Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Ethical Naturalism and the Constitution of Agency

  • Published:
The Journal of Value Inquiry Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. See Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 185.

  2. Hursthouse, op. cit., p. 170.

  3. Julia Annas, “Virtue Ethics: What Kind of Naturalism?” in Stephen Gardiner, ed. Virtue Ethics Old and New (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 20; see also David Copp and David Sobel, “Morality and Virtue,” Ethics, vol. 114, 2004.

  4. Bernard Williams, “Replies,” in World, Mind, and Ethics, J. E. J. Altham and R. Harrison eds. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 199.

  5. See Chrisoula Andreou, “Getting On in a Varied World,” Social Theory and Practice, vol. 32, 2006; see also Louise M. Antony, “Natures and Norms,” Ethics, vol. 111, 2000; see also David Copp and David Sobel, “Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Recent Work in Virtue Ethics,” Ethics, vol. 114, 2004; William FitzPatrick, Teleology and the Norms of Nature (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000); Joseph Millum, “Natural Goodness and Natural Evil,” Ratio, vol. 19, 2006; and Scott Woodcock, “Philippa Foot's Virtue Ethics Has an Achilles’ Heel,” Dialogue, vol. 45, 2006.

  6. See Philippa Foot, “Morality and Art,” in Moral Dilemmas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

  7. See Christine Korsgaard, Self-Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); see also Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

  8. See David Enoch, “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What is Constitutive of Action,” Philosophical Review, vol. 115, 2006.

  9. Copp and Sobel, op. cit., p. 536.

  10. John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 170.

  11. Ibid., p. 179.

  12. Ibid., p. 189.

  13. G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 49.

  14. Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 11.

  15. Ibid., p. 63.

  16. Ibid., p. 114.

  17. Michael Thompson, Life and Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 40.

  18. See Paul Benson, “Free Agency and Self Worth,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 91, 1994.

  19. Foot, op. cit., p. 30.

  20. Enoch, op. cit., p. 189.

  21. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, op. cit., p. 1.

  22. I would like to thank Erin Flynn, four anonymous referees,Thomas Magnell, Editor-in-Chief of the Journal for Value Inquiry, and Debra Lawson for their very helpful comments and assistance.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, N1G 2W1, Canada

    John Hacker-Wright

Authors
  1. John Hacker-Wright
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John Hacker-Wright.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Hacker-Wright, J. Ethical Naturalism and the Constitution of Agency. J Value Inquiry 46, 13–23 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9321-5

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-012-9321-5

Keywords

Search

Navigation