The Philosophy of J. L. AustinMartin Gustafsson, Richard Sørli These new essays on J. L. Austin's philosophy constitute the first major study of his thought in decades. Eight leading philosophers join together to present a fresh evaluation of his distinctive work, showing how it can be brought to bear on issues at the top of today's philosophical agenda, such as scepticism and contextualism, the epistemology of testimony, the generality of the conceptual, and the viability of the semantics/pragmatics distinction. The contributors offer in-depthinterpretations of Austin's views and demonstrate why his work deserves a more central place in mainstream philosophical discussion than it currently has. The volume also contains a substantial introduction that situates Austin's thought in its original intellectual milieu and provides an overviewof the many different ways in which his ideas have influenced later developments, in philosophy and elsewhere. |
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analytic philosophy answer arguing argument from ignorance assertion audience Austin thinks Austin’s view Austinian believe Bennett’s Cambridge Cavell circumstances claim to know cognitive relation concept context contextualist criticism dichotomy dimension of assessment dimension-word discussion distinction doesn’t dream argument dreaming entitled to act epistemic epistemology example expressions fact falsity Frege illocutionary act infelicities J. L. Austin knowledge logical mean meat minds occasion one’s ordinary language ordinary language philosophy ordinary practice Oxford University Press painted mule particular performative performative utterances person phenomenologically philosopher’s philosophical possibility priority requirement proposition psychological question of truth reading reason in favour recognize relevant response saying I know saying I promise semantic Sense and Sensibilia sentential negation simply someone sort speak speaker speech act standard waking experience stuffed goldfinch suggested sun has set suppose tell Things with Words thought traditional Travis true or false true to say utterance Warnock Wittgenstein worries wrong