Abstract
For a long time, scientific theories were usually characterised (by philosophers) as sets of laws, holding of the world. In the last decades, this view has been repeatedly challenged, with structures, capacities, mechanisms, and perhaps also ontologies and processes competing to take the place of laws. But rather than taking part in that debate, I wish to look into a matter that is epistemologically prior to it, namely how various sciences select, define, and develop their concepts.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Structuralism or the non-statement view, originating in works by Patrick Suppes and developed by Joseph Sneed. For an overview see An architectonic for science: the structuralist program by Wolfgang Balzer, C. Ulises Moulines and Joseph D. Sneed, Dordrecht 1987. The theory has since been further developed by several German philosophers. For a more recent account, see Structuralist theory of science: Focal issues, new results, ed. by Wolfgang Balzer and C. Ulises Moulines, Berlin 1995.
- 2.
See Nancy Cartwright’s Nature’s capacities and their measurement, Oxford 1989.
- 3.
See e.g. Jon Elster’s Nuts and bolts for the social sciences, Cambridge 1989.
- 4.
See my “Infallibility and incorrigibility”, in Knowledge and inquiry, ed. by Erik J Olsson, Cambridge University Press 2007 for an argument to this effect.
- 5.
Gradually developed in many articles, beginning with “Ordinal conditional functions. A dynamic theory of epistemic states” in Causation in decision, belief change, and statistics, ed. by W.L. Harper and Brian Skyrms, Dordrecht 1988.
- 6.
See my “An analysis of some deontic logics”. Noûs vol. 3 (1969), pp. 373–398. Reprinted in Deontic logic: introductory and systematic readings (ed. by Risto Hilpinen), pp. 121–147. Dordrecht 1971.
- 7.
For an overview, see e.g. several articles in Defeasible deontic logic (ed. by Donald Nute), Boston 1997.
- 8.
Published rather late in Peter Gärdenfors’ Knowledge in flux, Cambridge (MA) 1988, although the original ideas were developed in the late 1970s in a frequently meeting discussion group with Gärdenfors, Nils-Eric Sahlin and myself as the regular members.
- 9.
See e.g. Lewis’ Counterfactuals, Blackwell 1973.
- 10.
See my “Why explanations? Fundamental, and less fundamental ways of understanding the world”. Theoria vol. 72, part 1 (2006) or “Explanations are about concepts and concept formation”, in Rethinking explanation, ed. by Petri Ylikoski and Johannes Persson, Springer 2007.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Hansson, B. (2010). A Note on Theory Change and Belief Revision. In: Olsson, E., Enqvist, S. (eds) Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-9608-1
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-9609-8
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)