Abstract
Swinburne relies on principle P in The Existence of God to argue that God is simple and thus likely to exist. In this paper, I argue that Swinburne does not support P. In particular, his arguments from mathematical simplicity and scientists’ preferences both fail. Given the central role P plays in Swinburne’s overall argument in The Existence of God, I conclude that Swinburne should further support P if his argument that God likely exists is to be persuasive.
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Notes
Swinburne (2004).
Ibid., 17 and 67.
Ibid., 17.
Ibid., 93.
Ibid., 55. Note that Swinburne is using ‘infinite’ in a specific, and nonstandard, sense. He is using it to mean the maximum degree of a property. Quentin Smith (1998) makes this point. Thus Swinburne is not discussing infinite numbers (whether ordinal, cardinal, hyperreal, surreal, etc.) in this context. Swinburne does discuss infinite numbers elsewhere, e.g., he writes, ‘Consider an artist who can create as many paintings as he chooses…. Even if he creates an infinite number, he could still create more.’ Swinburne (2004), 102.
Consider Philo in Part 5 of the Dialogues: ‘Now, Cleanthes, said Philo, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the consequences. First, by this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the deity. For as cause ought only to be proportioned to effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite; what pretentions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the divine being?’
Swinburne (2004), 54-55.
Ibid., 97.
Swinburne may not intend his discussion of scientific practice to be an argument to the conclusion that the infinite is simple, but rather more of an illustration that the infinite is simple. Insofar as his discussion of scientific practice is meant to support P, I suggest that such discussion does not succeed.
Swinburne (1997), 28.
Swinburne (1990), 192.
Swinburne (1993), 90.
Swinburne (2004), 97.
Ibid., 139.
Swinburne (2001), 90. Note that historically people have understood 1 without understanding 0, which raises doubts regarding Swinburne’s, ‘You would not know what it is for something to be an A in the room unless you knew what it was for these to be 0 As in the room.’
At least in the context we are discussing, namely the context of hypotheses attributing values of properties to objects.
Swinburne (2004), 97.
Whatever that amounts to, there is a choice to be made concerning exactly what 1 unit of freedom is.
References
Smith, Q. (1998). Review article: Swinburne’s explanation of the universe. Religious Studies, 34, 91–102. doi:10.1017/S0034412597004228.
Swinburne, R. (1990). The limits of explanation. In D. Knowles (Ed.), Explanation and its limits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Swinburne, R. (1993). The coherence of theism, revised edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Swinburne, R. (1997). Simplicity as evidence of truth. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
Swinburne, R. (2001). Epistemic justification. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Swinburne, R. (2004). The existence of god, second edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Acknowledgment
I thank two anonymous referees for comments that benefited the paper.
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Gwiazda, J. Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, and Principle P. SOPHIA 48, 393–398 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-009-0111-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-009-0111-x