

Editorial preface

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Published online: 2 November 2016
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The articles in this issue have a decisive continental flavor. The essays begin with a discussion of Augustine, continue with a phenomenological response to scientism, and proceed to discussions of Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, Hegel, Dostoevsky, Marion, and Nancy.

In the first article, John Zeis proposes an updated version of the old controversy regarding the roles of faith and reason in religious belief. On his view, it is possible to reconcile evidentialism in religious epistemology with an idea derived from Augustinian according to which faith is prior to, and essentially independent of, rational justification. In making this case, he proposes a position that is a modification of Susan Haack's notion of "foundherentism," which holds that there is no clear distinction between foundational justification and justification via coherence. On this proposal, the complex truth connection that rational justification requires for establishing knowledge is something that faith requires as well. Accordingly for Zeis, while faith alone and reason alone are insufficient for knowledge, their complementary roles are necessary in producing it.

Matthew Burch investigates parallels between religion and scientism in the face of the obvious clash between them. Burch is careful to say that the parallel he wants to draw is not between science and religion, but between scientism and religion. As he puts the matter, "science doesn't require anything akin to faith; scientism does." As Burch rightly points out, the claim of scientism is that religious discourse is bankrupt because it is committed to the reality of things that transcend the purely natural world of cause and effect mechanisms. Burch does not deny that this commitment to non-natural reality is intrinsic to religion, but argues that in this respect scientism is no better off, indeed perhaps worse off. Here Burch is elaborating on the insights of phenomenology. He points out, for example, that

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Heidegger thinks that scientism is guilty of failing to see that it cannot account for its own preconditions. Or as we might say, scientism cannot account for consciousness in purely naturalistic terms, and yet presupposes consciousness as the condition for the intelligibility of the natural world itself. If there is any difference here, it is that religion is more aware of the preconditions of its project than scientism. As such, the religious believer readily acknowledges his or her reliance on faith and hope. Scientism seems oblivious to its own similar reliance.

The Continental perspective is deeply influenced by Hegel. As Merleau-Ponty once said, phenomenology had its beginning in Hegel. Hegel's influence also extends to the central ideas of process philosophy, including its idea of God. This is why I include this next essay on Hegel's pantheism in this group. In this article, Russell W. Dumke argues that William Lang Craig's claim that Christian theologians should not appeal to Hegel because his position leads to pantheism and this position is monistic and hence is antithetical to Christian theology. In his analysis, Dumke claims that Craig's attempt to refute Hegel's pantheism not only fails but seems to endorse the very pantheism it seeks to defeat.

Like Craig, Kierkegaard blames Hegel for misconceiving religious faith, and in particular, for conflating faith with the certainty of first immediacy. Chandler D. Rogers expands Kierkegaard's complaint about this conflation to cover the anti-idealist Schleiermacher. Rogers calls on an array of Kierkegaardian characters to argue that religious faith requires a movement to a higher (second) immediacy. In this higher immediacy, certainty gives way to uncertainty and hence to risk and invites the would-be person of faith to summon the courage that is necessary to make decisions in the face of uncertainty—that is, the courage to take the leap of faith.

It has seemed to me that one major difference between analytic and continental philosophy of religion has been the openness of the later to the philosophical import of literature. As Dennis Vanden Auweele demonstrates, much can be learned from Dostoevsky's *Brothers Karamazov* regarding the nature of human salvation. Given that the path to redemption entails existential struggles, it is perhaps a more profound way into these struggles if we recount these experiences in narrative as opposed to discursive form. Indeed, tracing the dialectical development of Dostoevsky's characters is testimony to the philosophical import of literature for the philosophy of religion.

"The death of God" can mean many different things. Indeed, as Richard Kearney might say, the death of one God (or perhaps the death of one conception of god) may usher in another (hopefully more profound) conception of faith. Ashok Collins seems to have something like this in mind in our last article. As Collins reads Jean-Luc Marion, it is the death of God in a metaphysical sense of divinity that opens to what might be called the divinity of love. Collins argues that in working out the death of a metaphysical divinity, Marion insists on a separation of love from being. In contrast Jean-Luc Nancy is more sanguine with love's connection to being. Indeed, he thinks love is the heart of being. Collins, however, argues that the two are more closely aligned than this would seem to suggest, since it is plausible to think that for both love (here and now) serves as an ontological limit-point for thought.