Abstract
This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about ‘knows’. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for a brand of contextualism that I call ‘practical interests contextualism’. I also answer some questions that contextualism leaves open, particularly why the concept of knowledge is valuable, why the word ‘knows’ exhibits context-variability, and why this term enjoys such widespread use. Finally, I show how my contextualist framework accommodates plausible ideas from two rival views: subject-sensitive invariantism and insensitive invariantism. This provides new support for contextualism and develops this view in a way that improves our understanding of the concept of knowledge.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
There are various ways of spelling-out the notion of the ‘strength of an epistemic position’. For our purposes, think of it as a matter of the range of alternatives to p with respect to which one’s evidence favors p.
I put quotes around ‘knowing’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘knows’ to indicate semantic ascent. My focus is not on the property of knowledge, but rather on our use of the word ‘knowledge’ (and its cognates) for epistemic evaluation.
Craig speaks of the role of the concept of knowledge rather than the linguistic role of ‘knows’. I shall sometimes speak of the concept of knowledge, but most of what I say can be adequately expressed with the linguistic framing. My concern in this paper is with our linguistic knowledge-attributing behavior. Also, if you agree with Frege that concepts are eternal, then substitute the notion of concept change with a change in what concept is expressed by ‘knows’ (and its cognates). Nothing should turn on this.
I do not assume that the sole purpose of the concept of knowledge is to serve as a marker for good informants. My view requires only that a central (common, important) purpose of the concept of knowledge is to certify such sources. For expository convencience, however, I shall speak of ‘the’ purpose of the concept of knowledge.
Contextualism also allows for cases in which it seems true that an attributor, A, in a ‘low-standards’ context can say something true in asserting “S knows that p”, whereas another attributor, B, in a ‘high-standards’ context, can say something false in asserting “S knows that p”, even though A and B are talking about the same S and the same p at the same time t.
Two points of clarification: first, Craig’s initial hypothesis is that “the concept of knowledge is used to flag approved sources of information” (ibid: 11), however he later settles on the more specific hypothesis I’ve mentioned concerning reliable informants (ibid: 35); second, Craig describes these informants as ‘good’ rather than ‘reliable’, but I shall use these terms interchangeably.
This approach assumes that true belief is conceptually prior to knowledge. For a contrary view, see Williamson (2000).
State of nature theories only require us to think of concepts as having started out in a state of nature without actually presupposing that they began this way at some point in our ancestors’ history. Craig is not committed to the idea that people actually went through the stages he describes (1990: 84). We can disentangle the method of practical explication from Craig’s genealogical (or state of nature) account. A practical explication of a concept seeks to explain how, given some set of facts, and some interests or aims, we have a need that the concept we are explicating satisfies (see Kappel 2010: 72–73). A genealogical account, in contrast, is concerned with the origin of a concept. This paper is concerned with the essentially ahistorical method of practical explication (see Rysiew 2012: 274).
The truth condition is essential because knowledge and ‘knows’ are factive (see Hannon 2013). However, speaking of a ‘reliable’ informant while including a truth condition is slightly misleading because reliable informants may sometimes be mistaken. I think there is a sense of ‘reliable’ that captures the truth condition—i.e., “Tim is usually reliable, but he wasn’t today” (he was wrong)—but you might prefer to follow Craig and use the term ‘good informant’ to avoid this confusion.
These ‘indicator properties’ bestow what Williams (2002: 42–43) calls “purely positional advantage”, an example of which is having been looking in the right direction at the right time.
Even if I am not so inclined, I still need to appreciate their point of view if I am to be successful at getting them to help me (1990: 88).
Craig does not discuss whether it is only purposes that drive the standards up or other aspects of the epistemic context as well. I briefly discuss this point in the final paragraph of Sect. 4.3.
Whether or not the objectivised concept will feature descendants of (b), (c), and (e) that are relaxed enough to be satisfied by virtually anyone to whom we would intuitively attribute knowledge is a contentious issue. Some commentators, such as Kappel (2010: 86), claim that these conditions (or at least some of them) drop out of the picture altogether as a result of objectivisation. I simply leave this matter open, since my focus is on condition (d*).
The skeptic will claim that there isn’t any reason to think that someone is more likely to be right about p than not-p. Craig discusses skepticism in chapter 12 of his book, and I will discuss it in Sect. 4.6.
I borrow this way of framing the issue from Kelp (2011).
Henderson (2009, 2011) uses Craigean insights to motivate his own version of contextualism, which he calls ‘gate-keeping contextualism’. While there is much in Henderson’s work with which I agree, we develop our views in different ways. A detailed discussion of gate-keeping contextualism will take us too far afield, but I will mention one essential difference. Henderson’s account rests on a distinction between two broad types of communities, ‘general source communities’ and ‘applied communities’ (2009: 120). I find this distinction troublesome because, as Henderson recognizes, there will be much membership overlap: people will be members of several groups of both kinds of communities. This makes it difficult to explain how these groups can operate with distinct sets of epistemic standards. Given the inevitable overlap between these groups, it seems that the standards associated with one of these communities will influence the other, leaving no way to distinguish them. In contrast, my own view will show that an intersubjectively determined epistemic standard (the ‘objectivised’ standard) will set reasonable constraints on the context-variability of ‘knows’ without positing problematic groups or communities.
I do not consider versions of invariantism that set the standard fairly low because Craig is clear that the standard will be quite high as a result of objectivisation.
Whether or not Craig actually endorses some version of contextualism is not my concern. My aim is to show that Craig’s hypothesis can motivate contextualism; it is not to show that Craig would endorse this view. In other words, I shall argue that the reasons which seem to motivate the invariantist interpretation do not force someone attracted to Craig’s general idea to be an invariantist.
I leave aside truth relativism about knowledge (see MacFarlane 2005).
‘Tailoring’ works somewhat like Lewis’s (1996) Rule of Accommodation. We are expected to be accommodating or sensitive to contextual shifts and this is presumed to be semantic.
Whether it is the perceived stakes that matter or the actual stakes depends on the context. I agree with DeRose (2009: 55) that perceived stakes may take us from a low-standards context to a high-standards context; however the reverse is less plausible. If someone is in a context in which much is at stake but they fail to recognize this fact, the standards reflect the actual stakes.
Admittedly, there is a limit to how low the standards can go—i.e., it is doubtful that they can go so low as to include cases in which S truly counts as ‘knowing’ that p even though S has an unjustified belief that p.
This is to be expected since ‘reliable’ is a gradable adjective and as such context-sensitive, just like ‘tall’ or ‘flat’.
Thanks to Robin McKenna here.
David Henderson (2009: 124) raises a similar objection to SSI.
For a defense of the idea that evaluative concepts are semantic entities that are shaped by their roles or purposes, see Henderson (2011).
This is compatible with Craig’s idea that “a practice develops of setting the standard very high, so that whatever turns, for others, on getting the truth about p, we need not fear reproach if they follow our recommendation” (Craig 1990: 94).
This section is heavily indebted to Henderson (2009).
Rysiew (2012) raises doubts about the advisability of arguing directly from facts about the function of ‘knows’ to facts about its semantics. Rysiew’s paper was published after my paper was written, so I cannot provide a detailed reply here. However, much of what I have argued does go some way to answering Rysiew’s worry that “more needs to be said by [contextualists] about how their favored account of knowledge ascriptions enables them to play their broader, social role” (ibid: 291).
References
Baumann, P. (2011). WAMs: Why worry? Philosophical Papers, 40(2), 155–177.
Brown, J. (2005). Comparing contextualism and invariantism on the correctness of contextualist intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 69(1), 71–100.
Cohen, S. (1988). How to be a fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 91–123.
Cohen, S. (2000). Contextualism and skepticism. Noûs, 34(1), 94–107.
Craig, E. (1990). Knowledge and the state of nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dancy, J. (1992). Review of knowledge and the state of nature. The Philosophical Quarterly, 42(186), 393–395.
DeRose, K. (1992). Contextualism and knowledge attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52(4), 913–929.
DeRose, K. (1995). Solving the skeptical problem. Philosophical Review, 104(1), 1–52.
DeRose, K. (2009). The case of contextualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, R. (1997). Review essay: Knowledge and the stated of nature: An essay in conceptual synthesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57(1), 205–221.
Fricker, M. (2010). Scepticism and the genealogy of knowledge: Situating epistemology in time. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Social epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greco, J. (2008). What’s wrong with contextualism? The Philosophical Quarterly, 58(232), 416–436.
Greco, J. (2010). Achieving knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hannon, M. (2013). ‘Knows’ entails truth. Journal of Philosophical Research (Forthcoming).
Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Henderson, D. (2009). Motivated contextualism. Philosophical Studies, 142(1), 119–131.
Henderson, D. (2011). Gate-keeping contextualism. Episteme, 8, 83–98.
Kappel, K. (2010). On saying that someone knows: Themes from Craig. In A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Social epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelp, C. (2011). What’s the point of “Knowledge” anyway? Episteme, 8, 53–66.
Kusch, M. (2011). Knowledge and certainties in the epistemic state of nature. Episteme, 8, 6–23.
Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(4), 594–597.
MacFarlane, J. (2005). The assessment sensitivity of knowledge attributions. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 1, 197–233.
Rysiew, P. (2001). The context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. Noûs, 35(4), 477–514.
Rysiew, P. (2012). Epistemic scorekeeping. In J. Brown & M. Gerken (Eds.), Knowledge ascriptions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schaffer, J., & Knobe, J. (2012). Contrastive knowledge surveyed. Noûs, 46(4), 675–708.
Schmitt, F. (1992). Review of knowledge and the state of nature: An essay in conceptual synthesis. Mind, 101(403), 555–559.
Sosa, E. (1974). How do you know? American Philosophical Quarterly, 11, 113–122.
Sosa, E. (1988). Knowledge in context, skepticism in doubt. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 139–157.
Sripada, S., & Stanley, J. (2012). Empirical tests and interest-relative invariantism. Episteme, 9(1), 3–26.
Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and practical interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vogel, J. (1999). The new relevant alternatives theory. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 155–180.
Williams, B. (1973). Problems of the self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williams, B. (2002). Truth and truthfulness. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, T. (2005). Knowledge, context, and the agent’s point of view. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (Eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: Knowledge, meaning, and truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Hallvard Lillehammer, Ernest Sosa, Tim Crane, Arif Ahmed, Michael Blome-Tillmann, Mikkel Gerken, Berit Brogaard, Robin McKenna, Jess Kwong, members of the Cambridge Epistemology Group, and members of Ernest Sosa’s Epistemology Group at Rutgers University for helpful advice. This paper was written while I was generously funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hannon, M. The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism. Erkenn 78, 899–919 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9426-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9426-z