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Confining ‘Disenhanced’ Animals

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Abstract

Drawing upon evolutionary theory and the work of Daniel Dennett and Nicholas Agar, I offer an argument for broadening discussion of the ethics of disenhancement beyond animal welfare concerns to a consideration of animal “biopreferences”. Short of rendering animals completely unconscious or decerebrate, it is reasonable to suggest that disenhanced animals will continue to have some preferences. To the extent that these preferences can be understood as what Agar refers to as “plausible naturalizations” for familiar moral concepts like beliefs and desires, then they can make moral claims on us and provide support for intuitive opposition to disenhancement.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Humanities and Communication Arts, University of Western Sydney, 7.G.10b, Bankstown Campus, Locked Bag 1797, Penrith, NSW, 2751, Australia

    John Hadley

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  1. John Hadley
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Correspondence to John Hadley.

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Hadley, J. Confining ‘Disenhanced’ Animals. Nanoethics 6, 41–46 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-012-0142-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-012-0142-6

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