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Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation

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Abstract

What is the connection between action that is caused by inauthentic antecedent springs of action, such as surreptitiously engineered-in desires and beliefs, and moral obligation? If, for example, an agent performs an action that derives from such antecedent springs can it be that the agent is not obligated to perform this action owing to the inauthenticity of its causal antecedents? I defend an affirmative response, assuming that we morally ought to bring about the states of affairs that occur in the intrinsically best worlds accessible to us and that a version of attitudinal hedonism is the axiology for ranking worlds.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, Feldman (1986), Moore (1903/1962), and Zimmerman (1996).

  2. Feldman (1986, pp. 37, 43).

  3. Mele (1995, p. 172). On global manipulation, see, for instance, Fischer and Ravizza (1998, Chaps. 7–8), Haji (1996, pp. 703–720), Kane (1996), Locke (1975, pp. 95–112), and Pereboom (2001).

  4. Mele (1995, p. 145).

  5. Glannon (1998, pp. 231–249, Sect. IV) has argued that our practices of holding people morally and criminally responsible require only a low threshold of psychological connectedness and bodily continuity. In Mele (1995, p. 175), Mele suggests that in such transformation cases, the pre- and post-surgery agents may be strongly psychologically connected, in Parfit’s sense (Parfit 1984, p. 206). They may be such that the number of direct psychological connections between them “is at least half the number that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person.” In addition, Mele argues that the pre-surgery agent (t-Beth) just before her transformation is much more similar, on the whole, to the post-surgery agent (t*-Beth) than she is to neonate Beth or toddler Beth. Still, t-Beth is the same person as the neonate and toddler Beths, in a familiar “personal identity” sense of “same person.” So what is to prevent her from being the same person, in the same sense, as t*-Beth? On the supposition of personal identity, see also, Haji (2000, pp. 135–150).

  6. See, for example, Locke (1975); Mele (1995, pp. 159, 164); Mele (2006, pp. 164–184); Fischer and Ravizza (1994, pp. 430–451), Fischer and Ravizza (1998, Chaps. 7–8). Michael McKenna (2004) argues that manipulated Beth may well be responsible. Frankfurt (2002, esp. pp. 27–28), also believes that an agent such as victimized Beth may be responsible. For a reply to McKenna, see Haji (forthcoming), and Haji and Cuypers (forthcoming).

  7. Haji (1998), Haji and Cuypers (2004), and Haji and Cuypers (forthcomming).

  8. See, for example, Mele (1995, Chap. 10), and Fischer and Ravizza (1998, Chaps. 7–8).

  9. Haji (2002), and Zimmerman (1996).

  10. Feldman (2004, p. 56). Corresponding things are true about displeasures. Zimmerman (2001, pp. 195–198) proposes that attitudinal pleasures and displeasures do have an affective aspect, so an adequate account of the nature of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure must make reference to their affective aspect; and that an adequate account of the value of these attitudes must also make reference to this aspect.

  11. See Feldman (2004, p. 173); Harman (1967); and Zimmerman (2001, Chap. 3).

  12. Feldman (2004, p. 173). Not everyone agrees that states of affairs are bearers of intrinsic value. For example, Lemos (1994) describes what he takes to be the bearers of intrinsic value as abstract but he does not think that these abstract objects are abstract entities. Zimmerman (2001, pp. 50–52) proposes that concrete events are the bearers of intrinsic value.

  13. Feldman (2004, p. 176). See, also, Feldman (2000).

  14. Feldman (2004, p. 66).

  15. I assume that the number of basic intrinsic value states true at a world is finite. If it were infinite, clause (iii)’s summative principle would need recourse to a more complicated mathematics. The simple theory is compatible with its being the case that the atoms of value that contribute to the intrinsic value of a world (“world atoms”) may differ, in significant respects, from the atoms that contribute to the intrinsic value of a person’s life (“life atoms”). I work with a theory which stipulates that world atoms are no different than life atoms.

  16. Ross (1930, p. 138).

  17. Feldman (2004, pp. 192–197).

  18. Feldman (1997, p. 163).

  19. See Feldman (1997, p. 204). AXP1 is relevantly analogous to the widely accepted principle that pleasure in the good is intrinsically good. If someone takes pleasure in the good, and this person deserves, because of past good deeds, this pleasure, then the intrinsic goodness of such an episode seems to be enhanced (the pleasure is made better) by virtue of his getting what he deserves. See, for example, Chisholm (1986, p. 63); Lemos (1994, p. 74); Moore (1903/1962, p. 224); Smart (1973, p. 24), and Zimmerman (2001, p. 220).

  20. Feldman (1997, pp. 164–165).

  21. Feldman (1997, pp. 166, 168–169).

  22. Feldman (1997, pp. 164–165).

  23. Feldman (1997, pp. 166–167).

  24. On this theory when we say that a pleasure is made better if (for instance) the person who receives it deserves to receive it, we are speaking somewhat loosely. We should not be taken to be claiming that pleasures have variable intrinsic values—values that can be increased or decreased depending upon whether subjects who receive them deserve or do not deserve to receive them. Rather, when we say things of this sort, we are strictly expressing some fact about the basics on the desert-adjusted theory. A basic intrinsic value state on this axiology would be a state of affairs of this form: S takes intrinsic attitudinal pleasure (displeasure) of intensity n and duration m at time t when S deserves to degree r to be taking that pleasure (or displeasure).

  25. Feldman (2004, p. 195). More fully, the theory runs as follows: (i) Every episode of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure is intrinsically good; every episode of intrinsic displeasure is intrinsically bad. (ii) The subject’s desert-adjusted intrinsic value of an episode of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure is equal to (the amount of pleasure contained in that episode adjusted for subject’s desert); the subject’s desert-adjusted intrinsic value of an episode of intrinsic displeasure is equal to − (the amount of displeasure contained in that episode adjusted for the subject’s desert). (iii) The intrinsic value of a world is entirely determined by the subject’s desert-adjusted intrinsic values of the episodes of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure contained in that world, in such a way that one world is intrinsically better than another if and only if the net amount of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure adjusted for subject’s desert in the one is greater than the net amount of that sort of pleasure in the other. See Section 6 below for a complication.

  26. Nozick (1974, pp. 42–45).

  27. For discussion on the connection between desert and responsibility, see, for example, Cupit (1996), Feldman (1995, 1996), McLeod (2003), Rachels (1978), and Sadurski (1985).

  28. See, for example, McLeod (2003) and Miller (1976).

  29. See, for instance, Fischer and Ravizza (1998) and Strawson (1962).

  30. Some pluralists may propose that (un)freedom and (dis)pleasure are independent sources of intrinsic value. The interest here, though, is with monistic hedonism.

  31. The other two clauses of the theory are these: (i) Every free episode of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure is intrinsically good; every free episode of intrinsic displeasure is intrinsically bad. (ii.) The intrinsic value of a free episode of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure is equal to the amount of pleasure contained in that episode; the intrinsic value of a free episode of intrinsic displeasure is equal to − (the amount of displeasure contained in that episode).

  32. An even more complicated axiology would take into account, in addition to the influence of freedom and desert, the influence of, for instance, truth on the value of basics.

  33. See, for example, Ginet (1996), and van Inwagen (1983).

  34. See, for instance, Fischer and Ravizza (1998) and Haji (1998).

  35. See Frankfurt (1971).

  36. See Mele (1995).

  37. See the references in footmote 6, as well as Mele (1995), and Fischer and Ravizza (1998).

  38. This list is, of course, not meant to be exhaustive and some may take issue with whether some of the items on this list should be on the list.

  39. A generalized version of this principle says: If an agent deserves a primary intrinsic good (or evil) on the basis of an action-implicating desert base, then that good (or evil) causally arises—“it has its basis”—in springs of action that are authentic.

  40. I assume that there is such a world.

  41. See Pereboom (1995, 2002).

  42. For a view similar to the view that some important “life-hopes” must be abandoned if determinism is true but that other life-hopes that matter to us can be retained, see Honderich (1988, 1993, 2002).

  43. Pereboom (2001, pp. 4, 43).

  44. Pereboom (2001, pp. 89–126); and (2002, p. 478).

  45. Pereboom (2002, p. 478).

  46. Pereboom (2001, pp. 69–88).

  47. Again, assume that there is such a world.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Randy Clarke, Stefaan Cuypers, Fred Feldman, Michael McKenna, Al Mele, and Michael Zimmerman for discussion on various issues that I take up in this paper.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada, T2N 1N4

    Ishtiyaque Haji

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Haji, I. Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation. J Ethics 12, 239–261 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-008-9034-y

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