned explicitly with determining time within that science: historical chronology (Heidegger, 2011, p.68).

Discovering, or to be more precise, interpreting the fundamental nature of history (with relevance to time) is an eternal endeavour for the philosophies of historical thinking, since when philosophical thinking is applied with a historical dimension that investigates the tension between the temporal and the eternal, the nature of Beingness – as not the initial but the primary subject matter of disciplined philosophy – will inevitably be construed with the nature of the **history** of such Beingness. It is in this sense that history, as not only a notion that supports the background of other existences in the present in a genealogical sense but also as a notion for its own self referral to the existences in the past, needs to be preliminarily investigated, as far as history is a real being (though in the past tense) rather than a logical hypothesis.

This, a philosophical curiosity on the fundamental nature of the Beingness of history, inspired my retrospection of the dominant tradition of philosophies of history in the first chapter, and led me to the conclusion that those philosophies of history, in the form of the three waves of epistemological historicization, though they can be said to be successful due to their enlargements on the knowledge of the subjectivism knowing range of a historical thinking, ignore the original philosophical aim of historical thinking, that is, focusing on the tension between the past **and** the present rather than merely on the present thinking **of** the past. Therefore, in the previous chapter, I outlined the primary structure of a metaphysical science of history as a substitution for epistemological historicization, which aims to return to the original philosophical significance on the

tension between the past and the present. Such a primary structure is established upon a preliminary interpretation of Aristotelian ‘practical science’ regarding the science of *polis* (Aristotelian political science). A practical science studies the entities – in most cases, they are complex entities – in practical affairs like politics and history by interpreting the *physis* and *technê/phronēsis* of the entities. Then it moves to the parts of constructing the *physis* and *technê/phronēsis* respectively, and will be expanded specifically with more regard to the temporal nature than the general nature of practical science in this and the following chapters.

In the part of the *physis* of practical entity, by demonstrating the metaphysical principles and then explaining the practical applications of those principles in the science of *polis* as an example, I have argued that a metaphysical science of history should investigate, firstly, the developmental process from the historical events in the past as the material cause of the understandable historical knowledge in the present as the formal end cause, which denotes the temporal nature of history, and, secondly, the actualization of the combination of the material and the formal end causes which makes such a complex entity come into being in the present, and be understandable by present thinking activities.

However, this metaphysical scheme of historical thinking, though its general structure has been outlined by referring to a parallel example in the domain of the science of *polis*, is still out of precise correspondence with the rigorous disciplined science of history. It still has not thoroughly described the fundamental logic of a science of history in relation to time – if I assume the temporal nature is the fundamental nature of the process from historical events in the past to historical knowledge in the present. Therefore, in this chapter, I will demonstrate such a temporal nature of historical thinking and attempt to sketch the first part of the logics of a rigorous sense of the science of history – the second part will be expanded in the next chapter. I will clarify the features of the temporal nature of history (*Ordnungszeit*), and then will initially (since it refers to the knowing activity in the next chapter) investigate the transformation from *Ordnungszeit* to *Geschehenszeit*; the latter indicates the final actualization of the combination between the past and the present. In particular, I will clarify (3.2) modern theories of the temporal

feature of history, (3.3) the logical position of historical events in a metaphysical developmental process, (3.4) the nature of historical events and how they differ from historical facts, and (3.5) the fundamental Beingness, or '*ousia*', of the generated historical knowledge in the present as a complex entity with regard to the transformation from *Ordnungszeit* to *Geschehenszeit*.

3.2 On modern theories of the temporal feature of history: Ricoeur and Koselleck.

This section introduces some modern theories that also are concerned with and study the temporal feature as the fundamental feature of history. However, regarding the term I use, these theories at best describe the **feature** rather than the **nature** of history, since these theories have not regulated the rigorous metaphysical meanings of the *physis*, that is,, the nature, of the historical entities, before they study the so-called nature of history further. The fundamental nature, or *physis*, denotes one of the second instances of an entity, and thus indicates the process and basis by which the entity comes into its own being, whereas feature describes merely the pre-given subjectivism understandings of the entity. In several theories, the temporal feature of history does not indicate a temporal essence by which history as an entity comes into its own being, but rather indicates that understanding history depends on the pre-understanding of time.

However, this is not to say we should totally dismiss such theories. Similar to epistemological historicization (though actually, those theories have responded to and developed epistemological historicization by overcoming subjectivism explanations of historical consciousness), those theories are indeed successful due to their achievements in exploring the functional qualities of history by which history comes into its perceptible (though not necessarily understandable) form. In the sense of the functional qualities, those descriptive features present a structural position similar to that of the *physis*, though they are not the same, as I have already argued. And that perceptible form of history may be a good start from which we may gradually approach the fundamental nature of history.

In the rest of this section, I will mainly introduce two modern theories that investigate the temporal features of history. They are (1) Ricoeur's temporal seriality of

history and (2) Koselleck's temporal modes of historical events. Both theories propose a chronological quality of history by which history can be understood with relevance to time. Ricoeur viewed chronological relevance to time as an 'ontological' relevance of history, whereas Koselleck refused such a simplifying tendency of the so-called ontological research of history but argued for a more complicated proposal about the theoreticalization of history (and understanding of history).

3.2.1 Ricoeur's temporal seriality of history.

In his masterpiece *Time and Narrative* (Ricoeur, 1984, 1985 and 1988), Ricoeur re-examined and sketched a developmental progress of different philosophical meanings of the idea of 'chronology'. For those traditional philosophers like Aristotle, the term 'chronology' in a temporal sense was often understood as the numbers of motion. It was regarded as a cosmological fact which presupposes there are other existences to be identified. This opinion has been challenged many times in later centuries by several different arguments, for example, Augustine's attempt to reconstruct time into a divine historical structure, and Husserl's work demonstrating temporality as an inner consciousness and then claiming temporality is a subjectivism experience of human historical existence. By reviewing the development of the notion of chronology, he then established a conceptual bridge over the traditional cosmological view and the subjectivism view of time, and developed such a bridge into a narrative form of history, before finally developing it into the fundamental temporality of history. In particular, Ricoeur redefined the notion of a historical event by distinguishing it from a natural event in terms of whether the event has a 'narrative structure'. This clarification was made within the traditional argument on the tension between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*. For him, what a natural event lacks is a historical narrative which represents the reality towards human consciousness. Such a narrative consists of the structure of the temporal reference of history, as it suggests that the 'historicality' of a historical event is the being in time. Generally, it could be thought that a story also calls for a temporal structure like chronology; however, Ricoeur argued that a story itself is not a historical narrative, and not even a formalist or rhetorical analysis of folktales: historical

narrative must employ an order between the event itself and other historical events. This order indicates that those historical events as a whole are transformed into a story in a chronological sequence, so that the holistic meaning of the story can be comprehended by humans as corresponding to a certain universal experience, namely, the experience of chronological time. Such an experience of chronology makes human beings able to endow historical events with a temporal meaning, and such a temporal meaning is actually the present meaning of our daily life. In Ricoeur's view, historical events represent themselves as plots,³⁷ and these plots are endowed with meanings which then are able to consist coherently and generate the story. Without historical narrative, a story cannot move further into history, or precisely speaking, a temporal history. In short, a historian transforms historical plots to historical events by narrating the 'wording' rather than the 'working' (White, 1989, p.174), which means that historical narrative is necessary for the happened events to represent themselves in the writing of history.

It is on this basis that the role of a historian goes far beyond that of purely a narrator. A historian not only tells a story of a past; rather, a historian should justify all the events in the past. That means the historian must construct a narrative bridging the past and the writing of the past, with the latter considered as the real significance of a history. This narrative bridge is founded not only on the historical plots investigated by the historian, but it also calls for a broader reference as a platform from which a common present understanding of the meaning of the historical narrative can begin. Therefore, for the historian who not only narrates the historical past but also gives present meaning to the past, the natural sequence, namely, the chronology, of historical events is not only a temporal representation of the events themselves, which is demonstrated by the records of the raw materials of the historical past: it is an internal categorical feature of history, as a chronological order of history, in that it is symbolized as the ultimate reference of the temporality of such a history (but not the ultimate temporality itself!). To this extent, chronology is thus not merely a sequence of historical events; rather, it is the seriality of history.

But we should be careful. While I emphasize above that it is the reference of the

³⁷ Ricoeur develops Aristotle's theory of plot (in *Poetics*) into his historical narrative.

temporality rather than the temporality itself, for Ricoeur, the seriality of history is not in accordance with an ontological discourse of history. It may be regarded as a reflection of the temporal experience of history, but may not be equalized to the temporality. This is why the seriality of history denotes the quality of 'within-time-ness' of history rather than the ultimate essence of history, which means Ricoeur's scheme of an 'ontological' study on the essence of history is not so firm. Though the gap between the seriality of history as the ultimate reference of the temporality and the ultimate temporality itself may be small, it is determinatively significant that the nature of chronology or chronological history is totally changed. Ricoeur regarded the seriality, or the 'within-time-ness', as the reckoning or calculation of time so that it works as the representation of time in which history happened. But such a representation of time can be cognized as a temporal understanding of history only by the subjectivism self-consciously experience which generates from his or her daily experiencing of time. It is like a testimony of history: for Ricoeur, history itself cannot demonstrate its temporality without a presupposed subject who enquires about it consciously. We could bestow historical meanings on the beginning, the development, and the end of a chronological history; however, the chronology itself – if it calls for studies regarding it as being 'ontological' in nature – does not have any meaning. It is not a negatively 'meaningless' but merely neutral. What historical narrative endows finally is the inauguration, the transition, and the termination of history, rather than merely a fundamental nature of history in the form of chronology (White, 1989, p.178). For Ricoeur, the chronology needs a subjectivism perception by which history can be 'created' in a narrative sense. Therefore, history in this sense is construed not merely upon a continuous structure of time, since it must be re-performed into a meaningful discourse. Ricoeur regarded this discourse as an 'allegory' of temporality. It means that history performs an analogy or 'extended metaphor' in that humans endow history with a present temporal life. This awakens the awareness of a temporal consciousness during daily life where history projects its narrative.

Some inspiring conclusions – though in general rather than in detail – can be drawn from Ricoeur's proposal of the seriality of history, though it should be remembered that at best they are the fundamental features of the quality of chronological history rather

than the essential nature. Firstly, the seriality as a featured chronology that sketches the continuity from past to present bridges the gap between the past and the present. Based on that, secondly, seriality may indicate the distinction between historical events in the past and history as knowledge in present narratives. For Ricoeur, this distinction preliminarily supports further demonstrations of the causality between historical events, and thus further endows narratives with meaningful explanations of the causal relevance, which, finally and more significantly, provides a legitimacy of meaningful history to the present.

3.2.2 Koselleck's temporal modes of historical events.

Compared to Ricoeur's seriality, Koselleck's attempt to investigate the essential temporal quality of history is systematic as well, but focuses more on the 'principles'. Reversely speaking, those principles enlarge the explanation of the temporal quality – though as features rather than natures – of history, as far as Ricoeur's seriality investigates more the logical position rather than the principal contents of this concept. The principal explanation of the temporal quality of history can be related to the question of how we can perceive such a temporal sequence of history experientially. However, regarding the logic within which a science of history is studied, it is not related to experience (whether the daily experience as Ricoeur argued or not) directly, since principles of a temporal sequential character exist without any knowing or not knowing of them: these principles relate directly to the temporal structure rather than an epistemologically second-hand perception of such a structure.

It can be imagined that, by arguing such an anti-subjectivism demonstration of the temporal quality of history, people might easily deduce that the temporal structure of history is essentially distinguished from the generality of a measurable time presupposed by *Naturwissenschaften*. And more aggressively, some could be concerned with the singularity of a unique historical time, which is also not introduced from a real historical time. This argument might indicate an immediate relation in which a particular history cannot transcend itself as a whole, but can only be derived from the experiential abstractions of the singularity of every particular history. By listing possible arguments

like these – based on which the theoretical premises of historiography (rather than the philosophy of history, as I have clarified in the first chapter) have indeed developed productively – I am not ruling out historiographies from historical thinking; rather, I am re-discussing in what sense we reinvestigate historical thinking. If a historiography studies the fundamental reason (in terms of both the causes and the logics) for historical thinking, then it will be regarded as the same as the philosophy of history. Regarding these arguments, we should remember that, irrespective of whether we are dealing with the traditional historical writings like Herodotus's *Histories* in which a particular history is sketched as a conflict between civilized people and aliens, or the modern comparative work of plural civilization-histories under a kind of investigation that adopts a relatively single standard of the developing progress of civilization format/mode, we are continually attempting to comprehend the aliens' experiences by our own experience, which has been or is theoreticalized by the broad sense philosophies of history. This is because the philosophy of history relates to the kind of universal interpretation of generalized history **and** particular histories whereas the narrow sense historiographies provide the analysis of particular aliens' experiences and histories but **without** being generalized by our own experience.

Therefore, though Koselleck himself argued that the premises or prerequisites of history have been established on historiography rather than on the philosophy of history because it is historiography that initially provided the relatedness between natural time – the time beyond which any artificial effect and subjectively is comprehended – and history, actually he investigated such relatedness on the level of the philosophy of history regarding the fundamental reason for historical thinking. And in this sense, his term 'historiography' should be understood as being the same as the philosophy of history in my usage. According to his analysis, histories have been embedded into relative time periods, and thus historiography has not been able to be independent from relative chronologies, which further presents a categorical proposal of illustrating the experiences of history by different stages regarding the relatedness to time. These fundamental features – in the form of the temporal stages – of the temporal quality of history may conduct the investigation of the fundamental nature.

(1) Koselleck argued that the temporal experience in history firstly presents “the irreversibility of events, before and after, in their various processual contexts” (Koselleck, 2004, p.95). For us, this first principle is the initial application of a significant transformation from merely the temporal sequence to the interrelated temporal and historical structure. In the sense of merely the temporal sequence, the irreversibility of time regulates the necessary condition of antecedent things, by which random things – in that every individual thing is independent and beyond any potential contextual categories like historical relatedness – can be organized by positioning before and after. But the positioning of a purely temporal sequence actually does not correspond to either *Naturwissenschaften* or *Geisteswissenschaften* because even if positioning work has been done upon the knowing and the judgement of time and thus corresponds to practice, it still principally investigates the categorical time in a broad sense and thus belongs to the theoretical science rather than the particular practical science; the clarification of the latter develops into either *Naturwissenschaften* or *Geisteswissenschaften*.

However, the positioning work and irreversibility of before and after in the purely temporal sequence are meaningless for human practice, as they belong to theoretical science, unless they are applied to particular events as practical affairs. Historical events are organized chronologically with the first glance of a temporal sequence in which the initial form – and one of the fundamental characters even for the modern historical sciences – of historical writings is the chronicle. Here, I use the term ‘chronicle’ in its minimal sense, in that it does not mean a broad range of histories which merely record what happened year by year, time by time, but indicates a fundamental form of temporal sequence internally existing within such histories and even in all historical writings, whether merely records of what happened or the logical investigations of relations of what happened. Therefore, considering the primary chronicle form of history as the form of time in its minimum sense, historians are able to establish a logical relatedness upon the basis of temporal relatedness: a temporal relatively antecedent event can be possibly regarded as a cause, rather than an effect, of a relatively latter event. Of course, such an antecedent event can also be possibly regarded as a nonrelated or isolated event, but it will never be an effect, in the sense in which the relatively positions of two historical

events are located irreversibly. Cause and effect, or the logical relatedness between former and latter events, which might be considered as the most significant logical difference between the chronicle and the real 'science of history' (for example, for Croce), are actually established upon the primary introduction from chronological characters and principles of time.

One thing should be noticed. The irreversibility from a purely temporal sequence to the relatedness of historical events is not necessarily presented as a linear or unique form, and not even a universal form, since not every before and after are joined as one unique whole.³⁸

(2) Secondly, the temporal experience in history presents "the repeatability of events, whether in the form of an imputed identity of events, the return of constellations, or a figurative or typological ordering of events" (Koselleck, 2004, p.95). By accepting merely the first principle of the temporal structure of history, it might easily be claimed that such an argument on the repeatability of events may lead to a paradox since even if the temporal sequence of history does not present a linear form, it still presents an irreversible character. But it is in the gap between the first and second principles that the temporal structure of history develops to its determinative step: What had happened has been conceptualized and embedded into new happenings by the discovery of *Begriffsgeschichte* (the history of concept).

For Koselleck, *Begriffsgeschichte* as a discipline has developed from the critique of relatively simple demonstrations of a linear progress from the ancient to the modern world. This reconsideration of the concepts appearing in history and historical events is essentially a practical approach, in that the expressions of the concepts and the changing of them have been regarded as a form of categories that differentiates itself from other same, similar, or totally different forms of some relatively eternal constitutional arrangement of political and social practice, which "directed itself to criticizing the practice in the history of ideas of treating ideas as constants, assuming different historical forms but of themselves fundamentally unchanging" (Koselleck, 2004, p.81). A history of

³⁸ This is very similar to Walsh's 'historical colligation', which suggests that historical events should be introduced into many single separated processes and such processes are not any pieces or parts of a united universal process, though the temporal fundamentals of history (and of the science of history) has not been discussed thoroughly in Walsh's demonstrations.

a single concept is determined in the sense that the past meaning of such a concept has been specified and conducted into the modern context of its daily usage, and has retained an empirical validity upon its past meaning in a minimum sense. The combination of these two crosses the boundary of the isolated concept and generates a hermeneutical context: a context that has temporally developed from the beginning to the contemporary world. By minimum, it means that there are still many potential concepts that have kept the old forms or intentions which they used to denote, but their modern meanings actually indicate totally different contexts (rather than totally different meanings since even different meanings can be given to the same context). The historical investigation of concept calls for a temporally recurrent emergence of specific meanings: past circumstances can be provoked by the *Begriffsgeschichte* so that the present practical predicaments – in modern circumstances – can be considered in a more dependable regard with the past, rather than merely expecting the future without understanding the path they have followed and are still following.

Therefore, the conceptualization of history, though essentially the feature of the temporal quality of history, actually may conduct the *physis* from historical events in the past to understandable knowledge of history in the present, since the concept is by nature temporally after the emergence of a practical happening of a temporally antecedent event. If we stay at the first stage of the temporal principle, the temporal feature of history will not make history a practical science, since without particular investigations on the specificity and interrelatedness of concepts and thus the hermeneutical circle of them, the relatedness of before and after, or the positioning work of cause and effect, of historical events, is meaningless to history itself: the science of history is thus only a sub-discipline under the domain of the science of time. As Koselleck argued, “Persistence, change and novelty are thus conceived diachronically along the dimension of meanings and through the spoken from of one and the same word” (Koselleck, 2004, p.84). A purely temporal organization of events is merely a fact in the temporal dimension; it must be conceptualized so that it is able to further transform itself into a theoreticalized form of history as following which indicates the understandable knowledge of science of history.

(3) Finally, it presents “the contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous (*Gleichzeitigkeit der Ungleichzeitigen*)”, regarding which, Koselleck argued more straightforwardly that,

A different classification of historical sequences is contained in the same naturalistic chronology...they refer to the prognostic structure of historical time, for each prognosis anticipates events which are certainly rooted in the present and in this respect are already existent, although they have not actually occurred (Koselleck, 2004, p.95).

Based on the first principle that initially conducts the temporal sequence, or the chronology, into history, and on the second principle that by conceptualizes the past events, the relatedness of time and history finally presents itself as a theoreticalized and systematic work that investigates the purely abstracted foundations of history – or ‘philosophy of history’ in the broad sense, which is not against Koselleck’s position. As a practical science, the philosophy of history presents its final principle of relatedness in a dynamic way: even after the conceptualizing work has already developed into a systematic understanding of certain historical concept(s), it will still constantly practise its theoreticalized understanding by re-investigating such historical concept(s) with *reflective equilibrium* in different experiential circumstances – in the historical world, they are historical experiential circumstances. A temporal interpretation of history is not merely embedded into a given time when the coincident historical event happened (nor the given space as essentially the affiliation of that given time in the opinions of the modern people, as they may and indeed do locate modern happenings in merely modern circumstances, such as the chronicle); rather, a temporal interpretation of history has already been anticipated theoretically beyond the particular temporal or spatial point, and further approaches the essential temporal structure as a metaphysically interpreted knowledge of the general.

3.2.3 From featured principles to the study of the nature of historical thinking.

Ricoeur’s demonstration of seriality and Koselleck’s featured temporal principles regulate both history in a general sense of referring to a way of thinking and its

fundamental reasons, and the plural form histories in different particular historical circumstances. As Koselleck argued, the theoretical premises regulate historical thinking as it “must be developed [so that it is] capable of comprehending not only our own experience, but also past and alien experience; only in this way is it possible to secure the unity of history as a science” (Koselleck, 2004, p.94). Temporal chronological sequence, conceptualized historical events, and a theoretical system of history provide a relatively complete perspective of the fundamental feature of history with regard to the temporal essence of history. And these featured principles (and also the descriptive demonstration of the seriality) may provoke further investigations of the fundamental reason of history, as they have provided a direction towards the real significance of the logical construction of the metaphysical science of history.

In the following sections, considering the seriality and the three temporal modes as the chronological features of the development from historical events in the past to an understandable knowledge of history in the present, I will deepen the demonstration of *Ordnungszeit*, the initial interpretation of which has been given in the previous chapter. In particular, I will demonstrate the logical position (which relates to the first principle of conducting a temporal sequence into a historical sequence) (3.3) and the logical reason for historical events (which relates to the second principle of conceptualizing historical events) (3.4) relatively. These two parts will enhance the understanding of the temporal nature, *Ordnungszeit*, of history. Then, I will further argue that the traditional view that regards historical events as the ‘cause’ of present historical thinking is problematic. Indeed, historical events in the past stand on the logical position as the beginning of the generating progress of the understandable knowledge of history in the present, but this is not to say that historical events are hence the ‘raw materials’ of present thinking as second-hand abstractions. Rather, historical events themselves immediately belong to a systematic theoreticalized discourse. By investigating such issues, I am attempting to sketch the perspective of the science of history as a practical science with more particular relevance to the reason of historical thinking: In what sense is the concept historical events the intellectual beginning of historical thinking and directs the full mental development towards historical thinking? This question and the following discussion on

the theoreticalization of historical events will finally aim to support the whole description of *Ordnungszeit*, and will lead *Ordnungszeit* in to a deeper debate about *Geschehenszeit* (3.5).

3.3 The logical position of historical events: the material cause as the logical beginning.

Following on from the question above, in this section, I will investigate the logical position of historical events as the material cause of the science of history (understandable knowledge of history in the present), by which the fundamental features of the temporal quality of history, *Ordnungszeit*, will be re-sketches in a more rigorous metaphysical sense as the fundamental *physis* of history. *The physis* of history, or more precisely speaking, the *physis* that determinatively conducts the developmental process from historical events in the past to an understandable knowledge of history in the present, can be interpreted from its logical beginning, and from the temporal beginning for historical entities, since historical entities are generated from their causes, which are temporal antecedent existences. That beginning is the notion of 'material cause'. This approach to interpreting the *physis* of history from the material cause of history firstly, as one of the practical applications of the theoretical regulations of *physis*, again, begins from understanding the term '*physis*', or 'natural'.

3.3.1 A re-emphasizing of the meaning of the term '*physis*'.³⁹

As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, *physis*, as one of the second instances denoting the function of the *ousia* of an entity, means **being the entity itself** and suggests **a process of becoming and remaining itself**. This process of becoming and remaining an entity itself is, in modern English, a 'natural' process, or in Latin, a process *sui generis*, both of which suggest that this process is generated for its own cause without any external originator. In the sense that an entity corresponds to a natural process, history as a complex entity thus is a naturally generated result.

By 'natural', I refer to the interpretations of the notion that the generated result

³⁹ Please also see section 2.2.3 in the previous chapter.

relates to several different but mutually relevant linguistic cases of φυσικ⁴⁰. In the Greek linguistic context of metaphysics, *physis* comes from the verb *phuein*, which means 'bring forth' or 'grow'. In Aristotle's *Physics* ('*On Nature*'), he clarified that the natural result, or '*phusikon*' (singular form), has a linguistic reference to the dative case of *physis*, namely, '*physei*'; the latter means 'by nature'. For him, the noun *phusikon* is applied to describe an existing thing, and further indicates the being of the thing and its generating process, since *phusikon* linguistically is based upon 'by the cause of bringing it forth'. Though *phusikon* is not equal to *physis*, as the former emphasizes the existing while the latter emphasizes the reason or the cause of the existing, it is this distinction that supports the metaphysical relation between the theoretical science and practical sciences, as I have argued. The developing generating process of *phusikon*, which in most cases is a practical entity and thus belongs to practical sciences, is conducted by *physis* through *physei*, which belongs to theoretical science.

Therefore, if I am going to argue for the '*physis* of history', I have to preliminarily argue that an understandable knowledge of history in the present as a science of history is a generating result corresponding to the natural process in a strictly metaphysical sense. *The physis* of history hence denotes the quality of the generating of such a form of history in the present. As Aristotle stated, "of things which are generated, some are generated naturally, some artificially, and some others spontaneously; but every generated thing is generated by something and from something, and it generates something" (*Metaphysics*, 1032a12-15).

3.3.2 A logical rather than a particular concept of the term 'beginning'.

According to the primary interpretation in the previous chapter, the logical beginning of the *physis* of the understandable knowledge of history in the present as a generating process is the material cause of history. This argument further suggests that history as knowledge, or historical thinking, had not existed before being generated. History is not a metaphor of eternity; it definitely has a beginning, though that beginning is not a particular event, like the birth of the first human being, but rather a logical beginning

⁴⁰ Its Latin transliteration can also be *physis*.

from which the present historical thinking can be logically set up as a science of history. And it is on this issue – whether the beginning of history is a particular event or not – that the notion of a logical beginning is probably challenged by a misunderstanding. Based on the modern scientific knowledge of the geographical and biological physics of the earth, people might think that, before the birth of mankind, the earth and other species already existed and thus can be considered in the form of a ‘reasonable’ record as ‘history’, like a history of earth that began 4.6 billion years ago, or even a history of biological humans (*homo sapiens*) that began 315,000 years ago, which suggests that such ‘history’ exists individually and independently from the intellectual experiencing of mankind.

Indeed, this misunderstanding can be rectified by referring to the unique aim and methods of *Geisteswissenschaften* in contrast to *Naturwissenschaften*, as epistemological historicization has already offered an intellectualized proposal of historical thinking and its presupposed method on the hermeneutic interpreting of history, which is against the so-called neutral study of natural sciences. But more with regard to the temporal quality of history, *Ordnungszeit*, this misunderstanding may be due to the confusion between time and history, or more precisely, between the temporal sequence of the ‘past’ and history. For epistemological historicization and even for Ricoeur, who did not insist on the obvious subjectivism tendency to interpret the temporal features of history, history may be easily expanded into a chronological past based on which history is experienced consciously as follows. That is to say, the experience of daily life in which time is experienced as a chronological fact becomes the presupposition of experiencing history. And it is thus not hard to imagine that the chronological presupposition – which is often applied in *Naturwissenschaften* – becomes also a presupposed concept of the study of historical thinking. In short, the problem of equalizing time and history in the same dimension is that it creates confusion between a kind of category and an entity; the latter can be identified or described by the former but cannot be equalized to the former. And this clarification directly relates to the descriptive identification of the material cause of history.

3.3.3 A logical clarification of the argument ‘historical events as the material cause of

history’.

In the previous chapter, where I argued for the priority of the formal end cause over the material cause,⁴¹ I claimed that though the formal end cause ‘comes from’ the material cause, the material cause is defined by the formal end cause, since *epistêmai* (science) deals directly with the formal end cause due to its quality of being unchangeable. According to this interpretation, though I claimed to have conducted a study of ‘the material cause of history’, I cannot immediately demonstrate that the material cause is thus historical events, since in rigorous logic, the material cause of history remains unknown. I have used many terms with the preposition ‘of history’, and also with the adjective ‘historical’, but I have not demonstrated that the logical position of ‘historical events’ is definitely the material cause of history: as history is a complex entity, the material cause of history in the past has the quality of being able to combine and the quality of for itself existing as a real actuality, which further eliminates the other possibility of being known by other names without any relevance to ‘history’. That is to say, it is hard to imagine that the material cause of history in the past is not defined by the name of an understandable knowledge of history in the present as the formal end cause, since ‘history’ in the present has already been generated and has been in existence.

It might seem like a tautology, but it is not. Before that history in the present really generates itself as a complex entity, and thus is regarded as the actuality of itself, nobody can ensure that the material cause from which history **may be** generated **will** necessarily develop into history: an undeveloped material cause has merely the potentiality of developing rather than the actuality. The material cause is able to generate (or be generated in the sense of referring to the virtue of producing *technê*), but is also able to do nothing. Only after that history in the present has already been generated as actual existence can it be claimed that the potential material cause is indeed the material cause of history, though it is no longer a potential: it is the material cause for the generated history as an actuality. Such a material cause is defined by the actuality now: “Just as in the case of essence that which is predicated of the material cause is the actuality itself, so in the other kinds of definition it is the nearest approximation to actuality” (*Metaphysics*,

⁴¹ See section 2.4.1.

1043a5-7).⁴² For ‘historical event’, for example, we cannot say that ‘event’ is the material cause of ‘history’, only that ‘historical event’ is the material cause of ‘history’.

Indeed, it seems to suggest that we are not able to know what the material cause of history is until we already know what history as an already-generated *telos* is, which may challenge our common knowing experience of chronological consciousness. It may correspond to our general experience of the sequence of knowing as stated above, but may also contradict our experience of chronological consciousness: temporal antecedence is not the logical or knowing antecedence. It is by demonstrating a logic like this, which may contradict the common temporal experience, that I may further posit the logical position of the material cause, and emphasize again the reason why Ricoeur’s and Koselleck’s temporal theories of history are merely about the temporal features of history rather than the temporal essence of history (*Ordnungszeit*): though presenting an essential structure of history, time for itself is not the necessary condition of understandable knowledge of history in the present. We can still take historical thinking without any presupposed notion of time. What can be the necessary condition of history as knowledge or thinking in the present must be a thing ‘of’ history, or a ‘historical’ term. And in this sense, I need to investigate the position of the material cause as the necessary condition.

3.3.4 The material cause as the necessary condition of the *telos*.

“It is clear when the physicists [philosophers of *physis*] discuss the necessity, they should limit the term to what is inherent in the material cause, and should recognize the movement towards *telos* imposed on the material cause as a distinct addition to its inherent qualities” (*Physics*, 200a31-33). The necessity of the material cause is presented not as the result of a generating process, but as the condition of such generating, which therefore fundamentally – though also, it seems, easily – regulates how a generating result cannot become itself without the material cause. If it is argued that *telos* regulates the purpose of a generating result, it can and must be argued that the material cause regulates how such a generating result will necessarily be as it is. To take an example

⁴² For a brief analysis of the relation of essence-form-logos to material cause, see Loux, 1979, p.1.

from Aristotle's demonstration (*Physics*, 200a10-16, 30): Why is a saw like it is? Because we need it as a tool to saw something, and thus, being a tool of sawing is the *telos* of this saw as a generating result. This saw cannot be generated unless it is made of iron, and thus, iron is the material cause of this saw. Though iron can also possibly be anything else, when it is about to be a saw, it will definitely be the material cause of the saw. Therefore, if we have a tool to saw something, this tool must necessarily be made of iron. Iron is thus the necessary condition of the saw, though it does not account for the existence of the saw (what accounts for the being is the *telos*, which denotes the fundamental Beingness or *ousia*).

The material cause as the necessary condition can be understood with two more significances. Firstly, the necessary condition, or, in short, the necessity, is also a compulsory power in the sense that the necessity of the material cause decreases many possible routes of the generating progress to only one. As the material cause is the necessity for the final generating result, all the other possibilities of the material cause will no longer be possible since the material cause is no longer the potentiality. Necessity is the logical beginning of coming into being for a thing, an entity, according to its *physis*, just as Aristotle cited from Sophocles that "compulsion makes me do this of necessity" (*Metaphysics*, 1015a32).

Some specialists of Aristotelian philosophy might argue that, regarding the forcibility or compulsory power, it is *telos* that combines power cause and formal end cause, which should be the necessary reason that determines and defines the route of the generating process, rather than the material cause. However, secondly, in terms of a chronological view, only the material cause can and indeed does play a necessary role: the material cause is the only reason that exists in both the past and the present, which has a significant meaning for the historical entity crossing the past and the present. If a generating result exists as an actuality in the present, then the material cause as the necessary condition of the generating result will necessarily be in the relative temporal past, since the relative temporal future cannot provide actuality, but only endless possibilities, or, in accordance with Aristotle's interpretation of the poems in his era,

Choice is not concerned with anything that has already happened...for neither does

one concern oneself with what has happened in the past, but with what still lies in the future and may happen or not; what has happened cannot be made not to have happened (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1139b7-9).

3.3.5 Further meanings of the position of historical events for historical thinking.

As the logical beginning which is interpreted as a necessary condition in a rigorous sense, the further meanings of historical events are posited upon the relation between historical events in the past and an understandable knowledge of history as a science in the present. That is to say, such a metaphysical discussion on the meaning of historical events as the material cause does not posit upon the other external meanings, like 'the meaning of history', which further implicitly suggests the historical legitimacy of present day society or the immediate benefits of studying history. Actually, epistemological historicization did argue a kind of 'worthy' meaning of historical events by referring it to the subjectivism consciousness so that the meaning of historical events may verify the knowing capacity – and thus, such a capacity is endowed with a 'historical' dimension. Meanwhile, metaphysically speaking, the meaning of historical events is narrowed down to merely the logical position. It neither supports the other non-historical entities any longer, nor is it supported by the others.

Moreover, one of the further meanings of the material cause endows historical events with a realism understanding. Though I have clarified the logical position of historical events as a logical and necessary condition, I have not clarified the 'contents' of historical events. This means that historical events, though firstly the logical material cause of the present knowledge of history, must also be the really happened events so that the material cause as a concept will not fall into vacancy. Taking again the example of the saw, the generating process from the iron as the material cause to the saw as the formal end cause can be regarded as being in accordance with the *physis* of the saw. However, supposing we do not have the iron but still need to saw something, is there still a material cause as the logical necessary condition of the saw due to its quality of being logical rather than being real? We may do nothing and give up generating a saw, and hence eliminate the generating process of the *physis* of the saw since *physis* is based on

movements.⁴³ But we may also take metallurgy to create the iron. In this sense, by initiating metallurgy as the beginning of the logical chain from the iron to the saw, though the rigorous material cause of the saw is still the iron, the necessary condition of the saw is no longer the iron but the metallurgy: without the metallurgy, the iron will never come into being and will never subsequently become the saw. And in this sense, the metallurgy as the necessary condition ensures the material cause is not merely a logical concept, but rather, is a real concrete concept that refers to a real type of thing.

However, it is in referring to the 'contents' of historical events as the material cause that I must make further clarification. There are many 'historical facts' in historical events, like nations, and wars or contracts between the nations, or statesmen or stateswomen, and cooperation or intrigue between them. All these facts are the real sort of historical happenings and can even be regarded as historical entities; however, all these facts, even the unity of them as a single abstract fact, cannot be regarded as the material cause of history. The only material cause of history is the historical events. By distinguishing historical facts from historical events, the logical reason or the fundamental nature of the latter, as the rigorous metaphysical material cause, may be explained further.

3.4 The logical reason, or the nature, of historical event: being differentiated from historical fact, and being theoreticized to history.

In this section, I will continue to describe the fundamental nature of historical event as the material cause of science of history in the present. As I have argued, the position of historical event can be understood as the logical beginning of the developmental process of the *physis* of history. But the most rigorous sense of the nature of historical event has not been clarified thoroughly. In the following, I am going to present such a nature of historical event by distinguishing it from historical fact, as the latter may (but also may not) prepare a preliminary conceptualization for the former and hence it becomes the necessary condition of the former. This conceptualization of historical fact leads to the logical nature of historical event as the material cause and also the combined element, as in the transition from historical fact to historical event, a theoretical knowledge of the

⁴³ See section 2.4.1.

chronological nature of history is applied as a genericity of the circumstantial particularity of historical events.

3.4.1 Necessary condition may or may not be the material cause: an example of *polis*.

In Aristotle's *Politics*, there is a very famous argument about the material cause of *polis* which is essentially a misreading, even for some specialists. Probably due to the over-abstracted experiences from daily life and the partial understanding of the teleology, it has been wrongly argued that the natural slave⁴⁴ is the material cause of a family, and the family is the material cause of a *polis*. That is incorrect.

In *Politics Book I*, by investigating the incomplete reasoning capacity of natural slaves, Aristotle demonstrated some natural political organizing forms that existed in the beginning of the *polis* which is, though implicitly, in restricted accordance with the metaphysical principles, that is, in the teleological hierarchy from natural slave to master (freeman) then to family while excluding the *polis*, the inferior *telos* exists ONLY for the sake of the adjacent superior *telos*. The inferior *telos* does not serve the *telos* of the whole, which combines the inferior and the superior. Concretely speaking, the natural slave is indeed the necessity of the master, but is definitely not the material cause of the whole family combining slave and master; in addition, the family is the necessity of the *polis*, but is definitely not the material cause of the *polis*. The reason for this is that the *telos* of the family exists only for preserving itself, rather than serving the *telos* of the whole *polis*. Here we should be careful, and I do not mind repeating it again and again: the family is the necessity of the *polis* but is not the material cause of the *polis*. Being the necessity means that the family provides the necessary condition of citizens so that the citizens' association can immediately be the material cause of the *polis*. That is why in the previous sentence, I mention a teleological hierarchy but exclude the *polis*, since the teleological hierarchy, in strict metaphysical logic, exists only from the natural slave to the family and provides a full demonstration of the necessary condition of the material cause, rather than the material cause itself. But to continue investigating, there is a generating result of

⁴⁴ 'Natural' slave is a concept made by Aristotle himself. It means person who does not have complete reason capacity and thus is an incomplete freeman. This concept is irrelevant to any moral judgement which might think the quality of 'natural' bases upon inhumane or discriminative presuppositions.

the family which can be said to be an 'unexpected' result since it is generated without the purposive end of the family (as the purposive end of a family is merely preserving itself). Being the necessary condition, the family enables the master (freeman) to practise his or her reasonable ability for giving speech, doing economics, experiencing public life and finally forming a citizens' association. Furthermore, the citizens' association becomes the real fundamental material cause of the *polis*.

I may clarify the nature of the natural slave (as being understood as a logical beginning) from the nature of the citizens' association (as the real material cause of the *polis*) in more detail. A 'natural' slave differs from a master (freeman) regarding whether the reasonable capacity is complete. As Aristotle argued, "One who is a human being belonging by nature not to himself but to another is by nature a slave, and a person is a human being who belongs to another if being a man, he is an article of property, and an article of property is an instrument for action separable from its owner" (*Politics*, 1254a15-19). A natural slave is not a complete human being in the sense that the purpose of the slave is defined by the master rather than by the slave him or herself. As an individual entity, a slave really does have an end, since for him or her own self, there is a natural purpose of preserving him or herself. However, this purpose, preserving him or herself, exists not for his or her own sake: the *telos* of a slave is the *eudaimonia* of his or her master. He or she will no longer be a 'natural' slave if he or she pursues the *eudaimonia* of him or herself.⁴⁵

Similarly, the *telos* of a family aims only to preserve itself, namely, keeping the *eudaimonia* of the master in such a family, just as a slave does to the master. The *telos* of a family does NOT immediately serve the *telos* of the *polis*. As the formal end of an entity, the *telos* of a family is single and unique. Such *telos* cannot endow meanings to other entities. If a family cannot keep the *eudaimonia* of the master, it will no longer be a family. Natural slave and family, though they form a teleological hierarchy, do not directly indicate the material cause of the *polis*. They perform only the role as the necessary

⁴⁵ People might argue that Aristotle also mentioned the 'compulsory/forced slave'. It is true. For him, the existence of a natural slave has natural legitimacy since it corresponds to nature; whereas the forced slave has only customal legitimacy since it does not accord to nature but to *nomos* ('artificial and traditional laws'). However, even the forced slave provides the necessity of freeman because necessity does not depend on the kind of legitimacy. "For the compulsory is called necessary...Compulsion makes me do this of necessity" (*Metaphysics*, 1015a27-32).

conditions.

3.4.2 Epistemological historicization's clarifications on historical fact.

Similar to the political example, in the science of history, there is a concept which is interweaved and thus confused with the concept of historical events. That concept is often concretely constructed in the 'material' forms – which might be a reason for it being confused with the material cause, like the nations, statesmen or stateswomen, or the war or contract between them. These particular entities in the material forms are easily endowed with that concept and thus are regarded as the essential contents of a history or histories. Also, what makes that concept more easily confused with the material cause within a temporal interpretation is that the concept relates to the understandings of them in different circumstances regarding the chronological nature of history. That concept is historical fact, and it is often but wrongly regarded as being the same as historical events in terms of being the material cause of history.

Clarification of historical fact has been made by epistemological historicization, as it enlarges our understandings of historical thinking. For epistemological historicization, it may be a common argument that the term 'fact' is used in philosophies of history referring not to a particular sense; rather, abstracted notions of particular historical facts are concerned with the general nature of knowing of historical realities. This argument is discussed in the form of a question regarding whether human beings are able to state the historical fact in a 'precise' level called 'truth'. But by emphasizing 'precise', the logical standard of historical fact varies greatly:

In *An Introduction to Philosophy of History*, Walsh identified a coherence theory from the fact in a correspondence theory (Walsh, 1967a, Chapter 4). For a correspondence theory, "The facts in any sphere are what they are independently of the enquirer into it; in some sense they exist whether or not anybody thinks about them" (Walsh, 1967a, p.74). We say a statement is true if it corresponds with the facts. In this situation, fact is regarded as the logical necessary condition – often in a material form which is the reason for the confusion with the material cause – of succeeding, normally theoretical, thinking, or the conceptual knowledge. Without facts, a theoretical statement cannot be judged as

true or false. Facts are independent, neutral, and presupposed to all the observation, explanation, and systematic science. But the fact in a correspondence theory has a famous difficulty in that because the statements actually test each other, fact can never be reached due to the different particular experiences. Different experiences lead to different perceptions of the same fact; even the fact exists in a material form (thus it is called 'objective'). Any theoretical and conceptual form of the grasp of the fact is actually a subjectivism interpretation rather than an absolute truth that is believed as being in accordance with the objective nature of the material form.

Alternatively, with less ambition, a coherence theory interprets historical fact not as a presupposed material condition, but as one element in a relation between different statements, rather than the relation between a statement and its 'absolute truth', as a correspondence theory claims. For a coherence theory, the rigorous definition or the boundary of the concept of historical fact is less important than the interpretation of its meaning; the latter is a series of thoughts that is conceptualized and theoreticized so that the identification of historical fact is explained as meaningfully equal to a theory (rather than a definition): "Facts cannot, as was imagined in the correspondence account, be simply apprehended: they have to be established" (Walsh, 1967a, p.77). However, when a coherence theory approaches such an extreme form that it refuses any presupposed account of historical knowledge, it will necessarily fall into relativism. Under such an extreme form, it is impossible to identify a concept as being essentially coherent with a real historical fact and a concept as being generated from stories but keeping the historical form, since for the latter, in the long-term generating process, the current immediate perception of a fact has occurred gradually by temporal experience, so that the certainty of fact is no longer the necessary condition of theoretical thinking. Due to the relativism explanation of a 'degraded' historical fact in that the material form of a historical fact is no longer a necessary condition, the theoretical understanding of 'past' is divided into two parts, that is, the philosophical understanding is separated from the historical understanding, since the correspondence between a philosophical past and a historical past is destroyed by the relative equalization of theories and fact: when a fact loses its material form, it must depend on external standards to be conceptualized. Now,

the past **for** history which is viewed by the historians is disciplined and particularly defined by the past **in** history which is interpreted by philosophers of history, so that the chronological view of history is broken up, and the present becomes relatively independent from the past: "Evidence for the past must no doubt be present in the sense of being presented to us now, but it does not follow from this that it must refer to present time" (Walsh, 1967a, p.89). Fact in a coherence theory will finally not be applied to history.

3.4.3 The logical nature of historical fact – non-meaningful, and of historical event – meaningful.

By mentioning epistemological historicization's clarifications of historical fact – especially given that the two clarifications are not totally against each other but overlap each other to a certain degree, I am able to sketch a minimum perspective on the nature of historical fact as differing from historical event. Whether in correspondence theory or in coherence theory, historical fact is endowed with a conceptualized approach, as it has to be 'meaningful' to the epistemological construction of knowing the history. Even in correspondence theory, a fact in a material form is also conceptualized so that the succeeding theory – no matter what it is – is able to be established upon a certain 'objective' basis as a reasonable logical foundation. To this extent, the concept of historical fact in both theories suggests an overestimated logical nature rather than being merely the logical necessary condition. For a famous example (which has been referred to by almost all modern philosophers of history, from Collingwood to Walsh), in many 'theoretical' explanations of history, 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon River' is mentioned as a fact, and is interpreted for subsequent demonstrations in which the fact is presupposed as a logical standard, depending on which it can be decided whether an 'objective' historical record is right or wrong, or whether a historian thinks like Caesar rightly or wrongly by reviving Caesar's act of thinking with his circumstances in the historian's present mind. However, what I stress as the minimum perspective is merely that, without the historical fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon River, a historian can never make any logically succeeding demonstration based on the theoreticized construction of history.

Historical fact is merely the **necessary condition** of providing any meaningful interpretation of theories of history. For its own self, historical fact is not the logical beginning of historical thinking; it is just the presupposition of the meaningful succeeding concepts like historical events.

Historical fact must be conceptually transformed and conducted into **a meaningfully interpreted historical event**. This transformation does not stay simply in the literal field. A historical fact will not become a historical event only by a change in the descriptions. As Koselleck argued, "A word becomes a concept only when the entirety of meaning and experience within a socio-political context within which and for which a word is used can be condensed into one word" (Koselleck, 2004, p.85). Regarding the development from the material cause to the formal end cause, if the superior form of a theoreticization is generated for its own cause, namely, the *physis* of that development is complete, the inferior form of it begins **not from** the fact that an action happened spontaneously (Caesar crossed the river) – being spontaneous to the historian who did not exist when the fact appeared (Caesar did not necessarily know he would be a part of history) – **but from** the most initial theoreticized conception for the whole system (the historian thinks this particular event of Caesar's action can be theoreticized, just like Collingwood's revival of one's action of thinking). When a historical event can be named as so, it has already been intellectually construed as the beginning of the mental process, rather than staying in the 'neutral' but essentially particular status without any relatedness to the mental activity. That means that when the historical fact gets conceptualized, it must also become generalized (though it is not definitively universalized since a systematic practical science, even philosophy, does not necessarily exist in every civilization), and thus is it no longer particular.

But it should be emphasized that such a transformation from historical fact to historical event through mental conceptualization is not a once-and-for-all action, since besides the historical circumstance in the past, it depends also on the present circumstance in which historians make their judgements: "they synchronically treat circumstance and (along the diachronic dimension) their transformation" (Koselleck, 2004, p.89). Taking the political example again, a natural slave cannot be the material

cause of a *polis*. By analysing the logic of this argument, it can be further interpreted that the particular existence of a slave, which differs from the freeman/master who identifies him or herself in the general existence in the form of a public life, cannot be the initial theoreticized conception, though the particular existence indeed provides the necessary condition of the existence of the freeman/master. And such a necessary condition is not directly meaningful to the *polis* in the rigorous metaphysical sense. Only by investigating the aim and the meaning of the freeman/master to the *polis*, can the logical nature of the slave be clarified in retrospect. In this logic, the superior circumstance, namely, the uniqueness of every different *polis* and its citizens, regulates the conceptualization and further theoreticalization of the inferior circumstance again and again. So it is with the science of history. Though the 'origin' of the concepts of history is the historical fact that happened in the past, the generating process of the concepts which involves the transformation from fact to event is a process lasting from the past to the thinking present, and this finally leads to the concepts and the conceptualization to the present circumstance where the historical thinking is taken as approaching the general knowledge of history.

Now, the biggest difference between historical fact and historical event is whether historical fact corresponds to merely the particularity or the generally conceptualized approach of the particularity. Indeed, it is easy to argue that historical events are also concerned with the particularity because every event individually exists in a particular case (though they may also be interdependent on each other). But as I have already commented, a historical event – though it existed in the past – is endowed with a chronological understanding by present historical thinking, and furthermore, reversely interprets – rather than explains – the necessary condition of it, namely, the historical fact. A historical event can be so termed when the historical fact becomes 'meaningful' to us as a concept, and such 'meaning' is theoretically constructed upon our chronological expectation of the present, irrespective of whether such an expectation provides the historical legitimacy to present-day institutions, or the historical reason for present-day self-identities, or just the historical curiosities of our hollow minds.

As we have been clear about the nature of historical events in terms of being the

material cause, now we will investigate the movement, or the developmental process, from the material cause to the formal end cause, regarding the logic of historical thinking. For historical events in the past, the significance now is how the general understanding of a history in the present theoreticizes past events – as the past and the present can be valued in the same logical dimension while actually existing in two different temporal dimensions. Moreover, as this research is a descriptive research – though it adopts the form of metaphysics – rather than a revisionary one, which means that I do not aim to offer a ‘better’ scheme of interpreting the way we think about history but merely sketch the actual perspective of how it has already been embedded into our minds, the essential spirit of such a metaphysical interpretation is also self-improving, that is, it is also self-investigating regarding whether historical events will definitely achieve the theoreticalization of historical thinking. Somehow, this sceptical discussion on theoreticizing historical thinking shares the same academic interests with Oakeshott – especially in his late career.

3.4.4 Theoreticizing historical events in the past into systematic history in the present, or not.

In contrast to *Time and Narrative*, in which Ricoeur adopted Aristotle’s poetic science as one of the resources of his narrative theory but did not thoroughly investigate the relation between poetic science and other sciences and even metaphysics, Oakeshott’s *On Human Conduct* responded to classical clarifications and the mutual relevance of different sciences, and more importantly, considered the historical knowing in such a response. In this book – which is often believed to be the most important book of his late career – he argued that a mental structure of understanding has two succeeding levels, that is, a theoretical level (which comprises ‘recognizing’, ‘identifying’, and ‘theorizing’) and a practical level (in his words, the ‘human performance’). With these two levels of understanding, he further claimed that human conduct is an instrument of the theoretical understanding but actually is applied in practice, which essentially conducts the theoretical understanding in a general sense to the concretely practical considerations of different circumstances. It can be seen that for him, human conduct bridges a similar gap

for us, and for the classical differentiated sciences, the gap that exists between theoretical science and the practical sciences.

In particular, it is from that gap between the theoretical level and the practical level (or between theoretical science and the practical sciences in my view with regard to Oakeshott's inheritance from the ancient philosophies) that a special concept concerning the practical circumstances emerges. That, as one of Oakeshott's most famous concepts, is the contingency. Contingency "is understood in terms of the ideal character 'human conduct', a substantive performance [rather than a formal performance that shows an unbroken continuity of occurrences] is identified as an intelligent 'goings-on' composed of related circumstantial occurrences"(Oakeshott, 1990, p.101). Contingency, instead of the relatively formal performance of a unity of genericity and particularity, substantively presents a historical understanding of human conduct in that the contingency performs a sequential relatedness of a temporal circumstance where "what comes after is recognized to be conditional upon what went before" (Oakeshott, 1990, p.104), and generates an interdependent intelligible continuity of such conditional occurrences. For Oakeshott, this conditional interdependency – even if it is in the temporally sequential form –is not a teleological process;⁴⁶ it is just a description of a temporal contextual contingent relation which defines the understanding of continuity, or the seriality in Ricoeur's words, in an intelligible sense. Here, he showed some similarities with Collingwood's philosophy of history, as he claimed that such a contextual understanding needs a reviving perception of historical fact as "to understand a substantive performance in which an agent discloses and enacts himself is to put it into a story in which it is recognized to be an occurrence

⁴⁶ People might wonder that, especially in the first essay of *On Human Conduct*, Oakeshott argued his thoughts in a form of against the traditional teleology. Indeed many specialists have pointed out his apparent anti-Aristotelianism tendency. For example, for Oakeshott, "History provides the most appropriate way of explaining human conduct once we assume that human beings are 'agents' who have no *telos* or necessary ends" (Mapel, 1990, p.394). Moreover, Luke O'Sullivan has analysed Oakeshott's rejection of Aristotelian teleology in his *Oakeshott on History* (2003), especially page 243-245 where Oakeshott's concept of historical change is analysed and compared with Aristotle's idea of change.

It must be clarified that the usage of '*telos*' in this research is restricted to the minimum metaphysical usage that indicates only the formal end cause of an entity. That means this term is used without any implicit or explicit moral meaning or a Hegelian substantial/speculative metaphor of a purposive end of the whole history (like Hegel's World Spirit or Fukuyama's The End of History), and is used at best for describing **the logic of thinking itself**, rather than the logic of the subject-matter of thinking. What can be concluded as 'teleology' is merely the way that we think about history, rather than the way that history develops – anyway, history may also not develop.

contingently related to other occurrences” (Oakeshott, 1990, p.105). In this sense, it might be further argued that for him, an essential reason for demonstrating contingency is to identify the causality of historical events; however, for Oakeshott, there is no necessary causality between historical events, since the contingency is an immediate relation between events without any additional presupposed conceptualized approach, which is often adopted for a further theoretical system. Historical events, in an epistemological sense instead of the presuppositions of any theoreticalized construction, are for themselves the conclusions of the historical questions about the past, and are for themselves the meanings in authentically historical narratives. They are for themselves, rather than a theoreticalized result of them, the constructions of a history. Hence, those events of present practical experience are rejected, or at least distinguished, since they belong to a sensible and perceptual present corresponding to an epistemological difference from a non-perceptual past of historical events. As O’Sullivan argues,

Oakeshott’s final position on causality was that the historian does not and cannot claim to be invoking any of the Aristotelian ‘causes’ or the conceptions of causality argued by philosophers (like Leibniz) who have considered the matter: there are not relationships between events separated by an interval of time (O’Sullivan, 2003, p.243).

It seems that Oakeshott refused to endow historical events with a meaningful logical position as one of the elements of the whole logical chain of historical thinking, since for him, historical events interdependently and immediately relate to each other, which makes claiming the ‘whole’ historical thinking in a general sense futile. For him, if there is a kind of philosophy which can be named as a philosophy of history, that philosophy of history must aim to merely present or demonstrate the uniqueness of every contingent historical circumstance rather than the logic of the genericity of history. However, an ontological problem with such a conceptualized idea, that is, contingency, is that, though it really does develop the conditional interdependency of events into a temporally sequential circumstance and hence it deserves an epistemological appellation of knowing itself as a ‘historical relatedness’, it actually regards history as an adjective of the contextual relevance: if events relate to each other in a temporal sense, then the

relationship between them can be named a historical relationship – irrespective of whether such a temporal sense is based upon the rejection of causality (as Oakeshott suggested), or the acceptance of causality (as Oakeshott criticized). This problem is shared by most philosophers of history who are affected by epistemological historicization, and even by some philosophers outside the professional domain of the science of history, like Heidegger, who demonstrated the notion of historicity but essentially returned to serve his interpretation of the temporality of *Dasein*. Rather than a metaphysical interpretation outlining the developmental process from historical events in the past to historical thinking in the present with regard to the temporal quality (*Ordnungszeit*) of history, epistemological historicization or the subjectivism interpretation of history regards history as an element of the knowing capacity of the individualized subject (which could, however, be interdependent), which further suggests that without the currently knowing subject in the present, history may mean nothing.

However, in the minimum sense of the particularity of historical events being related to the genericity of history – ironically, Oakeshott regarded this relevance as ‘formally performance’ – his demonstration of the contingency shows a possible route towards an understanding in a general level of historical events as the material cause of history. This consideration of the logical reason for historical events is also described similarly as ‘colligation’ by Walsh, though neither of them distinguish historical event from historical fact in the sense of being meaningfully conceptualized or not.⁴⁷ A particular historical fact must be conceptualized meaningfully into a historical event with regard to the temporal position, so that the formal performance between historical events is reasonably regarded as a ‘historical’ adjective. In this sense, the term ‘cause’ or ‘*causa*’ is endowed with a broader explanation than the one based upon Oakeshott’s understanding of Aristotelian ‘cause and effect’ in the context of the science of history. Abandoning the narrow Aristotelian sense of causality but interpreting contingency upon causality, Oakeshott offered a minimum principle of the reason of historical events which may be similar to the metaphysically interpreted science of history, that is, historical events should be organized as interdependent conditions of each other, and such an organizing

⁴⁷ But Oakeshott did distinguish historical event from ‘historical situation’ in the sense that the latter indicates the epistemologically operated situation. See Oakeshott, 1983, pp.57-65.

approach should be chronological.

Some other philosophers of history indeed have noticed the temporal character of history and have examined this logical process, though it is hard to conclude that their efforts are successful, especially in distinguishing historical fact as the necessary condition, without the epistemological regulations and the subjectivism inferences, from historical event as the presupposed material cause of history. In the short '*Notes towards a metaphysic*' written in 1933 (Collingwood, 2001, pp.119-139), Collingwood attempted to describe a relation between historical events based upon the restricted 'metaphysical' interpretation of causality but in his own words. This metaphysical interpretation is actually a sceptical approach of epistemological historicization, since he accepted merely the minimum meaning of causality which correlates only to whether the causality is conditional or not, rather than a complete re-investigation of the epistemological or subjectivism tendency of historical thinking. Though it is the minimum set of principles on causality, it is enough for him to define (or discover) that "history is the coincidence of logical with temporal order" (Collingwood, 2001, p.121).⁴⁸ Of course, in particular, Collingwood refused to regard the temporal order as 'chronology', since he agreed with Croce's opinion that chronology is often used to describe the status of an organized series of events rather than the essential quality of the principled logical order behind such events. But through the appearance, in a general scope, it still can be seen that he was concerned with the temporal character of history in a way which is very similar to the chronological nature of history in our claim:

History begins when we see these events as leading by necessary connexions one to another: and not only that – for history demands more than that – but as the γένεσις ['coming to be'] of something, the history of something which is coming to be in this temporal process. Now, in a mere temporal process, necessary though it is, nothing comes to be; there is only change, not development. What imparts to an historical process its character of development is that the phases of this process are the phases in the self-development of a concept – e.g. that parliamentary government is coming into existence, which can only happen if the concept parliamentary government is

⁴⁸ However, he finally abandoned demonstrating a metaphysical structural relation between time/temporality and history in the later *An Essay on Metaphysics* in 1940.

articulated into elements or moments which (a) are capable of arrangement in logical order, the first being what historians call the germ of it (b) are capable of being brought into temporal existence in that order. Thus history is the deployment of a concept in a process that is at once logical and temporal (Collingwood, 2001, pp.121-122).

In the following section of the *Notes*, Collingwood explained that the combining of the logical order and the temporal order is to demonstrate the present essence of past things. History is a projection of the abstracted present affairs upon the past, which suggests history alone has no independent essence in or of the past. The essence of history depends on the present being, which exists as reality. For him, the combining of them does not simply regard the temporal former thing as the logical cause of the temporal latter thing, unless we want to get a Hegelian world towards an absolute end without any meaningful individuality; rather, the combining of them is actually a result of the fact that the mind is consciously in time. Therefore, though he had a plan for a metaphysical interpretation that considered history as a process in which the essence of history comes into existence in the present, he was actually concerned with the conscious experience of the past as the logical beginning of the science of history. For him, that is the reason the 'science' of history should be replaced by the 'philosophy' of history: this discipline discusses not only the knowledge of a certain field of a past world, but also the knowledge of the essential elements about the actuality of such a past world, which is a philosophical thinking in the present. It is to this extent that we can claim that it is also appropriate to study the logical reason for a historical event as the beginning of the science of history, just like Collingwood's minimum principled position, since we are not interested in a certain knowledge **in the past** as a specific history, but in the knowledge **about** the nature of the past as the science of history.⁴⁹

At the end of this section, I mention Giovanni Gentile's argument to highlight the different natures between historical fact and historical event and thus the theoreticalization of historical events for historical thinking, though he used the term

⁴⁹ This distinction has been described as the one between a speculative or a substantial philosophy of history and a real significant narrative within history by analytic philosophers of history like Danto, though for me, this distinction should and may be bridged by a metaphysical science of history. See Danto, 1985, p.118.

'historical fact' slightly differently from me. As he argued,

An historical fact as regards time is a past fact but our judgment concerning it can only have meaning if we take as its valuation, not the accomplished fact, but the historian's consciousness and personality, of which indeed the idea of the historical fact is an inherent past", and then "only spiritual acts have value, we do not judge pure facts such as fair or foul weather, deformity or fine stature (Gentile, 1922, p.127).

***Ordnungszeit*, which means time in which things like historical events are ordered in a temporal sequence, has been sketched as the fundamental nature, or *physis*, of history, by interpreting the logical position of and the logical reason for historical events as the material cause. It must consist not only of historical events as the existences in merely the temporal past, but also the full developmental process from past existences, through the conceptualization of the past existences, and finally to the present theoreticalization in the form of historical thinking – though it remains a problem that the present theoreticalization of history is not necessarily known by us in the present.**

3.5 Understanding the fundamental Beingness, or '*ousia*', of the generated historical knowledge in the present as a complex entity: the transformation from *Ordnungszeit* to *Geschehenszeit*.

This section is the logical connection between this chapter and the next chapter, and between this and the next group of chapters **as a whole** and the final chapter. In the previous sections (a preliminary section on the temporal feature and two essential sections on the logical temporal nature), I have outlined a relatively complete perspective of the developmental process from historical events in the past to theoreticalized historical thinking in the present (namely, a science of history), in which the fundamental nature, or *physis*, of history is presented as *Ordnungszeit*. According to the metaphysical structure of practical science that investigates a practical entity as a complex entity, which was discussed in the previous chapter, the significant work for interpreting the *physis* of history on a deeper level is that, if the generated historical knowledge in the present is

finally about to be actualized as a complex entity that combines with historical events, then a continual query must be how we can achieve the *ousia* of such a complex entity, since it is the *ousia* in the sense of primary instances rather than the *physis* as one of the secondary instances (the other is *technê/phronēsis*) that fundamentally makes an entity come into being, or in other words, makes it actualized.

I will give the answer in two stages. Firstly, history is actualized in the final sense by historical knowing as an action, or as I term it, historical deliberation. This concept will be interpreted in the next chapter. Now I need to clarify why in describing the *ousia* of history, I transform *Ordnungszeit* into *Geschehenszeit*. This provides a preliminary discussion of a deeper understanding of historical thinking.

In particular, in regard to transforming *Ordnungszeit* to *Geschehenszeit* and considering the *ousia* of history as a complex entity, in the following section, I will discuss (1) the logical position of the *ousia* of history, and (2) the logical possibility of ‘grasping’ it, specifically, knowing its function, in accordance with the metaphysical principle that the *ousia* in the primary instances can be grasped only by knowing its function in the secondary instances like *physis* and *technê/phronēsis*. These questions offer preliminary support for the discussion in the next chapter; since the first part of the secondary instances has been sketched as the *physis* of history, we need to move to the second part, which is concerned with *technê/phronēsis* but essentially with the issue of knowing.

3.5.1 The logical position of the *ousia* of history: by analogy with the example of the *ousia* of *polis*.⁵⁰

Firstly, I am going to describe the general logical position of the *ousia* of history, so that we may be clearer about the way that *ousia* is grasped in the form of the *physis* of history, or reversely speaking, about the way that *ousia* conducts the secondary instances like *physis*. The metaphysical meaning (rather than definition) of *ousia* is often interpreted as – in other languages for better understanding – the Latin *per se*, or the English ‘inside and by itself’ (*Metaphysics*, 1029b14). In describing the perspective of

⁵⁰ Please also see section 2.2.3 for the basic interpretations of the usage and the meanings of *ousia* or ‘entity’ in pure metaphysics, especially the explanation on the primary instances and the secondary instances of *ousia*.

ousia (irrespective of whether it relates to the practical applications, like *ousia* of history, or just to the pure metaphysics), it should be noticed that I ask 'How can we describe *ousia*?' or, more boldly, 'How can we achieve *ousia*?' rather than 'What is the *ousia*?', since – as I have highlighted – *ousia* can define the others but cannot be defined by the others. The other definitions can at best indicate an exact *ousia* in a particular sense but can never determine or define it. Therefore, in rigorous accordance with this metaphysical rule, I will continually describe the *ousia* of history in the analogy with the political example, as both political science and the science of history are practical sciences under the conduction of the same theoretical science/metaphysics.

Indeed these two sciences are not the same as they differ in subject matters, though they share similar structures. One of the unique features of the science of history is that, rather than a spatial complex entity in political science that a *polis* combines the constitution and the citizens and then is actualized in a spatial dimension, the complex entity in the science of history involves the temporal dimension which, though it brings the unique temporal *physis* of history (*Ordnungszeit*), it makes the *ousia* of such a complex entity difficult to describe, since the temporally antecedent elements (historical events in the past) and the temporally succeed element (historical thinking in the present) exist in different temporal positions, whereas in the political example the constitution and the citizens exist in a same spatial position. If it is *ousia* that makes an entity come into being, then it must be clarified how the *ousia* of history makes two temporal positions combine into one temporal dimension.

As I have argued, historical events as real existences in the past will not be eliminated even after they develop into historical knowledge in the present, since they are indeed elements of the resource of present thinking in the past tense, that is to say, they have delivered the uniqueness of their time in different circumstances to the present thinking. In this sense, they are actualities, though in the past tense, rather than potentialities. By investigating the actuality, we can presume many interpretations of a history or of events, but we cannot predict that if the actual events did not happen. Being a real rather than merely a logical hypothesis, historical events also immediately regulate the present historical thinking to the extent that the present thinking must explain itself in a way in

which the events involved are reasonable. In the science of *polis*, this metaphysical principle of the complex entity can be figured as the corruption of a purely natural *polis* not (or not only) being due to the corruption of its formal end cause (the constitution as the generated result of its *physis*) but due to the corruption of one of the combined elements, namely, the citizens' association. Though it is from the citizens' association that a *polis* develops its form and hence the citizens' association is the material cause, the citizens' association will not be eliminated even after the development finishes, but rather will combine with the constitution and will finally actualize the *polis* together with the constitution.

In the political example above, the final actualization of a *polis* as a complex entity is due to the *ousia* of the *polis*, which means that the generating process of the *physis* of the *polis* as the secondary instances of the *ousia* must correspond to the first instances. In pure metaphysics, this correspondence is finished by interpreting *telos* as the exact grasp of *ousia*, which means that when the formal end cause of an entity is generated, it will definitely be the fundamental Beingness that makes the entity its own self. However, this metaphysical correspondence should be interpreted more thoroughly when it is applied to practical sciences, since practical sciences are concerned not only with general knowledge, but they also study practical particulars.

For a practical entity, this correspondence means two things. The first is that the *ousia* of the entity – whether single or complex – is inside itself, and the second is that though that *ousia* can be indicated by others, it can be exactly and correctly indicated only by the entity itself. These two principles support each other and together conduct the presenting of a practical entity, as far as theoretical entity in pure metaphysic does not need to be presented.

To understand these two principles – two very simple principles – that essentially describe the logical position of the *ousia* of a practical entity, I will offer an experiential example which is often applied in the modern political science/philosophy and, in view of the metaphysically interpreted political science, is wrongly regarded as the fundamental Beingness of a practical entity like a state. This kind of experiential concept, which it is claimed offers a definition, actually confuses the definition (which is determined by *ousia*)

with the adjectives of the definition. For example, Max Weber defined a state as “the monopoly on the legitimated use of physical force...the monopoly is limited to a certain geographical area” (Weber, 2015, p.136). But under a metaphysical investigation, this ‘definition’ describes merely the accidentalities of the *polis*: it is not necessarily so by the reason from itself, or in the words used above, it is not so *per se*. The concept of monopoly, legitimated use, and geographical area, all indicate not the reason of the existence of a state, but the apparent forms of the existing of a state: monopoly of power within geographical area by legitimated method does not necessarily aim to the existence of a state but merely provides necessary conditions (this may also be in doubt) of a state. Without the formal end cause functionally presenting the distribution of power between the ruler(s) and the be-ruled, monopoly of power will still be simply monopoly of power and will never transform to a state. People could doubt that legitimated use of power provides the reason of power and the form of distribution of power; however, though Weber did explain the three ways of legitimacy of power, those ways are at best the generating of *status quo* of states rather than the generating of the essence of the states, that is to say, an explanation on the legitimacy does not offer the final reason of a state: a charisma state absorbing democratic legitimacy though is still essentially a tyrannical state since the distribution of power between the ruler(s) and the be-ruled does not change. For Aristotle, a *polis* of which the citizens do not change changing the distribution of power is definitely not the original *polis* any longer, though the legitimacy endows the change with ‘rightly’. Legitimacy – if Aristotle adopts this concept – essentially belongs to the citizens in accordance with *nomos*, whereas the reason of *polis*, whenever the *polis* is generated, is natural and may be against to the citizens due to citizens’ possession of the changeable and indeed changing *nomos*.

In this sense, indicating itself is not the sufficient and necessary condition of being itself: being itself necessarily requires indicating itself, but not vice versa. Being itself, or *to ti ên einai*, relates only to the entity, whereas indicating itself could relate to other categories:

Maybe definition, like ‘what it is’, has more than one sense. ‘What it is’ in one sense means the entity and the individual, and in another sense means one of these

categories: quantity, quality, and others. Like 'being' that applies to everything but primarily to one thing then secondarily to others, 'what it is' applies to entity in an unqualified sense, then to others in a qualified sense (*Metaphysics*, 1030a17-24).

Therefore, though indicating itself relates to many possibilities, there is a hierarchy in these possibilities: only the one that is indicating itself is equal to being itself and is the highest indicating. This principle consists of the most rigorous requirement of 'definition':

The primary and unqualified definitions, and *ousia*, belong to entity. It is true that they belong equally to other things too, but not primarily. For if we assume this, it does not necessarily follow that there is a definition of anything which means the same as any description; it must mean the same as a particular kind of description...in one of the proper senses of 'one' (*Metaphysics*, 1030b5-10).

That 'one' is the *ousia* of an entity that inseparably and individually exists. Therefore, when the *ousia* of a practical entity in a practical science is studied, it will necessarily relate to the inseparable and individual existence. Thus, the mistake of Weber's definition is that the *ousia* of a *polis*, which should exactly correspond to the constitutional *telos* of the *polis*, is divided and separated into other sub-definitions, such as the monopoly and the other concepts, and thus can no longer be regarded as an individual entity.

Considering the correspondence and the meaning of the correspondence, namely, the quality of being inseparable and individual of the *ousia* of a practical entity, we may homogeneously describe the *ousia* of history. In a metaphysically interpreted science of history, however, the difficulty – if we describe *ousia* based on the interpretation of the correspondence as above – is that, rather than defining constitution as the secondary instances *telos*, which corresponds to the primary instances *ousia* of a *polis*, **defining the *ousia* of history is the same as defining the *telos* of history**, since *telos* or the formal end cause of history, as the end of the developmental process of the *physis* of history, is the understandable historical knowledge in the form of historical thinking in the present (rather than in the past), which is for its own self a dynamic essence that presents the *ousia* in the sense of being itself, especially in accordance with the acting status of the *ousia*, namely, *to ti ên einai*.⁵¹

⁵¹ Again, please see section 2.2.3 for the relevance and difference between *ousia* and *to ti ên einai*;

This argument seems a tautology in that the primary instances of *ousia* and the secondary instances of *ousia* (presented by *telos* in the process of *physis*) demonstrate each other. Actually, it is due to the unique logical structure of historical thinking in the sense that our mental experience of historical thinking has not been construed as a metaphysically interpreted science like political science (in the Aristotelian sense). For example, a metaphysically interpreted political science regards the constitution as the *telos* of a *polis*. This constitution as the end of the *polis* aims to reserve itself by harmonizing the ends of the citizens and the end of its own self. By doing so, this *polis* is finally actualized and presents its own *telos*, and, more importantly, can be defined by its own *ousia*, which corresponds to the metaphysical principle that the primary instances of *ousia* can only be grasped by the secondary instances like *physis*. However, on the other hand, if we adopt the same logic into the science of history, then we will get an argument that ‘the historical knowledge in the present is for itself the *ousia* of historical thinking, of itself’, and actually, they refer to the same thing on the same level, rather than the political example in which ‘constitution’ is apparently different from ‘the *ousia* of a *polis*’ in terms of the secondary and the primary instances respectively.

Just as I have mentioned, this phenomenon is due to the lack of the metaphysical construction of our mental experience of historical thinking. In political science, we have already been using the concept ‘constitution’ and also the concept ‘*polis*’ as two related but different terms, which makes these two concepts interpretable with relevance but also with a distinction. Though *ousia* cannot be defined by other definitions, and hence the term ‘*polis*’ is at best one part of the descriptive phrase ‘the *ousia* of a *polis*’ rather than the *ousia* itself, the term ‘*polis*’ at least limits *ousia* to the range of indicating itself. However, in the science of history, in terms of investigating the logical reason for historical thinking rather than the subject-matters of historical thinking (as I have argued in the beginning of this research), we have already been using the terms only in the sense of the secondary instances, and have not found any term which can be used to indicate the *ousia* of history.

the latter emphasises the acting status of the former but cannot be referred to the secondary instances (whereas the former can), though actually, they are same in the sense of the primary instances.

	Primary instances: Fundamental Beingness of an entity	Secondary instances: <i>physis and technê/phronēsis</i> of an entity
Science of <i>polis</i>	the <i>ousia</i> of a <i>polis</i> – the harmonization of ends: makes the <i>polis</i> actualized	Constitution (generated from the <i>physis</i> of a <i>polis</i> but needs <i>technê/phronēsis</i> to be reserved)
Science of history	the <i>ousia</i> of history – ?	<i>Ordnungszeit</i> (generated from the <i>physis</i> of history but needs <i>technê/phronēsis</i> to be known)

But it is not impossible. If the logic of the science of history still follows the fundamental logic of practical science, as I highlighted in the previous chapter, then it can be claimed that, as a counterpart of the secondary instances, namely, the *physis* of history (*Ordnungszeit*), the primary instances of history can be indicated (rather than defined) by a term which presents a similar function to the term ‘the *ousia* of a *polis*’. I call that term *Geschehenszeit*, which means the time in which history is actualized as understandable knowledge of history in the form of historical thinking in the present and towards the *historical eudaimonia*.

Geschehenszeit indicates the primary instances of the *ousia* of history. It logically requires and conducts the actualization of history in the form of historical thinking, and is concretely presented as a developmental process in the sense of the secondary instances. And in this sense that the essential interpretation is outlined (though in the view of the secondary instances, it belongs to the two interpretations of *physis* as I have claimed in section 2.4), the interpretation of *Ordnungszeit* must be transformed into *Geschehenszeit*, since only by doing so can the whole perspective of a metaphysical science of history be outlined comprehensively, as the *ousia* does not show itself to us: we have to descriptively indicate it.

The question, though, is how? Though I have argued that the primary instances of *ousia* can be grasped by the secondary instances, and I described the *physis* of history in

the above sections, it is still keeping itself at the other side of a gap: the gap between the *ousia* of the realities of the world (including the temporal dimension like the historical world) and us. Please note: I state that the sides of the gap are the world and **us**, but I do not state that the sides are the world and **our minds**. If I investigate the logic of historical thinking, or the philosophy of history, in the latter sense, I will inevitably return to epistemological historicization. Metaphysics – even in a narrow Aristotelian sense – provides us with an alternative. That is, though it cannot present itself, *ousia* can be grasped by its descriptive functions (*ergon*) including *physis* and *technê/phronēsis*. As the *physis* of history aims to provide the theoretical foundation of the science of history beyond our knowing activities, *technê/phronēsis* has more relevance to us, especially to our understanding and adjusting of the *ousia* of history.

In the next section, I will introduce the logic of *Geschehenszeit* in a general scope with regard to **the function of the *ousia* of history**. This introduction is also the preparation for the next chapter, where I will elaborate the interpretation of the *technê/phronēsis* of history and conduct it to the final actualization of history (historical *eudaimonia*).

3.5.2 Descriptive function of the *ousia* of history: bridging the past and the present.

Since it is the *ousia* of history that makes a history come into being, the shortened phrase ‘the function of history’ is equal to ‘the function of the *ousia* of history’. Therefore, what is the function of history? Rather than describing an *ousia*, as an *ousia* cannot be defined by asking ‘What is it?’, this time, it is possible to ask about the function. Again, I will clarify the metaphysical principles firstly, and then will move to the political example as an analogue of the science of history, so that the function of history in the metaphysical sense can be understood more clearly.

As a history is an entity actualized by the combination of its formal end cause and its material cause, namely, the combination of historical knowledge in the present and historical events in the past, the first question I should ask is, ‘Is the function of an actualized complex entity presented by itself **and also** by its combined element, rather than only by itself?’ The answer is no. Actually, a complex entity performs its function only by the *ousia* of itself, rather than also by any combined element. The reason is, the

other combined elements – though they for themselves have their own *telos* since they exist as realities in the past – are not the fundamental reason for the complex entity: for the complex entity, at best, they are the material causes and cannot provide the *ousia*, which is provided by the correspondence of the *telos* of the **whole**. This metaphysical principle on the function of the *ousia* can be related to different meanings of accidentality. In the fifth book of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle offered two meanings of accidentality. The first is that accidentality “applies to something and is truly predicated, but neither necessarily nor usually” (*Metaphysics*, 1025a14-15). The second and perhaps more important one is that accidentality is “whatever belongs to each thing in virtue of itself, but is not in its *ousia*, like having the sum of its angles equal to two right angles belongs to the triangle; accidents of this kind may be eternal, but none of the former kind can be” (*Metaphysics*, 1025a30-b1). What does “in itself but not in its *ousia*” mean? The mathematical example here shows a relatively simple case. The sum of three angles of a triangle must be 180 degrees, which must be equal to the sum of two right angles. However, a triangle can never have two right angles, and thus the correspondence between these two phrases in degrees – though it is eternal – will never account to a real triangle: a triangle having two right angles will essentially not be itself any longer. Similarly, in the case that historical thinking in the present is the entity that combines itself and historical events, indeed, historical events are in the history due to its developmental process or its *physis*, and thus can be stated to be “in itself”; however, history, as such a complex entity, cannot be divided, which shows that the historical events cannot share the form of the existence of the present historical thinking. It is impossible to imagine that the historical events in the past can ensure that they will become part of history (namely, the ‘future’ for the past events, or the ‘present’ for we who take historical thinking). Historical events indeed exist as realities in the past tense, but this is not the reason they thus will definitely become historical thinking: they exist in the past only due to accidentality. Therefore, accidentality is “not in (history’s) *ousia*”. And by saying ‘the function of (the *ousia* of) history’, that function must be presented **only** by the actualized entity itself, namely, the understandable historical knowledge in the present, rather than by both the thinking in the present and events in the past.

With such a metaphysical regulation of the function of history, we may get a clearer description of the concrete ‘content’ of the function. To understand the function of history better, again, the political example can be used. In the science of *polis*, the function of the formal end cause (as the secondary instances but according to the correspondence with the primary instances of *ousia*), namely, the constitution of a *polis*, is performed as the highest principled regulation of organized **ruling** of the *polis*. This regulation, on the one hand, in a metaphysical sense, corresponds to the generalization of the particularity, as I have argued, and on the other hand, in a practical sense, that is for the purpose of **achieving the advantage (συμφέρον) of both sides of the ruler and the be-ruled**. It means that, without the highest regulation of the distribution of the power between the ruling and the be-ruled, a *polis* will be no different to a mere assembly of citizens,⁵² the advantage of which is undivided and thus impossible, like in Socrates’s *polis* (in Aristotle’s understanding), which demonstrates ‘the greatest possible unity’, in which “all the citizens say ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ at the same time” (*Politics*, 1261b23). In this kind of ‘*polis*’, or simply the assembly of citizens, there is no need for any *logos*, which is based on the virtues of communications and exchanges between citizens. It should be noticed that *συμφέρον* is not equal to *ἀγαθός* (good), which is the final purpose of an entity that corresponds to the metaphysical principle of *physis* and aims at *telos*, whereas the former indicates the practical conduction from such a *physis* to the practical applications in *nomos* and in every different circumstance. Therefore, though the function of a *polis* is apparently performed as the highest distribution of power, it actually **divides and identifies and then bridges the two sides of the power** (as the ruler and the be-ruled), in the approach to which each of the two sides **is indicated as the being of itself**, in that “a constitution is the regulation of the offices of the *polis* in regard to the mode of their distribution and to the question what is the highest power in the *polis* and what is the *telos* of each *polis*” (*Politics*, 1289a15-18).

In the science of history, which is conducted by the same theoretical science, the *ousia* of history performs a similar function in that **it divides, identifies and then**

⁵² An assembly of citizens is not equal to the term ‘citizens’ association’, as that the latter is used in rigorous metaphysical logic as the material cause of a *polis*, while the former is used to describe the disordered status of citizens without political order and thus without the differentia between citizens’ good – they are united as one individual.

bridges two temporal opposite sides in one temporal dimension. The past and the present stand on the two opposite positions of one temporal dimension of a descriptive actuality of what has already happened and is happening. Rather than the temporal future in which the 'will be happening' is essentially a potential being, the 'happened' in the temporal past and the 'happening' in the present are necessarily the actual beings. It is to this extent that the combination of historical events in the past and historical thinking/knowledge in the present can be deepened in regard to the function of history. For a historian, the gap between the past and the present is particularly represented as the distance between the historical events that happened in the past and the historian's conscious knowing of those events, the latter of which, though it cannot be generated without historical events, does not belong to the events in the past but to the present, since the historian can at most consciously re-enact a history in his or her present mind (as Collingwood argued) but cannot practically perceive or even participate in the historical events in the past.

In terms of a descriptive but also a hermeneutical study of the science of history, this distance corresponds to Gadamer's argument on what we project to history rather than merely grasp from history, as that:

If we are trying to understand a historical phenomenon from the historical distance that is characteristic of our hermeneutical situation, we are always subject to the effects of effective-history. It determines in advance both what seems to us worth enquiring about and what will appear as an object of investigation (Gadamer, 1979, pp.267-268).

In this sense, **the function of history can be understood as it is on a pre-given historical path following which our contemporary understanding depends and is prescribed and limited.** In the restriction of the historical path, the potentiality of the past develops into the actuality of the present in that every generated entity – no matter whether abstract or concrete – is unique (Gadamer, 1979, p.269). A limited finite present incurs a limited knowing of history as a 'horizon', in Gadamer's words, which essentially defines a similar consideration of the contingency of every particular situation.

But it is in the interpretation of bridging the past and the present that we probably

return to the different spirits of the philosophy of history, or historical thinking, which were outlined in the beginning of this research. Though philosophers have attempted to bridge the past and the present in hermeneutical ways such that the present situation is described as being determined and limited by the past, what a philosopher of history cares about and investigates is at most the aim of and the reason for historical thinking in the present, rather than the holistic understanding of a complex entity involving the real sort of past in the form of historical events. Historical thinking, or the philosophy of history, finally investigates the present meaning of history, no matter whether the history refers to the particular event in the past or to the holistic perspective of itself. While a historian essentially cares about the past (though maybe not only the past), and the greatest principle of his or her work is projecting him or herself into those events and regarding such events as his or her own practical circumstances, he or she can at best consciously grasp the practice, in the sense in which such subjectivism projecting or re-enactment is essentially an imagining of the past – but with a reasonable understanding of the present rather than the past. Therefore, a gap of knowing emerges again and calls for an investigation of the different attitudes towards itself, since we can see that merely the knowledge of chronology is not enough to reserve a static *physis* of history: it is always in the conflict of a past tense ‘happened’ and a present tense ‘understanding’. Moreover, this gap reflects not only the predicament of the present knowing of the past, but also the fundamental conflict between the ‘two differentiated-disciplines, namely, the philosophy and the history’, and the ‘philosophy of history’: as far as history aims at the realities in the past and philosophy aims at the thinking in the present, is a philosophy of history really possible?

In this section, I have described how the function of history is bridging the past and the present. This function – if the science of history is conducted by the theoretical science – is described for understanding the *ousia* of history, or to use my term, *Geschehenszeit*. It corresponds to the correspondence between the primary instances and the secondary instances, the latter of which has been offered by the *physis* of history as *Ordnungszeit*. However, it can be seen that *Geschehenszeit* is still kept away from being actualized, since though it can be indicated by describing its function, it is still out of our

knowing. And this encourages us to return to the other part of the secondary instances of the *ousia* of history, namely, *technê/phronēsis*, which relates to the knowing of history, so that *Geschehenszeit* can finally be fully actualized as historical *eudamonia*.

3.6 Conclusion.

In this chapter, I have outlined the first part of the secondary instances of the *ousia* of history, namely, the *physis* of history. In particular, (3.2) firstly, I introduced two modern theories of the temporal feature of history which can be conducted to our investigation of the temporal nature of history. That temporal feature of history can be described as a seriality of historical events in which the events are organized as an antecedent-succeed relationship, and this further points to the conceptualization of themselves and the theoreticalization of the history as a system. Based on this, (3.3) I then describe the fundamental nature, namely, the *physis* of history as regards the temporal nature of history in the rigorously metaphysical sense. I name this *physis* of history as *Ordnungszeit*, which means the time in which historical events are organized. The demonstration of *Ordnungszeit* is expanded into two parts. The first part clarifies the logical position of historical events as the material cause of history. (3.4) The second part clarifies the logical reason or the nature of a historical event by distinguishing it from historical fact, and while the latter is the necessary condition of the former, however, it is not the direct material cause of history. Only the conceptualized historical event that has already been transformed from the historical fact and thus become meaningful is the material cause of history in the strictly metaphysical sense. Finally, (3.5) I argue that, to understand the fundamental Beingness or '*ousia*' of the generated historical knowledge in the present as a complex entity in full comprehensiveness, that is, to achieve the primary instances of the *ousia* of history, the *Ordnungszeit* must be transformed into *Geschehenszeit*, so that the function of history can be grasped and then this makes *Geschehenszeit* **partly** actualized. I say 'partly', as besides the *physis* of history that merely uncovers the theoretical developmental process of history, the *ousia* of history also needs another part which involves the practical understanding by human beings, that is, *technê* and *phronēsis*, which will be discussed further in the next chapter.

Chapter 4 - On *technê* and *phronēsis* of history: the second secondary instances

4.1 Introduction.

According to what I argued in the introductory chapter, Chapter 1, and in the structural chapter, Chapter 2, this research as a whole aims to investigate the relationship, or in my opinion, the most significant spirit of historical thinking, **between the historical events that happened in the past and the historical thinking in the present.** To investigate this relationship, I have argued for a metaphysical science of history as the alternative to epistemological historicization. This metaphysical interpretation regards the science of history as an Aristotelian practical science which is conducted by a theoretical science, namely, metaphysics, but studies practical affairs like history. And though it aims to discover the fundamental Beingness or *ousia* of history, it must firstly study the secondary instances of the *ousia*. The secondary instances can be divided into two parts: *physis* and *technê/phronēsis*. These two parts are the descriptive functions (*ergon*) that indicate the *ousia* of history, as far as *ousia* cannot be defined by others but only be descriptively interpreted.

In the previous chapter, I discussed the first part, namely, the *physis* of history. I claimed that the developmental process from historical events in the past to understandable historical knowledge in the present, in which the former is the material cause and the latter is the formal end cause, corresponds to the rigorous metaphysical logic of the *physis* of history. The *physis* of history, or *Ordnungszeit* to use my term, presents a temporal or chronological nature as the logical process from merely historical realities in the past to the meaningful history as a dynamic process, within which the generating of history is interpreted as a metaphysical result beyond the purposive activities of human beings, though the subject-matters or the 'contents' of those realities were created by human beings. However, merely staying on the metaphysical level (or the level of the theoretical science) cannot explain why the science of history studies not only the logical reason for generating history, but also human beings' understanding of such generating, and the meaning of such generating to them. In the metaphysical sense, this

latter kind of question can refer to the second part of the secondary instances of *ousia*, namely, *technê/phronēsis*, since these questions aim to research the relation between the realities and us, rather than merely the logics of the realities.

In this sense, at the end of the previous chapter, I argued that though *Ordnungszeit* needs to be transformed into *Geschehenszeit* for the final actualization of history (in the form of historical *eudaimonia*), the *technê/phronēsis* must be studied first, since this latter pair of concepts directly relates to the relation between history and us, which is the necessary and logical step for the final actualization. Again, as this metaphysical research as a whole is elaborated in accordance with descriptive metaphysics rather than revisionary metaphysics, this chapter will descriptively interpret the relation between history and us. I will argue that this relation is based upon the demonstration of historical knowing as an action which relates to the virtue *technê*, or *phronēsis*, or both. By investigating this relationship with regard not only to the *physis* of history but also to the spirit of historical thinking, not only can the whole perspective of a metaphysical science of history be outlined, but also the fundamental reason for the philosophy of history can be re-constructed.

In particular, as in the first section in the previous chapter, in which I presented modern substituting theories on the temporal feature of history, I will first introduce (4.2) some modern theories on the relationship between the historical realities and us. These theories can be viewed as a kind of historical representativism. In essence, it is a result of the modern epistemological philosophy and furthermore, a result of the problems of historical knowing, just as I argued in the first chapter about the problems of historical thinking, though historical representativism is indeed successful in enlarging our knowledge of historical knowing as epistemological historicization did. Based on this, to achieve the advantages but overcome the problems of historical representativism, I will then move to (4.3 and 4.4) the demonstration of a **practical perception of history** as an alternative interpretation of historical knowing. This practical perception of history, or **historical deliberation** to use my words, which is conducted by *technê* and *phronēsis*, is a practical application from a metaphysical interpretation of knowing as action in the domain of the science of history. This interpretation contains two parts, though there is

no strict division between the two parts. The first part (4.3) will investigate the general positions of the practical perception and historical *eudaimonia* and their mutual relevance while the second part (4.4) will clarify the concrete form of historical deliberation by regarding knowing as an action, along with its related virtues. By outlining historical deliberation in regard to historical knowing, the second secondary instance of the *ousia* of history may be fully described, which together with the previous chapter promotes the final actualization of the *ousia* of history (which I have defined as *Geschehenszeit*) in the next and final chapter.

4.2 Modern theories on the relationship between the historical realities and us: historical representativism.

In this section, I will introduce historical representativism as the modern substitution of the traditional philosophies on historical knowing, though strictly speaking, traditional philosophies, as I have argued, did not develop any differentiated discipline which could be named the philosophy of history according to the modern sense. But that is not to say this introduction of historical representativism is meaningless for the metaphysical scheme of this research; rather, the historical representativism, just like the temporal features that play the role as preliminary theories which guide the interpretation of the temporal nature in the previous chapter, provides a platform from which our concern with or discussion on historical knowing can be initiated.

The development of historical representativism is similar to the development of epistemological historicization, that is to say, they, as both the applications in the domain of history from the pure philosophy, do not synchronize with the development of pure philosophy, but rather fall behind. The correspondence between pure philosophy, or more exactly speaking, modern epistemology, and historical representativism is not limited into any given temporal position or given group of mutually referenced theories. Therefore, though below I will introduce pure epistemological representativism and historical representativism respectively as two parts, I am not about to argue for a rigorous development from the former to the latter, since such a development needs a given temporal position by which the former can be precisely located with regard to the latter.

What I am going to do, again, according to the principle of descriptive interpreting rather than revisionary constructing, is merely offer a relatively whole perspective of the features of historical representativism, so that we may be clear on the reason for an alternative metaphysical interpretation of historical knowing.

4.2.1 Pure epistemological representativism in general.

It might be argued, though without any accuracy, that the concept of representativism in philosophy for the first time was – though not offered – explained by Heidegger in *Holzwege*. But the most famous and thorough interpretation is given by Charles Taylor, who thinks that representativism is a basic and common feature of the modern epistemological philosophies. In his *Overcoming Epistemology* (Taylor, 1997, pp.1-19), by partly accepting and partly criticizing Rorty's foundationism, Taylor demonstrates a wider position on the essence of modern is based on the view that "knowledge is to be seen as correct representation of an independent reality...in its original form, it saw knowledge as the inner depiction of an outer reality" (Taylor, 1997, p.2). In his opinion, this position is one of the unique features which argued that the human mind participates in the being of an object since the object and humans are informed by the same ideal form (*eidos*). For Taylor, modern representativism takes a different scheme regarding the generating of knowledge. Representativism distinguishes and then forms a relationship between the object outside ourselves as an external reality and the 'representation' inside our minds, which occurs or is caused by that object or external reality. Irrespective of how differently the characterizing of the reality is (like Descartes's scepticism and Kant's transcendentalism), broad Cartesian views – the most likely case of which is the certainty of subjectivity⁵³ – hold a common opinion that the traditional construction of knowledge has failed to provide with any certainty of a knowledge, since the informing upon subject and object given by the same *eidos* merely happens accidentally: the higher order of things and knowledge which goes beyond the knowledge itself, but consists of the eternal and unchanging structure of such knowledge, is achievable **only by chance**. Therefore, in Taylor's view, the modernists need to set their

⁵³ An introductory investigation on the subjectivity from Kant, Husserl to Heidegger can for the best be seen in Carr, 1999.

sights on what can be determined as the basic foundation of knowledge without uncertainty in a minimum sense, so that the reality will keep its original form to the greatest extent possible. This minimum sense of foundation is the human mind – and in this sense, the relation between the realities and **us**, as I mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, is narrowed down to the relation between the realities and **our minds**.

In Taylor's view, Descartes created a motivational connection between our minds and the representative abstraction of the object outside, as he argues that "the ideal of self-given certainty is a strong incentive to construe knowledge in such a way that our thought about the real can be distinguished from its objects and examined on its own" (Taylor, 1997, p.5). In a broader view, *cogito* was for the first time located in the first person, namely, the absolute subject 'I who am being', or the '*ego*', in terms of the primary subject 'I', and more importantly, as something outside the primary subject 'I'. The certainty of the representation now was no longer equal to the structural categorical character of the realities, which is denoted and determined by the higher metaphysical presupposition; rather, the certainty of the representation totally depends on the reflexive charity of the subjective 'I'.

In this sense, this modern theory of the connection between our minds and the representations might be characterized as *causa sui*, since it was generated by and for itself – rather than by and for the presupposed structure. It might even be further argued that modern epistemology inherits some traditional terms to demonstrate the new meanings and principles. However, these inheritances for most of the time are merely literal: the classical meaning of the same term has been totally dismissed. Just like the loss of meaning in the translation (rather than transliterating) process from $\varphi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (*physis*) to *natura* or to modern 'nature' in which 'for its own cause' disappears,⁵⁴ subjectivism representation also lost some traditional regulations on the regulation of the certainty. For example, in traditional philosophies, the certainty of knowing refers not only to the accuracy of the correspondence between *eidos* and objects (which would be substituted by the subjective *ego* and the representations in later centuries), but also to the practical purposive ends which consider the reasons for knowing as practices. Actually, this

⁵⁴ Please see Section 2.2.3.

relevance to the practical applications of pure knowing theories is also inherited by modern epistemology. For epistemological representativism, the self-given feature, or even the distorted *causa sui* feature, of certainty also leads to demonstrations on the practical level, in that the self-given should be moralized as the self-responsibility. Then, the self-autonomy, though the ignorance of traditional regulations and the distortion of original meanings, results in those practical demonstrations being easily separated from the original theoretical spirit, that is, looking for a minimum but firm standpoint for 'grasping' the realities. In addition, it may finally lead to the individualized discipline of morality, of politics, or of economy, but without the presupposed demonstrations on the essence of how human beings know these practical affairs. Indeed, the minimum theoretical spirit of looking for the firm standpoint of knowing can be thought of as a 'sceptical' tendency or a kind of 'scepticism'; however, it is important to remember the reason why Descartes did so: at least representativism, though concerned with uncertain possibilities, aims for the achievability of knowing the real world.

Taylor has also noticed the practical concerns of the pure epistemological representativism. According to him, this practical application (whether merely a tendency or an already-given fact) of pure epistemological representativism can be seen as three basic features, or three featured groups of notions, that is, the disengaged subject, the punctual self, and the atomism (Taylor, 1997, p.7). Here I will introduce them in general and then move to their historicization results in the next sub-section, as Taylor has not given a clear explanation of the latter. According to Taylor's explanation, firstly, an 'ideally disengaged' subject indicates the subject "as free as rational to the extent that he has fully distinguished himself from the natural and social worlds, so that his identity is no longer to be defined in terms of what lies outside him in these worlds" (Taylor, 1997, p.7). Secondly, a punctual self suggests the view that "ideally ready as free and rational to treat these worlds – and even some of the features of his own character – **instrumentally**, as subject to change and reorganizing in order the better to secure the welfare of himself and others" (Taylor, 1997, p.7). Thirdly, for atomism as the social consequence of the first two, it is "construal of society as constituted by, or ultimately to be explained in terms of, individual purposes" (Taylor, 1997, p.7).

Generally speaking, these notions enhance the character of the knower as an epistemological subject, though in two ultimately incoherent senses: on the one hand, they endow the knower with a self-enclosed and introverted knowing process in that the representations upon a knower can be accurately identified in the abstraction of the outside world but existing inside the knower's mind, whereas on the other hand, the ultimate aim of a knower is to know the outside world itself extrovertly, a world irrelative to the knower's inside mind. In Taylor's view, this epistemological predicament has been the core target for modern philosophers who have attempted to overcome or even overturn the Cartesian epistemology and to construe a new approach to explain the concept of knowledge. For some of them, like Kant, and later Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, that new foundation is the transcendental conditions of knowledge (though in different ways or formats); moreover, for Dilthey and Gadamer, that new foundation is formed by the hermeneutical conditions (or more precisely, mutual-conditions) of knowledge, by which the Cartesian epistemological separation between subject and object, or the knower and the be-known, can be more or less overcome.

However, irrespective of the transcendental or the hermeneutical, these new foundations bring new schemes to overcome the featured predicaments of the Cartesian epistemology, but are not applied to the domain of history. For an already-argued example, according to the retrospection of epistemological historicization in the first chapter, Dilthey's hermeneutical science was designed originally to argue against the epistemological dualism in pure philosophy, which later unexpectedly led to the intellectualized tendency and consciousness-dependent interpretation of historicity and hence deepened the epistemological tendency of the philosophy of history. Pure epistemological representativism may develop itself with a self-challenging and self-improving process, but this process does not directly work in the philosophy of history. The philosophy of history, in discussing the issue of historical knowing, still presents the featured historical representativism.

4.2.2 Historical representativism.

In the previous chapter, I mentioned Ricoeur's and Koselleck's theories to describe the temporal features and to further indicate the temporal nature as the *physis* of history. Though their works do not aim at any metaphysical science of history, they still benefit my interpretation, as they provide the preliminary theoretical works. Similarly, in this section, I will refer to Ricoeur again (and Hayden White) but in a broader scope to describe the common features of the historical narrativism as an example of the historical representativism which inherits those three featured notions from pure epistemological representativism.

In the view of Hayden White, who also supported historical narrativism (though for some specialists, he had a relatively more aggressive attitude than Ricoeur in the demonstration of the historical narrative),⁵⁵ Ricoeur's three stages of organizing historical consciousness, namely, 'within-time-ness', 'historicality', and 'deep temporality', which have to be 'recollected' by the historical narrative in symbolizing and then representing as the meanings of history in both the senses of reality and symbols, are essentially designed to establish a 'metaphysics' of narrativity (White, 1989, p.49). This is even though according to the later texts, the 'metaphysics' is actually used in a modern narrow context regarding merely the structural descriptions of the conditions of historical knowledge, like 'presuppositions', rather than the traditional metaphysics that systematically studies the fundamental Beingness of an entity. In his interpretation of Ricoeur's works (in which he argued his own idea but mostly expressed his agreement with Ricoeur's thought on the principal feature of historical narrativism), White argued that the historical narrative "conduces more to the attainment of an understanding of the events of which it speaks than to an explanation that is only a softer version of the kind found in the physical and social sciences" (White, 1989, p.50). In its broad sense,

⁵⁵ According to Hugh Rayment-Pickard's comment, White may be called the 'high level' narrativist in the sense that for him, the interrelation of text and world is impossible to determine since everything in and of the world is actually inside the language of the world (as the representation in Taylor's sense), whereas Ricoeur therefore may stand on a 'low level' in that for him, such interrelation is still able to be described since it is inside the world itself. See Burns and Rayment-Pickard, 2000, p.276. While in my own opinion this distinction is not big enough to suggest different natures between the two sides. Actually, in a broader view, both the two writers have claimed that historical narrative essentially discloses the historical character – even historical legitimacy – of present life, by arguing that historical stories provide the condition or the best analogue for the actuality of present life, which makes the distinction of 'high' and 'low' not so significant to the nature of historical narrative theory.

historical narrativism does not regard its aim as very different from that of the traditional philosophies of history, that is to say, representing a historical event in a narrative way is to indicate the meaning of being a part of a whole history. However, it is the way the historical event is represented and re-known by us that provides different explanations with the seemingly similar historical concerns or knowledge, which is essentially due to the epistemological features of knowledge.

For both Ricoeur and White, the central significance of historical narrativism is construed upon the understandings of historical actions. It is indeed a 'method' but does not merely belong to the 'methodology', since it structurally and essentially bridges the first two of the three stages, namely, the stage stating events as a chronicle and the stage of historicity. This significance as a bridge which refers to and unites the meaningful historical actions is a 'plot'. For the historical narrativism as representativism, historical actions provide meanings by their own consequences; however, they have to be grasped together so that such meanings are meaningful as a whole and to the whole, which is affected by the configuration through the instrumentality of the plot. Here, the plot refers to the holistic view that a plot is meaningless for a separated historical action unless the plot comprises the same kind of such actions in a plural form, so that similar or categorically identical actions can be composed into a whole development of the plot. And then, as the most important virtue for the narrativists, such a plot must be described only by narratives to make its own self meaningful.

But being meaningful to whom? Even though the plot, as a comprehensive narrative of relevant historical actions and events, is the significance of historical knowledge, and thus it is 'meaningful' to the knower, it still needs to clarify why it makes historical narrative a kind of historical representativism. It is on this issue that I can emphasize that, for Ricoeur, historical narrative is essentially a category of **symbolic discourse** "whose principal force derives neither from its informational content nor from its rhetorical effect but rather from its imagistic function" (White, 1989, p.51). For the narrativists, this principle defines the nature of their work as the so-called philosophy of history differing from other historiographies. It also principally regulates that either a social-scientific study of material history or a Straussian (Leo Strauss) interpretative study of the history

of political philosophies is no longer an appropriate approach for considering historical realities as historical knowledge in our minds, since historical realities cannot be grasped directly but can only be represented by narratives through creating a holistic meaning of the separated individual meanings. This does not directly respond to the particular inquiries of an individual historical action **in the past** but generates a symbol representing its image upon **our minds in the present**. Therefore, though White argued that for Ricoeur, the historicity “can only be indicated, never be represented directly” (White, 1989, p.52), the spirit of historical narrative is on the same level as epistemological representativism in that it is concerned with the uncertainty of knowing history and tries to minimize the foundation of the certainty into a smaller structure of the symbolized meaning, which is also ultimately incoherent again. On the one hand, this kind of historical representativism becomes a symbol of the abstraction inside the individual knowing mind but representing the outside historicity, whereas on the other hand, it is meaningful only regarding the extrovertly knowing of the outside historical world, unless this ‘meaningful’ refers not only to the initial endowing upon history but also to the present daily life, since we, the knowers of history, are in the present. **The history for the knower in the past of such a history cannot be known as history any longer, as it was the present for them. Only the knower for themselves outside and behind a history, namely, in the present, can be called the knower of such a history.**

Furthermore, in particular, historical narrativism as a kind of historical representativism also presents the featured notions of epistemological representativism but in an implicit way, and, further, develops the first two features into a different third notion, which still presents an atomism character but not as a social consequence of the first two; rather, the third is endowed with a temporal dimension.

For the first two features, the subject in a historical narrative is disengaged and plays a partly punctual role, though it is not distinguished from the natural and social worlds in an original Cartesian sense, since the language of these worlds has been simultaneously construed and characterized by the subject. That is to say, rather than as in Ricoeur’s early works, where the subjective as a knowing agent must employ the individual human consciousness in a hermeneutic position, the participation of a subject in a narrative

structure does not necessarily have influence over or totally change the metaphorical nature of history, since history has already been interweaved with fiction in terms of them both having been represented in time and both have represented the actual life of the present – a life with history as a symbol rather than reality. A subject attempting to describe a historical reality will inevitably find that he or she for his/her own self is essentially disengaged from history, since “by the interweaving of fiction and history I mean the fundamental structure, ontological as well as epistemological, by virtue of which history and fiction each concretize their respective intentionalities only by borrowing from the intentionality of the other” (Ricoeur, 1988, p.181). Also, in terms of the partly punctual role, historical narrativism regards symbolization as an instrument (though rather than the pure epistemological representativism, it is relatively indirect and discursive) for the subject’s adoption of its free subjectivity to ‘grasp’ the world. This ‘grasp’ is in a broad sense a subjective approach towards the objective world, which, on the one hand, is presented as an instrumentally changing and reorganizing, which is done by the subject in the Cartesian epistemological case, and on the other hand, is expanded as an active but still instrumental understanding in the historical narrative case, since it still follows the basic principal spirit about representing the distinguished world of reality in the reflective world of the mind. In White’s words, “In the kind of symbolization embodied in the historical narrative, human beings have a discursive instrument by which to assert (meaningfully) that the world of human action is both real and mysterious...that what cannot be explained is in principle capable of being understood; and that, finally, this understanding is nothing other than its representation in the form of a narrative” (White, 1989, p.54).

The consequence of the first two notions in historical representativism is more complex than the third notion of pure epistemological representativism. It presents two essentially incoherent characters in different dimensions. On the one hand, like the epistemological representativism, historical narrativism also presents an atomism character. Every understanding of a historical event for its own sake is given only for itself, which means that no matter whether the event is real or mysterious, a historical event without a subjective understanding is meaningless to the narrative – especially in the

case of social contexts, just like the social result of pure epistemology. It is not related to the willingness of subject; rather, it has been given a description of the state of individuality of the knowing issues under a historical narrative structure: a subjective knower does not need to know every detailed reality of every event to grasp the meaning of history, since the 'grasp' is about the whole of history, which has been symbolized as both real and mysterious for the understanding of the whole.⁵⁶ Therefore, based on the position of a single event, the existence of such an event will not necessarily affect the 'outside' subjective knowing, and thus depends only on a disengaged (but not necessarily isolated) individual being of its own self.

But on the other hand, such atomism is not so firm in terms of its broader temporal dimension, since historical narrative "must, by the virtue of its narrativity, have as its 'ultimate referent' nothing other than 'temporality itself'" (White, 1989, p.52). Historical narrativism, though it has different principles, shares a common view with the hermeneutical philosophy of history such that the narratives should be regarded as the manifestation in the discourse of a specific kind of time-consciousness or structure of time, by which history is reduced to a preliminary field as the condition of **studies of time** rather than an individual discipline in which the science of history is investigated *causa sui*: "Historicality is a structural mode or level of temporality itself" (White, 1989, p.51). It is no longer a science in accordance with *physis* in the sense of self-causing. Through symbolizing the discursive structure between events in the past and understanding in the present, historical narrative represents historical events in reproducing the processes by which they were produced in the past, and asserts such reproducing in the understanding which happens right now to the knower in the present. It is inevitably demonstrated that even historical narrativism, or historical representativism in the broad sense, is an investigation between the past and the present rather than merely historical events in the past. In addition, historical narrativism cannot be fundamentally distinguished from any analytical philosophies of history which also investigate the position of a subject in the present and its relation to the 'objective' or

⁵⁶ For pure philosophy, such knowing of reality may depend on the transcendental principles; however for its historical applications in the philosophy of history the most 'similar' work is Hegel's World Spirit which falls into the trap of politicalization of history.

semi-objective (in a hermeneutical sense) historical events in the past. This is the reason we say the atomism is presented in a different way. For historical narrativism, this does not suggest a plain society of individual historical events which exist meaningfully only for their own selves, though it could be that; rather, the significance is that it suggests a temporal chain relating historical events to the present life by claiming that the historical events inside their own past were meaningless – though for their own sakes, they existed for individual purposes (as they had happened)! Therefore, we have a temporal atomism, the essence of which is that the individual purpose of the existed-status of a historical event is distinguished from the meaning of such a historical event, rather than the atomism of pure epistemological representativism that describes only the plain state of a constituted society.⁵⁷

4.2.3 Problems of historical representativism.

These three featured notions, that is, the historical disengaged subject, the reserved punctual self, and the temporal atomism, comprise the general perspective of historical representativism. By outlining its general features, it can be further claimed that, regarding the issue of historical knowing, historical representativism essentially aims to look for a non-temporal condition of the historical knowledge for the temporal knower in the present. Though historical representativism has successfully elaborated the theories on historical knowing in the sense that they have expanded the scope and range of the relation between subjectivity and historicity by considering history as a temporal collective notion in the counterpart in accordance with individual consciousness, these theories interpret mostly subjectivity and apply subjectivity to a historical dimension, rather than interpret the concept or notion of history independently. Therefore, historical knowing is construed only on the given and limited temporal position when we are mentally thinking about history, namely, the rigorous present, and is ruled out from the time when the historical event actually happened, namely, the past. Under the scheme of historical representativism, the significant spirit or the final aim of the philosophy of

⁵⁷ Though some philosophers of history, like Koselleck, may argue (by referring to St. Augustine) that it is because the meaning of history lies outside and beyond history itself that human beings “gain a freedom of interpretation for the sphere of their own action and suffering, providing him with the advantage of perceiving earthly events in an acute manner”. Koselleck, 2004, p.100.

history moves from the essence of history or historical knowing to the essence of the subjectivity. In short, historical representativism makes the relation between historical realities and **us** narrow down to the relation between historical realities and **our minds**.

Is a metaphysical science of history concerning historical knowing an alternative? It may deserve a try. It has been argued that for Cartesian representativism, the restructuring of *cogito* essentially characterized the knowing action as the secondary and external end of the primary subject *ego*. Meanwhile a metaphysical science of history – if it corresponds to the traditional task or the spirit of philosophy and also historical thinking as I have claimed – may get beyond the dispute between *cogito* and *ego*, since it aims to reinvestigate the relation between historical realities and us rather than our minds. With regard to ourselves rather than merely our minds, this kind of philosophy of history must refer to certain practical sciences, like the science of ethics and the science of *polis*, since these practical sciences have provided a systematic and internal mutually-related or internal mutually-dependent demonstration of our fundamental relation to the world, which includes the basic regulations and explanations of ‘grasping’ the world. In this ‘grasping’ world, human beings apply their virtues of changeable things, namely, either *technê* for producing or *phronêsis* for practising. And I will argue that historical knowing is an action that applies *phronêsis* but also concerns *technê* in the domain of history.

4.3 General positions of the practical perception and the historical *eudaimonia* and their mutual relevance.

In this section, I will demonstrate the first part of a metaphysical interpretation of historical knowing (though the clarification between the first and the second part is not so rigorous). I will argue that some concepts, like the practical perception and the historical *eudaimonia*, serve the whole structure of the metaphysical science of history, which corresponds to my argument that the *ousia* of history in the primary instances can be indicated only by the secondary instances including *physis* and *technê/phronêsis*, the latter of which are applied to the knowing due to its relatedness to human beings’ practices.

Before elaborating the demonstrations, I will emphasize again the aim of the science of history (not the aim of history) as, though with regard to the theoretical or metaphysical knowledge, a practical science:

Our present study [the practical science], unlike the other branches of philosophy, has a practical aim (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for the sake of knowing what it is, but in order that we may become good, without which result our investigation would be of no use), we have consequently to carry our enquiry into the region of conduct, and to ask how we are to act rightly (*bonus*); since our actions, as we have said, determine the quality of our dispositions. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103b26-29)

This quotation may be a good introduction to the aim of practical sciences. Practical sciences aim to benefit the knower rather than merely increase their knowledge. That is to say, as a practical science, the science of history also aims not only to achieve historical knowledge but also to benefit the knower. If I define the 'knower' in the domain of history as a 'historian', then I must further define the 'good' of the historian.

Of course, this logical process must be done step by step. I need to investigate some fundamental concepts to locate the meaning of the knowing with regard to history, and also some logical movements from these concepts to a harmonizing concept that denotes the benefit to historical knower, namely, historical *eudaimonia*. In particular, I will investigate (1) the characteristics of the practical perception by distinguishing it from the mathematical perception, (2) its relevance to *eudaimonia*, (3) the position of historical *eudaimonia* for the science of history as a practical science, (4) the general route, namely, the deliberation, regarding practical knowing of the historical *eudaimonia*.

4.3.1 Characteristics of the practical perception.

As I have argued in the second chapter, practical science is a science conducted by the application of the virtue *phronēsis* but also corresponding to theoretical regulations like metaphysical presuppositions of *ousia*, the latter point of which means the former argument of the virtue *phronēsis* **is concerned with** not only particulars or particular circumstances but also the knowledge of unchangeable universals, though the virtue of

phronēsis **studies** only the particulars. In a famous section of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle demonstrated the characters of *phronēsis* with regard to the perception by distinguishing it from the characteristics of theoretical knowledge (*epistēmē*):

And it is clear that *phronēsis* is not the same as *epistēmē*, for, as said above, it apprehends ultimate particular things, since the thing to be done is an ultimate particular thing. *Phronēsis* then stands opposite to *noûs*. For *noûs* apprehends definitions which cannot be proved by *logos*; whereas *phronēsis* deals with the ultimate particular thing, which cannot be apprehended by *epistēmē* but only by **perception**: not the perception of the special senses, but the sort of intuition whereby we perceive that the ultimate figure in mathematics is a triangle (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1142a23-29; bold is made by me).

Also, as I argued in the third chapter, the *physis* of history is the theoretical approach of investigating the *epistēmē* of the science of history, which presents the knowledge of the unchangeable universals as a theoretical grasp of the *ousia* of historical entity. If the science of history is a practical science which is essentially established by the virtue of *phronēsis*, since both the researcher and the subject-matter of research action are human beings or human affairs, then the science of history cannot be completely apprehended only by the knowledge of *physis*, but must involve the perception that directly indicates particular things regarding theoretical knowledge, just like, to use Aristotle's example, what intuition does to a triangle (theoretical knowledge about what is a triangle in the universals plus the practical perception about how a particular triangle comes into being in different particular cases), though the knowledge of *physis* is necessary for the understandings of not only the relatively ambiguous 'meanings', but also the metaphysical presuppositions as a condition of the practical perception.

Here, one other issue deserves more attention. From the above, it can be seen that Aristotle made an analogy between the practical perception and the mathematical perception, and they both perform in a particular sense by involving themselves in the particular constructions of solving problems in every circumstance. No matter how similar they are, however, they differ in their essential aims and natures, which have been discussed not only by Aristotle. On the one hand, for Aristotle and his disciplines

differentiae, as one of the three theoretical sciences (metaphysics, science of *physis* in a narrow sense, and mathematics), mathematics ultimately aims at the unchangeable universal principles, whereas the practical perception aims at the ultimate goal of practical science, namely, *eudaimonia*, the highest good of human's practical life. Thus, if we want to know how the practical perception works in the science of history, we must investigate how it relates to *eudaimonia* especially in the relatedness with history. On the other hand, some of the modern philosophers of history have also expressed an identical (or perhaps more extreme) concern regarding history as involving the practical perception against the mathematical perception. For example, Collingwood claimed that,

Historical thought has an object with peculiarities of its own. The past, consisting of particular events in space and time which are no longer happening, cannot be apprehended by mathematical thinking, because mathematical thinking apprehends objects that have no special location in space and time, and it is just that lack of peculiar spatio-temporal location that makes them knowable (Collingwood, 1946, p.5).

It can be seen that for him, mathematics studies the universal things which do not need to be located in a certain position or circumstance, whereas history must be known in particular, as well as the science of history, as an Aristotelian practical science.

4.3.2 The relevance of the practical perception to *eudaimonia*.

By distinguishing the practical perception from the mathematical or the other perceptions, now we can investigate the practical perception further by relating it to *eudaimonia*, namely, the highest happiness, since *eudaimonia* is the ultimate and best end (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094a14-16 and 1176b30-31), and also the unconditional end (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1097b1 and 1139b1-4) of all the practical sciences and of ourselves. Similarly, *eudaimonia* also applies two dimensions of itself. *Eudaimonia* should be understood in both senses of a concept regarding theoretical universals, and of a concept applying to every particular circumstance to which every internal practical action aims.

Some could argue that if I want to investigate such relevance between the practical perception and *eudaimonia* especially in the science of history, I have to clarify the

definition of *eudaimonia*, irrespective of whether or not it is a proper concept for historical science. However, whether in terms of history or not, defining *eudaimonia* rather than describing it is still a distorted understanding of the practical perception and practical sciences. In fact, in Aristotelian philosophy, the practical perception is a perception **not of any specific object** (the productive perception is of this), but **of the route towards to the object**, of the route which involves both universals and particulars, and such a route 'happens' upon the subject's perception of him or herself (Reeve, 1992, p.69). For example, 'recovering' as an action is for the end of health and 'health' is for the good of a subject, but the practical perception involved here is not the perception of health, but rather, is the perception of **how** to recover, namely, the perception of medicines, or of a balanced diet, or of a healthier life style. Therefore, if the practical perception aims at the ultimate goal of practical science, namely, *eudaimonia*, it does not aim at the *eudaimonia* itself, but aims at the **route** towards *eudaimonia*; and the question of what is *eudaimonia* in history should be properly transformed into what is the **position** of *eudaimonia* in history, so that the investigation of the knowing of history – as a practical perception – can be directed by such a position, since in a broad sense, all the practical sciences are directed to *eudaimonia* in certain ways.

Now I will develop this question further in two steps. Firstly, I will describe what *eudaimonia* in history 'looks like' (since we cannot directly define what it is) so that its position in the knowledge system can be descriptively located; then, I will demonstrate how we can know that position in relation to historical perception as a concept of historical deliberation. After these steps, I will discuss the different virtues of the steps of historical knowing and how they support understanding the gap between history and the science of history in the next section.

4.3.3 The position of historical *eudaimonia*.

By indicating and describing historical *eudaimonia*, I am not asking for a metaphorical end of history (like Hegel's World Spirit). More significantly and strictly speaking, in the sense that it could cause misunderstandings in another way, by referring to historical *eudaimonia*, I am refusing an objective approach of regulating the aim of

historical science. Actually, according to my main argument about the distinction between **historical events in the past** and the **science of history or historical thinking in the present**, historical *eudaimonia* is not only for the good of historical people or events in the past which no longer exist, but is also for the good of the understandings of such history, of the understandings that currently come into being in the present, namely, of the historians and the philosophers of history in the present, and in a broad sense, all the human beings in the present who inherit the self-knowledge of themselves from their historical ancestors. Though in the previous chapter, I demonstrated that history for its formal end cause is the subject-matter of the science of history, and in accordance with the *physis* of the science of history, it must be clarified again that, rather than what I have argued as historical events in the past, a common usage of so-called 'history in the past' is, for its own self, essentially the historical fact in my words rather than the understood historical events. It is not the immediate material cause, but merely the necessary condition of the material cause. This argument is derived from the previous chapter. The common usage of 'history in the past', namely, what I have clarified as historical fact, is a preliminary work of the science in the present, which means 'history in the past' at most is the preliminary semi-science just like the observational work in *Naturwissenschaften*; whereas the science of history investigating the whole formal end of history is, for its own self, a holistic *Geisteswissenschaften* since it calls for cognitive interference, namely, humans' own minds on the whole, and human beings in a temporal dimension. The so-called 'history in the past' itself never presents temporal concerns since it is not concerned with the present. Therefore, when historical *eudaimonia* is mentioned, it must be the *eudaimonia* for the science of history which is concerned with both the development of history from material events to the formal end and the good of the investigation of such a development, the former of which is a *causa sui* process according to *physis* without artificial interference, the latter of which is taken by us in the present rather than our ancestors in the past.

On this point, Collingwood, again, may be referred to when discussing the 'good' of the science of history due to the fact that he discussed 'what history is for' directly in his writings, though sometimes his thought on the nature of historical knowledge may seem

ambivalent. On the one hand, in *The Idea of History*, he argued that “history is ‘for’ human self-knowledge”, and that “the value of history is that it teaches us what man has done and thus what man is” (Collingwood, 1946, p.10). In a later section, he regulated this argument further to state that such self-knowledge is not knowledge of man’s bodily nature or of the mind, consisting of feeling and emotion, but “knowledge of his knowing faculties, his thought or understanding or reason” (Collingwood, 1946, p.205). On the other hand, however, in *The New Leviathan*, he argued that thought (with reason) and mind (with feeling and emotion) overlap each other (Boucher, 1989, p.111). Even in *The Idea of History*, he demonstrated such a point in an ambivalent attitude by arguing that “historical knowledge entails the study of mind’s activities” and that “history has only recently emerged as an autonomous form of thought” (Boucher, 1989, p.111) which could suggest a possible study of history in the form of feelings or emotions before modern historical science in the form of thought emerged. I should investigate these arguments in different levels in relation to *eudaimonia*.

Initially, it can be said that, for Collingwood, the science of history (namely, ‘the philosophy of history’ in his words) provides a man – a man in the present who studies history, not a man in the past or in historical events – with the same thing that an ethical *eudaimonia* provides to the man even without any historical dimension, that is, **the completeness of deliberating life conducted by the faculty of reason**. However, for Collingwood, it is due to its different ‘metaphysical’ (in his understanding) presuppositions that the philosophy of history may not be the same as ethical *eudaimonia*, at least at the initial stage. In his *An Essay on Metaphysics* where his thoughts on the relation between history (actually, the science of history; Collingwood did not strictly distinguish between these two terms) and metaphysics were expressed more clearly, Collingwood suggested that “metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking” (Collingwood, 1969, p.47), which indicates further that, for him, metaphysics is ultimately a historical approach, and the ‘absolute presuppositions’ are absolute only for a certain range of time or limited age, rather than presenting the absoluteness beyond the

limitation of circumstances (in a classical metaphysical sense of presenting unchangeable universal principles which can be applied to any time and any place). Like Haskell Fain, who studies Collingwood's effort to bridge history and philosophy more than Collingwood's own philosophical interpretive regulation of history as a discipline, some theorists have criticized that, even for the relatively 'absolute presuppositions', it is still not clear whether the absolute presuppositions are for an age in the past (which makes his 'metaphysics' ultimately historical), or presuppositions are for the present (which makes his suggestion of researching metaphysics in historical methods not so crucial) (Fain, 1970, p.61).

Collingwood regarded metaphysics as an inevitable mental development toward historical research and hence suggested that there is no rank of knowledge among them, whereas I have assumed that the science of history is a practical science which studies practical affairs but also deals with metaphysics as conceptions, and hence, the metaphysical principles have priority to the science of history. But we are still benefitting from Collingwood's argument on 'What is history for?', though his precondition of a science of history is totally different from ours. As Fain argues, concerning the self-knowledge of human beings as the aim of historical study, Collingwood may regard his philosophy of history as a 'first-order philosophy', which means that a "first-order philosophy of history concerns itself with criteria of intelligibility of the concepts that historians use in their attempts to make sense of history" (Fain, 1970, p.68),⁵⁸ and in the sense that the aim of the 'self-knowledge' of history presents an essentially same function as *eudaimonia*, namely, the **deliberating completeness**. The deliberating completeness provides the conduction, the aim, and the criteria of serials to the secondary intelligible concepts of human beings, rather than, reversely, the partial or necessarily insufficient knowledge to the first-order concepts of human beings. By arguing the criteria of intelligibility and first-order, Fain suggests that,

Criteria must be fulfilled for the intelligible application of concepts or, for short, criteria of intelligibility. Any positive inquiry, be it mathematics or history, is characterizable in terms of a certain set of concepts it employs; the philosophy of

⁵⁸ Also see pp.59-61.

mathematics, accordingly, consists in the formulation and critique of the criteria of intelligibility of mathematical concepts, and the philosophy of history consists in the formulation and critique of the criteria of intelligibility of historical concepts (Fain, 1970, p.40).

And that,

If one defines philosophy in terms of what professional philosophers are up to, then it might indeed seem more apt to designate philosophy a “second-order” concern – a concern for the intelligibility of criteria, perhaps, rather than for the criteria of intelligibility. Yet professional philosophy does become sterile when contact is lost with those first-order concerns about intelligibility that are the most essential ingredients of the philosophy *of* something ... What I have termed “second-order” philosophy must feed on first-order philosophical concerns, on the attempts to formulate criteria of intelligibility in the philosophy of history ... Historians and cytogeneticist *are* sometimes vitally involved in the task of formulating the criteria of intelligibility of some of the concepts that make up their respective fields. And when they are, they are doing philosophy in a primary sense (Fain, 1970, pp.58-59; *Italic is original*).

From the above, it can be seen that Fain makes an important distinction between first and second-order philosophy by differing the criteria of intelligibility from the intelligibility of criteria. It seems that the philosophy of history belongs to the second one since most of such philosophies adopt the concepts from the first-order philosophy and apply them to the research of intellectual history and even material history. However, just like Collingwood, who investigated metaphysics as a first-order philosophy by applying historical methods and thus regulated the aim of metaphysics as looking for the uniqueness of a given period of time in history, if a historian wants to investigate those essential concepts which constitutionally consist of the history of ideas (which even in a minimum sense is one of the subject matters for a historian), he or she will inevitably discuss the essential concepts of history itself, and in the sense in which he or she will start to discuss the first-order concepts of history, since such concepts of history generate the criteria of historical intelligibility: what can be regarded as history, and what cannot

be.

But we should be careful. Not only the essential function, but actually, the structural function of both general ethical *eudaimonia* and the Collingwoodian aim of the philosophy of history are the same, since they both make preceding theories aiming at the final purposive end. However, I cannot demonstrate this homogeneity by arguing this, because this coincidence happens merely accidentally, and this does not support the idea that the natural development process of each can also coincide with each other. Thus, it is not good evidence regarding the homogeneity of the two theories, and we must not benefit by distorting the original meanings of both Aristotle and Collingwood.

Therefore, in the sense of the essential function, *eudaimonia* performs at the same level as self-knowledge as the aim of the philosophy of history, as both of them are the concepts of the first-order philosophy providing the criteria of intelligibility. By arguing so, it is clearer for us that *eudaimonia* is not a narrowed concept inside the domain of ethics; rather, it is functionally the same to history: what can be regarded as history, such as a good life in ethics, and what cannot be, and finally, how we can apprehend such a history as the ultimate good life. The discussion of themes and concepts like these means the philosophy of *eudaimonia*, which looks like a second-order philosophy of ethics, will also inevitably investigate the first-order principles, which calls for the knowledge of metaphysics (except this time, it is 'metaphysics' as the highest theoretical science, rather than the Collingwoodian historical 'metaphysics'). However, if even the position of *eudaimonia* and the position of the self-knowledge of history are the same, does this mean that the deliberating completeness of life is equivalent to the self-knowledge of history? In other words, since ethical *eudaimonia* is achieved by deliberation, does this mean that historical *eudaimonia* is achieved by deliberation as well? If so, what is the deliberation in history?

4.3.4 Deliberation for *eudaimonia*, and historical deliberation for historical *eudaimonia*.

In the previous sub-section, I demonstrated that the position of historical *eudaimonia* and the position of ethical *eudaimonia* are in the same sense regarded as **conducting the route** towards each *eudaimonia* respectively rather than presenting a concrete form of

what each is respectively. Now I will specifically investigate how the concept of deliberation plays a role in the practical perception of history, namely, the role of such a route towards historical *eudaimonia*. This demonstration will start from a general description of deliberation. Then it will move to a comparison between Collingwood's argument on emotion being excluded from historical knowledge, and Aristotle's argument on emotion being embedded in deliberation. Finally, it will provide us with a full perspective of historical deliberation as the practical perception in historical dimension. This, the logical position of the historical deliberation, will support the next demonstration about its concrete form.

(1) General description.

I have argued that practical science **studies** only the particular practical affairs but is **concerned with** both the theoretical knowledge of universal principles and the particular affairs; but I have not clearly demonstrated that practical science is concerned with both by **what**. Here I do not mean the subject matters of practical science; rather, relating to the reasoning capacity or the *logos* of human beings, I am going to demonstrate that based on what faculty practical science can work. For Aristotelian philosophies, this 'what' is deliberation, though for the other philosophies, the irrational faculties like emotion are also related.

As I have argued above, in seeking a route to *eudaimonia*, the practical perception is distinguished from the mathematical perception, which lacks deliberation. For the perception of purely theoretical affairs (like *physis*), there is no room and no need for deliberation, since irrespective of whether such affairs are known by human beings or not, they will keep their unchangeable and principal forms. However, for the practical perception and human affairs, as the ultimate end of human practice is *eudaimonia*, there must be something conducting the perception towards this ultimate end which calls for both the knowledge of 'where is the ultimate *eudaimonia*' (namely, the theoretical knowledge of its metaphysical position) and the knowledge of 'how can we achieve it in every circumstance' (namely, the practical prudence offered by the faculty of reason). And according to Aristotelian philosophies, as Reeve argued, "Deliberation finds a universal of

the right sort for perception to use ... Practical perception uses such universals to guide action in accordance with deliberation and with the wish that originates it" (Reeve, 1992, p.70).

(2) Does historical emotion belong to historical deliberation?

However, it is not enough to clarify some detailed logics of the deliberation which is about to be applied to historical *eudaimonia* or historical self-knowledge in terms of the following two issues. Firstly, deliberation is also concerned with irrational things and even regards them as the natural conditions of reason. Secondly, however, such irrational things merely **concern themselves with** rather than further **studying** the necessities by historical deliberation, so that historical *eudaimonia* or historical self-knowledge also is merely concerned with the irrational things but for its own self excludes the irrational things.

For the first one, deliberation can probably be positioned into the logical chain of the practical perception as a *causa sui* faculty of human beings in accordance with *physis*, since this concept is practically concerned with the theoretical regulations of action. By 'action', namely, *praxis*, it suggests that the subject and the object of such a deliberating action are the same, namely, the agent him or herself, and that deliberation is done by and for the agent. However, this self-causing character of deliberation does not mean that deliberation is necessarily the most fundamental faculty of an agent – though it could be the highest. In the second chapter, where the fundamental relevance between the practical and the theoretical science has been demonstrated, I discussed the Aristotelian sense of the differences between animals and human beings, one of which denotes that deliberation as a unique faculty of human's reason is related to the *ousia* or the soul of the human rather than the body of the human; and more importantly, it serves the *eudaimonia* rather than the immediate good. However, human beings live their lives by using both their rational and irrational faculties, which means that before the rational deliberation achieves the ultimate goal, a person must satisfy him or herself with primary, irrational, and immediate goals, like basic living needs, by applying his or her irrational faculties. There must be something initiating the deliberation and belonging to the basic

primary faculties of human beings, so that the logical chain of deliberation as the practical perception is complete. On this point, Aristotelian philosophy provides us with a concept which used to be very common but is rarely seen in the modern historical theories involving human reasoning, that is, emotion. Indeed, it is not common for modern philosophers of history, even for modern philosophers of general philosophy. For example, as mentioned above, Collingwood argued that historical self-knowledge can be achieved only by thought, that is, by using the faculty of reason, rather than by feelings or emotions. Emotion, at least in his *The Idea of History*, does not play a significant role in the process of historical knowing. Actually, Aristotle also did not directly apply emotion to the knowing action, but he endowed the concept of emotion with more engagements as a natural condition of the generating process of deliberation. For Aristotle, emotions are provoked by situations that are conceived as threats or insults, which help people view their situations as more problematic and hence call for deliberation to deal with such problematic situations. In other words, though indeed it is deliberation that immediately confronts every circumstance, if we do not have emotions, we cannot apply such deliberation to the first step since we cannot feel the urgency of dealing with a problem. It is emotions that initially correspond to the practical perceptions, because they essentially involve the desire of knowing further, though they apparently involve sensations and feelings.⁵⁹⁶⁰

However, secondly, historical deliberation – though I have clarified the character of deliberation as self-causing, I have not clarified **historical** deliberation as so – does not need emotion as a necessary condition: it can be a natural condition since it presents a natural faculty of human beings, but this does not mean it has to be necessary for the rational faculties to study knowledge. If I suppose that emotion is not merely a natural condition but a necessary condition of historical deliberation, then it may lead to the

⁵⁹ Like Reeve suggested, that is also the reason “*phronēsis* and the virtues of character require one another, and he [Aristotle] defines the virtues of character as states or dispositions regarding feelings.” Reeve, 1992, 72.

⁶⁰ Somehow, on this issue, at least in *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes also regarded feelings and emotions as the first step of further perception (no matter whether such later perception is rational or irrational), which in a broad sense applied a similar logic with Aristotle’s philosophy, though indeed he attempted to structurally challenge Aristotle’s philosophy especially on the causes of politics (as he developed Aristotle’s material cause, power/efficient cause and formal cause of a state but totally refused the final cause/*telos* of a state).

result that, to develop historical *eudaimonia* in the sense of the practical perception, we need to investigate historical deliberation, and to develop historical deliberation, we need to investigate emotions in the knowing of histories (at least the possibility). This means we need to find out whether emotions can be applied to the knowing process of history, and then, we must ask, Can we be aware of the 'emotions' of historical people? By asking this question, are we suggesting a sympathy between ourselves in the present and the people in the past? The answers to these questions are no. We cannot be so and we are not doing so, as far as (and it can be seen I am not totally discarding epistemological historicization) one of the most significant epistemological characters of historical knowing is that a present historian cannot emotionally feel what people in the past felt when confronting their own particular situations. Their fears, worries, feelings of excitement or insult, and all the other immediate emotional responses, can at most be accidentally supposed, assumed, and even hermeneutically constructed, but can never be verified or empirically apprehended. On this point, it is Collingwood who suggested that a historian must re-enact the past experience in his/her own mind and such an experience is not of consciousness consisting of sensations and feelings. As he argued, though the experience of sensations and feelings can be studied by thought, such a study by thought is not a historical study, since,

We are remembering experience of our own or entering with sympathy and imagination into those of others ... we are merely contemplating them as objects external to our present selves, aided perhaps by the presence in ourselves of other experiences like them ... we are engaging in the science of psychology (Collingwood, 1946, pp.302-303).

This is not to say that we cannot investigate historical *eudaimonia* just because we cannot presume emotions as the beginning of historical deliberation; rather, this argument enhances the nature of emotions as the immediate source of responding in confronting the situations for people in a different past respectively. In the previous chapter, I argued that the conceptualization of historical events happened particularly in the past rather than in a universal form understood in the present, and that the conceptualization for its own past served the further theoretical system of history in the present. In this case, what

we should locate about emotions is that emotions presented their own self in their own past situations. It can be the natural condition of a historical event since the historical event was acted by people in such a relative past who had their own feelings and might provoke those feelings to respond to their situation at that time. However, it became irrelevant when the people's response had already generated the essence of the historical event. In other words, it is historical events as a whole that can be conceptualized and can further serve the theoreticalization system of a historical thinking or an understandable knowledge of history in the present (namely, the science of history), rather than the emotions in extreme particulars (but which may be claimed by Ankersmit in his later career). And what historical *eudaimonia* applies, or what historical deliberation conducts, is not in such a particular form of a single event but in a wider comprehension of the historical self-knowledge of human beings. In addition, by saying so, the notion of historical change may also be located on this sense – the sense of understanding a comprehensive tendency of change of the historical thoughts; one single event cannot be called a 'change'.

(3) The logical position of the historical deliberation.

Ruling out the possibility of 'historical emotions', I can focus on the core enquiry about the essence of deliberation in history – strictly speaking, in the science of history regarding practical knowing. To describe the nature of deliberation regarding *phronēsis*, Aristotle used the term '*phainomenon*', which may be translated as the modern English 'appearance' (rather than 'phenomenon'). But this is not to say that deliberation is merely the external appearance of *phronēsis*; rather, by setting up an 'apparent' relationship between *phronēsis* and deliberation, Aristotle enhanced the practical character of deliberation, that is, deliberation is meaningful **only** when it apparently deals with situations that call for the **decision** between changing and keeping the *status quo*. And no matter which decision is made, the purpose of such a decision is the goal of deliberation, namely, the good of a person in such a situation; and a goal of such deliberation is finally the ultimate good of the person, namely, the *eudaimonia*. Therefore, if I indicate that historical *eudaimonia* in its essential function is the completeness of historical

self-knowledge, and that the importance is not the definition of such self-knowledge – we do not deliberate about what the real concrete content of *eudaimonia* is – but the route towards its completeness, then I can at least assume that the historical deliberation is deliberating the decisions in confronting every historical situation, so that historical self-knowledge can be gained by gathering the reasons for historical events and for the changes among historical events.

However, by arguing so, I am actually assuming a very different approach to interpreting the concept of deliberation, especially in a different sense from the one that is strictly embedded only in Aristotle's philosophy. Here it can be noticed that I do not use the term 'Aristotelian philosophy' because I want to draw on the minimum sense of his regulations of deliberation so that my interpretation – historical interpretation – of deliberation can be described. For Aristotle, deliberation and its function of making decisions in situations are essentially the actions of an agent, which means that, even following his regulation that an action can be regarded as so only when it has already been done, deliberation as an action is strictly limited to a given instant when the action is being taken, and is immediately related to the one who acts (please remember the object of an action or *praxis* is the same as the subject, namely, the one who acts). So, it is difficult to say that deliberation as an action can be expanded into a temporal dimension, since a temporal dimension calls for an expansion of an immediate instant, even resulting in an elimination of such an instant in the river of time. Some could argue that there are many examples of long-term 'action', like 'maintaining one's health', which even comes from Aristotle's own example; however, all of these kinds of 'action' can be deconstructed into smaller actions; these make up the former 'bigger' 'action', which is actually a series of individual actions for confronting individual situations. What 'keeping one's health' indicates is not that there is an individual situation calling for such an 'action': we have to keep our health by dealing with our health-related situations one by one, step by step, and taking actions one by one, step by step. Therefore, in every individual situation, deliberation in this sense comes into being for its own self, though its purpose is for the *eudaimonia*.

But a historical deliberation involves a temporal dimension, if it deliberates the

changes between historical events, since decisions are made in confronting change which exists not inside a historical event but between or even among historical events. From one event to another, the temporal dimension emerges. Also, what I am adopting is not merely Aristotle's own philosophy but an Aristotelian philosophy, with regard to other professional arguments about the philosophy of history as a discipline, which makes me able to interpret the concept of deliberation in a wider range of possibilities; indeed, I must do so. This temporal dimension of a historically interpreted deliberation actually refers to the concrete form of historical deliberation: though historical *eudaimonia* can be asked not using 'what' but only 'how', the historical deliberation can be asked using both.

4.4 Concrete form of historical deliberation: regarding knowing as action and its related virtues.

In the previous section, I outlined the logical position and the meaning of historical perception and historical *eudaimonia*, and indicated that the latter can be studied only by describing the route towards it. Then I argued that this route is historical deliberation. Deliberation is a concept from ethical philosophy, but can also be adopted by the science of history due to its practical relevance. But sketching historical deliberation requires further demonstration of the quality of the temporal extension of historical deliberation, since the original concept of deliberation in ethics is applied merely in instant situations. In this section, to deal with this, I will explore the possibility of historical deliberation by interpreting historical knowing as an action which essentially accords the virtue of *phronēsis* and *technē* and finally serves the metaphysical structure of the science of history. That is to say, strictly speaking, I will argue that what a historian's historical deliberation in the present deals with is both historical events comprising historical actions in the past and the knowing action of such a historian in the present. In particular, I will elaborate (1) some similar arguments regarding the knowing mind as an activity, (2) the self-causing character of historical deliberation, and (3) the virtues and their clarifications related to historical deliberation.

4.4.1 Collingwood and Gentile's proposal.

Firstly, I am going to clarify some similar arguments in Collingwood and Giovanni Gentile's view of the idea of the knowing mind as an activity.⁶¹ I clarify them not only because I consider their tradition of the philosophy of history as an important source of my own interpretation, but also because Collingwood and Gentile indeed claimed similar arguments about knowing as action by using literally identical but meaningful different terms (especially the term 'fact'), which cannot be referred to as a direct source and which leads me to investigate their different usages and their presuppositions of these usages.

As Boucher concludes, Collingwood suggested that both philosophy and history are actual in the mind and only in the mind that thinks them (Boucher, 1989, p.112), which indicates that history is in its essential sense an activity of thinking, and nothing more, rather than a study of substance that focuses not on the activity of study but on the substance as the objective subject matter of study. Due to this reason, it can be seen that, for Collingwood, the term 'history' is equivalent to terms like 'study of history', 'science of history', and even 'philosophy of history', since these latter terms express the meaning of an investigating activity in the mind. So is the term 'philosophy'. The activity of philosophical thinking itself is the subject matter of philosophy. However, rather than a philosophy that exists *causa sui* as a pure activity, history is a **unity** of itself as an activity in the mind and 'something' else which stands inside time as a result of the activity. That is, by distinguishing these two activities, namely, history and philosophy, Collingwood argued for an important difference between 'fact' and 'act'. This distinction is believed to be influenced by Giovanni Gentile. As Gentile claimed, 'act' is not a result or a logical successor of the mind; rather, 'act' is for its own self the mind. It stands outside time and initiates change without being subject to change. While 'fact' is the result of the mind as being created by the mind, so that it is a temporal existence and possesses a location in time (Gentile, 1922, p.184 and pp.198-199). Though both philosophy and history are in

⁶¹ In modern English, the term 'activity' indicates an act that does not have a clear result but merely focuses on itself, whereas 'action' has a result. In this research, I use the term 'produce' to express the meaning of an act that has a result, which is in accordance with the Aristotelian distinction between 'produce' (*poiesis*) and 'action'/'practice' (*praxis*), since the common usage of 'action with a result' actually means what *poiesis* means, that is, 'produce with a production' in philosophical language. But in this short section about Collingwood and Gentile's argument, I will keep their original words to avoid any misunderstanding of them.

their essence acts in the mind, philosophy is about its own self, whereas history is about past facts, which makes history both a mental activity and its results, rather than either a mental activity or its results. For Gentile and Collingwood, fact is abstracted from the act of its creation, which indicates that mere fact for its own self is meaningless if it does not provoke mental activities like understandings in the mind.

In this sense, historical fact is the result of history, the latter of which is regarded as a creative activity in the mind. As I argued in the previous chapter, where historical fact is distinguished from historical event, I mention Gentile's argument again to show how he meant history as a unity of act and fact, and draw attention to my different usage of 'historical fact' again. As he argued,

An historical fact as regards time is a past fact but our judgment concerning it can only have meaning if we take as its valuation, not the accomplished fact, but the historian's consciousness and personality, of which indeed the idea of the historical fact is an inherent past ... only spiritual acts have value, we do not judge pure facts such as fair or foul weather, deformity or fine stature (Gentile, 1922, p.127).

For him, historical fact is the mental result of the activity of historical knowing. Thus, historical fact is in its essence an idealism concept that does not need to be set up as the necessary condition of the latter conceptualization work of the science of history as the formal end cause; whereas for me, historical fact is regarded as a given fact which had already been established in its logical and temporal position and needs to be transformed into interpretable historical events. But in the minimum sense, it can be seen that, for a historian who for him or her own self is in the present but studies subject matters in the past, the significant part of historical knowledge, namely, the judgement of past things, occurs inside the historian's own mind in the present and is not temporally involved in the pure fact in the past. Again, as an activity concerning past things, history studies the immanent in historical facts and that immanent is the transcendental and eternal activity of the mind. Philosophy is concerned only with the immanent of the activity itself in its own current situation, whereas history is concerned with human action as a conception that different people in different times have in different situations, the latter of which is further investigated as a judgement of past things, and the judgement of the changes

among such past things.

Therefore, if I am going to argue the theory that historical knowing actually means historical deliberation in the present, which naturally considers historical events in the past, I must go further in studying how does Collingwood-Gentile's activity concerning past facts bridge the gap between the past and the present, since merely arguing that history is an activity of thinking in the mind is not sufficient to demonstrate that historical deliberation practically aims at the historical *eudaimonia*, the completeness of self-knowledge, as far as the concept of deliberation for its own self is not temporal and practically aims only at the instant situation. I must find the homogeneity between pure (or ethical) deliberation and historical deliberation. On this point, Collingwood and Gentile's argument has a further indication that history as a thinking activity concerning the past is not only a normal activity in the mind, but also a 'self-causing' activity of thinking in the mind. It is in this sense that a historical deliberation in the present can be coherent with historical events in the past, the latter of which were performed as actions in the past, since such a character of historical deliberation is demonstrated in accordance with the characteristic of pure deliberation in the previous sub-section.

4.4.2 The self-causing character of historical deliberation: the fundamental reason that historical knowing can be regarded as an action (*praxis*).

'Self-causing', or *causa sui*, is the most significant character of the thinking activity for Collingwood and Gentile. In Collingwood's context, this character enhances an independence of one's thinking activity, that is, the independence that keeps the thinking agent away from another's thinking activity and makes the thinking agent responsible only to him or herself, though thinking activities can still be relevant to each other by setting up a causing-caused relationship. As a self-responsible activity, the thinking activity generates itself and is for the end of itself – it does not purposively serve the ends of others. To this extent, the self-causing thinking activity can be characterized in accordance with the Aristotelian sense of *praxis*, namely, 'action' or 'practice', which means the subject and the object of the activity are the same. Thinking activity/action is for and by an agent. Therefore, if I assume (like Collingwood did (Collingwood, 1946,

p.302)) that historical deliberation is a thinking activity of a historian in the present and it deliberates those actions which presented themselves in historical events in the past, and if such actions in the past were also essentially the activities of thinking, then what the historical deliberation deliberates, as I have argued above regarding the decision confronting every historical situation, is actually the **re-enactment** of the mind of the people who made the decisions in particular historical events in the past, and such a re-enactment happens in the mind of the historian in the present. Therefore, the route towards the historical *eudaimonia*, or the completeness of self-knowledge, is actually presented as **the action or historical deliberation of achieving the re-enactment of historical minds, and the inheritances and changes between these minds.**

This characteristic can be expanded more widely. It is on the point of the changes between minds that we can expand Collingwood's argument on 'cause', since he gave this term a slightly different meaning from the exact one in *causa sui*, at least apparently, though this difference will not essentially distort our understandings of *causa sui*. Collingwood used the term 'cause' not only in describing the nature of the thinking activity, but also in explaining the historical applications of such a thinking activity, the latter of which, however, applies 'cause' differently from the way it is applied in 'self-causing' in the sense that 'self-causing' is finally an individual category, as the subject and the object of self-causing are the same, whereas the historical causes actually comprise a pair of the distinguished causing and caused. As Boucher concludes (Boucher, 1989, p.115), Collingwood argued that there are two elements in the historical sense of cause relating to the thinking activity. One is *causa quod*, namely, 'efficient cause (or power cause)', and the other one is *causa ut*, namely, 'final cause'. The former means that a historical agent was confronting a historical situation, and he or she was aware of the situation, while the latter indicates an intention that the agent really meant to act in the way he or she did. And as he explains further, "The agent conceives a situation and believes himself to be in it, and on the basis of this he forms an intention to act. If an agent constantly acts in this way, the complex of his actions could be described as self-causing" (Boucher, 1989, p.115).

It is in this sense that we may get a different explanation, with more relevance to

subjectivism, of the nature of *causa sui*. For Collingwood, the significance of *causa sui* is limited to a consciousness demonstration inside the agent him or herself, rather than the descriptive characteristic that focuses merely on the fact that the subject and object of the thinking activity are homogeneous. By arguing that ‘the complex of his actions could be described as self-causing’, Collingwood actually interpreted the historical sense of causing and caused in a subjectivism dimension, which corresponds to his own judgement of the term ‘metaphysics’ in that ‘a’ (rather than ‘the’) metaphysics should be historical. For him, the descriptive character of *praxis* in the historical sense should be transformed into a conscious understanding of historical subjects, that is, the causing generates the caused by informing or persuading the agent to formulate a consciousness intention. He defined the terms *causa quod* and *causa ut* less in the sense of relating to the precede-succeed relation between historical events and more of relating to how the minds of the former affected the latter; though he did not very clearly argue whether these mutually affected minds were exactly existing inside the historical events in the past relatively, or just existing as abstracted concepts or notions only in the mind of historians in the present. Though Collingwood’s argument of the re-enactment of historical minds calls for a subjectivism interpretation, the logical position of the historical mind – which is described beyond the scope of subjectivism, just as I have described the logical position of historical events for the process of *physis* in the previous chapter – should be clarified more clearly.

Either way, at least in a minimum sense, by referring to Collingwood’s argument on the character of historical knowing, I claim that the character of historical deliberation is *causa sui*, and that it corresponds to the theoretical regulation, namely, the *physis* of *praxis*, so that such a knowing activity can be regarded as an action, though this character can also be interpreted as a subjectivism notion. Therefore, in the next sub-section, I will demonstrate further the process of practical perception in the historical sense, especially about the relation between *poiesis* and *praxis*. By doing so, I hope the possibility of subjectivism explaining *causa sui* can be ruled out.

4.4.3 Applying right virtue or virtues for historical deliberation.

This theme on the virtues of knowing in practical sciences has been discussed primarily in section 2.5.2. Here I would like to mention it again, but emphasize more the logical relevance to historical knowing as an action, namely, historical deliberation. I have argued that historical *eudaimonia*, the completeness of self-knowledge, should be transformed into the action of achieving the re-enactment of historical minds, and the inheritances and changes between these minds; and I have argued that the most significant character of this re-enactment action is *causa sui*, namely, self-causing, which essentially regulates historical deliberation as well. But in another sense of a subjectivism interpretation of self-causing, this concept of the character of historical knowing stands individually, since it does not need to differentiate between the self-causing of the historian's mind in the present and the self-causing of the minds of people in past events. Due to this, it seems that the re-enactment of the historical mind does not need any further differentiation between the science/philosophy of history and history itself, since re-enactment is in its essence a mental activity that corresponds to history as a mental activity as was well argued by Collingwood and Gentile. However, this is not to say that regarding knowing as an action will necessarily lead to a subjectivism interpretation. Regarding knowing as an action or historical deliberation, relatively speaking, is an approach in the general scope (more than merely the scope of knowing) relating to the structure of practical science, whereas a subjectivism interpretation, especially the previous one that formulates *causa sui* into a purely consciousness relationship, is in a narrower scope which deals with particular logical deductions. Actually, it is in the sense of adopting the view of knowing as action that I am able to enhance my argument about practical perception, and to specifically expand the understanding of *causa sui* as a character of historical deliberation by relating it to other important concepts of practical science rather than the subjectivism interpretation. And the most important pair of those concepts is *technê* and *phronêsis*, as the virtue of *poiesis* and *praxis* respectively.

But in common views regarding historical thinking, or more generally, with *Geisteswissenschaften*, the concept of *technê* might be easily ignored, since it apparently serves the non-practical part of human affairs, that is, 'producing' or *poiesis*. However, as I argued in section 2.5.2, the virtue applied in the **practical sciences** like the science of

polis and the science of history refers not only to the virtue of **practice**. By establishing practical sciences, human beings endow their knowing with a systematic approach that fundamentally and finally aims at *eudaimonia*. That is to say, practical sciences are created not only due to the fact that people live their life, but also because they want to and indeed do study their life to achieve an end, which requires the practical sciences to be concerned with both theoretical and practical knowledge. In this sense, practical sciences are also the 'production' of the knowing of human beings and hence apply the virtue *technê*. Moreover, some practical sciences, like the science of *polis* and the science of history in my regulation, internally construct themselves as an architectonic virtual science in which all theoretical, productive, and practical knowledge combines together. To give an example in the science of *polis*, for the ruler in a *polis*, political activity is not only a *praxis* ('practice' for one's own good/end) like the one performed by citizens to achieve their own but individual good, but also a *poiesis* ('produce' for the good of the producer rather than the production) which is performed to achieve the good of the whole of the *polis* beyond the individual good of the statesman. So does the historian in the science of history. For a historian who is about to know the past but is personally in the present, on the one hand, his or her knowing as an action applies the virtue *phronêsis* since the knowing action is currently done by and for him or herself; on the other hand, what he or she re-enacts by performing the historical deliberation is the knowledge which is generated as the production of his or her mind, and thus makes the knowing also by applying the virtue *technê*.

Therefore, as I have argued in section 2.5.2, *technê* and *phronêsis* are not two opposite virtues which are applied to two different entities respectively or to two different steps or sections of one development progress of an entity respectively; rather, *technê* and *phronêsis* are two mutually supported virtues indicating one entity from two different angles. Their relation is that between the obverse and the reverse of a coin: I am not indicating two different coins, but two faces of one coin – both two faces are necessary for the existence of the coin. Therefore, though it seems that the subjectivism interpretation could also explain the *causa sui* character of historical knowing in an 'essential' sense, as the knowing is by and for the knower him or herself, actually this

interpretation eliminates the fact that historical knowing is also a generated result as a science: it must be a production of human beings' minds. In this sense, the claim that *causa sui* exists only for the agent him or herself thus calls for not only *phronēsis* but also *technê*. Also, the subjectivism interpretation argues that the inner relation of historical cause(s) as the consciousness-intentions of the former and the latter, of the precede and the succeed, is actually applied only to particular histories, since the consciousness relation between the former and the latter can be explained only in every particular and concrete situation. This is because the consciousness-intention of each is for its own self. In other words, though the concept of consciousness can be generalized as an abstract concept that may conduct or be conducted by other concepts and thus forms an internal logical chain of a science, what is applied to a given historical event cannot be such a generalized concept of consciousness as a universal, but rather every concrete consciousness itself, the latter of which exists with its own uniqueness as an individual and differs from any other consciousness. Under a subjectivism interpretation, what is meaningful is only every individual consciousness in every different particular, which makes the concept of consciousness actually meaningless to the relation between the former and the latter, since it is not a necessary element of this relation. And the subjectivism interpretation gives explanations of historical causes relating only to a historian's own preference: the historian does not need to know the theoretical structure of the science of history in a general scope before he or she begins to investigate particular causes. The science of history, or the philosophy of history in a wider sense, is thus not necessary for the study of history.

Further, as I have argued, the biggest tension in historical thinking is the distance from historical events to the science of history, in accordance with the temporal distance from the past to the present. In relation to historical deliberation, firstly, a period of a given past may consist of historical events, and thus it forms its own history in a particular sense which existed in the past. However, the format of this process should be studied as a general process that exists in every particular history and thus in the sense of universals, since no matter how the process from events to formal history is applied differently in every particular in the past, the process as theoretical knowledge indicates

that the development from the material cause to the formal end cause is unchangeable. That is to say, though the historical deliberation should be and indeed is applied to every different circumstance in the past for the re-enactment in the historian's mind in the present, the logic of historical deliberation and its related virtues are definitely unchangeable. Secondly, it is by our minds in the present that historical deliberation is finally located inside the science of history rather than wandering in the conceptualizations of the past. As historical deliberation is defined as **achieving the re-enactment of historical minds, and the inheritances and changes between these minds**, though the materials from the particular historical events are still particular as existing in the past, the knowledge of them, or the knowing action upon them (the knowledge as the result of the knowing action is the same as the knowing action itself as far as it is *praxis*), is a generalizing action of establishing a science in the present which investigates the inheritances and changes between those mentally thinking actions. Actually, this also corresponds to the real meaning of *phronēsis*: 'applying *phronēsis* in every particular situation' does not mean there is no generalized conception of *phronēsis*; rather, 'applying *phronēsis* in every particular situation' calls for preparing the theoretical knowledge of this conception, so that it may be applied well in real practices.

Finally, I add the following as a short conclusion of this section. By arguing that historical deliberation is the way of knowing historical causes since both the deliberation and the historical cause are essentially self-causing, on the one hand, I am not concerned with historical deliberation, but only with the particular cases in the past. Indeed, I am arguing that, as the most significant character of historical deliberation, *causa sui* is endowed with historical deliberation only as far as I for myself am the generator of the historical knowing, and thus of a further possible completeness of self-knowledge by re-enactment. And only in this sense do I argue that knowing the development process from the historical events to the science of history applies the virtue *phronēsis*, just as knowing the process from an individual good to the ultimate good for a statesman or stateswoman in a *polis* also applies to the virtue *phronēsis*. On the other hand, if I change my perspective and put it beyond the angle of myself, I find that no matter whether I am concerned or not, the knowledge of *causa sui* of historical knowing will always exist, since

it is the unchangeable theoretical knowledge of the science of history – though the knowing of particular histories is changeable. In this sense, I may claim the applicability **only** of *cogito*, **rather than** *cogito, ergo sum*.⁶² What I should do – if I at least have curiosity about what happened in the past – is merely know the development process as a natural result, which means that though the development process may initially be for purpose of the completeness of my self-knowledge, it has its own end which serves the science of history rather than my own end. And in this sense, I refer to *technê*, since though it is I who generates a piece of the knowledge of history, when it is generated, it is not my own knowledge but part of the science of history, and is not for the purpose of my own historical *eudaimonia* but for the good of the science of history.

4.5 Conclusion.

In this chapter, I have outlined the second part of the secondary instances of the *ousia* of history, namely, the *technê/phronēsis* of history with regard to historical knowing, or historical deliberation in my words. In particular, (4.2) firstly, I introduced historical representativism as a modern substituting theory for construing the relationship between historical realities and us. Historical representativism, inheriting three featured notions from purely epistemological representativism, at the end narrows down the relation between historical realities and us to the relation between historical realities and our minds. Then I move to the demonstration of historical deliberation by constructing two logical steps. The first part (4.3) investigates the general positions of the practical perception (by ruling out the mathematical perception) and the historical *eudaimonia* and their mutual relevance. I argue that the historical *eudaimonia* can be functionally (rather than by definition) understood as the completeness of historical knowledge, which calls for the route towards it, that is, the historical deliberation. The second part (4.4) clarifies the concrete form of historical deliberation by regarding knowing as action, and its related virtues. I argue that the basic character of historical deliberation is *causa sui*, and thus, it can be regarded as action (*praxis*) but also calls for the virtue of *poiesis* due to its quality of being the generated knowledge as a science. The concrete form of

⁶² Nietzsche's reversal of Descartes' axiom in his *The Gay Science* may have a similar scheme to mine to investigate the pre-existing factors of knowing.

historical deliberation can be understood as achieving the re-enactment of historical minds, and the inheritances and changes between these minds.

As I introduced in section 3.5 in the previous chapter and at the end of the previous section, what I have descriptively interpreted in these two chapters are merely the secondary instances of the *ousia* of history and the need for it to be transformed into the primary instances of the *ousia* of history. Referring to the table in section 3.5, I would like to emphasize our current position and our final end:

	Primary instances: Fundamental Beingness of an entity	Secondary instances: <i>physis</i> and <i>technê/phronēsis</i> of an entity
Science of <i>polis</i>	the <i>ousia</i> of <i>polis</i> – the harmonization of ends: makes the <i>polis</i> actualized	Constitution (generated from the <i>physis</i> of <i>polis</i> but needs <i>technê/phronēsis</i> to be reserved)
Science of history	<i>ousia</i> of history – ?	<i>Ordnungszeit</i> (generated from the <i>physis</i> of history but needs <i>technê/phronēsis</i> to be known)

I may point to the position of the question mark by *Geschehenszeit* which means the time in which history is actualized as the understandable knowledge of history in the form of historical thinking in the present and towards historical *eudaimonia*. In the next chapter, I will elaborate how *Geschehenszeit* is actualized in the form of historical *eudaimonia* and thus how it presents the function of history as bridging the past and the present by offering a pre-given historical path, upon which our contemporary understanding depends, and is prescribed and limited – in accordance with my argument in section 3.5.2.



Chapter 5 – Conclusion, and Actualizing *Geschehenszeit*

5.1 Introduction.

As I have demonstrated the two secondary instances of the *ousia* of history, namely, *physis* in Chapter 3 and *technê/phronēsis* in Chapter 4, what I have described about *Ordnungszeit* and its related historical knowing, now has to be transformed to *Geschehenszeit* for the final actualization of history (in the form of achieving the historical *eudaimonia*), though as we will see, this transformation emphasizes not its concrete contents, but the way towards it. This may be the final presentation of the science of history, though the final aim of the science of history is merely discussing the relation between past events and present thinking. In this final chapter, as this chapter serves primarily as a conclusion, I will firstly (5.2) summarise the contents of the previous chapters, especially the logics from the secondary instances of the *ousia* of history to the understanding of the primary instances of the *ousia* of history, in accordance with the primary structure claimed in the second chapter. Then I will (5.3) clarify the meanings of *Geschehenszeit* and the historical *eudaimonia* respectively and their mutual relevance, so that the meaning of actualizing *Geschehenszeit* can be established as the end of the logical chain of the science of history.

5.2 Conclusion: the structure of a metaphysical interpretation of science of history.

In this section, I will summarise the previous four chapters, and then in the next section, I will conduct the logic of the previous four chapters to the end, namely, the final actualization of *Geschehenszeit* (or the historical *eudaimonia*).

5.2.1 Chapter 1: the spirit of historical thinking, and epistemological historicization.

As I argued in the beginning of this research, the philosophy of history should study the reason for historical thinking. This reason can be explained as both the logic of historical thinking and the power/efficient cause of historical thinking, that is to say, the philosophy of history discusses by what and for what historical thinking is initiated.

According to this, in section 1.1, I claimed that the significant spirit of historical thinking should be **exploring the relation, even bridging the gap, between historical events in the temporal past and the understandable knowledge of history in the form of historical thinking in the temporal present.**

However, there are different interpretations of this spirit of historical thinking due to the different understandings of the aim of philosophy. The first level of the spirit regards history as the necessary method of philosophical thinking, since for philosophers like Plato, the task of philosophy is to experience the tension between the immortal and the temporal or mortal, the latter of which is presented in the form of history. The second level of the spirit indicates history is a differentiated discipline, which further leads to the intellectual structuralization of historical knowledge. Enhancing the second, the third level of the spirit presents historical thinking in a modern form of 'philosophy of history' which completely inherits the principle of the differentiated disciplines, and shows that 'history' inevitably becomes the objective subject matter of philosophical thinking. At the end, I claimed that most of the modern and contemporary philosophies of history are elaborated in the third level in the form of 'epistemological historicization'.

Before outlining epistemological historicization, I introduced the general method of this research in section 1.2. The main method of this research, though it is a complex of different methods, is a systematic and hermeneutic philosophical method. In this way, I endow the method with how the philosophical demonstrations must be internally mutually related and thus form a philosophical system which presupposes some fundamental theories, from which the secondary questions can be asked with a firm foundation. This system is constructed and construed hermeneutically, as hermeneutics provides supplementary explanations of the meaning of concepts to a systematic method, though for itself it does not pursue a system. I also introduced some methods which involve particular demonstrations. However these do not encompass the whole research structure.

Then I moved to epistemological historicization. I gave a short introduction of epistemological historicization in section 1.3. Though in the domain of pure philosophy, the problem of epistemology has been argued in some depth and range, its historical

application, namely, the epistemologicalized philosophies of history, has not been investigated thoroughly. Therefore, I tried to outline this historical application of epistemology. As a result, I argued that there are at least three obvious waves of the enhancement of epistemological historicization: the waves of **an intellectualization tendency, of individualization, and of fragmentation**. And I discussed them in more detail in the following three sections respectively.

In section 1.4, I analysed Hegel's epistemological tendency in his philosophy of history and Dilthey's epistemological scheme of his philosophy of history. For Hegel, I argued that he was the first one to deal with the issue of history with an intellectual approach rather than a materialist explanation. He noticed the fact that it is contemporary thinking that investigates past events, and in particular, he distinguished the character of people in history and the character of the historian differing in time, by which a subjectivist explanation of the intellectual approach can be applied. This subjectivist intellectual tendency was inherited by Dilthey. Dilthey referred to an important concept which can endow intellectualized history with the individual's consciousness, that is, historicity. The emergence of historicity actually promoted the real peak of the first wave of epistemological historicization, as the historical knowledge will inevitably be constructed in an intellectualized form.

In section 1.5, I focused on a famous differentiation between the so-called speculative/substantial theories of history and the critical theories of history. This differentiation was made by the latter which study the 'nature' of a historian's enquires rather than the former, which studies the totality of human actions in the past – as actions in the past cannot be perceptually known by historians in the present. In the opinion of the supporters of critical theories (with their belief that the applicability of historical knowledge is based upon the knowing capacity in the present), a historical event should be interpreted peculiarly, or at best, as dependent on its circumstances, rather than as existing for any 'pattern' of a universal history, which provides legitimacy to the speculative philosophy of history. As a result, this differentiation and the emphasis on the critical theory lead to an individualized scheme of interpreting history.

In section 1.6, I elaborated the third wave of epistemological historicization, that is,

the fragmentation tendency. As a not-complete critique of the epistemological tendency of the philosophy of history, this tendency was accompanied with the destruction and re-enhancement of epistemological historicization. Firstly, I argued that, given the criticism of the foundationism in the pure epistemology, the philosophy of history might have an opportunity to overcome the epistemological tendency as the research of historical thinking adopted other forms of interpreting history, such as the linguistic or the rhetorical interpretations, rather than the original philosophical interpretation. However, this opportunity was soon eliminated by the wave of returning to the philosophical approach of historical thinking, since the other forms cannot offer a plausible explanation for the essential nature of history. As one of the examples of this returning, Ankersmit provided a new philosophical interpretation of the historical experience. However, his explanation of the historical experience indicated an extreme individualization of the experience, as the historical experience is meaningful only to the person's own individual feeling, who can emotionally or psychologically embed the individual experience into the meaning of history. This finally results in the fragmentation of epistemological historicization, which even means the destruction of the philosophy of history, at least in the traditional sense of the philosophy of history.

In section 1.7, I drew a conclusion from the previous contents and emphasized again the task of this research, that is, to investigate the relationship between what happened historically in the past and historical thinking in the present. Considering the fruit but also the problems of the dominant tradition of the philosophy of history, namely, epistemological historicization, I argued for the possibility of a metaphysical interpretation of a philosophy of history as an alternative. This alternative is not concerned with speculative theories that attempt to provide a pattern to history; this alternative aims to rethink and reconstruct an interpretation of the reason for historical thinking on the highest level of mental activity, in accordance with the original spirit of historical thinking with regard to philosophical thinking.

5.2.2 Chapter 2: the general structure of a metaphysical science of history: An Aristotelian scheme of practical sciences.

In section 2.1, I reiterated the problems of epistemological historicization. With the regard more to the reason for constructing a metaphysical interpretation of the philosophy of history, I claimed that epistemological historicization is problematic because it limits the range of historical thinking or the knowledge of history. Under epistemological historicization, the structural generating process of history is ignored; and thus the knowing of such structural generating of history is also ignored. Therefore, I claimed the necessity of the metaphysical alternative and primarily introduced its possible structure, and argued that this metaphysical science of history is designed in accordance with an Aristotelian scheme of practical sciences.

From the section above, based on Chapter 1 as a preliminary chapter, I began to outline the whole perspective of the structure of this metaphysical science of history. Firstly, as a preliminary work but inside such a structure, I investigated and clarified some important concepts and terms in Section 2.2. I argued that the metaphysical scheme involved in this research is a descriptive metaphysics rather than a revisionary metaphysics, in the sense that it offers merely a description of already-existing realities rather than any better plan or blueprint. I also regulated such descriptive metaphysics in this research as an Aristotelian one rather than a Platonic one, since an Aristotelian descriptive metaphysics that investigates realities in the same world – rather than a Platonic one that distinguishes between the world of realities and the world of *eidos* – is more suitable to the domain of history. Then, I specifically clarified the translation, the transliteration, and the meaning of the term οὐσία. As a very important argument that determines the structure of the following demonstrations, I argued that *ousia* consists of two levels of instances. **The primary instances of *ousia* indicate the fundamental Beingness of an entity which makes the entity come into its own being. However, this fundamental Beingness cannot be defined by the others, but only defines the others. It has to be grasped by the functional knowing from the secondary instances. The secondary instances of *ousia* contain mainly the *physis* and *technê/phronēsis* of an entity.**

With the knowledge of these preliminary investigations, in Section 2.3, I began to demonstrate the general character of a metaphysical science of history, that is, it is an

Aristotelian 'practical' science. I firstly introduced the Aristotelian differentiation of disciplines differing as the theoretical science, the practical sciences, and the productive sciences, and then distinguished the practical sciences from the others by the subject matters, the aims, the faculties employed, and the methods. I also investigated the relevance between the practical sciences and the others, and using an example of the science of *polis*, I claimed that though the practical sciences **study** practical affairs, they must also be **concerned with** theoretical knowledge, namely, metaphysics. Theoretical science regulates the structure and the elements of the practical sciences.

Then I moved to introduce the first part of the secondary instances of *ousia* – as far as the primary instances cannot be defined directly but can be grasped from the secondary instances – with regard to the science of history, that is, the *physis* of the science of history. In Section 2.4, I mainly argued that *physis* is about both a developmental process from the material cause to the formal end cause, and a combination of the material cause and the formal end cause, since for complex entities like *polis* and history, the material cause will not be eliminated even after it has generated the formal end cause, but rather it combines with the formal end cause and forms the complex entity. Then I introduced the idea that this logic can be applied to the science of history, as the science of *polis* has been constructed upon this logic. This section was further expanded in Chapter 3 with regard more to the temporal character of history.

In Section 2.5, I introduced another part of the secondary instances of *ousia*, that is, *technê/phronēsis*. I firstly argued that *technê/phronēsis* serves *physis* as supplements, since only *physis*, the generating process of an entity, is enclosed, though it is not necessarily complete and self-consistent. In this sense, a metaphysical science of history studies not only the generating process from historical events in the past to historical knowledge in the present, but also the practical interference with the generating process, that is, human beings' knowing activity as a practical action which involves the virtue *technê* and *phronēsis*. Therefore, I then investigated the role of 'I' or a historian in the knowing of history by discussing which virtue is applied. As a conclusion, I argued that these two virtues are not opposite each other but depend on different angles and support *physis* together. This section was expanded into Chapter 4 with regard more to the

historical deliberation as a knowing action.

Finally, in Section 2.6, I conducted this primary structure of a metaphysical science of history to an open end, that is, actualizing historical *eudaimonia*. I defined historical *eudaimonia* as a dynamic concept that focuses not merely on the completeness of historical knowledge but on the route or the achieving process of the completeness of historical knowledge. Historical *eudaimonia* indicates an attempt that, by deliberating the past to the present mind, present historians may re-enact the past as a present understandable knowledge and hence regard the process from the past to the present as a relatively complete history.

5.2.3 Chapter 3: on the *physis* or *Ordnungszeit* of history: the first secondary instances.

In Section 3.1, I argued that this chapter would continually investigate the *physis* of the science of history as a practical science but with more relevance to the temporal nature of history. I also claimed that this chapter would focus on the fundamental logic of the science of history rather than the subject matters of the science of history. To describe the fundamental logic with regard to the temporal nature, in Section 3.2, I preliminarily introduced some modern theories about the relation between time and history, especially Ricoeur's seriality of history and Koselleck's temporal modes of historical events. However, I also pointed out that they at best uncovered the temporal features of history rather than the temporal nature of history, though these features indeed relate to the temporal essence of history and may provoke further investigations into the fundamental reason for history.

In the rest of this chapter, in accordance with the structure of *physis* argued in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, I began to demonstrate the generating process of the *physis* of history, or *Ordnungszeit* in my words. In particular, firstly, in Section 3.3, I sketched the logical position of historical events. I argued that the generating process of *Ordnungszeit* is a process in which a historical event in the past is regarded as the material cause, the understandable historical knowledge in the present is regarded as the formal end cause, and the movement from the former to the latter is regarded as the generating process of the *physis* of history in the pure sense without human beings' interference. This process

was demonstrated with an analogue from the example of the science of *polis* as also a practical science.

In Section 3.4 which is closely related to Section 3.3, I further differentiated an historical event from an historical fact, the latter of which provides merely the necessary condition for the former, but for its own self is not the direct material cause. I claimed that an historical fact existed in the past for its own sake without any conceptualization, whereas an historical event must be already conceptualized and thus can be the direct material cause, and can further serve the theoreticalization as the formal end cause of history. By doing this in the above two sections, *Ordnungszeit* has been outlined as the fundamental nature, or *physis*, of history. It must consist not only of the historical events as existences in merely the temporal past, but also the full developmental process from the past existences, through the conceptualization of the past existences, and finally to the present theoreticalization in the form of historical thinking – though it is still a problem that the present theoreticalization of history is not necessarily known by us in the present.

Therefore, in Section 3.5, I elaborated the reason why such an understandable knowledge of history, or historical thinking in the present, is not necessarily known by us. This section is the logical connection between this chapter and the next, and also the logical connection between this and the next chapters **as a whole** and the final chapter. According to the basic regulation given in Section 2.2 that the *ousia* of history can be grasped only from secondary instances like *physis* and *technê/phronēsis*, I argued that I must further investigate another secondary instance to identify how we know such a pure sense of the *physis* of history, since without that, *physis* alone cannot actualize the *ousia* of history as a complex entity, to say nothing of historical *eudaimonia*. Thus, I firstly presented the logical position of the *ousia* of history by analogizing it with the *ousia* of the *polis* as seen in the table below:

	Primary instances: Fundamental Beingness of an entity	Secondary instances: <i>physis</i> and <i>technê/phronēsis</i> of an entity
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Science of <i>polis</i>	the <i>ousia</i> of the <i>polis</i> – the harmonization of ends: makes the <i>polis</i> actualized	Constitution (generated from the <i>physis</i> of a <i>polis</i> but needs <i>technê/phronēsis</i> to be reserved)
Science of history	the <i>ousia</i> of history – ?	<i>Ordnungszeit</i> (generated from the <i>physis</i> of history but needs <i>technê/phronēsis</i> to be known)

Then I named the question mark as *Geschehenszeit* and defined it as indicating the primary instances of the *ousia* of history. I also further claimed that the function of *Geschehenszeit* is bridging the past and the present, or more particularly, offering a **pre-given historical path on which our contemporary understanding depends, is prescribed and limited.**

In Section 3.6, I concluded that this chapter, which mainly investigated *Ordnungszeit*, that is, the *physis* of history, must be further transformed into *Geschehenszeit*. And this work needs *technê/phronēsis* as the supplements to *physis*.

5.2.4 Chapter 4: on *technê* and *phronēsis* of history: the second secondary instances.

In Section 4.1, I argued that this chapter was the expansion of Section 2.5. This chapter dealt with the human beings' interference in the *physis* of history, that is, the knowing and understanding of the pure generating process of history. Similar to the previous chapter, before demonstrating the logic of historical deliberation, in Section 4.2, I introduced some modern theories on knowing the historical realities which can be characterized as historical representativism. I claimed that historical representativism inherited and developed the notions from pure epistemological representativism, namely, the disengaged subject, the punctual self, and the atomism. I finally argued that historical representativism essentially narrows down the knowing relation between the historical realities and **us** to the knowing relation between the historical realities and **our minds**.

In Section 4.3, I sketched the general positions of the practical perception and the historical *eudaimonia*. I firstly clarified the practical perception from the mathematical

perception, the former of which is appropriate to be applied to the science of history as a practical science. Then I introduced the concept *eudaimonia* in the general sense and the historical sense respectively, and structurally equalized them by valuing them as having a similar function, that is, the completeness of deliberating life conducted by the faculty of reason. I also emphasized that the practical perception is not for any specific object of *eudaimonia* but for the route towards *eudaimonia*, in the sense of which I referred to the term 'historical deliberation' to describe such a route towards historical *eudaimonia*.

In continuation, in Section 4.4, I investigated the concrete form of historical deliberation. I defined the concrete form of historical deliberation as a knowing action involving the virtues *technê* and *phronêsis*. With help from Collingwood and Gentile's theories, I discovered that self-causing or *causa sui* is the essential nature of historical deliberation, and is also the fundamental reason that historical knowing can be regarded as an Aristotelian action (*praxis*). By doing so, I argued that the route towards historical *eudaimonia*, or the completeness of self-knowledge, is actually presented as **the action or historical deliberation of achieving the re-enactment of historical minds, and the inheritances and changes between these minds**. In addition, I claimed that, as a concept in an architectonic practical science of history like the science of *polis*, the historical deliberation involves not only *phronêsis* but also *technê*, since this logical demonstration is produced as a part of the knowledge of and by human beings.

In Section 4.5, I concluded that this chapter, which mainly investigated the *technê* and *phronêsis* of history, is another necessary part of the secondary instances of the *ousia* of history. With this and the previous chapter together, the route towards *Geschehenszeit* can be conducted and fully sketched.

5.3 Actualizing *Geschehenszeit* or the historical *eudaimonia*.

Having finished the descriptions of the secondary instances of the *ousia* of history, now I am going to sketch the relevance of the relation between the secondary and primary instances of history regarding its final actualization. Indeed, in this research, I have already mentioned and demonstrated some concepts which are probably confused with each other due to their similar usage in referring to the fundamental essence of the

science of history. These concepts perhaps include the primary instances of the *ousia* of history, *Geschehenszeit*, and the historical *eudaimonia*. Therefore, to sketch the final actualization, I will clarify these three concepts again. This does not merely function as a glossary; rather, I will make clearer the logical relevance – and the levels, as far as they actually refer to different things, which draw them together – which supports the final actualization of history.

The first concepts are the primary instances of the *ousia* of history and *Geschehenszeit*. By mentioning them together, I am indeed suggesting that they refer to the same thing. According to the basic metaphysical regulation of *ousia*, it is *ousia* that makes an entity come into its own being, though it cannot be defined by the other concepts but only be indicated indirectly, for example, by describing its function. In the science of *polis*, it is the *ousia* of *polis* that makes a *polis* come into its own being, and this primary instances 'being' can be indicated and understood by the secondary presentation of the 'constitution', which is endowed with the functional meaning, that is, how to distribute the power between the ruler and the be-ruled. Without the presented constitution, a *polis* cannot be described and known as itself: merely an assembly of land, people, trade, army, or any other elements is not a *polis*. Similarly, if I suppose history to be a complex entity and the science of history to be a practical science just like the science of *polis*, then it must be the *ousia* of history that makes history come into its own being, a being generated from the complexity of past events and present thinking.

However, for the science of *polis*, we do have experience, which can lead us to perceive the *ousia* of the *polis* in the form of a harmonization of goals (the citizens' goals and the goal of the *polis*), since the concrete method of the harmonization – education – is indeed perceptual for us and applied to ourselves. However, for the science of history, we do not have a similar experience: we cannot experientially perceive the harmonization between the past events and the present thinking/knowledge, though we may demonstrate it in a logical sense. Therefore, I refer to the term '*Geschehenszeit*' to mean the *ousia* of history, as it may remind us that, as a primary instances, *Geschehenszeit* must be grasped by the harmonization in the level of the secondary instances, which requires knowledge of both the general generating process of history and the general knowing

process of particular histories, rather than merely staying with the primary instances of the *ousia* of history and saying: "It cannot be known since it cannot be defined". *Geschehenszeit*, which makes history come into its being, though it cannot be defined, can still be known by studying its function. **In short, these two terms, the *ousia* of history and *Geschehenszeit*, are the same and both are in the level of the primary instances that denote the fundamental Beingness of history.**

But the historical *eudaimonia* is different. **In short, the historical *eudaimonia* remains in the secondary instances, though it is the highest end for all the secondary instances.** I have claimed many times that the primary instances of *ousia* can be known by studying its function in the secondary instances, and have argued that the secondary instances consist of *physis* and *technê/phronēsis*. For these functional conductions (as conducting to know the primary instances), however, is there anything serving as the end or the aim of them? The answer is yes and indeed, it appears many times, that is, *eudaimonia*. Here I am not going to repeat the definition and the regulation of *eudaimonia*; rather, I am going to specifically refer to the political and the historical examples to show how *eudaimonia* comes to be the highest end but still remains in the level of the secondary instances.

In the science of *polis*, *eudaimonia* is the purposive goal of a master/freeman. To achieve *eudaimonia*, a master decides to live a public life by applying his or her faculty of *logos* to the public life to communicate and exchange with the other masters the whole process, which is purely natural and corresponds to *physis*, since this process is generated for its own sake and its own cause. As a result, masters generate *polis*, and they transfer themselves to the citizens. And in this sense, the *telos* of the *polis* is to achieve the *eudaimonia* of the citizens. However, as I have argued, when the *polis* is created, it is for itself an individual existence and is an individual entity (though not a single but a complex entity), and hence has its own *telos*. Therefore, the citizens – now one or some of them become the ruler(s) – apply *technê/phronēsis* to make sure their *telos* can be embedded into the *telos* of the *polis*, or reversely. Indeed, it might be argued that the reverse situation, namely, embedding the *telos* of the *polis* into the citizens' *telos*, is not possible; but this case denotes that the essence of the mutual embedding is *eudaimonia*:

the ends or *telos* of the two sides are mutually consistent and further generate the individual self-consistent *eudaimonia* of both individual citizens and the whole *polis*. This process is not purely natural since it calls for human beings' interference by applying *technê* and *phronêsis*; but this process finally serves the reservation of the pure natural generating process, and thus makes the final *eudaimonia* embedded into the process of *physis* in the form of harmonizing the ends, though the *eudaimonia* perhaps can never be achieved: the significance is the route towards it rather than *eudaimonia* itself. Therefore, in this sense, *eudaimonia* is the highest end of *physis* and *technê/phronêsis*, which makes it belong to the secondary instances of the *ousia* of the *polis*. Therefore, the political *eudaimonia* is at best presented as a harmonizing constitution which can harmonize different ends one hundred percent, but cannot be equalized to the fundamental Beingness of the *polis*. What makes *polis* come into being is not *eudaimonia*.

The logic in the science of history is similar. Historical *eudaimonia* means the completeness of historical knowledge, or the completeness of the self-knowledge of history. It perhaps can never be achieved, but it deserves the attempt. In the science of history, this completeness of historical knowledge is the end of the developmental process from historical events in the past to historical thinking in the present, which is purely natural and denotes a temporal nature, namely, *Ordnungszeit*. But this process must also be understandable and be known by historians in the present so that it can become a meaningful history. Therefore, like *polis*, this natural process of the generating of history also calls for *technê* and *phronêsis* for the knowing of itself. Thus, the historical deliberation applying the virtues *technê* and *phronêsis* is also for the final completeness of historical knowledge, in the form of achieving the re-enactment of historical minds, which makes the completeness, or the historical *eudaimonia*, also belong to the secondary instances of the *ousia* of history. The completeness of historical knowledge can make history serve to bridge the past and the present, though they cannot be equalized to history itself. What makes history come into its being is only the *ousia* of itself, or *Geschehenszeit* to use my term.

From the clarification above and all the demonstrations in the previous chapters, **history has been described – rather than defined – as functionally bridging the past**

and the present. This bridging is conducted by and towards the completeness of the self-knowledge of history, the whole process of which and its understanding and knowing consist of the structure of a metaphysical science of history. Based on this, I describe the actualization of history, or *Geschehenszeit* in the primary instances, as only by actualization can an entity become a reality rather than remaining a potentiality. And the most significant logic of the actualizing is, though in different levels, *Geschehenszeit* and the historical *eudaimonia*, which are strongly related to each other on this issue of the final actualization of history.

As I argued in the beginning of Section 2.4, the concept of actuality corresponds to the presentation of the formal end cause rather than to the material cause. That is to say, though it is *ousia* that makes an entity become itself, the presented form as an actuality of the entity is determined by the formal end cause in the level of the secondary instances. Therefore, in accordance with the clarification above, the actualization of an entity – though in essence it belongs to the level of the primary instances – indeed concerns the final harmonization, namely, the *eudaimonia* of the entity, especially for the practical entities, most of which are complex entities. Moreover, since the actualization of a practical entity (like a *polis*) is for the bonum of the originator (like the citizens) rather than only the entity itself, it must definitely serve the harmonization of the *bonum*, namely, *summum bonum*, which is achieved by pursuing *eudaimonia*. That is why in Section 2.6, as the title shows, I claim that the end of the science of history is actualizing historical *eudaimonia*. Strictly and precisely speaking, it means **‘actualizing *Geschehenszeit*, which is functionally presented by pursuing historical *eudaimonia*’**.

Finally, I am going to emphasize the function of history again by differentiating it from the other interpretations based upon the non-metaphysical or the epistemological opinions. What I have argued regarding the function of history as bridging the past and the present has already been construed within a metaphysical structure, so that the logics and the applicable range of the involved concepts are organized in a reasonable manner and as a whole serve a systematic interpretation of historical thinking – though as I mention again, it is important to be aware that this is an interpretation of historical thinking rather than history. That is to say, by constructing such a metaphysical science of

history, what I have attempted to do is to clarify the logic of how we think of history, rather than what we think of history. In accordance with the first paragraph of this research, the philosophy of history (as a differentiated discipline of historical thinking) studies not the subject matter of but the reason for historical thinking. In this sense, what I mean about bridging the past and the present is thus not equal to the 'historical legitimacy' of present affairs, no matter whether in the materialism sense or in the idealism sense. It is also not equal to the demonstration or the verification of modernity, since the generating process of history does not matter with an individual's consciousness, which consists of the essence of modernity in the form of freedom. **What I mean by bridging the past and the present refers to the mental antecedent-succeeding relation, with a relatedness to but not equal to a temporal relation, which appears and is indeed applied and used in a unique mental activity, that is, 'thinking history'**.⁶³

5.4 A metaphysical science of history (and also a metaphysical science of *polis*): return to philosophical thinking.

This final section in essence serves to the whole research as an addition, as it is not a strong related demonstration or conclusion of this research but a wider debate on the role of metaphysics. Indeed, the role or the task of metaphysics has already been presented more or less in this research. In the second chapter where I firstly gave a preparing demonstration on the reason of descriptive metaphysics, I have indicated the basic character of a metaphysical science of history should be descriptive. This principle has been kept thoroughly in the whole research. Moreover, I indeed have claimed that metaphysics investigates the generating process (as one of the four reasons) of the existences of entities as the highest or the most preliminary presupposition of any further investigation. However, that is not to say a metaphysical science of history would investigate the generating process of history. Rather, as this research has showed, metaphysical science of history investigates the generating process of **the thinking of**

⁶³ Bridging the past and the present and the related 'history' respectively, which is not a totally new theme for philosophers of history, has been discussed in the form of differing *res gestae and historia rerum gestarum*, though most of the modern and the contemporary theorists support only the latter rather than a harmonization between them. See Rotenstreich, 1978.

history. What can be termed as ‘teleological’ is not the individual existence of a certain entity but the mutual-related existences of entities, the latter of which involves not only the existences of the entities themselves but also the relevance or the relationship among them which account to our rational deliberations and experiencing, that is, the thinking activity. Therefore, metaphysics, or metaphysical interpretation of history (at least in this research), does not account to any critiques of the so-called speculative or substantial ‘pattern’ or ‘covering-law’ of history especially from the critical theorists in the second wave of epistemological historicization. Similarly – as I have made strong analogue and claimed the relatedness between politics and history – a metaphysical science of *polis* does not pursue any ‘best regime’, even the investigation on the generating of *polis* indeed leads to the investigation on the route towards the *eudaimonia* of *polis*. A metaphysical science of *polis* provides us, or exactly speaking, those who may be the statesmen or stateswomen but who definitely are the citizens, political knowledge (*politikê epistêmê*) in both universal and particular sense, in both theoretical and practical sense. What metaphysics does in these two sciences at best describe the reason and the path that things come into their beings. And this descriptive character of (Aristotelian) metaphysics corresponds to the essence of philosophical thinking as I have argued, which is just in accordance with another conservative and humble but also sublime judgement on the essence of philosophy, that is, “Philosophy is essentially not possession of the truth, but quest for the truth” (Strauss, 1976, p.11).

In continuation on the theme of the analogue between politics and history, metaphysics gives us an opportunity to rethink the relation between politics and history, as the metaphysical science of history has been constructed with considerable homogeneity to the metaphysical science of *polis*. It is also a continual response to the levels of the spirit of historical thinking discussed in the beginning of this research, that is to say, by construing such a structure of a metaphysical science of history, we may make a final conclusion – or initiate new research – on the clarification of the mutual dependence between politics and history. Firstly, in contrast to the opinions of most modern political scientists, for a metaphysical interpretation, history is not merely an empirical resource of political science: the meaning of history is not to provide verifiable legitimacy to the

political existence. Secondly, under a metaphysical examination, history is not merely a mental activity following which the path-dependence of the political concepts can be clarified regarding the uniqueness of modern political identity. Furthermore, as this would be confused with (Aristotelian) metaphysics, history is not merely an idealist projection of the absoluteness by which history and politics are interpreted as sharing the same idealist structure. Indeed, while my arguments in this research do have this tendency to inherit the spirit of *Geisteswissenschaften*, the aim of my scheme is more than this. On earth for me and for the metaphysical science of history itself, this scheme must in the final sense attempt to return and respond to the meaning of philosophy and politics, as the traditional interpretation of the meaning of philosophy and the meaning of politics are combined into one: dealing with the tension between the eternal and the mortal. Politics ultimately aims to philosophical thinking. History also ultimately aims to philosophical thinking. And metaphysics uncovers such quality of aiming. This is the final reason and meaning of metaphysics, or of any metaphysical interpretation.



GLOSSARY

[Complex entity] A complex entity is a special kind of *ousia* (see **[Ousia/entity]**). In general it means the entity that comes not from its own cause but from the combination of different beings; but in this research, the emphasis is more on the logical relevance of self-combination for an entity. That means, rather than the material cause of a single entity that will be eliminated when the entity comes into being, the material cause of a complex entity will still exist even after such a material cause has already generated the formal end cause of the entity, which finally forms the complex entity as a complexity of its material cause AND its formal end cause. In this case, for the generated complex entity, the material cause becomes part of the components of the generated result, and makes the generated result a complex rather than individual entity. In this research of the science of history, historical event as the material cause will not be eliminated even after it has generated the formal end science of history. Historical events will become part of the formal end science of history in the form of conceptualization, which is particularly referred to for the understanding of history.

[Epistêmê] *Epistêmê* is the singular form of *epistêmai* which can be translated as 'knowledge' or 'science' but refers especially to 'theoretical knowledge' or 'theoretical science', like mathematics and metaphysics, both of which deal with unchangeable universals. More importantly, *epistêmê* as a theoretical science is regarded as the counterpart of practical and productive sciences in Aristotelian philosophies. In this research, especially in that the term 'science' adopts such a traditional meaning of *epistêmai*, 'science of history' can be equivalent to 'historical knowledge' or 'philosophy of history', and the latter 'philosophy' corresponds to the modern context of disciplines differentia.

[Eudaimonia] *Eudaimonia* originally means the highest good of a human's practical life. It is the ultimate, the best, and the unconditional end of all practical sciences and human beings. It should be understood in both senses, that is, of a concept regarding the

theoretical universals, and of a concept applied to every particular circumstance to which practical action aims. In this research, the concept of the historical *eudaimonia* is demonstrated. Compared to the normal/ethical *eudaimonia*, the historical *eudaimonia* is not only for the good of historical people or events in the past which no longer exist, but also for the good of the understandings of such history, of the understandings that currently come into being in the present, namely, of the historians and the philosophers of history in the present, and of a broad sense of all the human beings in the present who inherit the self-knowledge of themselves from their historical ancestors, that is, the completeness of self-knowledge in a historical dimension.

[*Geschehenszeit*] This concept is the counterpart of *Ordnungszeit* (see **[*Ordnungszeit*]**). Different from *Ordnungszeit*, the time in which historical events are ordered, *Geschehenszeit* means the time in which history just happened. Also, different from *Ordnungszeit*, which corresponds to the *physis* of history in the secondary instances of the *ousia* of history, *Geschehenszeit* corresponds to the primary instances of the *ousia* of history, and is presented by achieving the historical *eudaimonia*. *Geschehenszeit* can be used as an equivalent to the primary instances of the *ousia* of history, namely, the fundamental Being of history. To understand *Geschehenszeit*, preliminary studies are required to investigate its function, which can be grasped by studying the *physis* of history and *technê/phronēsis* applied to historical knowing, since *ousia* cannot be defined by others, but can only be descriptively indicated.

[Historical deliberation] The concept of historical deliberation is developed from the Aristotelian concept of deliberation. By applying deliberation, people can transform their desire for an end into the practical choice of the way or the method towards achieving the end. But this deliberation is not ultimately about the choice or the way itself, in particular, in an instrumental sense of reason; rather, deliberation is ultimately for the highest good of life, namely, *eudaimonia*. This means that what it deliberates in every particular case is finally for the general sense of the practice of human beings, which calls for the presupposed understanding of theoretical knowledge of *physis*. In this sense, deliberation,

as a concept of practical life, is also presented as a mental deliberating life, which suggests that the concept of deliberation bridges the theoretical and the practical science together and conducts them to the *eudaimonia* of human beings. In this research, this concept is expanded into a historical dimension. Historical deliberation is essentially a mental action of knowing for the end of achieving the historical *eudaimonia*. It bridges the historical actions in past events and knowing action in present historical studies, and naturally presents a self-causing character, as historical *eudaimonia* is the completeness of self-knowledge in the historical dimension.

[Historical event(s)] In this research, historical event is demonstrated as the material cause of the science of history. As an event, it had happened in the past, but as the material cause, it serves the formal end (*telos*) history in the present. Different from the material cause of a single entity, however, historical event will not be eliminated even after it has generated the formal end science of history; rather, it will combine with the science together and generate a complex entity.

[Historical fact(s)] The concept of historical fact is mentioned together with historical event, as both of them provide the logical necessary condition of the formal end science of history. Historical fact, however, cannot be the immediate material cause of the formal end science of history, though it supports historical event as a necessary condition, since historical fact exists only for its own sake particularly. A historical fact could be (and also could not be) conceptually interpreted as a historical event when it is meaningfully understood as the necessary condition of the event.

[Historical thinking] The term historical thinking is widely used in this research in terms of both broad sense and narrow sense. In broad sense, historical thinking denotes to the mental activity, thinking, happening upon the history as a subject matter, no matter whether the history is in universal form or in particular form; it does not denote to the argument that our thinking is constructed or construed historically. In narrow sense, historical thinking is presented as the equivalent of the term historical knowledge or

science of history. It is the developmental end of the process from the historical events in the past to the thinking in the present. Historical thinking, though considering the subject matters in the past, belongs to the present, and highlights the relationship between the past and the present which is denoted by a metaphysical interpretation. Therefore, though this term is also used by Collingwood and others, the meaning (and the presupposition of the meaning) is totally different.

[History] In this research, the concept of history is interpreted or described in two senses. Firstly, history is the ultimate form as the result, namely, the formal end cause, of the development from the historical event in the past to the mental study of history in the present, namely, the science of history or historical thinking or historical knowledge in the present. Secondly, the term 'history' is used as the equivalent of the term 'science of history', since history in the present is a comprehensive conception of a mental action that relates to both the study of the essential conception and characters of history in a general sense, and studies of particular historical subject matters in a different past.

[Ordnungszeit] The concept of *Ordnungszeit* indicates the temporal essential nature of history. *Ordnungszeit* means time in which historical events are ordered and organized by chronological sequence. It is a chronological format according to the *physis* of history, and suggests that a natural development of history is in accordance with a natural sequence of time from the past to the present. See also **[Geschehenszeit]**.

[Ousia/entity] In short, οὐσία means the fundamental Being of a thing, and denotes the reason of the existence of the thing. It is one of the core concepts of Greek philosophy, especially for Aristotle. Its most appropriate English translation may be 'entity' (as 'Beingness' has not been widely accepted), though the term 'entity' has its own philosophical tradition, which somehow slightly distorts the original meaning of οὐσία. Due to this, in this research, the transliteration 'ousia' is also used when necessary. *Ousia/entity* structurally comprises two instances. The first and also the primary (*prōtē*) instances indicates the fundamental Being of a thing, namely, the Beingness or τὸ τί ᾗν

εἶναι that makes a thing essentially be itself (see **[To ti ên einai]**). This sense of *ousia* describes a thing as one of the basic realities in the world, and suggests that it becomes what it is due to its form rather than its matter. The secondary instances of *ousia* is used in a wider range to suggest a thing that comes from its material cause, that forms an individual of itself, that performs its formal end cause (*telos*), and that contains its own *physis* and the reason of applying (or not) *technê/phronēsis*.

[Physis/Phusis] This is the Latin **transliteration** of φυσίς, which originally means ‘growing for its own cause and from its own reason’. This concept is often used as a counterpart to *nomos*, which means artificial law and customs rather than the rules without human beings’ interference. The Latin **translation** of φυσίς is *natura*; however, *natura* (and English ‘nature’) is endowed with additional meanings like ‘essence’, which cannot be found in the original *physis*. In metaphysics, *physis* refers to the secondary instances of *ousia* (see **[ousia/entity]**) and corresponds to the unchangeable side of the knowledge. By investigating ‘growing’, *physis* is not only a stable concept presenting the state of an entity that comes into being by itself and for itself, but also a dynamic progress indicating the generating development of the entity from the material cause to the formal end cause (*telos*).

[Poiesis/praxis and technê/phronēsis] This pair of concepts also refers to the secondary instances of *ousia*, but corresponds to the changeable side of the knowledge. In short, *poiesis* (‘produce’) means the activity the result of which is outside of the originator, whereas *praxis* (‘practice’/‘action’) means the activity the result of which is the originator (namely, the practiser) him or herself. *Technê* and *phronēsis* are the two virtues applied to these two kinds of activity respectively. In this research, I further argue that these two kinds of activity and their virtues are not totally excluded from each other, but support each other and as a whole, generate the knowledge of an architectonic practical science like the science of *polis* or the science of history.

[To ti ên einai] *To ti ên einai* is the transliteration of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, which means ‘the

what-it-was-being'. It is the acting phrase of the peculiarly εἶναι (to be) (which makes 'what-it-was-being' often change to 'what-it-is-being'). This concept often refers to the stationary noun *ousia* (see [**ousia/entity**]), both of which may refer to the same thing in terms of the primary (*prōtē*) instances of *ousia* indicating the pure unchangeable Beingness that makes an entity come into its being. However, they are totally different in terms of the secondary instances: *ousia* can also indicate the form of a thing by which the thing gets actualized in such a formal end cause, whereas *to ti ên einai* can never do so.

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