

*Santayana's
Anticipations
of Deleuze:
Total Natural
Events and
Quasi-
Pragmatism*

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Abstract

In a monograph published last year, literary theorist Mark Noble notes that, in the way Deleuze understands the relationship between materialism and subjectivity, Deleuze “also sounds curiously like Santayana.” For example, the work of both philosophers “locates human value in a source at once immanent and alien.” Noble also wonders “whether the lesson of Santayana’s own negotiation with his tendency to humanize the non-human ground of experience also anticipates the thrill Deleuze chases when positing the univocity of being.” In the present article, I will attempt to elaborate on this “anticipation,” the implications of which include a greater appreciation of Santayana on the part of Deleuze enthusiasts, an understanding of both philosophers as U.S.-influenced, European quasi-pragmatists, and a decision in favor of Michael Brodrick’s recent interpretation of Santayana as a “total natural event” philosopher of mind.

Keywords: George Santayana, Gilles Deleuze, Essence, Event, Phantasm, Ghost, Epiphenomenalism, Philosophy of Mind, Pragmatism

In the present article, I hope to articulate three important implications of Mark Noble’s recent observation that Deleuze at times “sounds curiously like Santayana.”¹ First, Santayana predates many of Deleuze’s most famous insights. Thus, in regard to the influence on Deleuze of U.S. American thinkers, both Deleuze and his interpreters have been remiss in focusing almost exclusively on the Pragmatists (and especially on C. S. Peirce). Second, one can helpfully

understand both Deleuze and Santayana as U.S. American-influenced, European quasi-pragmatists. And finally, the most promising development in recent Santayana scholarship is Michael Brodrick's reading of Santayana as what Brodrick terms a "total natural event" philosopher of mind.²

In the present article, in regard to Santayana, I will focus on Santayana's *Skepticism and Animal Faith* (hereafter, *SAF*), due to both its helpful summarizing nature, and also the fact that his more detailed works are mostly out of print.³ As for Deleuze, I will focus here primarily on his early monograph, *The Logic of Sense* (hereafter, *LS*), because it is in that volume that he develops a conception of "events" comparable to Santayana's "essences."⁴ But before I turn to my own readings of both philosophers, I will begin with a brief consideration of the relevant secondary literature in philosophy.

I. Greeks, and Spinoza, and Events, Oh My!

Two points of kinship between Santayana and Deleuze are implied by Douglas Anderson's recent article on Santayana. To wit, Santayana (a) revered Heraclitus qua philosopher of flux, and (b) later "adopts Democritus as a central persona for his own work."⁵ To this I would add, as a third point of kinship, that Deleuze, too, reverse Heraclitus, and that Democritus is a forerunner of Deleuzian materialism. Fourthly, Anderson notes that Santayana has both aesthetic and philosophical love for Plato's forms, which Santayana nevertheless torsions into non-agential virtual entities (59). This is also true of Deleuze, especially in his dissertation, later published as *Difference and Repetition*.⁶ Fifthly, Anderson notes that, for Santayana, "Among the moderns, only Spinoza upholds the power of imagination" (582). Similarly, Deleuze famously terms Spinoza "the prince of philosophers," in one of Deleuze's two monographs on Spinoza.⁷ Finally from Anderson's article, he approvingly quotes Horace Kallen's description of Santayana as "the laughing philosopher."⁸ And Deleuze is widely celebrated for his extensive use, and praise, of humor.

Returning to Anderson's point regarding Heraclitus and Democritus, it also suggests Deleuze's love of the Stoics (which is most evident in *LS*). This further allies Deleuze to Santayana, via the latter's love of the ancient Greeks in general. There are also moments in Santayana where he singles out the Stoics in particular for praise, often in proximity to Spinoza, and using the label "pantheist." Moreover, Santayana frequently affirms Stoic ideas without mentioning the Stoics by name.⁹ Finally in regard to this Stoic-Santayana connect, it is also reinforced by John Lachs' book, *Stoic Pragmatism*.

More precisely, Lachs (a) devotes half of his book's title to the Stoics, (b) is arguably the most influential Santayana scholar of our era, and (c) considers Santayana as sharing much with the Pragmatists. That

Santayana is central to Lachs' text is affirmed, in part, by the title of Charles Padrón's review of *Stoic Pragmatism*, namely "The Lachsian Version of Santayana."¹⁰ In defending his review's title, Padrón quotes Lachs' claim that Santayana is "in complete agreement with the pragmatists" in being a "fallibilist," and in "ground[ing] the good in the in the needs and desires of living creatures."¹¹ Though sympathetic to Lachs' quasi-pragmatist reading of Santayana, I gravitate even closer to Michael Brodrick's aforementioned interpretation, in his article, "Santayana's Amphibious Concepts."

For starters, Brodrick's introductory definition of Santayana's essences suggests a subtle allusion to a Santayana metaphor that resonates strongly with Deleuze. To wit, Brodrick writes that "essences are the forms events wear to our senses" (289). This evokes Santayana's description of the domain of essences as "a costumer's shop, where [one] will see all sorts of garments hung in rows upon manikans [sic], with hollow breasts all visible wire, and little wooden knobs instead of heads" (*SAF* 70-71). As this metaphor reveals, Santayana, like Deleuze, emphasizes the folds of the fabric of being, draped over individuals who are (in some sense) less vivid and important than those folds. I will return to this important metaphor in detail below.

Also compatible with the present article is the first example that Brodrick uses to explain the fact that essences consist of logical relations. The example is "difference," which is generally considered the most important word in Deleuze's oeuvre (289). Moreover, Brodrick returns almost immediately thereafter to the concept of difference, via his definition of Santayana's essences as "eternal characters constituted by their inherent differences" (289). It is precisely this—Santayana's conception of essences as eternal and infinitely self-differentiated—that makes Santayana the closest American precursor to Deleuze. Finally in regard to the concept of difference, Brodrick repeats the word a third time in a quote from Santayana's preface to *SAF*. Santayana's "realms" of being, Brodrick quotes, are merely "kinds or categories of things which I find conspicuously different and worth distinguishing, at least in my own thoughts" (*SAF* vi, quoted in Brodrick 242). In this way, Brodrick emphasizes that for Santayana (as for Deleuze) the world is fundamentally made of one fabric, even though that fabric is always bursting at the seams with difference.

A third compatibility between the present article and Brodrick's lies in the latter's invocation of another of my favorite Santayana metaphors. "Matter is the invisible wind," Santayana writes, "which, sweeping for no reason over the field of essences, raises some of them into cloud of dust: and that whirlwind we call existence."¹² In terms of this metaphor's relevance to Deleuze (in addition to the emphases on dynamism, chaos, circular motion, and dramatic eventuation), it

recalls Deleuze's detailed discussion and affirmation (in his *Bergsonism*) of Bergson's whirlwind-like "cone" of memory.¹³

Finally in regard to compatibilities between the present article and Brodrick's, the latter also elevates Santayana's concept of "total natural events" to a position of central interpretive importance. Brodrick explains that this concept, articulated in Santayana's "Locke and the Frontiers of Common Sense," is "the notion that consciousness and matter are not separate events but different phases or elements of one complex event."¹⁴ This definition alone is already quite close to Deleuze in *LS*. Additionally, Brodrick's supporting evidence for the importance of total natural events brings Santayana into even closer proximity to Deleuze. Brodrick writes that,

[i]n a second passage, rather than relying on his usual "realms" metaphor, Santayana calls on analogies that distinguish matter and mind while uniting them in one event, as a single piece of fabric consists of many strands, or as a cross-section of rock is composed of several strata. "The web of Nature has two strands or strata", Santayana writes, "as a tiger skin has hide and hair. The lower level is matter, the upper, thought."¹⁵

Similarly, one of Deleuze's favorite images for his monism is "the fold," including the example of a fold in a piece of fabric (which, moreover, recalls Santayana's "costumer" mannequin metaphor).¹⁶ Also noteworthy in regard to the above block quote, Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* assign great importance to the concept of "strata," which for them denotes several dichotomous relationships at the core of being itself.¹⁷ Finally in support of Brodrick's interpretation, there are also moments in Santayana's own writing that support it, and that undermine his claims elsewhere to be an epiphenomenalist.¹⁸ With these numerous parallels between Santayana and Deleuze in mind, I now turn to a close reading of *SAF*.

II. Deleuzian Scents in Animal Faith

I will describe here the similarities between Santayana and Deleuze in *SAF* using a term common to both, "resonance." The first of these resonances occurs in Santayana's Preface, which praises Spinoza for being "right on the chief issue, the relation of man and his spirit to the universe" (viii). In other words, as Santayana elaborates later in *SAF*, he agrees with Spinoza's view that consciousness (or spirit) is a kind of effervescence of materialist nature. And Deleuze agrees with Santayana's high estimation of Spinoza. (So much so, in fact, that Deleuze repeats his praise of Spinoza as "prince of philosophers" in more than one text).¹⁹ Perhaps significantly, the last resonance with Deleuze in *SAF* (in its final chapter) also involves Spinoza. "Merely learned views are

not philosophy,” Santayana claims, “and therefore no modern writer is altogether a philosopher in my eyes, except Spinoza” (305).

As for the many intervening resonances in *SAF* with Deleuze, I will organize them here thematically, grouped into patterns or themes based on a concept held in common. The first such theme, and here I take my inspiration from *SAF*'s bookending references to Spinoza, concerns the historical figures and schools of philosophy that Santayana and Deleuze interpret in similar ways. After Spinoza, the next shared historical figure that appears in *SAF* is David Hume, and thereby his philosophical school of skepticism. In Chapter II, entitled “Dogma and Doubt,” Santayana claims that “intelligence is naturally forthright; it forges ahead; it piles fiction on fiction” (7). To this, Santayana adds (on the next page) that, “luxuriance itself is murderous. So is luxuriance in the human mind. What kills spontaneous fictions, what recalls the impassioned fancy from its improvisation, is the angry voice of some contrary fancy” (8). Like Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*, Santayana here both echoes and goes beyond Hume. Deleuze and Santayana both, that is, regard thought as, not only the Humean “slave of the passions,” but also a spontaneous and violent power given to creative improvisation.

As for Hume's school of skepticism, the resonance in question comes from Chapter VII, “Nothing Given Exists,” where Santayana describes the view of existence most amenable to a skeptic. “The theory that the universe is nothing but a flux of appearances,” Santayana claims, “is plausible to the sceptic” (44). This description of the universe as appearance-flux sounds exactly like Deleuze's mature thought, for example in his two *Cinema* volumes.²⁰ And though Deleuze would admittedly not label himself a skeptic, Santayana's use of that term for himself is not at all obvious or intuitive, either.²¹

The next shared historical figure to appear in these Deleuzian resonances in *SAF* is Plato, specifically his “theory of the Forms,” in relation to Santayana's conception of essence. In Chapter X, entitled “Some Uses of this Discovery,” Santayana focuses on the torsioning of the forms (which, as I noted above, Anderson, emphasizes in Santayana's thought). In regard to this torsioning, Santayana cautions that, although his view of essences is admittedly “Platonic,” these essences are nevertheless “a corrective to all that is sentimental in Platonism, curing it as it were homeopathically” (77). In Santayana's humbler vision (compared to Plato's), essence is “simply the unwritten catalogue, prosaic and infinite, of all the things as happen to exist, together with the characters which all different things would possess if they existed” (77). Put in Deleuze's terms from *Bergsonism*, essences are “virtual,” and infinitely exceed the actualities of the world (94–96).

The next historical thinker to appear in a Deleuzian resonance in *SAF* is Proust, in Chapter XVII, “The Cognitive Claims of Memory.” Santayana's concept of memory in general, like Deleuze's, borrows

heavily from Proust's conception as articulated in his masterpiece, *In Search of Lost Time*. Memory's fundamental function, Santayana claims, is "to review things more intelligently than they were ever viewed" (157). Similarly, in reference to the example of Proust's novel, Deleuze asserts that a literary artwork creates experiences which never actually occurred in the "objective" past (such as, for Proust's narrator, the taste of the madeleine).²²

The second theme that emerges from the resonances between Deleuze and *SAF* is the affirmation of difference, along with the reduction of identity to a mere byproduct of difference. Santayana first announces his view that identity derives from difference in Chapter III, entitled "Wayward Scepticism." Identity, Santayana claims, "implies two moments, two instances, or two intuitions, between which it obtains" (18). Thus, identity for Santayana is secondary, derivative, a result, deferring to the multiplicity of other phenomena out of which it coalesces. This conception of identity is also central to *Difference and Repetition*, in which Deleuze presents difference and multiplicities as foundational (see, for example, 24).

The second resonance concerning identity and difference is found in Chapter IX, in the same paragraph that presents the aforementioned mannequin metaphor. Santayana remarks, in a tone that foreshadows Deleuze's later work, that the "little word *is* has its tragedies; it marries and identifies different things with the greatest innocence; and yet no two are ever identical" (71). This recalls, again, Deleuze's insistence on the ontological priority of difference (and the secondary and derivative nature of identity).

Thirdly from this identity/difference theme, from Chapter XII, Santayana's transition from essences to identity again foreshadows specific details of Deleuze's conception of identity. Specifically, Santayana writes of invisible forces that rupture the subject. Rather than being lost forever among the mannequins draped in essences, Santayana asserts, "I must allow subterranean forces within me to burst forth and to shatter that vision" (111). The result of this sub-human agency of force is, according to Santayana, the first and founding fiction of "identity" (more specifically "the *identity* of this essence in various instances and in various contexts") (111). This notion of powers that rend apart the identity of the human subject is also a prominent dimension of Santayana's mannequin metaphor, which by itself suggests that what transcends the human (i.e. the essences as clothes) is more important than the human (i.e. the mannequins) (70-71). That is, the proper bearers of identity are the essences-as-clothes, whereas the particular body over which those clothes happen to be draped is merely a matter of a temporary accident. This view is also central for Deleuze, especially with Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*.²³

Since Deleuze's early magnum opus is called *Difference and Repetition*, and I have just considered the resonances with the first term in that title, it might be helpful to consider Santayana's discussion of the title's second term. These references to "repetition" appear, however, not in *SAF* but in *The Realm of Matter* and in "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy."²⁴ In the former text, Santayana claims that "organisms are instruments of repetition," and that "repetition of itself marks the beginning and the end of a trope and rescues it from the arbitrary scope of human apperception" (*RM* 106). As for the "tropes" that are the subject of repetition here for Santayana, he defines them as the "essence of any event"; and they figure prominently in a number of other resonances with Deleuze in that text.²⁵ As for the second text, "The Genteel Tradition," Santayana claims there that "[e]verything is... indefinitely repeated, yet, in repetition, twisted somewhat from its old form" (19).

Returning to *SAF*, one specific form of repetition constitutes my next theme of Deleuzian resonances, namely "pulsation," insofar as the latter is a critical concept in *LS*. The first reference to pulsation in *SAF* appears in Santayana's distinguishing between time as succession and time as eternity. Santayana writes here that the positing of identity "presupposes time—an immense postulate" (112). More specifically, identity presupposes a time of succession which, nevertheless, exists simultaneously with "Eternity" (112). Eternal time, Santayana elaborates, "has nothing to do with [chronological] time," in that it "is always equally real, silent, and indestructible" (112). By contrast, the time of succession for Santayana is an animalistic time composed of organismic movements. This successive time is helpfully illuminated by his poetic description of bodily rest, as follows: "a suspension of motion in a thing, a pause for breath, an ominous and awful silence," which pause "seems to [Santayana's] mind a pulsation in all being" (113). Deleuze also makes this distinction between two types of time, *chronos* and *aion*, which are analogous to Santayana's time of succession, and eternal time, respectively.

The second resonance regarding pulsation occurs in Chapter IV, "Doubts about Self-Consciousness," in Santayana's claim that even negative thoughts can be productive. Santayana writes there of "pulsations and phantoms which to deny is to produce and to strive to banish is to redouble" (22). As I will elaborate below, Deleuze in *LS* repeatedly invokes a word almost identical to "phantoms," namely "phantasms."²⁶ Moreover, one OED definition for the word "phantasm" is "ghost," and Santayana uses the latter term on ten separate occasions in *SAF*. Finally on this point, Deleuze agrees with Santayana—and with Hegel, if in nothing else—when he asserts that what appears as mere negation is actually a massively productive power (*LS* 20).

The third and final resonance on this theme of pulsation is found in Chapter XVII. And it is there that Santayana explicitly takes up the rhetoric of “resonance.”

The radical stuff of experience is much rather breathlessness, or pulsation, or as Locke said (correcting himself) a certain uneasiness; a lingering thrill, the resonance of that much-struck bell which I call my body, the continual assault of some masked enemy, masked perhaps in beauty, or of some strange sympathetic influence, like the cries and motions of other creatures; and also the hastening and rising of some impulse in me in response (189).

Note here the multiple moments of Deleuzian style, namely (a) the emphasis on radicalness, (b) the dynamism of breathless pulsation, (c) the theatrical deployment of masks and enemies, and (d) the emphasis on our shared animality with other species (for example, *LS* 124, and *A Thousand Plateaus* 232-309).

The next theme in the Deleuzian resonances in *SAF* concerns that which is repeated in these pulsations in Santayana, namely his distinctive concept of essences. First, in Chapter IX, Santayana claims that the “manifest being” that is essence “will appear dwelling in its own world, and shining by its own light” (73). The result of this, Santayana elaborates, is that the essence “will seem an event in no world,” and instead “will be merely the quality which it inherently, logically, and inalienably is” (74). This explication could be taken directly from *LS*, in which Deleuze explains events as pure phenomena, consisting of verbs in their infinitive form (such as “to green”) and (“to grow”). It is these events, according to Deleuze, which are given free rein in (the logician) Lewis Carroll’s *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass* (2-3). For example, reminiscent of Alice’s game of living chess against the Red Queen, Santayana describes essence as “a sort of play with the non-existent, or game of thought.”²⁷ And the other instance of this theme of essence is found in Chapter XXI, “Sublimations of Animal Faith.” Here, Santayana insists that “events are changes,” and that he can “imagine a total event,” which “would actually be identical with a changing thing or substance in flux” (230). This foreshadows Deleuze’s claim that all events “form one and the same Event...where they have an eternal truth” (*LS* 64).

The logical next theme to consider, after essence, is infinity, since for Santayana (as for Deleuze) essences are infinite in number. First, in Chapter IX Santayana speaks of “that thin and bodiless plane of being” which “in its tenuity is infinite” (75). This formulation is nearly

identical to Deleuze's descriptions (across multiple texts) of his monistic plane of being. The other infinity resonance is found in Chapter X, in Santayana's claim that "the realm of essences infinitely multiplies that multiplicity" (78). This phrase, "infinitely-multiplied multiplicity," could serve as a perfect three-word summary of Deleuze's entire ontology (see, for example, *DR* 182, 230). Relatedly, Santayana explains how these essences, despite being evanescent, find purchase in our solid material world. Essences, he writes, "come to light in nature or in thought only as material exigencies may call them forth and select them" (80). In themselves, however, Santayana insists, essences constitute "a perfect democracy" (80). Like Deleuze, therefore, Santayana posits materialism (or, in Santayana's words, "the predispositions of matter") as the prime causal force in existence.²⁸

The next theme I will consider is what both Santayana and Deleuze claim is the result of this infinite series of events, namely the theatrical or cinematic. First, in Chapter XI, "The Watershed of Criticism," Santayana's description of existence evokes what one might call a kind of "semiotics of the theater." That is, in the spirit of the Peircean semiotics of Deleuze's two *Cinema* volumes, Santayana offers the following rhetorical question. "Can anything be more evident than that religion, language, patriotism, love, science itself speak in symbols?" (102) Even the specific way in which Santayana connects semiotics to the theatrical anticipates Deleuze. For example, Santayana claims that "theatre, for all its artifices, depicts life in a sense more truly than history, because the medium has a kindred movement to that of real life" (102). It is precisely this point that justifies Deleuze's claim that the entire world is a film (*Cinema 1* 2).

The second theatrical/cinematic resonance with Deleuze is found in Chapter XVII, where Santayana links his account of memory to theatrics. In the "remembered past," Santayana writes, "images chase one another," specifically in a way which is analogous to the way that images "chase one another sometimes in a cinema" (159). Deleuze's term for these images are "movement-images," and in Santayana's *The Life of Reason*, he even deploys the near-identical term "the moving image," and in a similarly cinematic context (36). Returning to the previous passage in *SAF*, Santayana then turns to consider the consciousness, or spirit, that contemplates this cinematic reality. This spirit, he claims, "is virtually omniscient: barriers of space and time do not shut it in; they are by the boundary-stones of field and field in its landscape" (162). This sounds much like Deleuze's conception of the camera's virtual consciousness.

The third theatrical/cinematic resonance is found in Chapter XXVI, entitled "Discernment of Spirit." Santayana remarks that "spirit is not a reality that can be observed; it does not figure among the *dramatis personae* of the play it witnesses" (274). This is also Deleuze's position

in regard to the spectator or consciousness of his cinema-world, the subjectivity of which consciousness Deleuze views as a kind of “folding over” of the play (or filmstrip) on itself.

Finally from this theatrical/cinematic theme, in Chapter XXVII, “Comparison with Other Criticisms of Knowledge,” Santayana describes transcendentalism as “a legitimate attitude for a poet in his dramatic reflections and romantic soliloquies; it is the principle of perspective in thought, the scenic art of the mental theatre” (303). This also anticipates Deleuze’s claim that the field of events is “transcendental” (to which I will return below) (*LS* 125).

The penultimate theme I will consider in the Deleuzian resonances in *SAF*, a theme loosely connected to that of the theatrical/cinematic, is fantasy. As I explore elsewhere, the fantasy/speculative fiction genre of film (and time travel cinema in particular) is uniquely powerful in illustrating Deleuze’s thought.²⁹ First from this theme, and returning to Santayana’s mannequin metaphor in Chapter IX, he writes that “the display” of clothing on the mannequins is “not the living crowd that it ought to be, but a mockery of it, like the palace of the Sleeping Beauty” (71). This tone recalls Deleuze’s invocation of fantasy and fairy tales in *LS* (based, again on Carroll’s Alice books) and in *A Thousand Plateaus* (for example, the figures of “werewolves” and “vampires”) (304).

Second from this fantasy theme, Santayana urges that, “if you eliminate your anxiety, deceit itself becomes entertainment, and every illusion but so much added acquaintance with the realm of form” (73). This recalls Deleuze’s valorization in *Anti-Oedipus* of the schizoid comportment toward the world (as opposed to the paranoid comportment). The former, he claims, involves embracing fictional creation, and celebrating form over content (see, for example, 23).

The last theme I will consider in these Deleuzian resonances is one that figures prominently in science fiction and fantasy, namely thunder-and-lightning (in Santayana’s first reference, the “thunder-clap”) (126). Given the nature of this phenomenon, it seems appropriate that it is the most tightly-focused and recurring of all these resonances. After an initial mention of this phenomenon in Chapter XIV, “Essence and Intuition,” Santayana first returns to it in Chapter XV, “Belief in Experience,” where he also appends the phrase “a flash of lightning” (126, 140). The connection to Deleuze here is that the lightning bolt is the basis of his famous concept of the “dark precursor.”³⁰ Originally, the phrase “dark precursor” was a technical term in meteorology for the invisible ionized pathway, connecting the ground to the atmosphere above it, formed just before—and thereby facilitating—the visual lightning strike.

A second similarity between Santayanan thunder and Deleuzian lightning is that Santayana shares Deleuze’s rhetorical emphasis on the “intensity” of this total natural atmospheric event. Thirdly, this thunder/lightning connection grows even stronger through Santayana’s

later elaboration on this phenomenon, in Chapter XIX, “Belief in Substance.” The “thunder-clap,” Santayana observes here,

is felt to be an event in the self and in the not-self, even before its nature as a sound—its aesthetic quality for the self—is recognized at all; I first know I am shaken horribly, and then note how loud and rumbling is the voice of the god that shakes me (188).

I identify four distinct Deleuzian moments in this block quote. There are, (1) the emphasis on event, (2) the undermining of the distinction between self and non-self, (3) the identification of the (also dark) corporeal precursor of the lightning (i.e., being “shaken horribly”), and (4) the ironic and demystified reference to a “god.”

Finally from this thunder-clap, Santayana again connects it to both lightning and events in Chapter XXIV, “Literary Psychology.” The poet, Santayana claims here,

feels the rush of emotion on the other side of the deployed events; he wraps them in an atmosphere of immediacy, luminous or thunderous; and his spirit, that piped so thin a treble in its solitude, begins to sing in chorus (258-259).

Note, first, Santayana’s implication that poetry is impersonal. Deleuze makes this explicit in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, where he claims that poetry “strips us of the power to say ‘I.’”³¹ Note, secondly, Santayana’s emphasis on a kind of pluralistic social being. For Deleuze’s part, he and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus* discuss this kind of sociality at length (specifically in terms of “wolf packs” and “nomadic tribes,” among other phenomena).³²

To close this section on Deleuzian resonances in *SAF*, there is also one important resonance that did not fit neatly into any of the above themes. In Chapter XI of *SAF*, Santayana anticipates Deleuze’s politicization of metaphysics. “The ideas we have of things,” Santayana asserts, “are not fair portraits; they are political caricatures made in the human interest; but in their partial way they may be masterpieces of characterization and insight” (104). In other words, Santayana anticipates Deleuze’s claim that all thought derives from a play of powers, which play nevertheless does not undermine thoughts’ truth at all.³³

III. The Logic of [Santayana’s Common] Sense

Having considered the many Deleuzian resonances in Santayana’s *SAF*, I now turn to the many unwitting echoes of Santayana in Deleuze’s *LS*. The most obvious connection is probably the centrality of the concept of “sense.” In Santayana, this primarily takes the form of his distinctive concept of “common sense.” For example, Santayana claims

in *The Life of Reason* that his entire philosophy is a “revision of the categories of common sense, faithful in spirit to orthodox human tradition, and endeavouring only to clarify those categories and disentangle the confusions that inevitably arise.”³⁴ In *LS*, Deleuze claims that the logic of sense equals nonsense, which entails that logic is expressible only via paradox, which in turn implies that Deleuze’s title, *The Logic of Sense*, is also a paradox. Similarly paradoxical is the “animal faith” half of Santayana’s title. Even though faith is a concept applied exclusively to humans, the most basic faith that humans possess (according to Santayana) is shared with all nonhuman animals (namely, the organism’s faith in itself, its world, and the two’s connection).

There is an additional resonance with Santayana in the very structure of *LS*, concerning the term “series.” Deleuze uses this word, in place of “chapters,” for the largest formal divisions of his book. For his part, Santayana uses the word “series” as follows:

For the continuity and successiveness of this successive series [of “events”], synthesis in apprehension is useless; it merely creates one more item—a living thought—to be ranged among its neighbors in the flux of existence” (RM 16).

Deleuze affirms the gist of this passage in *Anti-Oedipus*, where he and Guattari write that “the whole” is “nothing more than a part alongside other parts” (43).

Aside from the overarching concern with the concept of events, and with Stoicism, the resonances with Santayana in the body of *LS* do not fall naturally into any patterns (as did those with Deleuze in *SAF*). Consequently, for my discussion of these resonances, I will instead proceed sequentially through the book. The first resonance occurs in Deleuze’s Preface, which closes with the suggestion that *LS* is “an attempt to develop a logical and psychological novel” (xiv). This echoes Santayana’s repeated valorization of what he calls “literary psychology.” By this phrase, Santayana means the imaginative, creative narrative that the psyche/soul generates in seeking meaningful survival in the bodily material world (*SAF* vii).

The second set of resonances with Santayana in *LS* is found in the second chapter, entitled “The Second Series of Paradoxes of Surface Effects.” First, Deleuze claims that “‘incorporeal’ entities” are “never themselves causes in relation to each other” (6). These incorporeal entities are analogous to Santayana’s essences, as I have argued above in regard to the subtype of incorporeal entities which Deleuze terms “events.” More specifically, both essences and incorporeal entities are more epiphenomenal than phenomenal. And neither thinker’s entities are the causes of material processes. Additionally, Deleuze writes that these incorporeal entities “are an *extra-Being* which constitutes the

incorporeal as a nonexistent entity,” which claim Santayana could easily affirm in regard to his essences (7). For ease of reference, and to emphasize the similarity between these two entities, I will refer to them both, indifferently, as “incorporeals.”

In the second resonance in *LS*'s second series, Deleuze echoes Santayana in utilizing the term “*Dialectics*” to describe the discourse of incorporeals (*LS* 8, *SAF* vii). In the second series' third resonance, Deleuze designates “Humor” as the “art of the surface” concerned with the incorporeals (9). This echoes Santayana's privileging of humor, especially in regard to incorporeals (*SAF* 89). And in its final resonance, Deleuze emphasizes the two-dimensionality of events. This flatness is exemplified, for Deleuze, in the playing card uniforms worn by the soldiers of the Red Queen in his Wonderland narrative. It is “*by skirting the surface,*” Deleuze writes of these playing card soldiers, that “*one pass from bodies to the incorporeal,*” because “what is most deep is the skin” (10). This example recalls Santayana's mannequin metaphor for his incorporeals.

The third set of Santayana resonances in *LS* occurs in the “Third Series of the Proposition.” More specifically, Deleuze identifies his “fourth dimension of the proposition” as “sense” (22). Leading up to this fourth dimension, he describes the first three dimensions of the proposition as follows: (1) the “denotation” of the referent, (2) the “manifestation” of the speaker, and (3) the “signification” of the concept, respectively. Returning to the fourth proposition, sense, Deleuze defines it more precisely as “exactly the boundary between propositions and things” (22). As such, Deleuze concludes, “the event is sense itself” (22). Deleuze's distinction between signification (#3) and sense (#4) is strongly reminiscent of Santayana. The reminiscence is especially strong when one considers Santayana's distinction between concepts and events (though Santayana scholars sometimes miss that distinction).³⁵ Moreover, Santayana, too, views human consciousness and meaning as merely random events in cosmic history (*SAF* 285). Finally from this third set of resonances (all from the third series), although Deleuze claims that the event “belongs essentially to language” (and that “it has an essential relationship to language”), he immediately emphasizes the additional truth that “language is what is said of things” (22). In other words, although all sense is linguistic, sense is no less objective on that account. This recalls a similar tension between Santayana's similar two claims, namely that (a) all knowledge is symbolic (or “linguistic,” broadly speaking), and yet (b) commonsense realism still deserves philosophical affirmation (*SAF* 102, 12).

The fifth, sixth and seventh Santayana resonances in *LS* are each brief. To begin, in the “Fourth Series of Dualities,” Deleuze opposes the “eating” done by bodies to the “speaking” proper to events (23). This suggests Santayana's contrast between (a) the meaningless consumption

of material life, and (b) and the meaning-making life of soul in its perpetual dialectical dialogue of literary psychology (*SAF* 129). Next, in the “Tenth Series of the Ideal Game,” Deleuze notes that “events are *signs*” (63). This, again, recalls Santayana’s insistence that all knowledge is semiotic (*SAF* 81). And lastly, in the “Seventeenth Series of Logical Genesis,” Deleuze describes “the surface,” on which events take place, as “the transcendental field itself” (125). For Santayana, too, all transcendentalism is purely fictional (or, in Deleuze’s terms, “virtual”), insofar as it consists of an imaginative tale told by the soul (*SAF* 298).

The eighth resonance with Santayana in *SAF* is from the subsequent “Eighteenth Series of Three Images.” It concerns Deleuze’s claim that the Stoics can be defined, in part, by the fact that they “expect” salvation “laterally, from the event, from the East” (129). (This, as opposed to the pre-Socratics, who expect salvation “from the depths of the earth”; and as opposed to Plato, who expects it “from heaven or from the Idea”) (129). Santayana, too, looks to places east of the U.S., including Spain, Greece, and India (the Hinduism of which he views as beautiful fiction) (*SAF* 305). Santayana could thus easily agree with the following claim from Deleuze. “It is always a matter of unseating the Ideas,” Deleuze writes of the Stoics, “of showing that the incorporeal is not high above (*en hauteur*), but is rather at the surface” (130). Moreover, Santayana’s incorporeals, too, can also be accurately described as “impotent Ideas” (*LS* 130).

The ninth resonance with Santayana in *LS* is found in “Twentieth Series on the Moral Problem in Stoic Philosophy.” Here, Deleuze observes that “Stoic ethics is concerned with the event; it consists of willing the event as such, that is, of willing that which occurs insofar as it does occur” (143). Although this might sound incompatible with orthodox interpretations of Santayana as a moral relativist, I would suggest that this characterization is appropriate to a kind of ethics of spirit (in Santayana’s sense of “spirit”).

Brodrick calls this “an ethics of detachment,” in which one’s consciousness is transformed into a mere spectator of essences, in contemplative contentment.³⁶ Brodrick’s ethics of detachment also dovetails with Deleuze’s elaboration of Stoic ethics. Deleuze claims that the “use of representation,” according to the Stoics, is to “limit the actualization of the event, in a present without mixture” (147). That is, Deleuze claims that the Stoic works “to make the instant all the more intense, taut, and instantaneous since it expresses an unlimited future and an unlimited past” (147). This recalls Santayana’s aforementioned distinction between the time of succession and the time of eternity, and Deleuze’s analogous conceptions of *chronos* and *aion*. Finally on this note of Stoic ethics, Deleuze offers the following description of “the mime” as an ideal Stoic figure. “Beginning with a pure event,” Deleuze writes, “the mime directs and doubles the actualization” (147). This

claim is also true of Santayana's ideal poetic artist. Put in Santayana's terminology, spirit doubles the material world in its representational, contemplative paradise.

The tenth resonance with Santayana in *LS* is found in the subsequent "Twenty-First Series of the Event." This resonance concerns Deleuze's claim that becoming a mime, in his Stoic-inspired sense, "is a question of becoming a citizen of the world" (148). If one notes the word "cosmopolitan" in this quote, it clearly applies to Santayana as well. (Born in Spain, to parents who met in the Philippines, Santayana grew up and worked in the U.S., spent his retirement traveling in Europe, and died in Rome). Deleuze then discusses this Stoic cosmopolitanism in detail, and in a way that recalls Santayana.

First, this cosmopolitanism's goal is "not to be unworthy of what happens to us" (149). Second, those who achieve this goal are rewarded with the experience of "a sort of leaping in place (*saut sur place*) of the whole body which exchanges its organic will for a spiritual will" (149). And third, such a person wills "not exactly what occurs, but something *in* that which occurs...in accordance with the laws of an obscure, humorous conformity: the Event" (149). Put in terms of Santayana's realms, the ethics of detached requires that one utilize the realm of essence, in order to pursue truth therein, and to detach emotionally from the realm of matter, all in order to enjoy contemplation in the realm of spirit. Or, put in the more specific terms of Santayana's own life, the ethics of detachment required him to enlist both poets' images and philosophers' concepts, so as to detach from the materialistic world of the U.S., all in order to instead contemplate spiritual marvels from Ancient India, Greece and Rome.

Skipping past a few more brief resonances in *LS*, its "Twenty-Third Series of the Aion" claims that sense "brings that which expresses it into existence; and from that point on, as pure inherence, it brings itself to exist within that which expresses it" (166). This could also apply to Santayana's essences, which give form to the matter which instantiates them. And the record of such instantiation, which might be described as a material ramble through the mist of essence, constitutes Santayana's truth (*RM* 94).

The next resonance is found in the subsequent "Twenty-Fourth Series of the Communication of Events." The latter begins with what Deleuze terms "The Stoic paradox," namely "to affirm destiny and to deny necessity" (169). Santayana, too, writes of "destiny," specifically humans' "material destiny." In this view, though humans must occupy a materialist world, we nevertheless "deny necessity" insofar as spirit freely contemplates essence (*RM* 25). Or, as Deleuze puts it, one constructs "an aggregate of noncausal correspondences which form a system of echoes, of resumptums and resonances, a system of signs" (170).

The next resonance is found in the “Twenty-Fifth Series on Univocity.” Here, Deleuze claims that, “to the extent that divergence is affirmed and disjunction becomes a positive synthesis, it seems that all events, even contraries, are compatible—that they are ‘inter-expressive’ (*s’entr’ experiment*)” (177). This echoes Santayana, who goes as far as affirming the essence of a square circle. Moreover, his mannequin metaphor illustrates the eternal co-presence of infinitely many essences (*SAF* 121).

Although briefly introduced in the second series, *LS*’s crucial term “phantasm” dominates its thirtieth series, “The Series of the Phantasm.” Here, Deleuze’s and Santayana’s terminologies converge almost completely. To begin, Deleuze describes the concept of the phantasm as follows: “the phantasm represents the event according to its essence, that is, as a noematic attribute distinct from the actions, passion, and qualities of the states of affairs” (214). In other words, the phantasm is a kind of ghost which figuratively hovers over the material world. And recall that, as noted above, the OED lists “ghost” as a definition for “phantasm.” On the one hand, Deleuze writes, the “phantasm recovers everything on this new plane of pure event” (221). But on the other hand, “the event is *properly* inscribed in the flesh” (221). In just this way, Santayana’s essences have their own independent *being* on their unique and pure plane. And yet they only *exist* when matter “wears” these essences like clothes, or like a sheet draped over one who is pretending to be a ghost.

With the phantasm/ghost thus understood as an image of Santayana’s essences, I will now briefly consider the two of Santayana’s many references to ghosts in *SAF* which resonate most strongly with Deleuzian phantasms. First, Santayana writes that the skeptic does not experience images as things which either existed in the past or will exist in the future. “It would be vain to imagine,” Santayana asserts, “that these ghosts had once been men; they are simply nether gods, native to the Erebus they inhabit” (14). Thus, Santayana’s ghosts are no more abstractions (nor the effects of material bodies) than are Deleuze’s phantasms. And second, Santayana writes of how “actors would soon flit away like ghosts” (52). And one of Deleuze’s central figures in *LS* is the Stoic actor or dancer, who affirms the event at a spiritual, artistically-transfiguring distance. “Counter-actualizing each event,” Deleuze claims, “the actor-dancer extracts the pure event which communicates with all the others and returns to itself through all the others, and with all the others” (179).

Finally from *LS*’s resonance with Santayana, the last is found in its “Thirty-Third Series of Alice’s Adventures.” Here, Deleuze claims that, “to extract the non-actualizable part of the pure from event from symptoms” is “the object of the novel as a work of art” (238). Deleuze then paraphrases this “extraction” as “rais[ing] everyday actions and passions

(like eating, shitting, loving, speaking, or dying) to their noematic attribute and their corresponding pure Event” (238). To put this point in Santayana’s terms, the task of literary psychology is to use essences, actualized by matter, in order to construct meaningful and artistically-rich narratives of our lives in the world. “The universe is a novel,” Santayana summarizes, “of which the ego is the hero” (*SAF* 254). Deleuze also, and here I conclude my penultimate section, links the ego to heroism. In Deleuze’s case, this linkage passes through the psychoanalytic figure of Oedipus. “*Oedipus is a pacifying hero*,” he writes, “of the *Herculean type*” (201, emphasis original).

IV. Conclusion: Quasi-Pragmatism

Deleuze and Santayana were both Europeans, and both were both attracted by, yet resistant to, the United States. Additionally, both philosophers were strongly influenced by American Pragmatists (especially William James for Santayana, and C. S. Peirce for Deleuze). However, both thinkers were also too much in love with ancient Greece’s underappreciated thinkers and traditions to fully belong in the Pragmatist camp. (More specifically, the central figures for Santayana are Democritus and Lucretius, and for Deleuze the Stoics).

Building on these commonalities between the two philosophers, my first conclusion is that both can be meaningfully labeled (insofar as labels can be meaningful) as “quasi-pragmatists.” Quasi-pragmatists, in my sense, are insufficiently American and science-driven to be classical pragmatists. And quasi-pragmatists are insufficiently globally-affirming of the classical pragmatists to be neo-pragmatists (such as Richard Rorty or Richard Bernstein), either. In addition to Santayana and Deleuze, a third philosopher who arguably fits under this heading of quasi-pragmatist is John Lachs, particularly in light of his Hungarian origins and his work in *Stoic Pragmatism*.

My second conclusion, related to the first, is that present-day thinkers who find themselves drawn to Deleuze ought to also take a closer and longer look at Santayana. More specifically, I wish to suggest that we might find in Santayana’s work some new hints and directions for persistent controversies in Deleuze scholarship, including how *LS* relates to the rest of the Deleuzian corpus, and what sense can be made of Deleuze’s indebtedness to the Stoics. In light of the two philosophers’ shared emphasis on trans-historical incorporeals, along with the numerous conceptual commonalities I have traced above, the lack of a direct, explicit historical influence between them presents no serious obstacle. That this lack is not an obstacle, moreover, is particularly true by both thinkers’ own lights.

My final conclusion moves parallel to, but in the opposite direction from, my second conclusion. Santayana and Deleuze, in alliance, might clarify what many Santayana readers find most troubling and

counterintuitive in his philosophy, his allegedly epiphenomenalist philosophy of mind. More specifically, the Santayana who shines through the translucence of Deleuze in my analyses appears to fit best with Brodricks' Santayana. In brief, understanding mind as one aspect of total natural events opens the door for essence to function like Deleuze's "quasi-cause" (LS 94).

In an endnote, Deleuze elucidates this concept of a quasi-cause with reference to Clement of Alexandria's observation, as follows: "The Stoics say that the body is a cause in the literal sense; but the incorporeal, in a metaphysical fashion, poses in the manner of a cause" (343n1). This recalls Deleuze's aforementioned emphases on the Stoic mime or dancer, for whom of course poses and manners, or mannerisms, are centrally important. Put briefly, Deleuze's quasi-cause suggests that the poses which one adopts toward events—or one's posture toward them, what one posits of those events, how one imposes one's will upon them—become the essence of the story.

In this way, and in closing, one benefit of Brodrick's total natural event interpretation of Santayana is that it helps explain and justify Santayana's repeated insistence that his philosophy is elaborated commonsense. Insofar as that self-description is accurate, then Brodrick's Santayana, and the Deleuze with whom he resonates, could offer us a desperately-needed, quasi-pragmatist revision of the logic of our own sense.

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NOTES

1. Mark Noble, *American Poetic Materialism from Whitman to Santayana* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 186.

2. Michael Brodrick, "Santayana's Amphibious Concepts," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 49:2 (2013), 238–249.

3. George Santayana, *Skepticism and Animal Faith*. New York: Dover, 1955.

4. Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

5. Douglas Anderson, "Santayana's Provocative Conception of the Philosophical Life," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 45:4 (2009), 579–595, 582.

6. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

7. Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone, 1990), 11.

8. See *The Philosophy of Santayana: Selections from the Works of George Santayana* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), 467, quoted in Anderson 592.

9. Regarding Stoic ideas, Santayana writes, for example: "Life begins to have some value and continuity so soon as there is something definite that lives and something definite to live for" (5). That is, like the Stoics, Santayana does not

value life per se, but only the good or virtuous life. Santayana also claims that “reason is not a faculty of dreams but the art of living,” which resonates with the Stoics’ conception of philosophy as the art of living well (61). For another example, in *The Realm of Matter*, Santayana asserts on the penultimate page that “[i]t is easier to change one’s pleasures than to change the nature of things,” and thus we must “assume the presence of an alien universe and must humbly explore its ways, bowing to the strong winds of mutation, the better to endure and to profit by that prevailing stress” (205, 206). Finally, regarding explicit affirmations of the Stoics, Santayana claims that the “deity spoken of by the Stoics had exclusively this symbolic character; it could be called a city—dear City of Zeus—as readily as an intelligence” (44). Santayana then links this conception to “the Hebrew prophets,” whose god was not “much more” than “a moral order” (44). This clearly prefigures Spinoza’s pantheism.

10. Charles Padron, “The Lachsian Version of Santayana: Reflections on *Stoic Pragmatism*,” *Limbo* 33 (2013), 167–179. As Padron notes, Lachs wrote

both his MA thesis and Ph.D. dissertation at Yale, some twenty-three articles, encyclopedia and dictionary entries, and introductions, with ‘Santayana’ mentioned in the title (and these do not include the many articles among his smaller pieces that mention Santayana at some point or address some aspect of the individual or his writings), four reviews of scholarly publications on Santayana, six books (and I include *Stoic Pragmatism* here) that have Santayana as the primary focus, along with having been Chair of the Editorial Board of *The Collected Writings of George Santayana*, currently being published by the MIT press, and on the editorial board of *Overheard in Seville*, the Santayana Society’s annual publication (168).

11. John Lachs, *A Community of Individuals* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 156–160, quoted in Padrón 169.

12. George Santayana, *The Realm of Matter* (New York: Scribner’s, 1930), 94.

13. Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 59–67.

14. George Santayana, “Locke and the Frontiers of Common Sense,” in *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy* (New York: Scribner’s, 1933), 41–42, quoted in Brodrick 243.

15. George Santayana, “Maxims,” in *Animal Faith and Spiritual Life*, ed. John Lachs (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), 164.

16. See especially, *Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

17. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 80. Examples include the relationship between “expressions and content,” and between “signs and particles.”

18. One example is the following excerpt from Santayana’s 1913 letter to Horace Meyer Kallen:

the title of epiphenomenalist . . . is based (like the new realism) on idealistic prejudices and presuppositions. An epiphenomenon must

have some other phenomenon under it: but what underlies the mind, according to my view, is not a phenomenon but a substance—the body, or nature at large. To call this a phenomenon is to presuppose another thing in itself, which is chimerical. Therefore I am no epiphenomenalist, but a naturalist pure and simple, recognizing a material world, not a phenomenon but a substance, and a mental life struck off from it in its operation, like a spark from the flint and steel, having no other substance than that material world, but having a distinct existence of its own (as it is emitted continually out of bodily life as music is emitted from an instrument) and having a very different kind of being, since it is immaterial and moral and cognitive. This mental life may be called a phenomenon if you like, either in the platonic sense of being an instance of an essence (in which sense every fact, even substance, is a phenomenon) or in the modern sense of being an observable effect of latent forces; but it cannot be called an epiphenomenon, unless you use the word phenomenon in the one sense for substance and in the other sense for consciousness. Since these terms are so equivocal I should rather not use them at all; but I am willing to be called a dualist and a materialist (though the things might be called incompatible, if by dualism were meant a dualism as to substance); in fact I am pleased to be called so, because I am sick of having these terms considered equivalent to a reduction ad absurdum, which they cease to be when someone is declared to maintain them as truths. (Letter of 7 April 1913 to Horace Meyer Kallen).

See *The Letters of George Santayana*, Book 2, page 127). For another example, see Santayana's essay "The Idler and His Works," *The Idler and His Works* (New York: George Braziller, 1957), 8, 9. For both observations, I am indebted to an early reviewer of the present article.

19. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 49.

20. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); and Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2, The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).

21. Admittedly, Santayana does explicitly adopt the label of sceptic, for example in the opening to *The Realm of Matter*. See George Santayana, *Realm of Matter* (Edinburgh: R. & R. Clark, 1930), 8.

22. Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs: The Complete Text*, trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 26.

23. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).

24. See George Santayana, *The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy and Character and Opinion in the United States*, ed. James Seaton (New Haven: Yale, 2009).

25. 101–102. To begin with, Santayana deploys one of Deleuze's central themes, in claiming that tropes are "radically 'vital,' if this word means spontaneous

and irreducible to any alien principle” (RM 108). And Deleuze is famous for his vitalism, the primary historical precursor for which is Bergson. Moreover, as with Deleuze’s events, Santayana writes that tropes “all belong to the region of Platonic Ideas” (RM 113). Finally in regard to tropes, Santayana also makes the more distinctively Deleuzian claim that “The psyche (as we shall see presently) is herself a trope, not a substance” (RM 116). That is, the mind is merely the essence of an event. In other words, and in sympathy with Deleuze and Guattari’s magical bestiaries (for example, in *A Thousand Plateaus*), Santayana writes that “[w]e are compacted of devils” (RM 162).

26. See, for example *LS* 7.

27. 75. For a direct Santayana take on Carroll, see Morris Grossman, “Lewis Carroll: Pedophile and/or Platonist?,” *Art and Morality*, New York: Fordham, 2014, 177–190. I am indebted for this reference to an early reviewer of the present article.

28. 80. Later in this same chapter, Santayana engages another major trope of Deleuze, in suggesting that our natural languages are a kind of barbarous mangling of the natural world. “We read nature,” Santayana claims, “as the English used to read Latin, pronouncing it like English, but understanding it very well” (88). That is, I detect in the claim a similarity to Deleuze’s conception of “minor languages,” which cause eruptions, deformations and stuttering in the major language. Santayana also shared Deleuze’s valuation of this arena, terming it “innocently humorous” (89). See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1986).

29. See Joshua M. Hall, “Time-Traveling Image: Gilles Deleuze on Science-Fiction Film,” *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 50(4): 2016, 31–44.

30. For more on Deleuze’s conception of the dark precursor, see Joshua M. Hall, “Poetry as Dark Precursor: Nietzschean Poetics in Deleuze’s ‘Literature and Life,’” *Philosophy Today* 62(1): 2018 (forthcoming).

31. Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 3.

32. See especially Chapter 2, “1914: One or Several Wolves?” (26–38).

33. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 82.

34. George Santayana, *The Life of Reason: Reason in Common Sense*, edited by Marianne W. Wokeck and Martin A. Coleman, Vol. VII, Book One, of *The Works of George Santayana*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press (2011), 824.

35. Angus Kerr-Lawson, for example, at least occasionally suppresses this distinction. See Angus Kerr-Lawson, “The Non-Empiricist Categories of Santayana’s Materialism,” *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 38(1,2): 2002, 53.

36. Michael Brodrick, *The Ethics of Detachment in Santayana’s Philosophy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

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