Abstract
Three arguments for the conclusion that objects cannot endure in B-time even if they remain intrinsically unchanged are examined: Carter and Hestevold’s enduring-objects-as-universals argument (American Philosophical Quarterly 31(4):269–283, 1994) and Barker and Dowe’s paradox 1 and paradox 2 (Analysis 63(2):106–114, 2003, Analysis 65(1):69–74, 2005). All three are shown to fail.
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Notes
For an introduction to and a defense of the B-theory of time (also known as “the tenseless theory of time” and “the static conception of time”), see Mellor (1998).
Persuaded by reasoning like that in Smith (1997).
It is often assumed that time travel is sensible only on the B-theory of time: it is thought that in order for time travel to take place there must be other times than the present one to travel to (the so-called destination requirement). Keller and Nelson (2001) have challenged this line of thought. If they are right, then the argument from time travel can be invoked against presentist endurantists as well (presentists hold that only the present moment exists).
I should mention that Carter and Hestevold (1994, pp. 278–279) back up their allegation by comparing endurance in B-time with “endurance” over possible worlds, assuming modal parity (i.e., the thesis that all possible worlds are ontologically on a par). They hold that only universals can be multiply located in different worlds given modal parity. They subsequently ask: why should the situation be any different for times given temporal parity (i.e., the thesis that all times are ontologically on a par)? It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the modal case. However, I have two things to say about this analogy. First, Carter and Hestevold have not shown that only universals can be multiply located in different worlds given modal parity—they merely intuit that it is so. Second, the temporal case differs from the modal one in that times belong to a single, unified world: the contents of distinct times—in contrast with the contents of distinct possible worlds—are interrelated by earlier/later than relations and causal/nomological relations. Hence, the cases are significantly different.
That is, if it is extended in all spatial dimensions (neglecting the curled dimensions of string theory); otherwise, it is 2D or less. I suppose an immanent universal would not have to be 3D.
Here, I disagree with Bebee and Rush (2003, p. 313), who claim: “No sensible endurantist is going to equate being a 3D object and having zero temporal extent.” I think sensible endurantists should do just this.
If the time traveling human gains/loses weight and swells/shrinks during his time travel, it cannot be said that the fusion/human simply has a width of 0.4 m at the time in question: we must say that the fusion/human has distinct weights/widths at distinct places at the time in question (see Miller (2006)). In this paper, however, we are concerned with objects that do not change intrinsically.
Notice, though, that s-endurance for concrete objects is due to ordinary endurance plus time travel. Ordinary endurance, i.e., endurance in time, does not require some kind of “meta-endurance” to take place in a further dimension.
I take it that possible worlds can be invoked here even if we do not conceive of them realistically.
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Acknowledgement
The paper was presented at the Swedish national philosophy congress, “Filosofidagarna”, Lund 12–14 June 2009. I thank the participants for helpful comments. Thanks are also due to Anna-Sofia Maurin, Nils-Eric Sahlin and Lena Wahlberg.
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Hansson Wahlberg, T. Endurance Per Se in B-time. Int Ontology Metaphysics 10, 175–183 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-009-0049-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-009-0049-z