A Normative Theory of Argument Strength

Authors

  • Ulrike Hahn Cardiff University
  • Mike Oaksford Birkbeck College London

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v26i1.428

Keywords:

Argumentation, fallacies, Bayesian probability, argument from ignorance, slippery slope arguments, circular arguments, Theophrastus rule

Abstract

In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We also provide some evidence based on our recent work on the fallacies as to why Bayesian probability might, in fact, be able to supply such an account. In the remainder of the article we discuss the general characteristics that make a specifically Bayesian approach desirable, and critically evaluate putative flaws of Bayesian probability that have been raised in the argumentation literature.

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Published

2008-02-10

Issue

Vol. 26 No. 1 (2006)

Section

Articles

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