The Obligation DilemmaCan you be morally obligated to do something? To renowned philosopher Ishtiyaque Haji, the answer is guardedly no. Regardless of whether determinism is true, he argues, there is a prima facie plausibility that there are no moral obligations. Powerfully and efficiently, Haji develops a conclusion that has major implications for how we conceive issues in moral responsibility and free will. The book develops the obligation dilemma as clearly as possible. The next step will be for further sustained philosophical work to solve it, assuming it can be resolved, inspired by Haji. In many respects, the obligation dilemma mirrors the well-known responsibility dilemma, where no one is morally responsible for anything. When suitably amended, the strongest recommendations in favor of, or in response to, the responsibility dilemma neither fully support nor undermine the obligation dilemma. Exposing the obligation dilemma's implications for responsibility, and its ramifications for forgiveness (something central to interpersonal relationships), underscores its urgency. |
Contents
2 Determinism and Obligation | 34 |
3 Indeterminism and Obligation | 73 |
4 The Extended Luck Problem | 119 |
5 Obligation and Responsibility | 140 |
6 Does Obligation Require Weak or Strong Alternatives? | 166 |
7 Obligation and Forgiveness | 220 |
8 Options and Challenges | 245 |
Appendices | 259 |
A The Actual Sequence Proposal | 261 |
B Some Other Responses to the OLuck Problem | 271 |
Notes | 279 |
References | 287 |
Index | 297 |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
actual sequence actual world agent agent-causal akratic alternative possibilities assume Augustine behavior believe best judgment Beth blameworthy causal claim coin flip compatibilism compatibilist contrast world cross-world DBWC-Refined decision deontic deserve desire determinism is true deterministic horn distally avoidable acts entails erwise explanation facie obligation false favor forgiveness Frankfurt examples Franklin Ginet Haji Hence impermissible implies indeterministically caused intrinsic Kane Kant's Law/Obligation luck problem matter of luck Mele modest libertarians moral obligation morally responsible motivational narrow ability Norm obligation dilemma obligation libertarianism obligation requires obligatory option otherwise past and laws perform permissible pertinent possible world pre-t past precludes presupposes prima facie duty principle proposal R-luck rationalizable reasons to decide refrain from stealing relevant responsibility requires Sartorio scenario Sehon set of reasons sible sort stealing the pears strong alternatives Suppose Ted decides Ted's teleological thesis thing tion ultimate origination unalterable undermine Vihvelin weak alternatives worlds accessible zygote