Abstract
An operator of contraction for a belief set (a theory) can be obtained by assigning to it a belief base and an operator of partial meet contraction for that base. It is argued that closure of the base under disjunction is an intuitively reasonable condition. Axiomatic characterizations are given of the contractions of belief sets that can be generated by (various types of) partial meet contraction on disjunctively closed bases. The corresponding revision operators are also characterized. Finally, some results are reported on operations on bases that are closed under material implication.
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I would like to thank Hans Rott and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences for financial support.
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Hansson, S.O. Changes of disjunctively closed bases. J Logic Lang Inf 2, 255–284 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01181682
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01181682