Abstract
While most discussions of political realism in the West draw their inspiration from thinkers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes, they were far from the only political theorists developing such an approach. Rather, we see realist approaches to politics not only in a vast array of European thinkers throughout history, but also in a diverse range of non-European traditions. One such thinker, whose ideas have largely been lost to the contemporary world, was the Chinese philosopher Shen Dao, who focuses on the sources of political resentment and the necessity of eliminating them as a prerequisite to a strong and stable society and state. This essay develops Shen Dao’s argument that resentment arises not merely when people’s desires are not fulfilled, but rather when there was an expectation that they could have been fulfilled and works to demonstrate how he envisions eliminating sources of resentment in the political sphere. In doing so, this essay engages with much more prevalent Confucian views, demonstrating that Shen Dao presents a trenchant criticism of one of the very bases of Confucian political philosophy and, indeed, any political theory that develops itself from moral foundations.
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Notes
- 1.
For a translation and analysis of the remaining fragments attributed to Shen Dao, see Harris (2016).
- 2.
The term “Confucian” is often used to refer to the thought of Kongzi and those who saw themselves as following his ideals. However, while they share many ideas, there are important differences to be found in the thought of Kongzi and Mengzi (and later Confucians). The term “Mohist” is used to refer to those who followed the ideas of Mozi. An extensive discussion of the difference between Confucian and Mohist ethical thought can be found in Van Norden (2007).
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
Unfortunately, there has been little direct analysis of the contrasts between Shen Dao and either the Confucians or the Mohists, aside from Harris (2016). Other useful work speaking to contrasts between Han Fei, a later thinker who draws on Shen Dao for motivation, and the Confucians or Mohists includes Hutton (2008), Bárcenas (2012), Harris (2013), Van Norden (2013), and Harris (2020).
- 6.
- 7.
There is much controversy over the term “Legalist.” For more, see Harris (2014).
- 8.
- 9.
I lack resentment in this case not because it is objectively impossible to get a time machine. Rather it is tied to my beliefs that time travel technology does not exist and that no one could provide such a machine. If I have this belief, then even if the technology does exist and is being hidden by the government, I would have no reason to feel resentment.
- 10.
We may think that people can become acrobatically ingenious in their continual creation of targets for resentment. While Shen Dao does not address this point, his likely response would be that minimization of these targets remains a more effective goal than any alternative.
- 11.
In contemporary political and legal philosophy, a distinction is often made between rule of law and rule by law. Rule by law uses the law as a tool of political power, whereas rule of law places the law above all individuals within the state, binding even the ruler. See, for example, Tamanaha (2004), 4. Shen Dao does not distinguish between these two and may have lacked the theoretical resources to do so. However, from what he does say, he is clearly advocating what we today would describe as rule of law.
- 12.
See, in particular, chapter 5, “The Way of the Ruler,” in Sahleen (2005), 314–317.
- 13.
- 14.
There is, of course, a relationship between Congress and the EPA insofar as Congress has passed laws that give the EPA the power to enact regulations in a certain area.
- 15.
There are also a range of customs and norms of forbearance that restrict our actions, and these norms (as well as a whole host of other customs and even, we might think, common law) have no easily identifiable source toward which to target resentment.
- 16.
We could transmute anger at the results of such natural disasters to anger at a deity viewed as being responsible for the workings of the world, and this could give rise to resentment of such a deity. But, once again, it does so by identifying an agent, a target toward which feelings of resentment can appropriately be targeted. Absent this, it is hard to see how resentment toward the patterns of the natural world would arise.
- 17.
One might think that it is still possible to feel resentment for a political law without knowing how it came about. If the law is unjust, we may resent it. I would argue though that the resentment in such cases would be directed at those applying the law—identifiable agents. Absent such identifiable agents, it is unclear that the fact that the political law is unjust would give rise to resentment any more than the fact that an earthquake killed your family and not the family of others would give rise to resentment—even if you saw it as unjust. I thank Marius Backmann for pushing me on this.
- 18.
This leaves open the question of whether political or moral normativity should be followed when they conflict, but this question is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a deeper analysis focuses on Han Fei, an early Chinese political thinker who drew upon Shen Dao’s insights, see Harris (2013).
- 19.
It would be worth exploring the extent to which feelings of resentment toward the political elite have played a significant role in the decisions of voters in Europe, North and South America, and Asia, particularly since 2015 or so. Some work has been done in this area, particularly Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) who note that one key indication of a healthy democracy is forbearance, the point being that competitors recognize each other and feel no major resentment toward defeat. To the extent that this is lost, order is diminished. This is not to claim that contemporary philosophical analysis of resentment, anger, and so on is absent in the Western literature. It certainly makes an appearance in work on philosophy of race and feminist theory, among other areas. However, it has received less attention by those defending versions of political realism.
- 20.
Shen Dao is not arguing that this system is justified because moral goods require the sort of political stability that only his system can ensure. This may be a side effect, but it is not the goal, and, insofar as any moral goods subsequently developed potentially destabilize the system, he would advocate their elimination.
- 21.
I wish to thank Marius Backmann, Thai Dang, Amber L. Griffioen, and Philip J. Ivanhoe for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
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Harris, E.L. (2023). Developing Political Realism: Some Ideas from Classical China. In: Griffioen, A.L., Backmann, M. (eds) Pluralizing Philosophy’s Past. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13405-0_5
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