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Bargaining for Justice*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Russell Hardin
Russell Hardin
Affiliation:
Political Science, Philosophy, and Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago
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Extract

David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement presents a partial theory of distributive justice. It is partial because it applies only to the distribution of gains from joint endeavors, or what we may call the ‘social surplus’ from cooperation. This surplus is the benefit we receive from cooperation insofar as this is greater than what we might have produced through individual efforts without interaction with others. The central core of Gauthier's theory of distributive justice is his bargaining theory of ‘minimax relative concession’ or MRC. Whether his theory is compelling turns essentially on whether MRC is workable and compelling. It is this issue that I wish to address.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , Spring 1988 , pp. 65 - 74
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1988

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References

1 David, Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). (Henceforth, page number references to this book will be given parenthetically in the text.)Google Scholar

2 Olson, Mancur Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965);Google ScholarRussell, Hardin, Collective Anion (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 1982).Google Scholar

3 One might defend against this criticism by supposing that the payoff is actually some sharing of commodities, not of money. But Adelaide and Ernest may be presumed to have money with which to compensate each other for alternative allocations of the commodities in a way that would be far more optimal. This point will be considered below.

4 Luce, R. Duncan and Raiffa, Howard, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957), p.168.Google Scholar

5 For further discussion of the range of such problems, see Hardin, Collective Action, Chap. 6, “Contractarian Provisions.”

6 Epstein, Richard A., Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p.4.Google Scholar

7 Gauthier, David, “Bargaining and Justice,” Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 2 (Spring 1985), p.40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Ibid., p.39.