Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

12-2017

Abstract

It is commonly held that all deontological moral theories are agent-relative in the sense that they give each agent a special concern that she does not perform acts of a certain type rather than a general concern with the actions of all agents. Recently, Tom Dougherty has challenged this orthodoxy by arguing that agent-neutral deontology is possible. In this article I counter Dougherty's arguments and show that agent-neutral deontology is not possible.

Keywords

Agent-neutral, Agent-relative, Deontoogy, Moral theories

Discipline

Philosophy | Theory and Philosophy

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy

Volume

12

Issue

3

First Page

319

Last Page

324

ISSN

1559-3061

Identifier

10.26556/jesp.v12i3.267

Publisher

University of Southern California

Copyright Owner and License

Open Access

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i3.267

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