Abstract
In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical reasons to create the actual world.
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Notes
See, for e.g., (Leibniz 1975).
I (like many others) take the Leibnizian argument seriously. To analyze it, one need not, for instance, work with something like a “maximally complete concepts” analysis of possible worlds that a Leibnizian may favor. My approach, then, is not strictly historical. I might depart, at various junctures, from what we find in the Leibnizian texts about the Creation Argument. Still, a theorist who thinks this intriguing argument has merit may want to know how strong the argument is independently of what Leibniz had to say about it.
See, for e.g., Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2002).
For further restrictions on what an omnipotent being can do, see Rosenkrantz and Hoffman (1980).
See Feldman (1986). Suppose that for every world accessible to A at t, there is a better one then accessible to A as well. To handle this possibility, Feldman advances the following as the official version of world utilitarianism: as of t, A ought to see to the occurrence of p if and only if p occurs in some world accessible to A at t, and it is not the case that not-p occurs in any accessible world as good as or better than that one (1986, p. 38.)
In a different (forthcoming) work, I argue that an omniscient being cannot have knowledge of propositions that predict the occurrence of undetermined future contingent events. If this is so, I argue, further, that God cannot know the value of certain “free worlds,” worlds that contain some such undetermined events. This spells trouble for the creation argument assuming that there are “free worlds.”
See, for example, Wierenga’s discussion in The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes, p. 203.
Leibniz seems to have believed that the criterion of goodness for possible worlds validates the ontological claim that there is a best. The best possible world, Leibniz says, is one that exhibits the greatest variety of phenomena compatible with the greatest simplicity of its laws. See Theodicy, sec. 208; and (Leibniz 1902).
On Frankfurt-type examples, see Frankfurt (1969).
Further defense of the view that there is a requirement of alternative possibilities for the truth of judgments of moral obligation can be found in Haji 2002.
A number of theorists accept the moral “ought” implies “can” principle; other theorists reject it. As I have argued, this principle, in conjunction with certain others, entails that “ought” implies “can refrain” as well. Conceding that some do not accept these principles but acknowledging that others do, it would still be useful to inquire about, for instance, whether we can have moral obligations in a world in which, perhaps because deterministic, we cannot do otherwise. Both parties would learn something from this exercise.
In section 5 below, I argue that scenarios in which God selects among optimals is not cost-free.
See, for e.g., Zimmerman’s The Concept of Moral Obligation, Chap. 2.
See, for instance, Hoffman and Rozenkrantz, The Divine Attributes, pp. 147–152; and Haji 1994.
Theodicy, Part 1, sec. 8.
In “Must God Create The Best?,” Adams argues that assuming some non-consequentialist principle of morality is true, God could create a non-best without wronging any of His creatures or failing in kindness to any of them.
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Haji, I. A Conundrum Concerning Creation. SOPHIA 48, 1–14 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-008-0062-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-008-0062-7