Abstract
G.E. Moore’s principle of organic unity holds that the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. Moore combined this principle with invariabilism about intrinsic value: An item’s intrinsic value depends solely on its bearer’s intrinsic properties, not on which wholes it has membership of. It is often said that invariabilism ought to be rejected in favour of what might be called ‘conditionalism’ about intrinsic value. This paper is an attempt to show how invariabilism might be filled out in ways that allow its proponents to answer their conditionalist opponents. The main point consists in identifying how some amount of extrinsic part-value may contribute to whole-value that is nevertheless intrinsic. This enables an invariabilist to explain how the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of its intrinsic part-values, without abandoning the Moorean doctrine that intrinsic value supervenes on intrinsic properties (the proposal is nevertheless consistent with the view that invariabilist and conditionalist accounts might exist side by side). I finish with a brief explanation of how the main proposal could help construct invariabilist accounts of particular organic unities, looking beyond the more general argument they have with conditionalists.
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Notes
Moore (1903, p. 28).
Moore’s principle is not accepted by everyone. Zimmerman (1999, 2001) has argued that that the bearers of intrinsic value are states of objects, rather than objects themselves (or facts, or states of affairs). Very roughly, Zimmerman’s view implies that items do not bear intrinsic value in isolation from complicated states in which they are found (rendering empty any principle about summing such values). A proper engagement with Zimmerman’s views would require an extended discussion of what the bearers of intrinsic value might be, for which there is insufficient space (although see note 27, below). In any case, this problem lies outside my focus on overcoming objections made by conditionalist opponents of invariabilism.
Strictly speaking, value holism actually rules out more than just ideas about summing the values of parts. Moore’s writings fail to make this obvious. Really, holism contrasts with value atomism. Denying atomism is actually to make a stronger claim than denying any principle about summing. The contrast between atomism and holism is highlighted by Brown (2007, pp. 457–459) and Dancy (2004, pp. 94–95). A good background discussion of atomism can be found in Broome (1991, Chap. 4).
See Noah Lemos’s presentation of what he calls the “Principle of Universality” (1994, p. 11). Dancy refers to the same view as the “local doctrine of supervenience for intrinsic value” (2003, p. 631). (Membership of a whole might be an intrinsic property when an item is a member of itself, but such cases may be set aside.)
Moore (1903, p. 30).
I should say that I am forced to be selective in using these labels, since there is not perfect consistency across the literature. Dancy sometimes uses “variabilism” to refer to what I’m calling ‘conditionalism’. Hurka (1998) uses “holism” to label what I have called ‘invariabilism’, although I, like others, prefer to think of both views as alternative conceptions of holism.
Insofar as this paper is an attempt to improve invariabilism, it is permissible to assume that it’s worth retaining the view that intrinsic value does supervene upon intrinsic properties. I should note, though, that it finds opposition in Dancy (2003, pp. 632–633; 2004, pp. 38–41), Dorsey (2012), and Kagan (1998). Bradley (2002) defends Moorean supervenience against some of these authors’ objections.
I should say that the question of whether to adopt invariabilism or conditionalism needn’t turn entirely on which view give the best account of organic unities. Conditionalists may also draw support from certain claims about the nature of intrinsic value, which contrast with some claims made by Moore. For more on Moorean vs. Kantian conceptions of intrinsic value, see Bradley (2006).
These remarks allow that a relation between parts of a whole is itself a part of that whole. But it is not the sort of part that can be isolated for the purposes of summing the intrinsic values that parts hold in isolation.
I should add that the relations principle and the non-dispersion principle are not exhaustive of invariabilist logical space, at least if the Moorean supervenience claim is regarded as the essential component of invariabilism. It is possible that the intrinsic value of a whole could supervene on its intrinsic properties, even if the parts of that whole (and the relations between them) were wholly valueless. Any way of accounting for such an organic unity could not draw on the relations principle or the non-dispersion principle. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
Thomas Hurka describes invariabilism like this: “The intrinsic value in a whole composed of two or more parts standing in certain relations need not equal the sum of the intrinsic values those parts would have if they existed alone, or apart from those relations” (1998, p. 300). Hurka goes on to say that invariabilists “value relations” (p. 307) and that these may be causal relations between the various parts of a whole (p. 302).
Ben Bradley suggests that an item can have value “in virtue of being a part of a valuable whole” (1998, p. 110). Bradley identifies this sort of value as non-instrumental extrinsic value, which makes his view close to an affirmation of the non-dispersion principle. See also the remarks from Chisholm, below.
This is not strictly true: As a referee has pointed out, the statue may have (say) carbon atoms among its parts, and these aren’t made of Georgia Marble. I suspect that it is possible to overcome this complication like this: Some properties disperse insofar as they are held by all of an object’s parts that are above some threshold separating (stipulated) macro- and micro-levels, and held by no parts identified as falling below this threshold. We may still contrast this with other properties fail to disperse insofar as they are held by some but not all parts at a given level. This modification allows us to distinguish the statue’s property of being made of Georgia Marble (which is held by all of its parts down to, we might say, its constituent calcium carbonate molecules) and the property of having ears, which is held by some parts at the macro-level, but not other parts at that level (see following footnote).
It is perhaps held by some proper parts, such as the statue minus its head. Of course, some intrinsic properties don’t disperse: Lincoln’s statue has ears, but his left foot doesn’t have ears.
Lewis (1983, pp. 111–112, italics added).
Langton (2007). Langton’s discussion builds on (and somewhat revises) the well-known taxonomy in Korsgaard (1983). There are further concepts relevant to Langton’s taxonomy, such as ‘final’ value, which I lack the space to discuss. Bradley (1998) identifies some additional categories as well. My use of categories such as ‘intrinsic’, ‘extrinsic’, and so on is guided by principally by Langton’s discussion, rather than by any competing views in the literature. This is not to say that Langton would be committed to my own conclusions.
Langton suggests the case of a wedding ring as an example of an item that could play this role.
This is roughly what Bradley refers to as a whole’s “basic intrinsic value”. This he describes as “value not derived from…parts, but instead…from the way the parts are put together” (2002, p. 34). Bradley attributes this view to Moore as well. It sounds to me like a denial of the view that parts have evaluative priority over a whole they’re in.
Dancy (2003, pp. 633–634).
This suggestion, and the example of the Mona Lisa, are inspired by the comments of an anonymous reviewer (I should note that I have somewhat adapted the reviewer’s suggested use of the example).
Hurka (1998, p. 304).
Korsgaard (1983, p. 271, italics original). When speaking of the “intuitionistic method of isolation”, Korsgaard has in mind the familiar Moorean idea that intrinsic value supervenes on its bearer’s intrinsic properties.
Korsgaard (1983, p. 271).
After drawing the distinction between invariabilism and conditionalism, Thomas Hurka suggests that “sometimes one and sometimes the other [might be] more appropriate for expressing a given evaluative view”, and that it might be wrong-headed to suppose that there must be any “general superiority of [invariabilist] holism over conditionality” (1998, pp. 300, 320). My points here are in the same spirit as Hurka’s.
See for example Hurka (1998, p. 312). Hurka does regard undeserved pain as an organic unity. It is likely that my account would also explain this case better than an invariabilist view that used the relations principle. Zimmerman suggests that the lesson of malicious pleasures is that we cannot sensibly ask whether a pleasure is good until we know whether it is held maliciously (2001, p. 145). Compare Lemos (2006, pp. 78–79). It is also worth remembering that intuitions about examples of malicious pleasure may be distorted by certain assumptions we make when confronting particular cases (Fletcher 2008). My point here doesn’t rely on inferences drawn from any specific examples.
Roderick Chisholm, for example, suggests that: “We may say…that one pleasure is better than another pleasure if the intentional object of the one is better than the intentional object of the other; and that one displeasure is worse than another displeasure if the intentional object of the one is better than the intentional object of the other” (1986, p. 63). These remarks don’t obviously select between conditionalism about value and the sort of invariabilism that might rely on ideas about non-dispersion of intrinsic value. But Chisholm’s picture does, I think, count against relying on the relations principle.
For more on this point, see Fletcher (2010, p. 166).
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Acknowledgments
Earlier versions of this paper were presented to audiences at Stanford University and the 11th conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, held at the University of Pisa. I’d like to thank those who attended for their helpful feedback. For valuable conversations and/or comments on earlier drafts, I’d also like to thank: Ralf Bader, William Beals, John Broome, Joshua Cohen, Thomas Dougherty, Guy Fletcher, Nadeem Hussain, Krista Lawlor, Gerard Vong, and Anna Wilkinson. The paper was also helped by the comments of an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies.
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Halliday, D. Holism about value: some help for invariabilists. Philos Stud 165, 1033–1046 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0007-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0007-4