Abstract
This paper presents a characterization of the ontological dependence relation between an existent and its sustaining cause, which allows to straightforwardly deduce that the being of any dependent existent is grounded on an independent one. Furthermore, an argument is given to the conclusion that there is a unique independent existent, which is therefore the ultimate ground of being.
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Notes
I am indebted to Joshua Rasmussen and Graham Oppy for wise advice and pertinent remarks about previous drafts of this paper.
References
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Hamri, S. On the ultimate ground of being. Int J Philos Relig 83, 161–168 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9625-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-017-9625-2