Abstract
In this article, Marjorie Silliman Harris offers a critical reading of Henri Bergson’s view of freedom as a creative act by the fundamental self.
Marjorie Silliman Harris: Originally published in 1933 in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 42, No. 5, pp. 511–520.
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Notes
- 1.
I turn, at this point, to follow an exposition of the matter given in an article by W. H. Williams on “Determinism and Indeterminism in Quantum Physics”, The Personalist X 4. Where I do not quote, I follow his explanation closely.
- 2.
W. H. Williams, op. cit., 245.
- 3.
Cf. Our Knowledge of the External World 232. Russell does not think that one is justified in assuming causation in the mental world simply because experience has shown uniformity, in some cases, in the physical world.
- 4.
An interesting point to note in comparing the view of the advocates of the quantum theory with Bergson’s theory is the different significance that discontinuity has for each. From discontinuity in atomic processes—designated as “the very essence of the quantum theory”—the former thinkers infer unpredictability; whereas Bergson implies that the intellect can grasp discontinuity, which exists in the realm of matter, and can predict there, but cannot grasp the continuity of life and therefore cannot predict in the realm of life.
- 5.
Cf. H. Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil II 303.
- 6.
Time and Free Will (tr. by Pogson) 219.
- 7.
Ibid., 221.
- 8.
Op. cit., 157.
- 9.
Cf. op. cit., 135, 165, and 167.
- 10.
Laughter (tr. by C. Brereton and F. Rothwell) 153–54.
- 11.
Cf. Time and Free Will 135, 165, and 167.
- 12.
Cf. Creative Evolution (tr. by Mitchell) 126, 164, 223–24.
- 13.
Cf. Time and Free Will 165–66.
- 14.
Cf. Creative Evolution 47–48 and Time and Free Will 231.
- 15.
In connection with Bergson's thought that the self may be reflected in a passion, one is reminded of Santayana’s statement that “to throw the whole mind upon something is not so great a feat when the mind has nothing else to throw itself upon. Every animal when goaded becomes intense.” The Life of Reason IV 88–89.
- 16.
J. E. Creighton, “Reason and Feeling”, The Philosophical Review XXX 468–9.
- 17.
Laughter 79.
- 18.
Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant II 270.
- 19.
Cf. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World 234–36, and Dewey, The Quest for Certainty 249–50. Substantially this point has been made many times since Hegel’s day, but in the light of Bergson’s conception of freedom it seems to need further reiteration.
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Harris, M.S., Edited by., Katzav, J., Rogers, D. (2023). Bergson’s Conception of Freedom. In: Katzav, J., Vaesen, K., Rogers, D. (eds) Knowledge, Mind and Reality: An Introduction by Early Twentieth-Century American Women Philosophers. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24437-7_28
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