

BRUCE HAUPTLI

## QUINE'S THEORIZING ABOUT THEORIES

In his 'Theories of Nature and the Nature of Theories',<sup>1</sup> Paul Roth argues that Quine's "theory of theorizing" constitutes his "prolegomena to a naturalized epistemology". According to Roth, Quine conflates his 'Duhemian Thesis' (DT), which asserts that theories have their meaning and evidence only as parts of larger theories, and his 'Epistemology Naturalized Thesis' (ENT), which asserts that epistemology is contained within natural science. Roth believes these theses should be clearly distinguished since DT is to be a ground upon which ENT rests. That is, DT is an a priori truth – a part of Quine's theorizing about the nature of theories. It provides an effective argument against the traditional conception of epistemology and in favor of ENT only if it is not itself a thesis of naturalized epistemology. If it were, the argument from it to ENT would beg the question.

Unfortunately, what makes Roth's interpretation attractive is also what makes it implausible. While he maintains Quine *must* distinguish between DT and ENT to argue effectively for his naturalized epistemology, this distinction yields an ineffective and question-begging argument. Since this interpretation does not offer the effective argument desired, the only compelling reason for us to distinguish Quine's theorizing about theories from his discussion of the theories of nature is Roth's assertion that without this distinction the argument against traditional epistemology is question-begging. I believe this is also incorrect. In what follows I develop both of these objections to Roth's view of Quine and show that the naturalized epistemologist needs no a priori theses to argue effectively against the traditional conception of epistemology and in favor of ENT.

Roth initially claims Quine makes it clear that his "... statements *about* theories are *not* justified by appeal to natural science" (434). However, Roth offers no points where Quine himself says this.<sup>2</sup> He does cite places where Quine distinguishes the new and traditional epistemological enterprises, but given his claim that Quine "consistently conflates" DT and ENT, I suspect what Roth would argue is that Quine *should not* or *can not* claim his theorizing about theories is a part of his

naturalized epistemology (of the particular theories of nature) if he is to argue effectively against the traditional conception and in favor of ENT. It is not clear, however, how Roth thinks the argument from an a priori DT to ENT is to proceed, and if we adopt the traditional epistemologists' perspective for a moment we can see that it must fail.

Traditional epistemologists allow for an a priori perspective and hold that (at least some) epistemological endeavors must be pursued independently of the inquiries of the natural scientists. Roth's Quine is to approach such philosophers and to argue that the a priori precept DT shows epistemology must be pursued from within the natural sciences – it establishes ENT. Surely the traditional epistemologists confronted with such an argument would point out that if this argument is successful, it fails. If they accept the argument they must allow (as they would anyway) that there is a place for a priori philosophizing in epistemology (i.e., in DT's role in grounding ENT). Since they are to accept DT as a priori and argue to the truth of ENT (in an argument which does not assume the stance of the naturalized epistemology) it is clear that there is much more to epistemology than the natural sciences. Roth's Quinean argument will not, then, convince any traditional epistemologist to reject the traditional conception of epistemology as prior philosophy and to adopt ENT instead.

The naturalized epistemologist seems to confront a dilemma here: either DT is an a priori precept or it is not. If it is not, Roth claims, it provides no good reason for traditional epistemologists (who, of course, deny ENT) to adopt the new naturalized epistemology – a “naturalized DT” argues for ENT only by accepting the perspective recommended by ENT in the first place. If, on the other hand, DT is an a priori precept, I claim it cannot effectively argue the traditional epistemologist into accepting ENT. Its a priori status and the fact that the argument from DT to ENT cannot take place within the perspective recommended by ENT provide a role for “prior philosophy”. Thus, to some extent, it recommends the traditional conception of epistemology rather than ENT. If this is a true dilemma, ENT is not forced upon us, Quine's argument is in trouble, and my view of Quine offers no real advantage over Roth's. Roth's horn, however, provides only an apparent difficulty. The naturalized epistemologist *may* argue effectively against the traditional conception without holding any a priori precepts. If I am correct here, the dilemma is only an apparent one and Quine's argument is in no danger on this count. Roth's Quine *is* in trouble, however, since he accepts the

demand for an a priori DT and, thus, confronts the horn I just argued for – he cannot argue effectively against the traditional conception of epistemology. Before I argue that Roth's view presents only an apparent difficulty here, however, we should examine his other argument for asserting that DT *must* be an a priori precept.

He notes that it is a consequence of DT that all sentences of any theory are, in principle, open to revision. DT, however, is such a precept. Thus a "naturalized DT", one which is *not* an a priori precept, would be significant and true only *within* the context of some broader theory and would *itself* be revisable. Roth maintains that if DT is revisable like any other naturalized epistemological precept, "there is no reason to accept it as true a priori of theories" (434). However, it is just *this* claim which Roth does not question. Rather than accepting this characterization of DT and its consequences, he concludes that it *must* be an a priori thesis. It is clear *why* Roth feels that DT must not be revisable – he feels it is only if it is an a priori truth independent of ENT that it may be employed in favor of ENT. I have already questioned whether the sort of argument he countenances could be successful, however. Moreover, to demand that the naturalized epistemologist adopt such a stance and allow that DT, unlike naturalized precepts, is true a priori of theories seems as question-begging in the context of the dialectic between traditional and naturalized epistemologists as it is to demand that the traditional epistemologists accept a "naturalized DT". Of course, if both options are question-begging there would appear to be little reason for preferring one to the other. I do not believe that the adoption of a "naturalized DT" begs the question here however.

As I see it, Quine's argument against the traditional conception of epistemology is a *reductio* one.<sup>3</sup> Rather than presuming an a priori DT, it begins by accepting the traditional conception of the epistemologist's endeavor and then goes on to show that this conception leads us to nonsense. The result of this argument, of course, is the denial of the traditional enterprise. This argument does not, however, require that one engage in a priori theorizing about theories.

Central to the traditional conception of epistemology is the correspondence theory or "the myth of the museum". A correspondence theorist maintains that determinate and unique world-word relationships are to ground our talk of truth and reference. Quine's *reductio* runs through three cases: radical translation, the case of one's linguistic neighbor, and the case of oneself. In each of these cases Quine argues

that assuming that reference is to be accounted for in terms of such determinate relations, it is possible that one could find oneself confronted with two distinct sets of correspondence relations between the speakers' (native, neighbor, or self) words and the world such that each set of relations is equally adequate. He further claims that there is no better set of correspondence relations, and all the possible (behavioral) evidence could not legitimate a choice.

Now in the case of the natives, or even (less obviously) in that of one's linguistic neighbors, it may not be wholly counterintuitive to conclude that *we* cannot tell what it is that is referred to unless we "go beyond the (behavioral) evidence" and make some presuppositions about the natives' (or neighbors') apparatus of individuation and identity. Nonetheless, one might maintain, all this shows is that *we* are not able to discover what it is which they refer to. Such a conclusion, of course, in no way shows that the traditional conception is fundamentally flawed – the natives' (or neighbors') reference might still be correctly cast in terms of such a unique and determinate correspondence relation, *we* however, might be perpetually in the dark about this fact.

This is not the conclusion Quine would draw, however. According to him, "the inscrutability of reference is not the inscrutability of a fact; there is no fact of the matter".<sup>4</sup> To make this point clear we turn to the final step in his *reductio*. He points out that it is possible, assuming the traditional conception, to find that there are several referentially distinct yet evidentially equivalent sets of correspondence relations which characterize one's own case. Thus we are unable to make a legitimate choice amongst this variety, and are forced to conclude that *our own* reference is (behaviorally) inscrutable. Here the response imagined one paragraph ago – that while reference might be correctly characterized by some correspondence relation, this characterization is perpetually unavailable to us – is one which makes no sense. If talk of correspondence relations is to have any efficacy in explaining reference, it must, certainly, provide for known and determinate relations in the case of our own terms. However, this account leads to the reference of our own terms being (behaviorally) inscrutable to us. This surely is nonsense and, thus, Quine concludes that "reference is nonsense except relative to a coordinate system".<sup>5</sup>

Correspondence theorists maintain there is a nonrelativistic "fact of the matter" in questions of reference and ontology. The facts here are to be "objective" which means that the answers to referential and ontological queries do not depend upon the beliefs and theories we hold

or the conceptual structure we occupy. While *we* may not know which relations in fact embody these facts and while the answers *we* give to such queries will depend upon our beliefs, theories, and concepts, the question of the correctness of a correspondence relation is an absolute one. That is, the referential and ontological questions are ultimately to be asked and answered independently of our beliefs, theories, and concepts. According to Quine such absolutistic questions lead to incoherence: "a question of the form 'What is an *F*?' can be answered only by recourse to a further term: 'An *F* is a *G*'. The answer makes only relative sense: sense relative to the uncritical acceptance of '*G*'".<sup>6</sup> As Quine sees it, the asking of such absolutistic referential questions is what engenders the nonsense at the end of the *reductio*.

The traditional theorists' talk of correspondence relations which are nonrelativistically to capture the "fact of the matter" in regard to reference represent an attempt to transcend the essential relativity Quine points to. His argument against the traditional program here requires no a priori theses however. The naturalized epistemologist begins by accepting the traditional theorists' program of explaining reference in terms of correspondence relations and, ultimately, arrives at the nonsense of the (behavioral) inscrutability of one's own terms. Thus the program must be rejected. The traditional program is accepted only as the first stage of a *reductio*, however, and the acceptance of such principles is mitigated by the absurdity they engender. An inquiry into what went wrong discovers that it was the attempt to transcend the essential relativity of referential queries which was the problem here. While a consequence of this *reductio* is that we ought to adopt ENT, it does not demand an acceptance of this thesis at the outset.

The correspondence theorist also offers an account of truth Quine would reject. This view may be called metaphysical realism. Such realists maintain our primary cognitive duty in theorizing about the world is that we develop true theories. Here, as Putnam notes, truth is to be considered "radically nonepistemic".<sup>7</sup> That is, these realists maintain that our most justified theories about the world may, in fact, be false. This view is not a thesis about the relatively primitive state of our theorizing *vis-à-vis* some future epistemological paradise. The metaphysical realists maintain our theories could be supported by the best possible evidence that persons, however advanced, could have and yet, in fact, be false. Indeed, they countenance the possibility that the best possible global theory of the world which we might advance could be false. As

they see it, the world is as it is independent of any theorizing on our part, and our theories will be true only if they state of what is that it is as it is.

Quine maintains that sensible questions about truth, like those about reference, are relative ones. He holds it is *meaningless* to inquire absolutely into the correctness of a conceptual scheme.<sup>8</sup> Thus from the Quinean perspective the metaphysical realists' assertion that our overall theory might be false is one which makes no sense. The realist might agree that for us to *speak* about truth, we must speak relatively while holding, however, that for a statement to *be* true no such relativity need obtain. Statements are true if they, in fact, correspond to reality. Our inability to determine whether such a relation obtains tells us nothing about the nature of truth.

Quine's *reductio* in regard to reference points to the error in this reply.<sup>9</sup> It yields an account of significance, DT, which holds that "unless pretty firmly conditioned to sensory stimulation, a sentence *S* is meaningless except relative to its own theory, meaningless intertheoretically".<sup>10</sup> The metaphysical realists would separate a theory or utterance from its background or context and yet consider the question of its truth or falsity to be a meaningful one. Quine, however, points out that by itself the theory or utterance *says* nothing. It is only relative to a background theory or conceptual structure that it has significance or reference (given the *reductio*) and it is only if it has significance or reference that it may be said to be true or false. Quine is not merely asserting that *from the Quinean perspective* the metaphysical realists' assertion makes no sense. While this is indeed the case, the *reductio* examines the issue not from the Quinean perspective but, rather, from the realists'. According to Quine's diagnosis traditional epistemologists are led into error because they attempt to occupy a transcendental perspective.

In effect, Roth denies a "relativistic" reading of Quine. Relativists advance the thesis (*R*) that "conceptual evaluations are always made relative to a particular frame of reference or conceptual scheme". Such a view seems to suffer from a self-referential malady – properly viewed *R* itself must be relativized to some conceptual scheme (presumably the relativists') and *only from that perspective* does it assert that all evaluations and justifications are relativistic. It does not seem to force us to accept the naturalized endeavor nor does it establish the senselessness of the traditional epistemological endeavor. If *R* is true relative to the relativists' perspective, then from some *other* perspective (that of the traditional epistemologists, say) "absolute" judgments of truth,

reference, and judgments of the truth of global conceptual schemes may well be possible.

Roth would offer (or have Quine offer) a *qualified* sort of relativism ( $R'$ ) which claims that no position *except relativism* is objectively true.  $R'$ , unlike  $R$ , allows a nonrelativized truth or evaluation – the truth of  $R'$  itself, which is advanced as a metalevel thesis *about* evaluations. Quine, in effect, is to argue that *if DT is accepted*, traditional epistemology will be ruled out. DT is, however, not to be established scientifically – it is not a thesis of any particular science.<sup>11</sup>

I believe such a qualified relativism will appear attractive to many. It has the “virtue” of reserving for philosophers a unique, foundational endeavor – they are to establish that  $R'$  (or DT) is a nonrelativized truth which grounds a qualified relativism. Unfortunately, however, what makes this view attractive is (I have argued) what makes it implausible. Roth's Quine is to offer a limited number of “philosophical” theses – those which, like DT, are a part of his “theorizing about theories” – and argue against the traditional (antirelativistic) epistemology. Since ENT is not a logical consequence of DT, however, several such additional theses will be necessary. Each additional thesis significantly extends the qualification upon relativism or naturalism – it minimizes relativism while expanding the scope of antirelativism. The greater the scope qualified relativists admit to antirelativism, however, the more difficult it will be for them to argue against this view. Moreover, such a qualified relativism sacrifices what is most interesting about ENT – its claim to provide a general, unified, and naturalized theory of human inquiry which is an alternative to the traditional epistemologists' sort of theory.

If one does *not* assert DT is a nonrelativized truth this problem is, of course, avoided. But if his “theory about theorizing” is a *relativistic* theory (if it itself is offered by someone who accepts  $R$ ), how can it function in the dialectic between the relativist and the antirelativist (the naturalized and traditional epistemologists)? I have answered that Quine provides a *reductio* argument – one which tentatively accepts the viewpoint of the traditional epistemologists only to show the senselessness of their endeavor. “But”, the traditionalist (or antirelativist) will ask, “Doesn't this argument attempt to establish the *absolute* pointlessness of the traditional endeavor?” If not, it seems, the only thing it can do is to show that *from the relativists' perspective* the traditional (antirelativistic) epistemology makes no sense.

Taking Quine at his word, I assume that no cosmic exile is to be

available and read his very philosophizing itself as the utterances of a Neurathian onboard shipwright. Here the philosopher philosophizes and inquires *from the perspective of* the conceptual scheme he or she occupies. The proffered claims do not represent a "theory of theorizing" that is offered nonrelativistically but, rather, the assertions of individuals who are investigating their conceptual scheme from *within*. That is, Quine is conducting his inquiries (and offering his arguments) from the perspective of *his* conceptual scheme. Given the strongly social orientation of his thought (language, after all, is to be a set of socially instilled dispositions), his claims must be taken as claims as to the nature of *our* conceptual scheme. If the *reductio* cannot be viewed as a propaedeutic to a naturalized epistemology, it must be an argument offered by a naturalized epistemologist. It does not, then, provide either pure or contingent a priori truths which limit traditional epistemology. Instead it plays a destructive role. Granting the traditional epistemologists as much as he can, the Quinean epistemologist finds their sort of endeavor leads to nonsense. Thus it seems reasonable to reject such an endeavor.

The "relativistic" nature of this *reductio* argument becomes apparent when we note that it establishes that traditional epistemologists must recognize that the reference of their own terms is *behaviorally* inscrutable. The nonsense which this destructive argument uncovers, then, is premised upon an acceptance of the behavioral theory of meaning. Quine holds that an acceptance of a "behavioristic semantics" is integral to naturalism.<sup>12</sup> It seems, then, the *reductio* does not show the traditional epistemological endeavor is unacceptable *on its own terms*. Few, if any, traditional epistemologists would accept such a limitation and, thus, most would maintain Quine's argument is in fact, question-begging.<sup>13</sup>

How can he consistently offer such an "internal" (or relativistic) argument without begging the question? Quine recognizes his argument is circular in that it presumes that one is working from within a naturalistic perspective. He denies that this circularity is vicious, however. According to him the traditional epistemologists sought a transcendent perspective because they felt science could not justify itself: they held that "if the epistemologist's goal is validation of the grounds of empirical science, he defeats his purpose by using psychology or other empirical science in the validation".<sup>14</sup> That is, if science was all one could appeal to to justify science, skepticism would be the only appropriate philosophical position. Quine has responded to this worry many times. He maintains the traditional epistemologists' fear of



circularity here is a “needless logical timidity” because the justificational challenge they would meet comes from *within science itself*:

It is our understanding . . . of what lies beyond our surfaces, that shows our evidence for that understanding to be limited to our surfaces. But this reflection arouses certain logical misgivings: for is not our very talk of light rays, molecules, and men then only sound and fury, induced by irritation of our surfaces and signifying nothing? The world view which lent plausibility to this modest account of our knowledge is according to this very account of our knowledge, a groundless fabrication.

To reason thus is, however, to fall into fallacy: a peculiarly philosophical fallacy . . . We cannot significantly question the reality of the external world, or deny that there is evidence of external objects in the testimony of our senses; for, to do so is simply to dissociate the terms ‘reality’ and ‘evidence’ from the very applications which originally did most to invest those terms with whatever intelligibility they may have for us.<sup>15</sup>

Quine, then, responds to the claim that his relativistic (naturalistic) *reductio* begs the question against traditional epistemologists by noting that they would avoid relativism only because they fail to properly understand the nature of the skeptical challenge to empirical knowledge. Like many contemporary philosophers, Quine maintains that the sort of Cartesian endeavor many epistemologists pursue is wrongheaded – it is a response to a pseudo-problem. The skeptical worries about the adequacy of our beliefs and theories arise as we begin to understand the nature of our evidence for these “fabrications”. Recognizing that we dream, hallucinate, pattern, and project, we begin to wonder whether there is any valid correlation of “irritations” and “irritators”. Here is the root of the museum myth and the motivation for the adoption of the transcendent perspective. With Dewey, Quine would reconstruct philosophy – not because it was wrong before, but because it was misguided. The skeptical worries surface as a result of our “scientific understanding” and it is there they are to be confronted.

Rather than begging the question against traditional epistemologists, then, Quine would respond to the very worry which motivated them. He would not answer their question (“What is there outside science which grounds this human enterprise?”); however, he would show why the question is ill-asked and he would offer a program for responding to the skeptical worries when they are properly raised. Where a question cannot properly speaking be raised, of course, it cannot be begged. While traditional epistemologists certainly will not be happy with this response, it is not clear that Quine is trapped by the dilemma broached earlier. He can avoid offering any a priori ground for ENT and yet offer a

“naturalistic defense” of this thesis. He appears to beg the question against traditional epistemologists only as long as one finds their motivating worry worrisome and here Quine (following Wittgenstein) would show us that the worry results from their failure to appreciate their (and our) predicament.

Quine’s naturalism, then, precludes the sort of distinction between the philosophic and scientific endeavors Roth advances.<sup>16</sup> It demands that philosophers recognize, with Neurath, that there is no wharf or external vantage point for the epistemologist to occupy. We must come, rather, to see ourselves as onboard shipwrights. Bereft of such an external perspective we are not able to make absolute or a priori judgments of truth, reference, or significance, nor to question the truth of our background conceptual scheme. We lose here, of course, only the temptation to ask meaningless questions. What we gain is the recognition that it is this background theory or conceptual ship which gives our queries sense. Relative to it we may question whether something is real or some utterance is significant or true. However, this background scheme itself is neither true nor false. *It* provides the standard we employ in our judgments of reference, reality, truth, and signification.<sup>17</sup>

While our conceptual scheme must, then, be regarded as conceptually sovereign, conceptual revolution is not unheard of. According to Quine, the reasons for such a change in our background theory will be pragmatic in character, and such changes and the reasons for them can only be studied from within. While we may not transcend the conceptual ship completely and adopt an external vantage point, we may transcend it from within – changing it plank by plank. The inquiry into such changes and the principles which guide us in making them may not be conducted a priori because there is no independent standard of evaluation or adequacy which may be employed. These changes occur not because the conceptual structure is false nor because one which is truer suddenly presents itself but, rather, for various pragmatic reasons.

Not only does Quine *not* need an a priori “theory of theorizing” to argue against the traditional conception of epistemology and in favor of his view, but we find that his naturalism leaves no room for prior philosophy. Whether we are theorizing about reference, truth, or signification in general, studying the character of the background theory from which we must begin, or studying the process of conceptual change, we must do so as naturalized epistemologists. A priori philosophizing and theorizing are not allowed just because in attempting such endeavors one

detaches one's words and theories from the very context which gives them sense. It is, of course, for this reason that Quine would present a thoroughgoing naturalism and that Roth's notion of an a priori prolegomena to naturalized epistemology is antithetical to Quine's position.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Paul Roth, 'Theories of nature and the nature of theories', *Mind* 89 (1980), 431–39. All citations to this article are followed immediately by the appropriate page reference.

<sup>2</sup> Quine maintains philosophy and science are "in the same boat" and says he does not see the former as an "*a priori* propaedeutic or groundwork for" the latter in his essay "Natural Kinds" [in his *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 216–17]. Cf., also the passages cited in note 16 below.

<sup>3</sup> Here I will only sketch the outlines of this *reductio*. For a more detailed treatment see my 'Inscrutability and correspondence', *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 17 (1979), pp. 199–212, and my 'Quinean relativism: beyond metaphysical realism and idealism', in that journal, 18 (1980), pp. 393–410.

<sup>4</sup> W. V. Quine, 'Ontological relativity', in his *Ontological Relativity*, *op. cit.*, p. 47. In his 'On the reasons for the indeterminacy of translation', *The Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970), pp. 178–83. Quine maintains the indeterminacy argument is actually one for the inscrutability of terms. The *indeterminacy* here is not merely normal underdeterminacy, it is "additional". In the case of underdeterminacy it makes sense for one to ask of two theories, *A* and *B*, "Which is correct?" In the case of the correspondence theory, Quine is questioning the very sense of the question: "the question whether . . . the foreigner *really* believes *A* or believes *B*, is a question whose very significance I would put in doubt. This is what I am getting at in arguing the indeterminacy of translation" (pp. 180–81). The whole point of the radical translation case is that we have no "logical" beginning point – just because the whole matrix of linguistic behavior is new to us. We are restricted to behavioral evidence here – a restriction which Quine continues to recommend in the cases of our neighbors and ourselves. This evidence is inadequate to the task of specifying determinate correspondence relations. (Cf., my 'Inscrutability and correspondence', *op. cit.*)

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53; see also pp. 48–49.

<sup>7</sup> Hilary Putnam, 'Realism and reason', in his *Meaning and the Moral Sciences* (London: Routledge Kegan and Paul, 1978), p. 125.

<sup>8</sup> Cf., Quine's 'Identity, ostension, and hypostasis', in his *From A Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper Row, 1963), p. 79; his 'On empirically equivalent systems of the world', *Erkenntnis*, 9 (1975), pp. 318–28; his *Word and Object* (Cambridge: MIT, 1960), pp. 23–25, 75, 271, 274, and 275–76; and his *Theories and Things* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1981), pp. 21–22.

<sup>9</sup> Indeed, insofar as truth is to be treated in a Tarskian fashion – in terms of satisfaction – truth becomes a matter of reference and the *reductio* applies to discussions of truth directly (cf., Quine's 'Ontological relativity', *op. cit.*, pp. 67–68).

<sup>10</sup> Quine, *Word and Object*, *op. cit.*, p. 24. Here it is appropriate to note Quine's partial dissent from DT. In his 'On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World', *op. cit.*, p. 314,

he says that DT "... would be wrong if understood as imposing an equal status on all statements in scientific theory and thus denying the strong presumption in favor of observational statements".

<sup>11</sup> In correspondence Roth has indicated he would characterize DT as a *contingent a priori truth* – if DT is true, he would say, it provides a limitation to the types of knowledge we may justifiably claim to have. Here he does not wish to claim DT is *a priori true* – he only wishes to maintain that once it is accepted certain limitations are placed upon us. To the extent this revised view holds, as Roth would have it, that DT is outside the domain of ENT, the question of one's reasons for accepting it or believing it is true will arise and a relativistic or naturalistic answer will be ruled out. It is not clear, then, what sort of reasons one could have for this assumption. Of course, if it is not true, or if one does not believe it to be such, one has no reason, it seems, to accept ENT.

<sup>12</sup> Cf., his 'Ontological relativity', *op. cit.*, pp. 28–29 and his 'The Pragmatists' place in empiricism', in *Pragmatism, Its Sources and Prospects*, R. Mulvaney and P. Zeltner (eds.), (Columbia: South Carolina University Press, 1981), pp. 35–37.

<sup>13</sup> J. Margolis, in his 'Behaviorism and alien languages', *Philosophia* 3 (1973), pp. 413–27; and R. Double, in his 'Quine and the determinateness of reference', *Kinesis* 7 (1970), pp. 49–61), question the advisability of this confinement to behavioral evidence. Double argues a determinacy is forthcoming if one considers not only the speakers' behavior but also their intentions. Quine offers the radical translation case, I believe, just because he believes it is the nonverbal circumstances of language use which confer meaning upon our words (as a whole). One's access to these circumstances is no different from the situation portrayed in the radical translation case. Whether one is discussing natives, neighbors, or self, appeal to intentions, beliefs, sacred truths, etc., will not aid us as we seek determinate word-world correlations beyond what we can justify by appeal to the behavioral evidence. (See K. Schoen's 'Introspection and the inscrutability of reference', *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 17 (1979), pp. 523–29.)

<sup>14</sup> Quine, 'Epistemology naturalized', *op. cit.*, pp. 75–76.

<sup>15</sup> Quine, 'The scope and language of science', in his *The Ways of Paradox* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 216. Cf., pp. 216–217; his 'Posits and reality' (in the same work) pp. 237–39; 'Epistemology naturalized', *op. cit.*, pp. 82–84; and 'The pragmatists' place in empiricism', *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>16</sup> Passages where Quine explicitly denies a distinction between the scientific and philosophic endeavors include: 'Natural Kinds', pp. 126–127; 'Epistemology Naturalized', p. 83; 'Ontological Relativity', p. 27 (all in his *Ontological Relativity*, *op. cit.*); *Word and Object*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5, 24, 25, 275–276; 'Posits and Reality', *op. cit.*, pp. 239–241; and his 'Reply to Stroud' in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, v. 6 (1981), pp. 473–475 (esp. pp. 474–475). In none of these passages does Quine seem to be excepting his own philosophy from the "Neurathian predicament".

<sup>17</sup> In addition to the passages cited in Note 7, see Quine's 'The Scope and Language of Science', *op. cit.*, pp. 216–217 and 219–220; and my 'Quinean Relativism', *op. cit.*

<sup>18</sup> K. Henley, G. Bailey, W. Siegmann, H. Bennett, P. Roth and an anonymous reviewer for this journal read earlier versions of this paper and provided valuable comments. An earlier

version was also read on Nov. 7, 1981 to the Florida Philosophical Association and the discussion there provided several important comments.

*Dept. of Philosophy and Religion  
Florida International University  
Tamiami Campus  
Miami, FL 33199  
U.S.A.*