

WAS NIETZSCHE A CONSEQUENTIALIST?

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"What is the objective measure of value? Solely the quantum of enhanced and organized power." (*The Will to Power* §674.)¹

Despite the fact that in nearly all of his writings (with increasing shrillness in his later works) Nietzsche slams morality as it has been understood in the Christian-cum-Kantian tradition, declares that there are no moral facts whatever (*BGE* 108, *TI VII* 1), and inscribes his books with such dangerous slogans as "Beyond Good and Evil" (*GM I* 17), his commentators persist in assigning him a positive moral theory. Moreover, in spite of Nietzsche's declaration that it is "better to live among ice than among modern virtues" (*AC* 1), his insistence that modern virtues are a form of sickness (*WP* 50), his claim that to praise virtue is to praise what is harmful (*GS* 21), and his suggestion that "one is best punished for one's virtues" (*BGE* 132), an increasingly popular view is that Nietzsche propounds a virtue theory in the broadly Aristotelian tradition.² The interpretation of Nietzsche that I will provide also has a faintly quixotic smell about it. Although he proclaims utilitarians to be mediocre dolts (*BGE* 188, 228), denounces their views as profoundly erroneous (*GS* 4) and naive (*BGE* 225, *WP* 291), and calls John Stuart Mill a "flathead" (*WP* 30), I believe that Nietzsche can be plausibly interpreted as a consequentialist, and that intrinsic and instrumental value are important and underrated leitmotifs in his works.

Two of Nietzsche's most famous projects are hopeless without consequentialist sympathies, and may not be plausible at all without some theory of intrinsic and instrumental value. The first such project is the investigation of the value of the classical notion of truth. Nietzsche, of course, uses the word "truth" in many different ways, and we must be careful. When Nietzsche asks in *BGE* 1, "What in us really wants truth? . . . Suppose we want truth: *why not rather* untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance? The problem of the value of truth came before us . . ." (Nietzsche's italics), or says in *GM III* 24, "let us thus define our own task—the value of truth must for once be experimentally *called into question*" (Nietzsche's italic), he is asking what the value is in adopting a "metaphysical," absolutist, non-perspectival concept of truth. That his philosophical predecessors have adopted such an idea of truth Nietzsche takes for granted. But what reasons do we have for thinking that belief in such "truth" is better than untruth, or, in fact, better than anything? What is it that makes truth so great?

Nietzsche claims, with some justification, that the ancient rhetoric that canonizes such truth as the *summum bonum* of believing is nothing other than unproven prejudice (*BGE* 34).³ The charge is a familiar one to contemporary philosophers, and comes from diverse quarters and perspectives. While outside the Nietzschean tradition, recent work by Stephen Stich would surely have been applauded by Nietzsche. Stich argues against the value of truth on the grounds that truth is merely an idiosyncratic notion, one that is just a member of a large family of more or less related notions that happens to have been picked out by our cultural tradition, despite having no obvious advantages over many of its kin.⁴ Other philosophers who *are* influenced by Nietzsche, e.g. Richard Rorty, also rehearse the criticism that truth is very probably overrated.⁵

The initial problem facing anyone who wishes to attack the sanctity of truth is that the question, "what good is truth?" seems impossible to answer without begging the question. It just *is* good, a defender might say, puzzled as to how the defense might otherwise proceed. And, so long as we restrict ourselves to a discussion of the intrinsic value of truth, we are in a fairly hopeless bind.⁶ It is notoriously difficult to either attack or defend a claim that something has intrinsic value—reasons seem hard to come by. However, if the issue is not the intrinsic value of truth, whatever it may be, but rather the *instrumental* value of truth, then the playing field changes altogether. This is, in fact, the very project Nietzsche undertakes. Consider Nietzsche's remarks at *BGE* 4: "The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment. . . . The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating." Here Nietzsche makes it explicit that he is interested in the issue of what truth is good *for*. What does metaphysical truth, or true belief, or reverence for this sort of truth, get for us, what does it accomplish for us? That is to say, what instrumental value is involved here? Note the logic of Nietzsche's question. Instrumental value is value that comes from the production of something else, and while an item might be instrumentally valuable because it produces something else with instrumental value, the whole chain of value cannot be circular. Otherwise the circle of value lifts itself into importance by its own bootstraps (and recall *BGE* 21 for Nietzsche's scathing opinion of *causa sui*). If something is instrumentally valuable, it is because it, ultimately, produces that which is valuable in its own right, something intrinsically valuable.

Nietzsche is of course sensitive to this requirement, and he does not attempt to establish the instrumental value of truth *in vacuo*. He lays his cards on the table in *BGE* 2: "For all the value that the true, the truthful, the selfless may deserve, it would still be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life might have to be ascribed to deception, selfishness, and lust." He is quite clear that he is concerned with the instrumental value of truth *for life*. With respect to the consequences for life, Nietzsche is even willing to countenance the idea that deception, selfish-

ness and lust are superior to the slavish worship of the classical Truth.⁷ There is nothing particularly special about Truth for Nietzsche (aside from its prominent role as cultural icon) other than the benefits or penalties its adoption provides for our lives. It is life that provides the benchmark against which the value of this kind of truth may be appraised. In *WP* 493 he writes, "Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live. The value for *life* is ultimately decisive" (Nietzsche's italics.) Life is *ultimately* decisive when it comes to value; it seems to be the repository of intrinsic value.

The revaluation of truth is not the only project for which Nietzsche requires these distinctions. Nietzsche's famous plan to reevaluate all values also turns upon notions of intrinsic and instrumental value.⁸ He writes in *GS* 345, "[N]obody up to now has examined the *value* of that most famous of all medicines which is called morality; and the first step would be—for once to *question* it. Well then, precisely this is our task." He is even plainer in the preface (sec. 6) to *Genealogy*, "[W]e need a *critique* of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called into question" (Nietzsche's italics). But how is Nietzsche to revalue all values? He is not interested in a simple exchange of old values for new ones, or in an inversion of morality for its shock value alone. Nietzsche takes himself to have principled reasons for questioning the moral tradition, and, as in the case of truth, has a methodology for doing so. Nietzsche's strategy for determining the value of the principles of popular morality is to consider the consequences their adoption has for life. He emphasizes this repeatedly in several places, notably *GM* pref. 3, *TI* II 2, *TI* IV 4, and *WP* 715. It is enough to cite just two of the passages that demonstrate Nietzsche's revaluations to be evaluations of instrumental value for life. Consider *WP* 254: "What are our evaluations and moral tables really worth? . . . In relation to what?—Answer: for life." And also *TI* V 5, "When we speak of value we do so under the inspiration and from the perspective of life: life itself evaluates through us *when* we establish values."

Nietzsche even goes so far as to recommend peremptory dismissal of philosophers who attempt to question the value of life (*TI* II 2). Thus we might well ask him here: why is the value of life itself not fair game in the process of revaluing our values? Why should life be granted special immunity from investigation? Without an adequate answer to these questions, Nietzsche seems to lapse into the very dogmatism that he so regularly and incisively criticizes. However, Nietzsche believes that he has responses to these queries; citing reasons reminiscent of Albert Camus's and Thomas Nagel's discussions of absurdity, he holds that the value of life is an "inaccessible problem" for us (*TI* V 5). The problem is inaccessible because to evaluate life adequately, we would have to meet the following conditions (listed in *TI* V 5): be situated outside life, and know life as thoroughly as any, as many, as all who have experienced it. The first condition requires that anyone wishing to evaluate life must do so from a

perspective that is not inherently biased, and the only way to avoid this bias is to be somehow abstracted from this life and outside of the order of this world. Nietzsche claims that no one and nothing could meet this requirement and also the condition of knowing life as well as anyone who has ever lived. Nietzsche thus concludes that the revaluation of all values grinds to a halt when faced with the value of life. Just as in the case of rational thought (*WP* 522), the perspective of life is one that we cannot escape.⁹ "Life," he says in *WP* 706, "is a unique case."

One might argue against the interpretation advanced in the following way.¹⁰ There seems to be room in logical space for Nietzsche to advocate the relativity of value, and yet deny the existence of anything with intrinsic value. By "relativity of value," I mean the idea that items have value only in virtue of the relations they bear to other things. Instrumental value is only one sort of value relativity. For example, contractarians think that which actions are right depends upon the terms of a (possibly counterfactual) social contract. However, neither the process of contracting nor the terms of the contract have any intrinsic value; they merely provide a mechanism for the establishment of value. Perhaps Nietzsche's view is closer to contractarianism than consequentialism, and that life somehow furnishes a way to institute value, but is itself valueless. *GS* 301 seems to support this reading: "Whatever has *value* in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature—nature is always valueless, but have been *given* value at some time, as a present—and it was *we* who gave and bestowed it. Only we have created the world *that concerns man!*" (Nietzsche's italics).

While a logically possible alternative, there are serious problems faced by the contractarian model. The first is that while the analogy is a sensible one, sensibility is a far cry from plausibility. It is easy to explain exactly how the revaluation of all values is to take place, and precisely how objects have value, when one views Nietzsche as a type of consequentialist. These things become murky indeed if one accepts the contractarian analogy. So, much elaboration and defense is required before this model becomes a serious competitor to the consequentialist one here advanced.

Secondly, I am prepared to grant that the textual evidence is just too ambiguous to *definitively* decide whether Nietzsche thought that life has intrinsic value, or life allows for the establishment of value in some other way. It may well be that he never clearly distinguished among the alternatives, and that we are left with a kind of irremediable exegetical indeterminacy. Yet, there is a strong textual case to be made for the claim that Nietzsche considered life to have intrinsic value. Consider what he says at *TI IX* 35: "[T]he moral lie in the mouth of the *decadent* says: 'nothing is worth anything—*life* is not worth anything'." Here Nietzsche claims that it is decadents who deny the value of life, and that to do so constitutes a moral lie. This clearly implies that life is valuable, or has value. In fact, Nietzsche's entire treatment of decadence is a useful signpost here—he

defines decadence in terms of activities and emotions harmful to life (cf. *TI* 35, 37; *AC* 30, 50; *WP* 40-44, 153, 180, 268, 423, 435), and he consistently derides decadence as immoral.

Moreover, *GS* 301 can be read in such a way that it is consistent with this view. There Nietzsche claims that nothing in "our world" has intrinsic value, and that the only kind of value is the value that humans assign for the purposes of satisfying their own interests. The world of value is anthropocentric, and we stand at the center of valuations, providing the grounding of intrinsic value that allows other acts and objects to be instrumentally valuable. The instrumental value of non-human objects stems from the relations they bear to humans and their interests. One lesson to be taken away from *GS* 301 is that if anything has intrinsic value, then the only thing that does so is life.

If we agree that what Nietzsche offers us is essentially a consequentialist view, complete with an account of intrinsic and instrumental value, something must be said about his frequent attacks on utilitarianism. These criticisms constitute at least a *prima facie* challenge to the interpretation offered. That the challenge is merely a *prima facie* one is easily shown, however, because as usual Nietzsche's concerns are more subtle and sophisticated than might be initially supposed. His criticisms of utilitarianism are much like his arguments against logic: he does not oppose the whole thing, just part of it. Nietzsche does not jettison proof theory, e.g., even while he abhors semantics that posit domains of non-fictional entities.¹¹ It is an all-too-easy error to assimilate his rejection of extant semantics to a rejection of logic altogether. Likewise, Nietzsche's complaint against utilitarianism is not so much a gripe about the structure of the theory as it is one about hedonism. Only the English strive after *happiness*, he tells us in *TI* 12, and he considers hedonism to be a typical example of decadence (*AC* 30). The utilitarian dichotomy between pleasure and pain is too simplistic for Nietzsche, and the idea that all people work towards their happiness too simple-minded. He says quite explicitly, "man does *not* seek pleasure and does not avoid displeasure: one will realize which famous prejudice I am contradicting" (*WP* 702, Nietzsche's italics). This theme sees work in *BGE* 225, and in *WP* 35, 671, 701-704. While Nietzsche employs the language of consequentialism, he rejects the Benthamite *summum bonum* as a mistake. This is a perfectly consistent position.

But is consequentialism the central moral view that Nietzsche proposes? Is this his fundamental position? I believe that these questions are unanswerable. Characterizing Nietzsche as a consequentialist may not be the best way of classifying his moral views; it may not even be the best way to taxonomize this element of his thinking.¹² However, it is a plausible way of making sense out of many passages, and is a powerful tool in trying to understand his moral thought in general. The case for employing this tool will be strengthened if we can demonstrate how certain other strains in

Nietzsche's moral thought can be tied to what has been said so far about consequentialism. Particularly, I now want to turn to Nietzsche's thoughts on virtue and his advocacy of the experimental life, and briefly show how these are wedded to his consequentialism.

That Nietzsche advocates the cultivation of certain virtues has been well defended by Robert Welshon. Welshon divides up the virtues discussed by Nietzsche into two kinds, which he calls "pervasive virtues" and "specific virtues." Pervasive virtues are those psychological attributes exemplified by all new philosophers; they are virtues found in all kinds of healthy souls.¹³ These include the love of enemies (*BGE* 216, *GM* I 10, *Z* 1.1.4) magnanimity towards the weak (*D* 556, *BGE* 273, *AC* 57, *Z* 3.5.2), love of solitude (*GM* III 14, *BGE* 44, *WP* 371, 886, 985, 988, *AC* 1, *GS* 338, 365), spiritual independence (*BGE* 29, 41, 201, 212, *WP* 904, 907, 984, *Z* 1.1.7), discipline (*BGE* 188, 219, 225, *WP* 904, 907, 911, 1033), pride (*BGE* 230, 270, *WP* 1033), and courage (*GS* 343, *BGE* 284). If these attributes are in fact all to be exemplified by the new philosophers, the natural question that then arises is, what kind of life will a being with these traits lead? Nietzsche answers *this* question by developing his theory of the experimental life.

The experimental life is the life of engaging in way of living for a time, and then adopting a new perspective (*D* 573, *WP* 944, 962) and a new set of beliefs. It is a dangerous life, one of dancing near abysses and sailing in uncharted seas (*GS* 283, 347, *BGE* 205). It is in living this experimental life that we become legislators and creators of morality (*BGE* 211, *AC* 11) and we each create for ourselves what Welshon calls the "specific virtues." New philosophers create new and different virtues for themselves as they engage in new experiments and sample new ways of living (*GS* 120, *BGE* 43).¹⁴ Nietzsche holds that it is the characteristic right of masters to create values (*BGE* 261), and one can become a modern master, a new philosopher, only by exemplifying the Nietzschean pervasive virtues, leading the experimental life, and so creating one's own ("specific") virtues.

Here we see an aspect of Nietzsche's moral naturalism: the complex moral perspectivism of the new philosophers is made possible only by the discipline of the psychological traits of the pervasive virtues (cf. *BGE* 188). That is, the pervasive virtues are *necessary conditions* for leading the experimental life. Unless one has self-discipline, solitude, courage, independence, etc., one will be unable to live on the margins of society, reject the values of good and evil, and escape from the boring, petty, day-to-day bourgeois lifestyle to which we have become accustomed (cf. *GS* 290). These pervasive virtues, these psychological traits of the new philosopher, are needed if we are to engage in an active response to the nihilism with which the collapse of Christian morality has left us (*WP* 22, 23).¹⁵ Without the Nietzschean (pervasive) virtues we may be able to change our lives in minor ways, and alter our perspectives in minute ways, but we will not be able to effect revolutionary changes in our lives.

The Nietzschean virtues may be said to "bound" the experimental life, but Nietzsche considers them to be required to maximize the range of perspectives available to us. They are more liberating than restricting. This is why we are unable to experimentally abandon self-discipline, for example. Once we do so we will enter a perspective we cannot escape. Self-discipline is something we need to be able to change perspectives at all.

The kinds of experiments that Nietzsche advocates are those which are morally natural; i.e. those which are non-decadent and are life-enhancing. It must be stressed that he does not promote all possible experiments as acceptable ways of living. After all, the Christian life is a life perspective, and Nietzsche hardly recommends Christianity as an option for the new philosopher. When evaluating a potential experiment, what one must do is test its instrumental benefit for life. An experiment is morally natural, and hence a permissible one for a new philosopher, just in case it is in some way life-enhancing and life-preserving. That is, permissibility rests on consequences. Here we see how the life of experimentalism and virtue-cultivation is encapsulated in Nietzsche's consequentialism. Some virtues (the pervasive ones) are needed in order to lead the experimental life. Some virtues (the specific ones) will be an outcome of the experimental life. Experimentalism itself is not simply a blind orgy of sensation and wantonness, but is disciplined and devoted to the goal of enhancing one's life.

It might be suggested that it is a mistake to consider the cultivation of the Nietzschean virtues and the experimental life as somehow *antecedent* to the good life. Rather, perhaps it is best to view the virtues and experimentalism as *constitutive* of the good life. One is leading the *eudaimon* life when one is independent and disciplined, and samples different (morally natural) ways of living. Thus it is a mistake to consider these things as features of any consequentialism on Nietzsche's part.

The question of what Nietzsche means by "life" is an important one, and the objection just raised serves to highlight this issue. Without some elaboration, it is hard to make sense of what it is for something to have "value for life," or what it is that the "life enhancement" Nietzsche advocates is supposed to amount to. However, I believe that once we more closely investigate Nietzsche's understanding of "life," we will see that the objection may be harmlessly assimilated into the consequentialist model.

In *WP* 254 Nietzsche asks himself, "But *what is life?*—Here we need a more definite formulation of the concept 'life.' My formula for it is: life is will to power" (Nietzsche's italics; cf. *Z* 2.12 and *BGE* 13). While Nietzsche clearly makes the connection between life and power, this, of course, does not imply that his notions of power or the will to power are equally perspicuous. However, once one sees the link between life and power, many other passages fall naturally into place. Consider for example the striking passage from *WP* 674 cited at the beginning of this paper in which Nietzsche declares the objective measure of value to be power, or

AC 2 which asks, "What is good?" and answers, "All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man." Despite the fact that Nietzsche usually explains it solely in terms of life, it appears that his consequentialism ultimately aims at the maximization of power. Although an adequate discussion of the complex concepts of "power" and "the will to power" is far beyond the scope of this paper, it seems fair to say that Nietzsche considered power to be quantifiable in the very way needed for a consequentialist theory. His infamous remarks on will to power *quanta* also lend support here.

In the end, experimentalism and virtue cultivation comprise the *strategy* Nietzsche recommends for the maximal enhancement of power. In this way his consequentialism is more refined than that of someone like Bentham, who famously held that "pushpin is as good as poetry." Any technique that maximized the good was fine for Bentham. Not so for Nietzsche—he endorses a specific strategy for power enhancement; and while not as open ended as Bentham's, it still provides for considerable freedom in the experiments undertaken and the specific virtues and values one invents in each perspective.

The objection above claims that experimentalism and virtue cultivation are constitutive of the good life instead of, as I have argued, tactics antecedent to the good life, designed to promote power. However, I believe that these views are not significantly contrasting, and in fact may be extensionally equivalent. Clearly, Nietzsche does not define "life" as experimentalism and virtue cultivation, since he explicitly defines it as will to power. However, it does seem that if one is leading a life exemplifying the Nietzschean virtues and sampling different life perspectives, then one will be leading the good life. How can we then say that these things are antecedent to the good life? One will be leading the good life if one engages in these activities not because the good life consists in them (since it consists in something like the maximization of power), but rather because one's power is enhanced precisely through these activities. What I have called Nietzsche's strategy for power enhancement is antecedent to the good life, but it is *logically* antecedent. It need not be *temporally* antecedent, and I believe that this is the relevant distinction. One leads the good life when one is engaging in certain activities because these activities are power-enhancing. It seems to me that this is Nietzsche's view, and it is a consequentialist one.

While a splendidly subtle and interesting ethics, Nietzsche's consequentialism is not without difficulties. One problem facing him, one that I do not know how to satisfactorily resolve, in this. I have argued above that Nietzsche recommends testing potential life experiments by considering their instrumental value for the production of power. He plainly does not advocate any particular way of living, but instead enjoins us to sample different ways. Thus it seems that all (morally natural) experiments are equally permissible ways of producing intrinsic value.

The problem is that none of this shows that we positively *ought*, that we have a *duty*, to try out different perspectives. Why not just stay in some comfortable, non-decadent perspective? One answer is that life is necessarily best served or one's power is most enhanced if one samples different perspectives. Another possible answer is that the cultivation of the virtues will somehow entail or ensure changing perspectives. Yet without considerable further argument, neither of these options looks too promising.¹⁶

1 Abbreviations are as follows:

- D*=*Daybreak*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982; original edition: 1881).
GS=*The Gay Science*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974; original edition: 1882).
Z=*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann, in *The Portable Nietzsche* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1954; original edition: 1885).
BGE=*Beyond Good and Evil*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966; original edition: 1886).
GM=*On the Genealogy of Morals*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967; original edition: 1887).
TI=*The Twilight of the Idols*, ed. and trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Viking Penguin, 1968; original edition: 1889).
A=*The Antichrist*, ed. and trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Viking Penguin, 1968; original edition: 1985).
WP=*The Will to Power*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). The opening passage is from *WP*, 674, p. 356.

2 See for example Robert C. Welshon, "Nietzsche's Peculiar Virtues and the Health of the Soul," *International Studies in Philosophy* 24:2 (Summer 1992): 77-89; Lester H. Hunt, *Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue* (London: Routledge, 1991) and the North American Nietzsche symposium at the 1991 Eastern Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association entitled "Nietzsche on Virtue and Ethics," with symposiasts Alexander Nehamas, Martha Nussbaum, Lester Hunt, Kelly Oliver and Alan White.

3 Barry Allen cites a good bit of this rhetoric in "Nietzsche's Question, 'What Good is Truth?'" *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 9:2 (April 1992): 225-240.

4 Stephen P. Stich, *The Fragmentation of Reason* (Cambridge: MIT Bradford, 1990). See esp. ch. 5. I believe that the notion of truth with which Stich (and Richard Rorty) is working is the kind of non-perspectival truth Nietzsche calls into question. I haven't the space here to provide a lengthy textual defense of his claim, however.

5 See Richard Rorty's "Solidarity or Objectivity" in *Post-Analytic Philosophy*, eds. J. Rajchman and C. West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 3-19.

6 Although Stich believes he has arguments against the intrinsic value of truth as well as arguments against its instrumental value. The latter are more

promising than the former, however. For a persuasive defense of the latter, see William G. Lycan, "Why Should We Care Whether Our Beliefs Are True," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 51:1 (March 1991): 201-205. For a compelling critique of the former, see Ernest Sosa, "Truth in Epistemology," *Philosophical Issues* 3 (1993).

7 For the kind of perspectival truth Nietzsche defends and further discussion of his thoughts on truth, see Steven D. Hales and Robert C. Welshon, "Truth, Paradox, and Nietzschean Perspectivism," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 11:1 (1994): 101-119.

8 It is curious that in his *Nietzsche* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), Richard Schacht correctly identifies Nietzsche's revaluations as involving "the employment of a standard of value by reference to which the value of things taken to be 'values' can be assessed" (p. 349), and later identifies this standard as life (pp. 354-356), yet he stops short of recognizing this to be consequentialism.

9 As such, it is an absolute truth for Nietzsche. On why Nietzsche does, and must, advocate some truths as absolute, see Hales and Welshon, "Truth, Paradox, and Nietzschean Perspectivism."

10 Reasons in support of this view, diverse from the ones I consider below, may be found in Alexander Nahamas, *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 135.

11 See Hales and Welshon, "Truth, Paradox, and Nietzschean Perspectivism."

12 On the issue of taxonomy for moral views, see James Dreier, "Structures of Normative Theories," *The Monist* 76:1 (January, 1993): 22-40.

13 Welshon, "Nietzsche's Peculiar Virtues and the Health of the Soul," p. 81.

14 Cf. Lester Hunt, *Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue* (London: Routledge, 1991), ch. 5.

15 I believe that the passive response to nihilism (which Nietzsche discusses in the first book of *The Will to Power*) is essentially the same concept as Sartre's bad faith, and Camus's philosophical suicide. I hope to discuss these connections elsewhere. See Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956) and Albert Camus, "An Absurd Reasoning," in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, trans. Justin O'Brien (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).

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