ABSTRACT

Since the nineteenth century, moral philosophy in the Western world has been dominated by utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism. Only a few philosophers have been able to escape from this Procrustean bed. Foremost among these few is Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950). Together with Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger, Hartmann was instrumental in restoring metaphysics. Hartmann's metaphysics differs markedly from that of both Bergson and Heidegger, in his indebtedness to Plato.In 1926, Hartmann published a massive treatise, Ethik, which was translated into English by Stanton Coit and published as Ethics in 1932. Ethics is probably the most outstanding treatise on moral philosophy in the twentieth century. The central concept of the book is ""value."" Drawing upon the pre-modern view of ethics, Hartmann maintains that values are objectively given, part and parcel of the order of being. We cannot invent values, we can merely discover them.The first part of Ethics is concerned with the structure of ethical phenomena and criticizes utilitarianism, Kantianism, and relativism as misleading approaches. After some introductory thoughts concerning the competence of practical philosophy, Hartmann discusses the essence of moral values, including their absoluteness and ideal being, and the essence of the ""ought."" Hartmann is both controversial and compelling. He provides a moral philosophy that rejects the subjectivism of the ruling approaches, without taking recourse to older theological notions on the foundation of the ethical. In sum: Hartmann's Ethics constitutes an impressive and preeminent contribution to moral philosophy.

chapter |20 pages

Introduction

part I|298 pages

The Structure of the Ethical Phenomenon

section I|24 pages

Contemplative and Normative Ethics

chapter I|4 pages

the Competency of Practical Philosophy

chapter II|8 pages

Can Virtue Be Taught?

chapter III|8 pages

The Right Meaning of the Normative

section II|46 pages

The Plurality of Morals and Unity of Ethics

chapter V|6 pages

The Knowledge of Good and Evil

chapter VI|18 pages

The Pathway to the Discovery of Values

chapter VII|11 pages

The Various Domains of the Moral Phenomenon

section III|36 pages

False Methods of Philosophical Ethics

chapter VIII|12 pages

Egoism and Altruism

chapter IX|9 pages

EudÆMonism and Utilitarianism

section IV|28 pages

The Kantian Ethics

chapter XI|11 pages

The Subjectivism of the Practical Reason

chapter XII|5 pages

Critique of Formalism

chapter XIII|10 pages

Critique of Intellectualism

section V|64 pages

The Essence of Ethical Values

chapter XIV|2 pages

Values as Essences

chapter XV|11 pages

The Relativity and Bsoluteness of Values

chapter XVI|15 pages

The Ideal Self-Existence of Values

chapter XVII|13 pages

Values as Principles

section VI|50 pages

The Essence of the Ought

chapter XVIII|8 pages

The Relation Of Value And The Ought

chapter XIX|16 pages

Position of the Ought Towards the Subject

chapter XX|12 pages

The Ought and the Finalistic Nexus

section VII|50 pages

Metaphysical Perspectives

chapter XXII|6 pages

Teleological Action and Reaction

chapter XXIII|14 pages

The Modal Structure of the Ought

chapter XXIV|15 pages

The Metaphysics of Personality

chapter XXV|12 pages

The Metaphysics of Personality