Reproducing Social Hierarchy (or Not!)

Sally Haslanger

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PREFACE

I am honored to be asked to give this year's Kneller Lecture to the Philosophy of Education Society. I am also humbled, because I am not a specialist in philosophy of education, and those of you here are much more knowledgeable about the subject matter than I am. However, I believe deeply in the value of both intra- and interdisciplinary work and knowledge gained through practice. I hope that my discussion today offers you some tools to enrich your thinking, and I look forward to learning from you.

BACKROUND: IDEOLOGY AND SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

In the world as we know it, injustice and oppression take many forms and are upheld in a variety of ways, many of them coercive. Ideological oppression, unlike more direct affronts to our freedom and dignity, "gets under the skin" and appropriates our agency; we become complicit in oppressive structures, whether as subordinated or privileged. As a result, ideological oppression is harder to identify and critique. It structures our everyday lives and shapes our experience, because ideology functions as "doxa" that is taken for granted as common sense. Political and legal theorists and judges are as subject to ideology as anyone else. And because power relations grant them status as authorities, their insights may simply reinforce the background unjust social structure.

But what is ideology exactly? How does it function, and how is it maintained?[1] On my account, social practices depend on a set of social meanings—what I call a "*cultural technē*"—that provide the basis for coor-

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dination around things taken to have (or lack) value. For example, streets and other thoroughfares are valuable to facilitate movement between two locations—they are *resources*; but the use of streets requires coordination if they are to remain safe. Communities develop a complex set of signs, signals, laws, norms, and such to manage the use of thoroughfares, and drivers, cyclists, and pedestrians are expected to be responsive to them. The tools for coordination are public (they must be to serve their coordinating function), but to be a fluent user of the street, we must all shape the collection of our individual beliefs, desires, and expectations around them. A cultural technē sets the cultural conditions and the material apparatus for social agency.[2]

There are two main uses of the term "ideology." In one tradition, a community's ideology is its cultural technē, good or bad. In the second (critical theory) tradition, however, an ideology is a cultural technē "gone wrong." This critical theory tradition uses the term 'ideology' in a pejorative sense. On my account, an ideology may fail us in various ways: it may not provide us with the tools to recognize what is valuable; it may distribute what is valuable unfairly; and it may organize us in unjust or harmful ways. Thus, I use the term "ideology" in what is called the "pejorative sense," but not all cultural technēs are ideological; some function to support reasonable and non-oppressive practices.[3] My account differs from standard accounts of ideology because it is non-doxastic: in other words, ideologies are not sets of beliefs or other psychological attitudes.[4] Ideologies are public tools for coordination—sometimes called "frameworks of meanings and values"—that are inscribed in an apparatus and guide us in managing the background material conditions.[5]

Social animals, including humans, rely on coordination for survival. Each of us needs to coordinate with others; it is not optional. So, we have strong reasons to engage in practices with others on the terms available. Moreover, our ecological flexibility depends on the ability to pass knowledge and skills to others through social learning (rather than waiting for biological evolution).[6] Cross-generational transmission of the cultural technē is a source of social stability. As a result, societies are (dynamic) homeostatic systems that reproduce themselves. In doing so, they reproduce social practices, social relations, and social injustice.

Under such conditions, social agency, itself, poses a challenge. Action that conforms to a social practice is intelligible to others; if one strays too far, one is either misinterpreted or viewed only as a questionable member of the community. This poses a tension. On the one hand, we need each other; we need to be interpretable, recognizable, included. But on the other hand, demands to conform can undermine our agency. Bernard Williams articulates this as a pair of problems:

> One is a political problem, of finding a basis for a shared life which will be neither too oppressively coercive (the requirement of freedom) nor dependent on mythical legitimations (the requirement of enlightenment). The other is a personal problem, of stabilizing the self into a form that will indeed fit with these political and social ideas, but which can at the same time create a life that presents itself to a reflective individual as worth living; in particular, one that does so by reinventing in a more reflective and demystified world assurances that were taken in an earlier time (or so we imagine) as matters of necessity.[7]

As individuals, we seek those "various structures [that] serve to build a self that will at once make sense of episodic feelings and thoughts—render the subject, as I have put it, steadier—and also relate

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the person to others in ways that will serve the purposes of co-operation and trust."[8] Cooperation demands of us that we occupy a role and the schemas for the role offer a narrative, an identity, a "steady" way to go on; we take up offers to occupy roles within the limited set of choices provided to us.[9] But even if we find a way to manage the personal problem, the political problem remains: is the structure of social positions available to us morally defensible?

Ideology provides a damaging and morally objectionable solution to the problem of social agency. Very broadly, ideology is maintained through socialization of individuals into the ordinary practices of everyday life and the shaping of material conditions to reinforce them. This is where education comes in. Educational systems not only teach knowledge and cognitive skills, they also teach social know-how. Social skills are extremely important for doing well in life, but they also make one a fluent participant in unjust and harmful practices. This raises moral dilemmas for individuals. However, the deeper problems are structural: how can society be structured to provide meaningful lives for individuals in a stable way? And how can we change the cultural technē to support this? And if we cannot, how does it fail? On what basis can we launch a warranted critique? And what do we say to those who have shaped their lives and identities to fit within it?

In what follows, I will develop this challenge. In particular, I will argue that the integration of diverse knowers in an educational community is not sufficient to disrupt ideology, even if they are included as equals. Situated knowledge is not the same as a critical standpoint. I will then outline one process for gaining a critical standpoint through consciousness raising. Consciousness raising prompts a paradigm shift in our understanding of the status quo and offers epistemic resources for a social justice movement. (Of course, knowledge does not make us free;

we must organize in order to effectively resist and remake unjust structures.) I conclude that education for social justice should make available resources and opportunities for individuals to engage in consciousness raising together, and also give them the skills for this process to be undertaken, as needed, over a lifetime.

IDEOLOGY AND INTERPELLATION

To motivate the problem, it is important to say more about how ideology works.[10] Louis Althusser distinguishes *repressive state apparatuses* (RSAs) and *ideological state apparatuses* (ISAs).[11] RSAs include the "the government, the administration, the army, the courts, the prisons, etc." that "function by violence" or, "massively and predominantly by repression."[12] Ideological state apparatuses include religion, education, the family, the legal system, the political system, trade unions, communications/media, and culture ("literature, the arts, sports, etc.") that "function massively and predominantly by ideology."[13] (No state apparatus is purely one or the other, and each depends crucially on the other, though in modern society, the ISAs are the dominant mode of social management.) A crucial difference between an ISA and an RSA is that individuals are hailed into a subject position by an ISA (Althusser calls this a process of "interpellation"), rather than violently forced into it. It is characteristic of those "good subjects" who respond to the hailing that they take up the norms as binding on themselves, so they don't need to be coercively managed. For example, to maintain a division of labor, instilling literacy, numeracy, and other kinds of technical "know how' is not sufficient:

> besides these techniques and knowledges, and in learning them, children at school also learn the 'rules' of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the division of labour, according to the job he is 'destined' for: rules of morality, civic and profes-

> sional conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order established by class domination. They also learn to 'speak proper French', to 'handle' the workers correctly, i.e. actually (for the future capitalists and their servants) to 'order them about' properly, i.e. (ideally) to 'speak to them' in the right way, etc.[14]

The local ISAs interpellate subjects so that they perform the practices of their social milieu voluntarily: this is how things are; this is what we do; this is who we are. As Althusser emphasizes, the good subjects "work all by themselves"![15]

On Althusser's view, school is a primary site where interpellation happens (the family is the other). Although he was concerned primarily about class, practices at school in the contemporary U.S., interpellate subjects with a complex mix of identities: race, ethnicity, nationality, native language, class, disability/giftedness, appearance/attractiveness, sex, and gender, among them. This happens not only through what material is taught, but how classes and non-class time are managed, who has authority and how it is wielded, what norms of etiquette are upheld and not, procedures for evaluation, what spaces are designated for whom, and the material infrastructure. Socialization into the public space of our particular form of patriarchal White Supremacist capitalism happens, to a significant extent, in educational settings.[16]

My conception of ideology is Althusserian. We participate in social practices guided by a set of public meanings, scripts, etc. that are realized in an ideological apparatus and are shaped by material conditions. A blackboard and desk or podium marks the front of a classroom. We organize ourselves in such a space depending on our role in that setting.

The front of the classroom has a meaning that both students and teachers understand, and it guides them in the activity of learning together. The cultural technē of academia, overall, has value, though some parts of it, or its manifestation in some settings, may be ideological. For example, recent work on epistemic injustice argues that some academic practices place unwarranted restrictions on who counts as a knower, what form knowledge must take, and the legitimate sources of knowledge.[17]

We are "hailed" into practices in a variety of ways: we are hailed into speaking English by having English spoken to us; we are hailed into the role of student by being sent to school and finding ourselves responding to the teacher as an authority (nudged by coercion); we are hailed into adulthood by having to pay the rent (with threat of coercion in the background). We then develop ways of being and thinking so that we are (more or less) fluent English speakers, fluent students, fluent rent-paying adults, etc. Ideology is not a set of beliefs, though it may produce belief about what is apt or inapt, right or wrong, and related desires, emotions, and other attitudes. As Althusser says, "Ideology always exists in an apparatus and its practice or practices. Its existence is material."[18] The world around us is structured so that we typically embody a practice before we even know we are engaged in it.[19]

It is tempting to interpret the process of interpellation as a process that creates subjects with adaptive preferences and desires. It is well-established that preference formation takes into account beliefs about what is possible, feasible, practical. In a simple case, I adapt my food preferences to the menu at the restaurant where I am having dinner. But, more broadly, individuals adjust their preferences, their desires, and their sense of self, to the social roles that are available. If doctors are men and nurses are women, and I am a woman, then I will probably aspire to be a nurse rather than a doctor. Moreover, becoming a nurse satisfies my preferences; I would rather be a successful nurse than a "woman doctor" who faces discrimination, disrespect, and self-doubt.

Sometimes interpellation works through causing us to adapt our preferences. However, there is another dimension that emerges when we consider it more like an apprenticeship into (or an imposition of) a practice.[20] Start with a simple case of a game such as soccer. When deciding whether to play a game of soccer, I consider the pros and cons of doing so. But the game has a set of rules. So, if I decide to go forward—if I commit to the game—my reasons for acting are constrained. It is no longer an option, when running down the pitch, to pick up the ball with my hands and run to the goal. If I do that, I'm no longer playing soccer. As John Rawls makes clear, if I am bound by a rule, it is a mistake to think that I should decide based on an individual cost/benefit analysis whether I should follow it (though, there will be a range of excuses allowed by the rule):

> To engage in a practice, to perform those actions specified by a practice, means to follow the appropriate rules. If one wants to do an action which a certain practice specifies then there is no way to do it except to follow the rules which define it. Therefore, it doesn't make sense for a person to raise the question whether or not a rule of a practice correctly applies to his case where the action he contemplates is a form of action defined by a practice. If someone were to raise such a question, he would simply show that he didn't understand the situation in which he was acting.[21]

Not all practices are rule-governed in the way games are, but they are governed by norms and values.[22] For example, in the case of nursing there are some professional rules, but the rules are constructed around values of health and care. If a nurse is treating an enemy, it is not permissible—consistent with the role of nurse—to decide how to treat the patient by asking whether it would be, all things considered, better to kill them. To kill them would be a way of renouncing the role of nurse. When we become experts in the role, these sorts of questions don't even arise.

CRITICAL SUBJECTS

The epistemic position of the "good subject" is complicated.[23] Under conditions of ideology there is, by hypothesis, a range of unjust social practices that situate some in privileged or dominant positions, and others as subordinate; however, not everyone experiences the oppressive conditions as such. Those who are fluent in the practices may not even recognize them as social practice: a practice may be naturalized or taken for granted. The working class may not recognize their exploitation as such; women may not agree on what practices are sexist; white folk are often unaware of how their practices are exclusionary. And even a problematic practice may be experienced as valuable and produce something of value.

Moreover, even those who have a vague dissatisfaction in a particular milieu experience a kind of ambiguity: am I the problem (is there something wrong with me?), or are others the problem (they are ridiculous . . . !), or does the problem lie in the broader institution or structure (I hate this school!)?[24] Still others may have an articulated critique (heteronormative, White Supremacist, patriarchal, capitalism is the problem!).[25] But even being deeply critical of a practice does not prevent one from being fluent in it; and because resistance is often punished, many will have reason to comply with practices they abhor. There may be no better live option. Because we depend on coordination with others, we are often just stuck enacting an unjust system we are embedded in, for lack of better alternatives.

One strategy for illuminating the injustices built into practices and

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the structures they compose is to call for diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in the process of knowledge production and dissemination. Because this approach rightly assumes that one's social position affects what one knows, it is sometimes defended as a form of "standpoint epistemology." However, the term "standpoint epistemology" emerged as an effort to address the problem of ideology, and situated knowledge is not itself sufficient to establish a critical standpoint. Because ideology, when successful, recruits us into fluent participation in an unjust structure, some of those who are subject to subordination will not develop or accept a critique of it. Critique may take aim at deeply held identities that both enable one to coordinate with others and provide a basis for self-esteem. So some broadly empiricist claims that "all knowledge is situated," although true, will not necessarily be enough to develop a critical perspective; and an effort to include diverse knowers in inquiry, although important, will not always (or even usually) be enough to disrupt ideological practices.[26] Situated knowledge may just provide knowledge of the practice, without knowledge of what makes it problematic or what would be better. What's needed is situated *critical* knowledge—not just knowledge of the practice, or knowledge from within the practice, but insight into the ideological function of the practice and a space of alternatives. What would critical knowledge production and dissemination practices look like? How would they go beyond standard practices of diversity, equity, and inclusion to promote anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-ableist, anti-colonial, anti-capitalist knowledge?[27]

If we know what is just and unjust, then the proper target of ideology critique simply follows: we should disrupt the cultural technē that prevents us from valuing things aptly and disrupt those social structures that produce injustice. In the context of education, we should socialize subjects to recognize what is valuable and organize themselves justly. This is Plato's solution. But as noted, we are theorizing from *within* a cultural technē, and that technē may itself be ideological. Ideology works by recruiting both the dominant and the subordinate to enact unjust practices without being coerced; it does so by masking and distorting features of the world that matter. Recognizing this, Robin Celikates points to three challenges that an account of ideology critique must address. Here are two that are relevant today:

> i) *Normative challenge:* what makes an ideology problematic? Are there objective moral truths by reference to which we can judge a social arrangement defective or unjust? Do we learn these by undertaking ideal theory? If not, then on what basis do we undertake critique?
>
> ii) *Methodological or epistemological challenge*: from what standpoint does the critic speak? Traditionally critical theory is embedded in a social movement and aims to articulate the interests and demands of the oppressed. But then the question is "which insights of which agents—given that they usually do not constitute a homogeneous category—the critical theorist articulates."[28]

Celikates's challenges situate us at a skeptical moment: if we, ourselves, may be in the grip of an ideology, how can we judge what is emancipatory? He addresses these challenges by treating ideology critique as a second-order project.[29] On his view, ideology "block[s] the formation and exercise of actors' reflective capacities."[30] So, "The critical and emancipatory task of social theory is thus to identify, analyse and criticise, in the context of a discourse with those affected, the social conditions that hinder or block the formation or exercise of their reflective capacities."[31] Because critical theory, on his view, is not relying on or importing values other than the epistemic value of developing critical capacities in a community, it needn't take a stand on the substantive values at issue in the context. The critic's primary goal should be to open space for resistant voices to be heard and allow the community to determine its own collective values and the social practices to further them.

I am sympathetic with Celikates's processualism, and with the fallibility of any such method. Note, however:

- Ideology prevents us from engaging in just and worthy practices by shaping our agency (and the social world). In other words, *every practice* has an epistemic element: it depends on an *orientation* that selects the information that is apt and cultivates a set of cognitive, affective, and agential responses. How do we distinguish changing all sorts of practices—and their component orientations—from "second-order" epistemic interventions?

- Are critical capacities sufficient? Can epistemic practices be ideological? How should we adjudicate which forms of critique are warranted?

- As Celikates suggests, a crucial commitment of critical theory is to listen to first person (and first-person plural) knowledge claims of the oppressed. This commitment is partly grounded in epistemic humility: we should listen to those directly affected by the practices in question because they are likely to have better access to morally relevant facts. However, sometimes it is a claim of epistemic entitlement by *those who are members* of such oppositional groups. Why aren't those demanding first-order solutions counted as critical theorists?

METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES: NARROWING THE TASK

Celikates's questions raise fundamental questions in moral epistemology, meta-ethics, and political theory. Is there any way to make progress on them today? Let's begin by situating the issues within social philosophy (rather than political philosophy or ethics) and accepting a few other assumptions that narrow our scope:[32]

- We are not starting the normative inquiry from scratch. Those engaged in justified political resistance cannot avoid the claim that there are *some* moral truths. So, it is not my task to argue for an objective basis for moral judgment.[33]

- Ideology critique *is critical*; it does not make a claim about the nature of justice. We do not need to *know what justice is* or have a complete moral theory to engage in social critique. We can begin with knowledge of (an) injustice. (Injustice may not be a proper kind. And modal knowledge of what makes something an injustice is not essential to remedy instances of it.) What counts as ideology is a matter of the injustice of its effects and the (bad) values it promotes/embodies, so it focuses on identifying injustice and harm.

- The site of ideology critique is *the social domain*. This includes both individuals and the state. But the primary issues concern what practices we should engage in, what social norms we should embrace, how we should go on, from here, together—for example, how should we organize food production and distribution? How should we organize childcare and education? An individual can be treated unjustly *qua* individual. But within the social domain individuals are vulnerable to perpetrating or suffering injustice *by virtue of their social positions.* The aim is to improve our social practices and social structures to eliminate this positional vulnerability. Because there are many ways to organize social life, the goal is not to ask: what is the *best* way to do this? The project is *anti-utopian* (but does require imagination and hope).[34]

- As social critics, we should distinguish the *justification problem* from the *illumination problem* (how do we get others to recognize their oppression and join our movement?) In critical theory, they are often joined because critical theory should be emancipatory. But they need not be.

- We should also distinguish the *justification problem* from the *political problem.* The justification problem concerns whether we have a justified complaint against the current social order—that is to say, some practice or set of practices is harmful or unjust. The political problem is what we, collectively, should do about it (and how to decide). Rarely can all *pro tanto* political complaints be adequately addressed. Also, power matters:

> the phrase "the common good" generally ignores the differential distribution of losses and benefits throughout a citizenry that result from collective action, and manages the problem of loss in politics (or, the defeat of a citizen's interests in the public sphere) simply by asking citizens to bear up in moments of disappointment.[35]

> Critical theorists who are dubious that there is a "neutral" or "non-ideological" basis for critique are focusing on the justification problem—how we can identify the problems with our cultural technē and its instruments (such as the family and education system) and come up with better alternatives?

- Objective values need not be ahistorical or acontextual. They may be path-dependent. What's valuable depends, inter alia, on what is available to value. Jack Balkin makes this point:

> Human beings possess an inexhaustible drive to evaluate, to pronounce what is good and bad, beautiful

> and ugly, advantageous and disadvantageous. Without culture, human values are inchoate and indeterminate; through culture they become differentiated, articulated, and refined.[36]

In what follows, I will consider a particular form of critique that arises in and through a practice that is sometimes called "consciousness raising." Consciousness raising is a collective activity—done with others—and prompts a *paradigm shift* in one's orientation to the world.[37] This includes a shift in what facts become accessible, our interpretation of them, and what responses are called for. It is not easily reversed. The experience of such a paradigm shift is powerful, but its adequacy or warrant is not guaranteed. If a movement is to be built on such a paradigm shift, and if movements are to make warranted claims against others, then we need to think more about the conditions under which consciousness raising provides knowledge, and what sort of knowledge it provides. In the next sections, I will provide a sketch of some of the main features of an epistemology of consciousness raising, as I see it. There is much that needs further discussion and elaboration.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF OPPOSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Let's start with an example:[38]

"The Girls Fought Back"

On March 26, 2019, *The Washington Post* published an article about a group of girls at Bethesda-Chevy Chase High School who learned that their male peers had cre-

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ated a "list" that "ranked and rated [them] based on their looks from 5.5-9.4, with decimal points to the hundredth place."[39] This kind of activity is not new at this particular high school and occurs virtually everywhere in some form or another. But a subset of the girls on the list, inspired by what they had learned through the #MeToo movement were upset and complained to the principal. One male student was given detention and that was supposed to be the end of it.

But one of the girls, Nicky Schmidt, texted with her friends after the disciplinary action was announced and they called on others in the IB program to meet at the main office the next day to protest the inadequacy of the school's response. Forty girls showed up. As a result, the school hosted a 2.5-hour discussion with all students, including those who produced the list. At this meeting, "Several girls delivered personal and impassioned speeches describing not only their presence on the list but also their previous experiences with sexual abuse, harassment and objectification, both inside the school and outside of it."[40] After this meeting, the boy responsible for the list said, "When you have a culture where it's just normal to talk about that, I guess making a list about it doesn't seem like such a terrible thing to do. . . . It's easy for me to lose sight of the consequences of my actions and kind of feel like I'm above something. . . . [But it's] just a different time and things really do need to change."[41] Between the school meeting and the writing of the article (at least), "a co-ed group of senior students has been gathering on an almost weekly basis at lunch

> time to discuss how to prevent this sort of incident from happening again."[42] Collective action was then planned to implement policies and practices aimed to reduce similar behavior in the future.

It is worth reflecting on several aspects of this process:

- The school initially treated "the list" as a one-off event and responded by slapping one offender on the wrist.

- A subset of the affected girls found the disciplinary action inadequate and saw the offense as a broad and repeated phenomenon that affected them *as girls*. They were inspired and guided by the current #MeToo movement.

- A broader set of girls met with the subset as a group to share their experience and articulate their concerns.

- The school hosted an event where girls shared their experiences with others, including the offenders.

- Some boys came to recognize that they were misled by "the culture" and reconsidered their behavior.

- New practices and policies were planned through "collective action".

Note that there seem to be several epistemic turning points: (a) a subset of girls found the actions of the administration inadequate; (b) they gained insight from the #MeToo movement; (c) they inspired a broader number of girls to resist; (d) the school administrators took seriously the girls' complaints and shifted from seeing the problem as individual to seeing it as cultural and structural; (e) some of the offenders learned from the girls' narratives that their behavior, although regarded as culturally appropriate, was problematic; (f) the administrators recognized the need for cultural and structural change. Notice that none of this happened in a classroom. The most effective methods seemed to be the sharing of counter-narratives—the public articulation of experience in the milieu that is normally kept private, invisible—and an insistence that the narratives be heard, directly, by the offenders (both the administrators and the students).[43]

Jane Mansbridge uses the term "oppositional consciousness" to capture a particular kind of response to oppression. She suggests (drawing on Michel Foucault) that oppositional consciousness *in liberation movements* (cf. social responsibility movements) requires:

> a gut refusal to be subordinated rooted somewhere in every human being. . . . To form an effective basis for collective action, gut refusals need cognitive and emotional organizing. They need an injustice frame. . . . They need an apparatus involving both reason and emotion.[44]

Iris Marion Young calls this a "desiring negation":

> Desire, the desire to be happy [?!], creates the distance, the negation, that opens the space for criticism of what is. This critical distance does not occur on the basis of some previously discovered rational ideas of the good and the just. On the contrary, the ideas of the good and the just arise from the desiring negation that action

> brings to what is given.
>
> Each social reality presents its own unrealized possibilities, experienced as lacks and desires. Norms and ideals arise from the yearning that is an expression of freedom: it does not have to be this way, it could be otherwise.[45]

Drawing on empirical case studies, Mansbridge argues that certain tools are valuable in moving from a gut refusal to an "injustice frame":[46]

> an existing *oppositional culture* provides ideas, rituals, and long-standing patterns of interaction that overt political struggle can refine and develop to create a more mature oppositional consciousness . . . a history of *segregation* with some autonomy, providing "free spaces" for the elaboration and testing of ideas; *borrowing* from previous successful movements; the *synthesis* of more than one oppositional strand, creating more than the sum of its parts; mutually supportive *interaction,* bridging divides in emotional commitments; and *consensus creativity* by activists, drawing on the traditions and practices of everyday life.[47]

Oppositional consciousness transforms into a movement when those in the group "demand changes in the polity, economy or society to rectify those injustices."[48]

Many of Mansbridge's steppingstones to achieve an "injustice frame" are present in the Chevy Chase example. The #MeToo movement (and other related movements) provided an oppositional culture and provided insight, language, and examples of the power of first-person narrative. The girls created segregated "free spaces" (both through social media and meetings) where they could elaborate and test ideas and provide mutually supportive interaction.

And the demands of the activists prompted both cultural and structural interventions. Note that this is a *very* small and rather limited example and doesn't capture all that Mansbridge is urging (especially the "synthesis of more than one oppositional strand" which can address intersectionality), but even here there are important shifts of consciousness.[49]

Under conditions of ideology, a primary task of critique is to articulate a (warranted) moral claim *in the name of the subordinate group*. The claim is made against those with whom one coordinates—in a classroom, a family, an institution (workplace, civic organization), a nation—and makes a demand that the terms of coordination be changed.[50] The goal is not to punish a wrongdoer or to achieve individual compensation; it is a demand for cultural and structural change in one's milieu, here and now. This form of critique requires a shift in perspective from a focus on individual interactions to the *positional vulnerability and privilege within structures*. A standpoint epistemology is an epistemology of this shift in perspective, a shift that allows one to analyze and destabilize the framework that enables oppression to persist in the social context. This can and often does rely on situated knowledge, but situated knowledge is not enough. Consciousness raising is one way to gain a critical standpoint.

On the account of ideology I have sketched, the target phenomenon is the structure of problematic practices and their governing frameworks of meaning and values (the cultural technēs), not just the beliefs or other psychological attitudes of those with whom one coordinates. A change in practices might involve improving rules and policies, and will often involve shifts in the cultural technē—the social meanings that guide our perception, attention, affect, memory, and action.[51] This will often also require a change in the material conditions and the ideological apparatus.

For example, the girls at Bethesda-Chevy Chase High School were not primarily asking for harsher punishment for the offenders, nor were they asking for special treatment. They were asking for a change in culture: to be a girl/woman/female is not to be a sex object, an object of the "male gaze;" a female's worth is not to be judged by her approximation to the bodies of supermodels. To implement such a change involves changing beliefs and desires of those in the community, but it is important to note that such meanings can provide a background for interaction even if most people involved actually reject them.[52] It is likely that most of the students at the school do not really believe that girls should be wholly judged by their appearance, but that doesn't prevent the evaluative framework from being an assumed backdrop for patterns of interaction: girls aim to achieve standards of appearance they don't fully endorse and boys perform their masculinity by going along with the ritual objectification. As a simplification, we might think of it as a game going on with rules about how to be a girl/boy; if one is playing the game, one performs in accordance with the rules to the best of one's ability and is judged as successful or not on their terms. Some people take the game seriously and have corresponding beliefs; but acceptance or commitment for certain purposes is enough; one doesn't have to "believe" the rules to be bound by them or to have them be the frame for interaction.[53] Sadly, in many contexts, there may not be a feasible or intelligible way to opt out of the game of gender (or other social categories, such as race, or disability). Consciousness raising calls attention to the frame and its effects. In the primary cases, it does so in a first-person way: *we* are living within this unacceptable frame, and *we* need to change it.[54]

It is plausible that oppositional consciousness arises and can be justified in a variety of ways. Here I will just briefly sketch one kind of process that begins with a reaction, moves to a complaint, and results in a *pro tanto* moral claim.[55] I draw on Elizabeth Anderson's pragmatist moral epistemology, but I will focus on the social knowledge that is needed to critique a practice.[56] I use bullets rather than numbers because the steps in the process need not occur in the order listed below.

- The process attempts to explain and develop insights deriving from a moral "gut refusal" to comply with or accept a practice, a "desiring negation" that yearns for and imagines other possibilities. Such a refusal might simply be a personal indication of displeasure, a whine, but does not rise to the level of a complaint against others. How do we transform whining or displeasure into a proper complaint? From here forward, the process is social rather than individual.

- To determine whether the desiring negation is simply a personal displeasure about a situation or a response to a positional vulnerability, one should articulate the concern to others within the same (affected) social group; test the reaction against the experience of others. Consider: is the problem individual or social? Am I over-reacting? Are others treating me this way because I am failing to live up to a reasonable standard? Is the agent simply a bad actor?

- The effectiveness of such inquiry often depends on the existence or creation of counter-publics where the subordinated can complain to each other without being "corrected" by members of the dominant group—where they can be heard and their testimony trusted.[57] The articulation process—at this stage and later stages—should involve forms of *bias reduction* and *consideration of epistemic injustice* of all sorts. There is compelling empirical evidence that: "Standing in a position of superior power over others tends to bias the moral sentiments of the powerful, in at least three ways: it reduces their compassion, activates their arrogance, and leads them to objectify subordinates."[58]

- The process involves shifting *orientations* to notice facts that have been occluded—empirical facts, for example, about patterns, morally relevant facts, facts about possibilities, facts about social structure. Shifts in orientations can be prompted by the idiosyncratic conceptions of individuals, by existing oppositional cultures (#MeToo), or by the alternative orientations gained by participation in different practices or cultures.

- The process allows for, even encourages, hermeneutical invention. Individuals within the group can sometimes rely on existing identities, but in other cases new "identities" are called for.[59] The shared identities (Black feminist, queer) allow for a cultivation of trust, new language, shared interests, etc. Patterns can then become more visible, new hermeneutic resources developed "smart-ugly" (as in the Combahee River Collective case), "misogyny."[60]

- Participants should develop and experiment with the new paradigm. This includes a new way of thinking but is broader than a cognitive shift.[61] It includes experimenting with new practices that call for different ways of interacting, different relationships, different affective responses. Counter-publics are another site for such experiments in living.[62]

- *Develop a hypothesis* about the forms and causes of practices that entrench subordination and block change. What is the cause of the harm or unfairness? Why is it not easily recognized or remedied?[63] This may involve targeting injustices in various domains: epistemic, material, legal, cultural.

- *Test the hypothesis.* Is the hypothesis generated from within the new paradigm empirically adequate? Is the hypothesis the best explanation of the injustices? Draw on critical social science. Revise the hypothesis, as needed.

Eric Olin Wright describes an emancipatory, or critical, social science:

> It is not enough to show that people suffer in the world in which we live or that there are enormous inequalities in the extent to which people live flourishing lives. A scientific emancipatory theory must show that the explanation for this suffering and inequality lies in

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> specific properties of institutions and social structures. The first task of emancipatory social science, therefore, is the diagnosis and critique of the causal processes that generate these harms.[64]

This is the stage where some pernicious ideologies can be ruled out, for example: White Supremacy relies on false empirical claims about races; heteronormativity relies on false claims about sex, gender, and sexuality; anti-vaxxers rely on false claims about vaccines. Of course, pointing out that the ideological assumptions are false does not convince the adherents, but we are talking here about justification, not illumination.

- Articulate *a claim* challenging the practice, for example, this (part of the) practice is unjust, oppressive, harmful, or wrongful.

Political stage (beyond our primary concern here, and due to background processualism, there are no guarantees!)

- Suggest proposals for corrective procedures and practices. (Where possible, corrective practices should be tested in counter-publics.)

- If deliberation concerning the claims and proposals is unsuccessful, resort to non-deliberative interventions, "from petitioning, publicity campaigns, theatrical performances, candlelight vigils, litigation, and political campaigns to street demonstrations, boycotts, teach-ins, sit-ins, picketing, strikes, and building occupations."[65]

- Even if a proposal is met with agreement in the public sphere, this is not the end of the story. Anderson suggests that we must ask: "[i] Does acting on the new judgments solve the problem as originally diagnosed? [ii] Does it do so with acceptable side effects? An affirmative answer to both questions amounts to a successful test of the new judgment in an experiment in living."[66]

- The process is fallible, so it must be repeated as needed.

On this view, an oppositional consciousness is warranted insofar as it moves from a "gut refusal" to a moral claim through a collective examination of shared experience that is guided by sound epistemic norms. What norms are "sound" is not simply a matter of what the dominant culture recommends but should be guided by best practices of social psychology, empirical investigation, and the lived experience of those affected. The aim of consciousness raising is not to reach certainty or to offer evidence that would be compelling to all who consider it. The task is to engage in epistemically responsible practices that push us beyond what is taken to be common sense, while also affording a reasonable form of objectivity.[67] After testing and revisions of our hypothesis have reached a stable point, we—those undertaking consciousness raising—move to the moral claim. This resulting claim is made on behalf of a social group and warranted through collective efforts. However, an oppositional moral claim is not, simply by virtue of being the result of such a process, dispositive. Rather, it is a move in a process of contentious politics that deserves consideration in collective deliberation. There is no perfect solution, as Danielle Allen makes clear, in describing Ralph Ellison's view:

> democracy is not a static end-state that achieves the common good by assuring the same benefits or the same level of benefits to everyone, but rather a political practice by which the diverse negative effects of collective political action, and even of just decisions, must be

> distributed equally, and constantly redistributed over time, on the basis of consensual interactions.[68]

CONCLUSION: EDUCATION FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE

What insights might this discussion offer for education? Let's return to Celikates's suggestion that ideology critique should be understood as "second order" and aimed at the social conditions that hinder or block the formation or exercise of individuals' reflective capacities. I have argued that some forms of ideology critique can legitimately make first-order moral claims. For example, the girls at Chevy Chase High School offered a justified critique of the sexual objectification of girls at the school through the apparatus of "the list," that is, the ranking of girls by appearance. I don't know the details of their process, but they were right to demand a paradigm shift that placed the focus on the sexist culture of the school and the structures supporting it. It is plausible, moreover, that they were justified in their claims about how the school's culture is unjust and harms students, even if some of the students and administrators were not convinced. And this makes sense: if, as I've maintained, the ideology of a community is the cultural technē embedded in the practices—the background ideas and assumptions that serve as common ground—then surely an ideology critique should provide a first-order critique of *that cultural framework*.

However, Celikates is right that in order to undertake such a critique, we will also need efforts to challenge the "second order" epistemic practices that block critical reflective capacities in those affected by oppression. Relevant capacities surely include capacities to reason, capacities to carefully examine one's beliefs and one's justification for them, capacities to engage in objective inquiry. But the process of consciousness raising suggests that these are not the only epistemic abilities and skills that matter. I will describe four here.

First, the relevant capacities, such as those just mentioned, are usually understood to be individual capacities concerned with belief formation. But the process of consciousness raising is essentially social.

In the process, one thinks and feels together *with others* who are affected; to do it properly, one must learn how to demand epistemic justice for oneself and accord it to one's interlocutors. These are difficult skills—including empathy, epistemic self-confidence, and flexibility in modes of communication, and they require practice.

Second, consciousness raising is a route to moral knowledge through *experience*, either one's own, or through the first-person reports of others. Seeking solid justification for, or drawing conclusions from, what one already believes is insufficient. Of course, finding and eliminating contradictions in one's beliefs is important, but adjusting one's beliefs for consistency keeps one locked in what might well be a deeply defective paradigm. Allowing oneself to *experience* new things is a skill. (My hunch is that just *thinking* new things is easier, for thoughts can just reflect possibility; experience is not just about possibility.) Some of the new experience will be first-person experience and requires a kind of epistemic self-trust; some will be disclosures of others and will require epistemic trust in them. Allowing oneself to be impacted in unexpected ways is not easy and requires both courage and support. Knowing how and with whom to undertake such epistemic work makes a difference.

Third, the paradigm shift that comes with consciousness raising will often involve a shift in identity. Identity is, among other things, a set of commitments to norms and practices that define that identity. Recall the soccer game: one commits to the game—to being a soccer player—and the rules tell one how to play; they define what counts as playing the game. In the context of the game, or the season, or part of one's life,

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conforming to the rules is part of who one is. In that role, one notices the movement of the ball and of one's opponents, the limits of the sidelines, the whistle of the referee, the yellow or red card. These are what matter. One has been interpellated into practices that shape experience, affect, cognition, and memory. If one starts to question one's commitment to the game or the structure of the rules, then one's relation to one's teammates, one's own performance, and the whole game, changes. In the context of a soccer match (for the non-professional!), this is usually fairly trivial. But in the context of living a gendered life, it can be deeply unmooring. A paradigm shift of this sort is difficult to sustain alone; this is again why the process is social.

Fourth, scientific inquiry depends on experimentation, and so does critical inquiry. Because a cultural technē is a set of tools for coordination, one cannot tell simply by reflection whether an alternative set of tools will function adequately. Social psychology and other forms of critical social science and history can help, but the project is to change one's current social conditions. (As I see it, one does not normally undertake ideology critique for someone else at some other time and place [though one may work in solidarity or as comrades with others].[69] This is why it is unhelpful to emphasize the supposed divide between theorist and those affected.) So structured opportunities must be available to try out different ways of interaction, different norms, ideas, concepts. How does the new paradigm work? What new conflicts and challenges does it create?

I could go on listing the cognitive, emotional, and social skills necessary to engage in the meaningful consciousness raising that yields justified results. My point is that these are skills that can be taught—that should be taught—in a curriculum that recognizes the power of ideology and the need to educate ourselves and others to resist it.

Let me be clear. I believe that there is tremendous suffering that might be alleviated by material redistribution of capital (of all kinds), food, housing, healthcare, education, and such. The problem is that although redistribution is important, we must also address the fact that societies are systems that maintain themselves and their hierarchies. Systems accommodate perturbations; they are self-regulating and revert to equilibrium. So, if we are going to address durable inequality, we should not only engage in a transfer of resources but also facilitate structural change. Structural change requires a change of culture. On my account, structures are composed of networks of practices. We are socialized—interpellated as subjects—to participate in practices, embrace their values, identify with the roles they offer, and work together with others, as the practices dictate, to produce, distribute, maintain, and eliminate things taken to have value. As mentioned, a change in the material conditions will prompt some changes in ideology; but because the material conditions and cultural technē are deeply intertwined, sustainable change requires a change in both. So, education for social justice should teach skills and methods of ideology critique. This does not happen simply by encouraging diversity, equity, and inclusion.

I've argued that epistemically responsible consciousness raising is *one way* to generate warranted ideology critique. Although we must provide better educational opportunities to those who are subordinated (including traditional critical thinking skills), and although we must expand the curriculum to learn material that does justice to their experiences, we should also provide spaces to form counter-publics, anti-bias training and facilitation skills that support collective inquiry, opportunities to develop epistemic courage and empathy, familiarity with methods of emancipatory science and histories of social movements, and opportunity to experiment with alternative identities. But most important, we must call upon educational institutions to recognize their role in the interpellation of subjects to occupy their "right" place in the hierarchy, and also to refuse such a role. This means creating spaces for local professionals—philosophers, educators, administrators, politicians, and such—to engage in the kinds of reflection and experimentation that will generate paradigm shifts in their own understanding of what education in their community is and might be.

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1 The view I sketch here is more fully developed in Sally Haslanger, "Culture and Critique," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume* 91, no. 1 (2017): 149-173; "What is a Social Practice?" *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements* 82 (2018): 231-247; "Cognition as a Social Skill," *Australasian Philosophical Review* 3, no. 1 (2019): 5-25; "Disciplined Bodies and Ideology Critique," *Glass Bead* 2, no. 1 (2019), https://www.glass-bead.org/article/disciplined-bodies-and-ideology-critique/?langenview.

2 My account of practices, structures, and ideology draws substantially on William H. Sewell, Jr. See "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation," *The American Journal of Sociology* 98, no. 1 (1992): 1-29; and "The Concept(s) of Culture," in *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn*, ed. Gabrielle M. Spiegel (New York and London: Routledge, 2005), 76–95.

3 Raymond Geuss, *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

4 Elsewhere, I have argued that they can be modeled in a way similar to the informational content of the common ground in a conversation. See Sally Haslanger, "Ideology in Practice: What Does Ideology Do?" *Aquinas Lecture* (Milwaukee: Marquette

University Press, forthcoming); Robert Stalnaker, “Common Ground,” *Linguistics and Philosophy* 25 (2002): 701–721.

5 Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt, “Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology . . .” *The British Journal of Sociology* 44, no. 3 (1993): 479.

6 Humans evolved to be social foragers in a broad variety of ecological contexts. This required social learning, reliable cross-generational transmission, and the material and technological resources for building on what came before. See Kim Sterelny, *The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), especially chapters 2-3. I also discuss this at length in Sally Haslanger “Cognition as a Social Skill,” *Australasian Philosophical Review* 3, no. 1 (2019): 5-25.

7 Bernard Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 201; see also Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The Lies that Bind: Rethinking Identity* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2018), and my response, “Autonomy, Identity, and Social Justice: Appiah’s *The Lies that Bind*, A Review,” *Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series)* 10, no. 2 (2020): 19-32.

8 Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness*, 200.

9 See Sally Haslanger, “Studying While Black: Trust, Opportunity and Disrespect,” *Du Bois Review* 11, no. 1 (2014): 109-136, for a discussion of the challenges Williams describes in the context of race and education.

10 This section draws on Haslanger, “Disciplined Bodies and Ideology Critique,” in which I expand some of the points I make here.

11 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” in *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 2014/1971).

12 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State,” 243.

13 Althusser, 243-44.

14 Althusser, 235-36.

15 See also Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), especially Chapter 5; and Sandra Lee Bartky,

"Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power," in *Femininity and Domination* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 63-82.

16 Haslanger, "Studying While Black."

17 For a useful overview see Nancy Tuana, "Feminist Epistemology: The Subject of Knowledge," in *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice,* eds. Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. (New York: Routledge, 2017), 125-138.

18 Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State," 259.

19 Victoria McGeer, "The Regulative Dimension of Folk Psychology," in *Folk Psychology Re-Assessed*, eds. Daniel D. Hutto and Matthew Ratcliffe (The Netherlands: Springer, 2007); Tadeusz Zawidzki, *Mindshaping: A New Framework for Understanding Human Social Cognition* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013).

20 Sally Haslanger, "Practical Reason and Social Practices," in *The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason*, eds. Ruth Chang and Kurt Sylvain (New York: Routledge, 2021), 68-82; Tamar Schapiro, "Compliance, Complicity and the Nature of Nonideal Conditions," *Journal of Philosophy* 100, no. 7 (2003): 329–355

21 John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," *Philosophical Review* 64, no. 1 (1955): 26.

22 For the dual character of social role concepts—what counts as merely occupying a role and what counts as "really" occupying it. See Joshua Knobe and Sandeep Prasada, "Dual Character Concepts," in *Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society* (Boston, MA: Cognitive Science Society, 2011); Joshua Knobe, Sandeep Prasada, & G.E. Newman, "Dual Character Concepts and the Normative Dimension of Conceptual Representation," *Cognition* 127, no. 2 (2013): 242-257.

23 Some parts of this section are drawn from Haslanger, "Culture and Critique"; and "Political Epistemology and Social Critique," *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy* 7 (2021): 23-65.

24 Gregory M. Walton & S.T. Brady discuss several related phenomena, including attributional ambiguity, social-identity threat, and belonging uncertainty, all of

which are subject intensification due to a kind of looping effect (which they call "recursion") in "The Many Questions of Belonging," in *Handbook of Competence and Motivation (2nd Edition): Theory and Application*, eds. A. Elliot, C. Dweck, & D. Yeager, (Guilford Press: New York, 2017), 272-293.

25 There is an important set of questions about the kind of knowledge gained by those who occupy a subordinated position and its relationship to critique. Patricia Hill Collins argues that "Black Feminist thought rearticulates a consciousness that already exists [among Black women]." See Patricia Hill Collins, "The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought," *Signs* 14, no. 4 (1989): 750. I am not denying that often the resources for critique already exist in the experience of the subordinate; my claim is that sometimes, for some groups or in relation to some practices, complicity in unjust practices is deeper than this suggests. See also Serene Khader, *Adaptive Preferences and Women's Empowerment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and *Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).

26 See also Kristen Intemann, "25 Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?" *Hypatia* 25, no. 4 (2010): 778–796.

27 I use the term "standard practices of DEI," not to critique all such efforts (!), but to question what I take to be a background assumption of many such programs—that is, that we will gain social justice through integration of members of subordinated groups into elite spaces. The problematic, then, is how to recruit and "maintain" them, which often amounts to socializing them into elite practices, so they won't feel alienated and so leave. I admit that this is an over-simplification—I am being polemical—and the issues are much more complex. The issues here, however, are broader: should we aim for "fairness" or anti-racism? Should we aim for "diversity" and inclusion, or to disrupt White supremacy?

28 Robin Celikates, "Beyond the Critical Theorists' Nightmare: Epistemic Injustice, Looping Effects, and Ideology Critique" (presentation, Workshop for Gender and Philosophy, MIT, Cambridge, MA, May 12, 2016); see also Robin Celikates, *Critique as Social Practice: Critical Theory and Social Self-Understanding* (London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2018).

29 Robin Celikates, "Systematic Misrecognition and the Practice of Critique: Bourdieu, Boltanski and the Role of Critical Theory," in *Recognition Theory and Contemporary French Moral and Political Philosophy*, eds. Miriam Bankowsky and Alice Le Goff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012),167f.

30 Celikates, "Systematic Misrecognition," 168; Celikates elaborates: "An answer to these questions would need to refer to those material and symbolic constraints which can prevent actors from engaging in practices of critique. In this sense, the ideological appearance of certain practices and institutions as legitimate and natural (i.e., their misrecognition by the actors involved), can be characterised as a second-order phenomenon. It effectively diminishes the probability that those opinions, dispositions and modes of acting which can be situated on the first level and which support these practices and institutions will be reflected on and criticised. 'Second-order pathologies' can thus be understood as blocking the assessment, critique and transformation of 'first-order pathologies'" (169). This is a broader strategy in Critical Theory that takes different forms in different authors.

31 Celikates, 169-70.

32 This section draws on Sally Haslanger, "Political Epistemology and Social Critique," *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy* 7 (2021): 23-65.

33 I leave open the meta-ethical view about the nature of moral facts. However, see also Haslanger "Culture and Critique."

34 Rebecca Solnit, *Hope in the Dark: Untold Histories, Wild Possibilities* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016), https://www.haymarketbooks.org/books/791-hope-in-the-dark.

35 Danielle Allen, "Law's Necessary Forcefulness: Ralph Ellison vs. Hannah Arendt on the Battle of Little Rock," *Oklahoma City University Law Review* 26 (2001): 858.

36 J.M. Balkin, *Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 27-

28.

37 See Catharine MacKinnon, *Towards a Feminist Theory of the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Sandra Lee Bartky, "Towards

a Phenomenology of Feminist Consciousness" *Social Theory and Practice* 3, no. 4 (1975): 425-39; Redstockings of the Women's Liberation Movement, ed., *Feminist Revolution: An Abridged Edition with Additional Writings* (New York: Random House, 1978); Patricia Hill Collins, "Learning from the Outsider Within," in *Beyond Methodology: Feminist Scholarship as Lived Research*, eds. Mary Margaret Fonow and Judith A. Cook (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Barbara A. Crow, *Radical Feminism: A Documentary Reader* (New York: NYU Press, 2000); Jennifer McWeeny, "Varieties of Consciousness Under Oppression," in *Phenomenology and the Political,* eds. S. West Gurley and Geoff Pfeifer (London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2016), 149-163; and Alice Crary, "Feminist Thought and Rational Authority: Getting Things in Perspective," *New Literary History* 46, no. 2 (2015): 287-308.

38 The fuller discussion of consciousness raising in Haslanger, "Political Epistemology," begins with a discussion of the Combahee River Collective's "A Black Feminist Statement," in *Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology*, ed. Barbara Smith (New York: Kitchen Table Press, 1983), 264-274. I focus here on another example in a school context.

39 Samantha Schmidt, "Teen Boys Rated Their Female Classmates Based on Looks. The Girls Fought Back," *The Washington Post*, March 26th, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2019/03/26/teen-boys-rated-their-female-classmates-based-looks-girls-fought-back/.

40 Schmidt, "Teen Boys Rated," para. 17.

41 Schmidt, para. 22.

42 Schmidt, para. 23.

43 There is a huge literature on the role of narrative in critical race theory and in other critical studies. A taste of this discussion can be found in Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, "Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative," *Law and Society Review* 29, no. 2 (1995): 197-226; "Common Knowledge and Ideological Critique: The Significance of Knowing That the 'Haves' Come out Ahead," *Law & Society Review*, 33, no, 4 (1999): 1025-1041; and "Narrating Social Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal Authority," *American Journal of Sociology* 108, no. 6 (2003): 1328-72.

44 Jane Mansbridge, "The Making of Oppositional Consciousness," in *Oppositional Consciousness: The Subjective Roots of Social Protest*, eds. Jane Mansbridge and Aldon Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 4.

45 Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990),

6-7.

46 Mansbridge, "The Making of Oppositional Consciousness," 5.

47 Mansbridge, 7-8.

48 Mansbridge, 1.

49 Mansbridge, 7-8.

50 I assume that one need not be a member of the subordinate group in order to demand justice with them. See Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., "Knowing Communities: An investigation of Harding's Standpoint Epistemology," *Social Epistemology* 16, no. 3 (2002): 283-293. But in a liberation movement, the process of articulating a claim typically begins with those directly affected.

51 Naomi Scheman, "On Mattering," in *Facts and Values: The Ethics and Metaphysics of* Normativity, eds. Giancarlo Marchetti and Sarin Marchetti (New York: Routledge, 2007), 119-136; Crary, *Beyond Moral Judgment.*

52 This is one reason I think that the idea of common ground is important for modeling ideology. I've mentioned this already in endnote 2.

53 In what sense does one "believe" rules anyway? And because the cultural technē includes concepts, scripts, and other non-propositional elements, belief isn't really the apt attitude for much of it.

54 This is related to the point I made above in relation to Celikates concern about the relation between those affected by the ideology and the "theorist." One concern is the basis for moral evaluation, and the other is the risk of elitism and arrogance on the part of the theorist. The method of consciousness raising does not rely on such a distinction because the critique arises from the experience of being affected, gives voice to it, and works with others affected to create what Mansbridge called "an injustice frame." On my view, an "injustice frame" in this context (among other

things) shifts the paradigm of moral engagement from the individual to the cultural/structural. There will still be some affected who do not buy the "theory," that is, the structural "injustice frame" offered. But their lack of acceptance is not evidence that the new frame is inapt; and as mentioned before, the problem of justification should be kept distinct from the problem of illumination (convincing others of the justification).

55 These are steps that I sketch—slightly revised—in Haslanger, "Political Epistemology."

56 Elizabeth Anderson, "How to be a Pragmatist," in *Oxford Handbook of Practical Reason*, eds. Ruth Chang and Kurt Sylvan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

57 Mansbridge, "The Making of Oppositional Consciousness," 7-8; Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public

Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," *Social Text* 25/26 (1990): 56-

80; Kristie Dotson, "Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing," *Hypatia* 26, no. 2

(2011): 236-257; and Kristie Dotson, "Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression," *Social Epistemology*

28 (2014): 115-138.

58 Anderson, "How to be a Pragmatist," 7.

59 Mansbridge, "The Making of Oppositional Consciousness," 9.

60 Kate Manne, *Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

61 Peter Railton, "The Affective Dog and its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement," *Ethics* 124, no. 4 (2014): 813-859.

62 Elizabeth Anderson, "John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living," *Ethics* 102, no. 1 (1991): 4-26; and "Social Movements, Experiments in Living and Moral Progress: Case Studies from Britain's Abolition of Slavery," (presentation, The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2014).

https://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/bitstream/handle/1808/14787/Anderson_Social_Movements.pdf

63 Mansbridge, "The Making of Oppositional Consciousness," 5.

64 Erik Olin Wright, *Envisioning Real Utopias* (New York: Verso, 2010), 11.

65 Anderson, "How to be a Pragmatist," 9.

66 Anderson, 5-6.

67 Work on objectivity within critical theory (feminist, anti-racist, post-colonial) is extensive and challenges many of the traditional assumptions about objectivity. However, it does not, for the most part, reject the value of objectivity *tout court*. The feminist empiricist literature—for example, Helen Longino, in *Science as Social Knowledge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)—recommends a procedural account whereby only communities that meet certain standards of diversity and critical engagement can count as objective. Generally, the goal is to provide a conception of objectivity that allows for values to play a legitimate role. Although my argument is seriously incomplete unless and until I provide some guidance on the criteria for objectivity, this gesture is the most I can accomplish in this paper.

68 Allen, "Law's Necessary Forcefulness," 859.

69 Jodi Dean, *Comrade: An Essay on Political Belonging* (New York: Verso, 2019).