Skip to main content
Log in

Abstract

The problem of pessimism is the secular analogue to the evidential problem of evil facing traditional theism. The traditional theist must argue two things: that the evidence shows that this is on balance a good world and that it is the best possible world. Though the secular optimist who advocates any form of secular moral theory need not argue that the current and future world will likely be the best possible world, she nonetheless must argue that were there a ‘clean solution’ to the problem of current and future suffering in which all sentient life could be instantly and painlessly eliminated, we would have reasons not to employ the clean solution because the future promises to bring on balance a good world in which the evil of human and animal suffering is outweighed by whatever is good in the world. Pessimism is the view that the evidence argues against secular optimism. It is argued here that it is anything but clear that secular optimism is warranted when viewed from an impersonal point of view. The problem is then evaluated from the personal point of view in which a form of personal optimism is defended even in the face of impersonal pessimism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Cohen, Joel E., How Many People Can the Earth Support?. New York: W.W.W. Norton, 1995.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris, George W., Agent-centered Morality. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris, George W., Dignity and Vulnerability: Strength and Quality of Character. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

    Google Scholar 

  • Herman, Barbara, The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hill, Thomas Jr., Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hurka, Thomas, Virtue, Vice, and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

    Google Scholar 

  • James, William, The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life, in Alburey Castell (ed.), Essays in Pragmatism. New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1968.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones, Ernest, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, vol. 3. New York: Basic Books, 1957.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1978.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, Christine, Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levy, Stuart B., The Challenge of Antibiotic Resistance, Scientific American (1998).

  • Livi-Bacci, Massimo, A Concise History of World Population, 2nd Ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayerfeld, Jamie, Suffering and Moral Responsibility. London: Oxford University Press, 1999.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, Thomas, The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pimentel, David and Pimentel, Marcia, Ten Billion Mouths to Feed, Population Press, (2000) http://www.overpopulation.org

  • Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, The World at Six Billion. (ESA/P/WP.154), 12 October 1999. http://www.popin.org

  • Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan, 1907.

    Google Scholar 

  • World Health Organization Press, Press Release WHO/64.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Harris, G.W. Pessimism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5, 271–286 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019621509461

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019621509461

Navigation