Social Participation and Cohesion

On the relationship between "inclusion" and "integration" in Social Theory

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Abstract: This article aims to make progress towards an account of social cohesion and participation in terms of which we can better understand how groups of people come to constitute stable social orders. It argues for a conceptual distinction between "inclusion" and "integration" and sheds new light on their theoretical relationship. While "integration" refers to group members' willingness to act in accordance with the given norms of a social structure, "inclusion" is linked to their participation opportunities. Although inclusion also plays an essential role in integrating a normative order, levels of inclusiveness necessary for social cohesion may vary across different contexts.

Keywords: Integration; Inclusion; Cohesion; Participation; Affiliation; Social Theory

1. The Main Idea

Dealing with the mechanisms of social participation and cohesion are fundamental themes in social theory. Today, understanding their theoretical place, conceptual relationship, and practical role in society is crucial as even in societies with long democratic traditions, acute conflicts threaten to exclude members and harm social cohesion (Council of Europe 2005; Schmeets and te Riele 2014; Zick and Küpper 2012; Sachweh 2020; van Bavel et al. 2020; cf. Schiefer and van der Noll 2017; Grunow et al. 2023). Whether ethnically, religiously, or politically based, these cleavages are often paired with politicization in the form of antagonistic demarcations vis-à-vis out-groups (Hulse and Stone 2007; Reckwitz 2020: ch. 6). However, a simplistic theoretical dichotomy between belonging and exclusion, or between harmony and conflict, is not useful in addressing these issues. I propose analytically distinct types of affiliation and social closure to better understand their implications for social theory, policy, and practice.

More precisely, the present article addresses a potential theoretical confusion between social participation and cohesion. It argues for a clear conceptual distinction between "inclusion" and "integration" and sheds new light on their theoretical relationship. The current contribution aims to support two hypotheses: *Firstly*, "integration" and "inclusion" encompass two interrelated yet separate dimensions of social order – social cohesion and social participation – which cannot be substituted or reduced to one another. This assumption is opposed to views according to which inclusion is an improved variation of integration that should replace the latter (see inter alia Uditsky 1993; Daniels and Garner 1999; Vislie 2003; Dixon 2005; Farrell 2005; Hinz 2006; Kronauer 2010; Jahnukainen 2015; Rodriguez and Garro-Gill 2015). *Secondly*, I propose that social cohesion, as a scientific category, is not inherently tied to a predetermined level of participatory opportunities. This perspective challenges viewpoints that directly associate social cohesion with the reduction of exclusion and posit an elevated degree of inclusivity as an obligatory prerequisite for achieving social cohesion (see inter alia Jenson 1998: 15–17; Gough and Olofsson 1999; Bernard 1999; Putnam 2000; Berger-Schmitt 2000; Duhaime et al. 2004; OECD 2011; European Commission 2019).

As will become apparent, on my account, "integration" refers to group members' willingness to act in accordance with the given norms of a social arrangement, whereas "inclusion" is linked to their participation opportunities. The first concept points to *social cohesion,* which denotes a specific type of a normative order's stability, while the second concept concerns the

participation structure, that is, the accessibility of its social positions.[1] For any normative order, distinctions between higher and lower degrees of integration and inclusiveness can be drawn. On the one hand, we can judge the latter as more or less *integrated* by how widely existing norms are accepted as legitimate by those affected – and, therefore, typically followed voluntarily.[2] On the other hand, we can judge it as more or less *inclusive* by the degree to which its social positions are open to different participants. By determining the precise degree of inclusion depending on accessible positions, the proposed analysis allows for various modes of participation ranging from full inclusion to complete exclusion without necessarily undermining a person's integration *into* and the cohesion *of* the corresponding social order. However, conceptually distinguishing between "inclusion" and "integration" in this way does not negate the fact that participation opportunities can play an essential role in empirically integrating a normative order. This indicates that levels of inclusiveness necessary for reaching sufficient social cohesion may vary considerably across various contexts and time periods.

This article aims to make progress towards an account of social cohesion and participation in terms of which we can better understand how groups of people come to constitute enduring social orders (or why they fail to do so). In the following, I will elaborate further on what role the degree of inclusiveness plays in integrating a normative order. The article is structured as follows. To gain a deeper understanding of the functional role of social integration in building social cohesion, I will first discuss complementary social-theoretical coordination and motivation problems. I argue that solving the first problem requires a system of social norms, which make an ordered life within society possible (the "ordo ordinans"). Solving the second problem requires a particular set of normative beliefs and attitudes among its members, as well as their behavioral manifestations, so that life in that society actually follows its norms (the "ordo ordinatum") (Section 2). Secondly, I will propose a reconceptualization of social inclusion as a normative disposition towards participation. By explicating the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for achieving effective participation, I will identify three fundamental forms of social exclusion that societies must address: institutional, intersubjective and material exclusion. It is important to highlight that the primary objective is to present a

[1] The term "normative order" is purposely broad and non-specific to keep the proposed analysis open to different theory strands. A normative order in this broad sense can encompass large-scale social structures such as whole societies or international relations as well particular subfields within societies or even smaller units of interaction such as certain social practices and institutions.

[2] The adjective 'integrated' is referred to in this article to both the social order and individuals. The former use (as in 'integrated order', which is a normative structure integrating different agents in one single group) does not designate the same notion as the latter (as in 'integrated agent', which is a subject that is integrated into a social group). The two notions are correlated but symmetrical. I express my gratitude to an anonymous reviewer for their efforts in making this point more explicit.

descriptive perspective on inclusion. Unlike a normative approach that examines morally good or required opportunities for participation, a descriptive perspective considers inclusion as a social phenomenon that exists in different contexts and time periods, which may deviate from what is morally required. Although I acknowledge the significance of the normative dimension to combat social injustices, my main focus in the current contribution is to provide a descriptive analysis to allow for an empirical investigation (Section 3). Finally, I will compare social integration and inclusion to further qualify their relationship more precisely. Despite their disparities, these concepts are intertwined in various ways, as they are both linked to the governing norms of a social order. In particular, social integration revolves around accepting and conforming to the norms of a particular order. Inclusion, to some extent, relies on these same norms because granting or denying access to roles and positions within the order necessitates a collective understanding and acceptance of its defining norms. Moreover, as effective social participation is response-dependent (i.e. dependent on mutual recognition between individuals in interactions), inclusion is linked to integration: Effective inclusion in a social practice requires the social practice to be socially integrated. Moreover, I will argue that inclusion can also contribute to social integration. Integration directly depends on inclusion when participation in the corresponding social position is considered valuable for its own sake. In such cases, inclusion becomes a key factor in achieving social integration. Conversely, the relationship between integration and inclusion is indirect when participation is solely pursued as a means to obtain external goods (Section 4).

This article employs a philosophical methodology, analyzing research questions and hypotheses conceptually and thoroughly. It utilizes techniques such as precise differentiation, multifaceted case examination, and exploration of conceptual boundaries to provide a conceptual and analytic understanding. I clarify theoretical and practical implications through hypothetical examples, approaching the topic as a philosopher seeking comprehension rather than an activist or policymaker combatting social dissolution. For example, I examine whether fostering social cohesion can coexist with excluding certain individuals to illuminate the intricate connection between inclusion and integration. This analysis does not advocate incorporating social exclusion into political agendas promoting social cohesion.

2. Deploying the Concept of Social Integration: Making an Ordered Life Within Society Possible

To work out precisely what social cohesion encompasses and grasp its dependence on the participation opportunities of those involved, I will focus exclusively on the concept of *social*

integration. Consequently, I will not address the complementary concept of *system integration* in this context (Lockwood 1964; Habermas 1987: ch. 6; Giddens 1984; cf. Mouzelis 1997).

When discussing the creation and maintenance of the binding forces within a social order, social theorists commonly use the term "social integration". This concept is closely connected to ideas like "solidarity", "unity", and "group loyalty" (Gough and Olofsson 1999). Social integration, due to its challenging definition, is frequently referred to in terms of "social cohesion" (Dragolov et al. 2013), "compliance" (Etzioni 1975), or "social capital" (Putnam 2000). Other related terms found in the literature include expressions like "identification with one's group" (Jenson 2010), "consensus" (Graham 1984), or "trust" (Phillips 2006). In addition to its antonym “disintegration”, counter-concepts to social integration encompass highly diverse phenomena such as conflict, deviance, rebellion, withdrawal, mistrust, and anomie (cf. Grunow et al. 2023: 4).

It is worth noting that, on my account, social integration is not a component of, nor synonymous with, social cohesion. Instead, it is a central mode or mechanism for building social cohesion. To make this more concrete, social integration can be characterized by the social validity or practical acceptance of the norms that define a social structure, while disintegration occurs when individuals deviate from these norms. In its various contextually and temporally situated forms, social integration serves as an effective mechanism for aligning independent agents by establishing and maintaining regular patterns of interaction. This represents a crucial aspect in addressing a fundamental question of social theory: How is social order possible? (cf. Habermas 2009: 157; Joas and Knöbl 2009: 18; Luhmann 1981: 195). Plato, in his "Politeia" (2007: 520a), addresses the social "bond of the polis" as a task of practical philosophy and thus provides a powerful image for the concept of social cohesion, which remains not solely a relevant theoretical problem to this day.

It is worth noting that I will be addressing two distinct perspectives on social integration: one that examines the integration of specific individuals or groups at a micro-level, and another that considers the overall integration of society at a macro-level. At the micro-level, a subject-centered perspective examines the integration of specific individuals or groups into society. This involves assessing factors like the voting participation of academic middle-class members, their acceptance of neighbors with foreign origins, and their confidence in the rule of law, particularly when compared to lower-income or less-educated demographics. These individuals or groups can be classified into specific categories, such as upper, middle, or working class, immigrants, welfare recipients, and so on, to assess their varying degrees of integration into society in certain respects. On the other hand, the second perspective takes a macro-level

approach using a structure-centered perspective to analyze the overall social integration of society. It examines the degree of consensus regarding specific norms and values, as well as the proportion of the population deviating from certain social expectations. This perspective assesses how well the attitudes and actions of all members of society align to facilitate the emergence of social order and prevent disorder. (cf. Grunow et al. 2023: 5-7).

One way to better understand the way social integration promotes social cohesion is by analyzing two related problems of social order: a) coordination and b) motivation. The problem of *coordination* refers to how lasting intersubjective relationships can be established over time, which requires a normatively-constituted, orientation-giving social world. In contrast, the problem of *motivation* highlights the importance of general recognition and voluntary (even if often habitual) observance to norms for a normative order to persist. When viewed through these two mutually-complementary aspects, it becomes transparent that the complex processes of individualization and socialization cannot be resolved unilaterally. Social integration involves the individual's participation in social practices, allowing them to experience themselves as social beings with independent personalities. This process "creates both subjective orientations and suprasubjective orientation systems, socialized individuals, and social institutions" (Habermas 1987: 24; cf. also Habermas 1992). In short, successful integration is "intrinsically motivated, self-purposeful execution of common practice" (Brunkhorst 2001: 605, my trans.).

Social cohesion requires more than just the absence of violence – it also involves fostering positive relationships and shared values across differences (Modood 2007). In the context of a modern, pluralistic society, the underlying idea can be further clarified by linking it to Rawls' (1993) concept of an overlapping consensus, as opposed to a mere *modus vivendi*. An overlapping consensus refers to a situation in which different social groups with varying moral, religious, and metaphysical beliefs agree on a set of principles that form the foundation for social and political cooperation. In contrast, a modus vivendi is a situation where different groups merely tolerate one another's views for pragmatic reasons. This is a fundamentally unstable state as it lacks a common ground for resolving disputes and is based on a delicate balance of power. For several reasons, a society with an overlapping consensus can be regarded as an integrated society. Firstly, agreement on fundamental principles and values fosters a sense of unity and a common purpose among its members. Secondly, the normative principles agreed upon in an overlapping consensus are grounded in a shared understanding of reciprocity and justice. Thirdly, while individuals and groups retain the freedom to maintain their own comprehensive views, they also concur on a shared understanding of cooperation, facilitating

peaceful coexistence over time. In general, a society with an overlapping consensus can be deemed an integrated society due to its sense of unity, common purpose, shared understanding of justice, and the capacity for beneficial cooperation while maintaining socio-cultural diversity. It is worth noting that this concept of social integration represents an ideal type in Max Weber's sense and rarely occurs in its pure form (cf. Weber 2012a). In reality, concrete manifestations of integration mainly differ in the degree of motivation and voluntariness.

2.1 The Problem of Coordination

To delve deeper into the problem of coordination, it's useful to consider the formation of ordered interaction patterns as a prerequisite: "Human beings are distinguished from other mammals by their extreme sociality. Because of this, solving coordination problems with our fellows is our most pressing ecological task" (Zawidzki 2008: 198). For a social order to exist, the goals of different agents must be connected so that their related actions do not break off arbitrarily or become blocked in endless confrontation. A stable social order is possible only when its members coordinate their behavior properly. Social norms, among other things, constitute systems of coordination that are essential for producing and allocating resources and pursuing collective ends. David Lewis (1969: 8) defines such pure coordination problems as:

> "Two or more agents must each choose one of several alternative actions. Often all the agents have the same set of alternative actions, but that is not necessary. The outcomes the agents want to produce or prevent are determined jointly by the actions of all the agents. So the outcome of any action an agent might choose depends on the actions of the other agents. That is why [...] each must choose what to do according to his expectations about what the others will do."

Classics such as Weber (2012b), Durkheim (1997: 7), and Parsons (1968a: 3) have argued that solely self-interested action (in the sense of strategic utility maximization) cannot stabilize social interaction in the long term. With reference to these traditional social theorists, Jürgen Habermas (1987: 212, emphasis in original) concludes that this "is true of *every merely* de facto, norm-free social order based *solely* on interests – no matter whether the conditioned behavior patterns are maintained, as in the Hobbesian model, by the power of authority and the fear of negative sanctions, or, as in theories of political economy; by an exchange of goods and a striving for positive sanctions, or by some combination of the two mechanisms".

This idea is supported by researchers such as Jens Beckert in their current research, who argue that it is necessary to adopt collectively shared norms to understand how the actions of individual agents integrate into a stable order. Beckert (2006; 2009) has explored the

relationship between normative orders and coordination within economic institutions. He contends that norms and institutions play a pivotal role in shaping economic behavior and facilitating collective action within economic systems. One of his key findings is that economic institutions, including markets and firms, are influenced by social norms and expectations. For instance, norms and expectations regarding property rights, contracts, and fair exchange influence the functioning of markets and the behavior of market participants. Similarly, norms and expectations related to hierarchy, authority, and cooperation influence how firms operate and how individuals within organizations conduct themselves. These norms and expectations not only constrain economic behavior but also form the very foundations of economic coordination and cooperation. For example, norms governing property rights and contracts establish a stable framework for market exchanges, enabling individuals to trust one another and engage in mutually beneficial transactions. Similarly, norms governing hierarchy and authority within firms provide a stable framework for organizational coordination and cooperation, allowing individuals to collaborate toward common objectives.

On an abstract level, norms are necessary for integrating a social order for several reasons.[3] Firstly, in an unregulated, norm-free situation, where agents strategically coordinate their action goals, it does not allow for precise expectation formation regarding how to act appropriately. This is a result of the double contingency in such a situation, arising from the fact that two agents not only freely choose their actions but also must attribute the same freedom of choice to their counterpart, making all agents aware of the situation's inherent openness (Cf. Ganßmann 2007: 63). As Parsons and Shils (1951: 16, emphasis in original) state, "there is a *double contingency* inherent in interaction. On the one hand, *ego's* gratifications are contingent on his selection among available alternatives. But in turn, *alter's* reaction will be contingent on *ego's* selection and will result from a complementary selection on *alter's* part." Under these conditions, uncertainty arises not merely by chance but is intrinsic to any norm-free interaction. Consequently, it can be posited that social order, characterized by stable interaction patterns, cannot be sustained over the long term without the presence of norms. To facilitate the coordination of potentially conflicting intentions among multiple agents, shared norms become essential for establishing generalized normative behavioral expectations. Social norms play a critical role in holding individuals accountable to one another (Brennen et al. 2013: 36–39).

[3] Ullmann-Margalit (2015) argues that certain types of social norms are solutions to specific problems that arise in social interactions, such as Prisoners' Dilemma-type scenarios, coordination situations, and inequality situations. She explains how these norms can effectively resolve these problems and are thus are essential for creating and maintaining social order. Bicchieri (2005) develops a similar account of social norms as a function of agents' preferences and social expectations. However, a detailed examination of the nature and function of norms is beyond the scope of this article.

Through this accountability function, norms encapsulate shared knowledge about what we can collectively expect from others and how we disapprove of those who deviate from these expectations. The latter creates situations in which all participants can develop reasonable preferences and second-order expectations regarding their interconnected behavior (cf. Lewis 1969: 1.3). Parsons (1968b: 437) succinctly summarizes this idea by stating: "The most important single condition of the integration of an interaction system is a shared basis of normative order. […] It must guide action by establishing some distinctions between desirable and undesirable lines of action which can serve to stabilize interaction."

In summary, norms are necessary for an integrated social order since they shape how people relate and behave by providing a set of expectations and standards for behavior in specific situations. They structure interaction according to the respective context in temporal, factual, and social terms and simultaneously define those affected as members of a social group (cf. inter alia Luhmann 1999: ch. 4; Habermas 1987: ch. 5).[4]

2.2 The Problem of Motivation

Having a normative order in which social norms are intended to coordinate the actions of group members is not sufficient to ensure a stable unit. Individuals must align their actions with the established norms for these social norms to be effective. If individuals frequently disregard the norms in favor of their own interests, it can lead to a rapid erosion of social order (Loh 2019: ch. 1). For a normative order to be successfully integrated, members must adhere to its values and norms voluntarily and not through coercion. They must be willing to fulfill the tasks and obligations associated with their mutual role expectations. This implies that the normative structure is widely accepted and considered by all members. Put differently, "the force of normative claims will be experienced by actors as externally imposed coercion, unless they make it their own as moral force, that is, unless they convert this force into their own motivations" (Habermas 1996: 67). This alignment of interests and attitudes fosters a general willingness to conform, as long as all other members do the same. It requires everyone to be motivated to fulfill their role in a collective enterprise.

[4] The factual dimension of norms refers to the specific context or situation in which the norm applies. For example, the norm for behavior at a funeral is different from the norm for behavior at a party. The temporal dimension of norms refers to the fact that norms can change over time. What was considered appropriate behavior in the past may not be appropriate today. The social dimension of norms refers to the fact that norms vary between different social groups. For example, norms of behavior for men may differ from those for women. Luhmann (1999, ch. 4) argues that understanding these three dimensions of norms is essential for understanding how norms shape behavior and social interactions. Norms provide a set of expectations for how people should behave in a given context, and these expectations can change depending on the situation, the period, and the social group involved.

A normative order can, therefore, be regarded as a collective enterprise in the sense that it comprises shared rules, expectations, and values that govern social interactions and behavior within a specific group or society. These norms are often established and enforced through collective processes, including socialization, legislation, and social institutions. The normative order is not created by a single individual or group but rather emerges from a collective effort to establish and maintain a shared understanding of how people should interact and behave in various contexts. However, it is important to note that the normative order may not always be the outcome of a conscious collective action; it can also be influenced by historical, cultural, and economic factors. As a result, it may not always be inclusive or reflect the interests of all members of society. Additionally, it is also possible for different groups or sub-groups within a society to have different normative orders, which can lead to conflicts and tensions. In other words, a normative order can be seen as a collective enterprise in the sense that it comprises shared expectations and values established and upheld by a group.[5] Typically, individuals internalize their environment's social norms during the first and second stages of socialization within society (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1989: ch. 3). In some contexts, consent is more explicit and deliberative, while in others, the agreement is more implicit, and conformity becomes habitual.

Building upon these considerations, social integration can be divided into internal and external components. *Internally*, individuals must identify with their roles and internalize the corresponding expectations. Only then can they perceive their roles as a part of their practical, reason-giving identity and endorse the related actions accordingly (cf. Korsgaard 2009: 26). *Externally*, there needs to be recognition and adherence to the norms of the social context among relevant interaction partners. To achieve social integration of a normative order, everyone must act in accordance with the norms and believe that others are doing the same. This belief must be collectively held among a significant proportion of the members. (cf. Brennen et al. 2013: 31).

To expand upon this concept, one can assert, in line with Émile Durkheim, that social integration depends on *solidarity*. Solidarity refers to the mutual acknowledgment and fidelity to the normative order among members of a social group (cf. Durkheim 1997 [1893]; Pahl 1991; Berger 1998).[63] The we-consciousness of associated members creates a sense of belonging and commitment that strengthens social ties in which interpersonal relations are

[5] It is also worth noting that some theorists view the normative order as a product of power relations, suggesting that it may not always be a true collective enterprise, as it can be imposed by a dominant group onto the rest of society. Cf. Mouffe (2005; 2016); Laclau and Mouffe (2014).
[6] From such a descriptive concept of solidarity, a normative concept can be distinguished (cf. Jaeggi 2001).

based on feelings of belonging and responsibility rather than manifest violence or strategic calculation. Solidarity, in this sense, represents trust among strangers in their mutual loyalty to the normative order. In larger groups, like modern societies, social cohesion may not depend on a unified group consciousness.[7] However, it still depends on general recognition and voluntary compliance with norms, which must align with internalized values for individuals to be motivated to comply. As a result, "[i]nstitutionalized values must […] correspond with internalized values. The addressees of a norm will be sufficiently motivated to comply with norms on the average only if they have internalized the values incorporated in the norms." (Habermas 1996: 67). When norms are rejected, and goals are regularly frustrated, it can lead to a decline in social cohesion and the disintegration of the social order.

However, it's important to note that challenging specific values or rules does not necessarily hinder social integration. Democracy, for instance, enables the orderly negotiation of controversial rules through peaceful conflict resolution procedures. Conflict, therefore, doesn't inherently weaken social integration; in fact, it can contribute to its strengthening. In a sense, democracy serves as a mechanism for restraining conflicts: as long as all sides engage in it, destructive disintegration is prevented (Deitelhoff and Schmelzle 2023). Yet even in agonistic democratic practice, the presence of shared norms and values at a higher level is essential for integration. As argued by Rawls (2001), political and social cooperation cannot thrive when individuals solely act in self- or group-interested ways. Solidarity in the sense of reciprocity is crucial for social integration and the stability of society:

> "Here we suppose that political and social cooperation would quickly break down if everyone, or even many people, always acted self- or group-interestedly in a purely strategic or game-theoretic fashion. In a democratic regime, stable social cooperation rests on the fact that most citizens accept the political order as legitimate, or at any rate as not seriously illegitimate, and hence willingly abide by it" (Rawls 2001: 125).

When people seek to organize and shape their social coexistence through binding norms, they must justify the normative order in a manner that establishes its legitimacy, regardless of the available coercive power.[8] Only when it is considered legitimate does a normative order possess (de jure) authority in the eyes of its members, ensuring loyalty to its norms and mutual solidarity among them. Consequently, an integrated order is founded on mutual recognition, where

[7] This insight underlies distinctions such as the one made by Tönnies (1988) between community and society, a concept further developed by Durkheim (1997) through the forms of solidarity: mechanical and organic solidarity.
[8] This is not to deny that rules are better left uncodified and informal in some cases. But it's vital for every normative arrangement´s reproduction de facto restricting its members´ freedom by binding norms and mutual accountability – formal or informal – that it is regarded legitimate.

individuals acknowledge and respect their equal standing. This recognition of full and equal membership enables individuals to view themselves as integral parts of a larger community, fostering the development of a shared identity and purpose. Therefore, in the context used here, the concept of solidarity encompasses more than just a feeling or emotion; it involves a practical and active process that includes cooperation and coordination in the pursuit of common goals. It serves as a necessary precondition for cohesive societies. This is echoed by Chan et al. (2006: 290), who state that

> "social cohesion is a state of affairs concerning both the vertical and the horizontal interactions among members of society as characterized by a set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help, as well as their behavioural manifestations".

I embrace the concept of social cohesion, which necessitates that individuals refrain from actions that violate the established social order, even if such actions may be personally appealing. For example, activities like insurance fraud or tax evasion may appear low-risk and profitable to some, but individuals must resist the temptation, as these behaviors harm those who adhere to the rules and undermine social cohesion if they become widespread. When too many members of society disregard its norms, they lose their binding power, and others may also begin to deviate whenever it is advantageous for them, creating a vicious cycle of norm erosion. In summary, I propose that a normatively integrated social order is characterized by a *shared sense of legitimacy, mass loyalty, and solidarity among its members*.

Problems of disintegration have two facets in this regard. From a structure-centered perspective of the normative order, they manifest as a *functional failure* where the norms are no longer enforced, and the structure becomes disordered or even dissolves. This is referred to as dysfunctional integration, indicating that the normative order has lost its coordinating power. From a subject-centered perspective of the associated members, disintegration is perceived as a *normative failure*, where the normative conditions of acceptance are no longer agreeable. The structure of institutionalized norms and values is considered delegitimized (cf. Habermas 1975: 12). This is referred to as delegitimized integration, signifying that the normative order has lost its motivating power since a critical mass no longer regards the unifying norms as justified. Simply put, "the actual disintegration of society is triggered because individuals feel unfairly treated" (Jaeggi 2018: 191).

It's worth noting, however, that the dissolution of normative orders is not always accurately described as a decline. While this may be true from the perspective of certain norms or normative orders, in some cases, this type of social change can be viewed as a shift in a

normative order or even as progress. Therefore, the dissolution of a normative order does not necessarily imply the complete breakdown of social order; it can also represent a change in the existing order rather than its total collapse. Institutions may adapt in response to new situations. Thus, the dissolution of a normative order is not always a negative development, as it allows for the creation of new norms and institutions better suited to the current situation (cf. Jaeggi 2018). From this perspective, the dissolution of a normative order can be viewed as a dynamic process in which new norms and institutions replace old ones in response to evolving social conditions. Various factors, including technological innovation, demographic shifts, or changes in cultural attitudes, can drive this process of change. In some cases, the dissolution of a normative order can also be seen as a consequence of social movements that challenge and transform existing norms and institutions to advance more inclusive and equitable societies (cf. Fraser 2003). Section four will deal with how the corresponding social order's inclusion structure plays an essential role in this tension. Before I illuminate this intricate relationship, some general remarks on the concept of inclusion are needed.

3 Defending a Practice-Theoretical Account of Social Inclusion: Participation through Role-Taking

The concepts of inclusion and exclusion refer to opposite poles of social participation. Inclusion is the process of enhancing one`s social participation, which is achieved as a state upon successful realization. When someone is successfully included within a social context, their level of participation increases compared to before. On the continuum of social participation, an individual's degree of inclusion and exclusion can be determined in a complementary manner.

The phenomenon of social participation refers to socially established practices, and access to social roles is the key to social inclusion. As Alasdair MacIntyre (1981: 216) aptly states: "We enter human society with one or more imputed characters – roles into which we have been drafted." Being included means having access to the existing roles within an established social context, which must be mutually recognized by all participants (including the agent itself) in their interrelated activities. For individuals, participating in social life means being included in their lifeworld's interpersonal practices. Inclusion and exclusion always occur relative to the role arrangements of a specific social context: "[A] role marks the way in which the individual—as editor, financial adviser, and newscaster, but also as moviegoer, patient, subway rider, father, or owner of an attack dog—comes into contact with society" (Jaeggi 2014: 72).

Social practice refers to repetitive and routine actions organized around shared meanings, values, and norms. It encompasses a wide range of activities, including economic transactions,

political processes, cultural rituals, and everyday activities (cf. Stahl 2021; Haslanger 2018; Ásta 2018; Jaeggi 2018; Searle 2010). These practices are shaped by the social structures in which they are embedded, and in turn, they shape and reproduce these structures. A crucial aspect of social practices is their inherent involvement in collective action, where individuals and groups engage in them together, relying on each other's actions to make sense of these practices. Social practices also tend to exhibit stability and continuity over time, as they are frequently repeated and passed on from one generation to the next. In the context of normative order, social practices both shape and are shaped by it. Norms and values provide a framework for coordinating and guiding these practices, while social practices, in turn, reproduce and reinforce norms and values through the actions of their participants.

Having a role in a social practice means that an individual actively participates in and contributes to the practice, fulfilling a particular function or set of expectations associated with their occupied social position. For example, in a market transaction, the buyer and the seller have distinct roles and expectations associated with their participation. In a political process, citizens have a role in voting and participating in elections, while politicians have a role in representing and making decisions on behalf of the citizens. Roles can be formal or informal, assigned or taken up voluntarily. Thus, the broad term „role“ encompasses a diverse range of potential social positions within the network of social relations. I adopt Searle's idea that “human society is largely constituted by distinctive institutional structures that create and distribute deontic power relationships by assigning status functions, and with those status functions differing social roles, in the society" (Searle 2010: 212). Generally speaking, roles are bundles of culturally marked expectations that possess a highly visible social profile, significantly shaping types of interaction and/or playing an important role in various social contexts (Lippert-Rasmussen 2014: 31). Furthermore, roles are identity-forming and value-laden characteristics, akin to Korsgaard's concept of "practical identity" (2009). In other words, social roles are socially meaningful categories by which people are primarily identified, forming expectations about individuals and serving as the primary clues for interpreting the conduct of others. While the social validity of a practice is rooted in the normative attitudes of its members, it also presents itself as a supra-personal structure to which individuals must relate. Its sustained existence depends on the active contributions of the involved actors, who collectively (re)produce the symbolic structures through their participation. As stable but changeable configurations of intersubjective relations, practices are "at once given and made" (Jaeggi 2018: 142).

Expanding on the concept of participation as having a role in a social practice emphasizes that individuals and groups are not passive recipients of norms but actively engage in shaping them through their actions and interactions. Social roles can be seen as imbued with a normative status that structures social interactions within the fabric of social relations, and these roles can be subject to contestation and change for various reasons. This means that all participants are typically entitled to expect from each other the performance or refraining from specific sequences of actions required in corresponding situations and to respond to deviant behavior with criticism when necessary. This aspect of the reciprocal attribution of "standard authority" for evaluating and correcting behavior within a practice has been recently emphasized by Stahl (2021). When no longer deemed acceptable, social practices can become the subject of interpersonal conflicts and negotiation processes, ultimately leading to subsequent changes. As Hardimon (1993: 348) aptly states:

> "Determining whether a given social role is reflectively acceptable involves stepping back from that role in thought and asking whether it is a role people ought to occupy and play. Determining that a given social role is reflectively acceptable involves judging that it is (in some sense) meaningful, rational, or good."

Because social participation involves taking on social roles within an intersubjective practice, it becomes crucial to scrutinize these practices and their associated role arrangements to assess the value of inclusion in a specific field and to instigate social change when participation opportunities are unjust or when role models no longer convincingly meet these criteria. In this context, it is necessary to consider three key aspects: first, whether the access mechanisms within a practice are fair or if they contain unjust exclusion criteria; second, evaluating the individual participation situation of those involved to determine any justified inclusion claims and the appropriate demands to fulfill them; and third, investigating whether the current states of inclusion need to be changed or abolished, such as in the case of outdated role models that are no longer reflectively acceptable. This would involve addressing marginalization, which affects individuals differently, as marginalization itself comes in degrees. To address deficiencies in participation, measures and precautions can be taken to change existing structures. These can include structurally transformative inclusion policies, such as when traditional role models or entire formations of practices necessitate sweeping social change. Additionally, measures linked to the attitudes and abilities of individuals can be employed, known as structurally persistent inclusion policies. This approach is applicable when an individual's participation situation justifies claims to inclusion, even if there are simultaneously

good reasons for the continued existence of a practice and its role structure, which is considered justified.

It's important to note that "integration" refers to actual facts of attitudes and behaviors in a normatively regulated context, while "inclusion" is a normative notion that refers to potential facts. An agent has access to a particular position within a social practice if they have the normative standing to take it. Thus, inclusion is not a logical or metaphysical but a normative modality. Since the corresponding application context determines whether an agent's role identity becomes manifest, I refer to this as the *dispositional understanding of social participation*. It states that an agent, *A*, possesses a particular role, *R*, of a social practice, *SP*, in a relevant context, *C*, only when the following applies: Necessary, if *A* is in *C*, then it is normatively required that *A* is regarded and treated as *R.* This means that a social position is not accessible to someone if they cannot claim the particular normative status even if they are in the relevant context (cf. Behrendt 2019).[9]

Consider the following example: All else being equal, a bachelor's participation in the consumer role is fundamentally different from the role of a husband. To perform the consumer role, the bachelor only needs to establish the appropriate context, such as going into a store. However, his social status as a consumer is not newly acquired. It would be implausible to speak of renewed inclusion with every fresh manifestation of the role. As soon as the bachelor leaves the store, no exclusion occurs. This would have absurd consequences. It is more plausible that the corresponding role is in a specific latent actuality until its manifestation. Consequently, the bearer is included in the complementary practice due to contextual circumstances, regardless of whether he currently exercises his roles. On the other hand, to perform the husband role, the bachelor must first enter into marriage, which fundamentally changes his social status. He must acquire the social position of a husband, not just change the application context. The bachelor possesses the husband role only potentially in the manner of marriageability. He has the opportunity to perform the corresponding roles in both cases, the consumer's and the husband's roles. However, in the former case, he is already the bearer of the role and only does

[9] Inclusion, like other normative concepts, can be examined from both normative and descriptive perspectives. Normative concepts typically involve principles that prescribe how individuals should behave or what justice requires. On the other hand, descriptive concepts aim to state how things are rather than how they should be. Nevertheless, normative concepts can still undergo empirical investigation. To illustrate this, let's consider the concept of rights. Rights prescribe how individuals should be treated by others and by society as a whole. While rights are inherently normative, their existence and effectiveness can be empirically studied in terms of actual behaviors and societal practices, or normatively in terms of their justification or incorporated values. Similarly, inclusion serves as both an empirical fact that can be analyzed in the social sciences and a normative value that justifies claims for inclusion. From the empirical perspective, we examine how specific participation opportunities are allocated within a given society. From the normative perspective, we explore how these opportunities ought to be distributed. Importantly, my intention throughout the paper is to develop a *descriptive* perspective on inclusion (as a normative concept).

not exercise it at certain times, whereas the social position must still be acquired in the latter case. While the social position of a bachelor is a necessary precondition to acquiring the respective social status of a husband, pure marriageability is not sufficient to actually perform it. It's important to note the different modalities that play a part here: The consumer role is truly accessible to the bachelor, and he has the *opportunity*$_{(1)}$ to exercise it in the relevant context. However, he does not yet occupy the husband role but has only the *opportunity*$_{(2)}$ of obtaining it and, consequently, acquiring the *opportunity*$_{(1)}$ of finally exercising it successfully in the relevant context.

According to the dispositional understanding of social participation, the bachelor is effectively included in the consumer role but not in the husband role, even though he has the *opportunity*$_{(2)}$ to obtain the latter. However, more is required than just switching to the relevant context. While the roles "bachelor" and "consumer" in this example are on the same realization level (latent actuality), the role "husband" is purely potential and, therefore, not as easily accessible to the agent. Whether it will manifest depends on a more far-reaching status change of the agent's social position within the normative structure of social relations.

A normative order can be evaluated as more or less inclusive based on the accessibility of its social positions to different individuals. Consequently, the extent to which a particular agent is effectively included depends on their opportunities$_{(1)}$ to actually take up the available positions in a given context. The degree to which an individual is included in a normative order is determined by their access to available social positions within a given context in this sense. It's crucial to note that full participation requires accessibility on three complementary levels: institutional, interpersonal, and material (cf. Behrendt 2017).

The *first* level is institutional, which reflects that participation is always related to certain institutionalized roles within an existing structure, such as those of a consumer or bachelor. Participation becomes possible when social practices offer positions for inclusion or exclusion. The necessary role competencies to successfully occupy a particular position determine the formal inclusion mechanism. Institutional inclusion occurs when someone meets the institutionalized requirements for potential role-holders. Since it's essential for achieving institutional inclusion that the individual characteristics of the subjects align with the institutionalized inclusion rules of a practice, it can be realized either by adapting the characteristics of the actor to the inclusion rules or by adapting the inclusion rules of the practice to the existing characteristics of the affected subject. In the first case, it can be referred to as "structure-preserving inclusion", and in the second as "structure-changing inclusion".

The *second* level of inclusion is intersubjective, which acknowledges that a significant number of participants must mutually recognize and accept each other's roles for effective participation. Intersubjective inclusion fosters positive attitudes and reduces prejudices among participants during interactions. This involves reducing cognitive, affective, and/or practical prejudices and aversions (negatively framed), as well as promoting mutual recognition and appreciation (positively framed). Informal inclusion can be categorized into two cases: first, when a participant has an institutional status but is not recognized by the relevant majority, and second, when there is only an intersubjective status without a corresponding institutional status. When social positions are not supported by the norms of a practice or are rejected for personal reasons, it signifies a significant inclusion deficit that requires attention.

The *third* level of inclusion is material, which refers to the material aspects of social practices. The design of these material frameworks, such as buildings, transportation, and equipment, or the availability and cost of childcare facilities, can significantly impact an individual's ability to participate. When the material components of a practice are not designed to be accessible for all, it can lead to exclusion for those with atypical characteristics or abilities. For example, a building without an elevator would exclude individuals who use wheelchairs. Therefore, to ensure structural inclusion, the material components of a practice must be designed to be barrier-free, meaning that they are entirely usable for all those involved. This can be achieved through various measures such as legal provisions, financial support policies, scientific expertise, and raising social awareness. Accessibility is an essential prerequisite for effectively realizing an individual's social participation.

Effective Participation

Any Agent *A* is effectively included in a socially established practice *P* iff.

i. *A* has access to at least one social role *SR* defined by the social norms constitutive of *P* (i.e., *institutional inclusion* holds);
ii. which a relevant majority of those affected mutually take into account in the relevant context C in their interrelated attitudes (i.e., *intersubjective inclusion* holds); and
iii. access to the necessary resources for participation is not systematically blocked due to barriers to the practice structure (i.e., *material inclusion* holds).

Figure 1. Effective Participation

When there's only one position open for a participant, it signifies that they have the opportunity$_{(1)}$ to actively and proficiently engage in that specific practice. This observation emphasizes the distinction between *effective* and *full participation*. In the case of *effective* participation, an individual is enabled to occupy the available role, contributing meaningfully within the scope of that position. However, this should not be confused with *full* participation, which entails the capacity for one person to assume any and all roles within the practice,

demonstrating versatility and comprehensive involvement. The importance of this differentiation cannot be overstated, as it highlights the various levels at which individuals can engage within a practice. The distinction between effective and full participation offers a nuanced perspective on the breadth of involvement that individuals can achieve. This distinction clarifies the diverse ways in which people can participate, leading to a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at play within the practice.

The three levels of inclusion discussed allow us to identify three distinct types of social exclusion:

1. *Institutional Exclusion:* This occurs when individuals or groups are barred from specific positions due to prevailing social norms. A prime illustration is laws prohibiting certain individuals from owning property or engaging in particular activities.
2. *Intersubjective Exclusion:* This takes place when individuals, despite having a formal entitlement to participation, are neither recognized nor accepted in their roles by others. A clear example is the unjust discrimination faced by individuals based on aversions or prejudices.
3. *Material Exclusion:* This emerges when the environment or allocated resources create substantial obstacles, potentially making participation in social practices challenging or even impossible for certain individuals. A concrete instance might involve a lack of accessibility for individuals with disabilities within a public building or the absence of adequate childcare facilities.

In summary, the degree of inclusiveness within a normative order can be assessed by examining how it addresses institutional, intersubjective, and material forms of social exclusion. These forms of exclusion can impede individuals or groups from participating in social practices and hinder societal integration. It's crucial to recognize that varying levels of inclusiveness may be necessary in different contexts to achieve successful social cohesion. These considerations provide a foundation for further elucidating the relationships among the concepts of inclusion and integration, as presented in the next section.

4 Connecting the Dots: The Relationship Between Inclusion and Integration

Building on the previous sections, it becomes evident that inclusion pertains to the aspects of social affiliation and belonging that fall within the scope of participation opportunities related to a social order's role structure. In contrast, integration encompasses the social validity or practical acceptance of the social norms underpinning these structures. More precisely, while the concepts “inclusion” and “exclusion” refer to a range of phenomena best explained in terms of accessibility to social positions within a particular social context, the concepts “integration”

and “disintegration” are associated with aspects that center around conformity to or deviation from these norms.[10]

Despite their disparities, the concepts of "integration" and "inclusion" are interconnected in various ways, as they both relate to the governing norms of a social order. Specifically, social integration revolves around the acceptance and adherence to the norms of a particular order. Inclusion, to some extent, relies on these same norms because granting or denying access to roles and positions within the order requires a collective understanding and acceptance of its defining norms. Moreover, since effective social participation is response-dependent, relying on mutual recognition between individuals in interactions, inclusion is closely connected to integration. Effective inclusion in a social practice necessitates the social practice to be socially integrated (see below). However, achieving social cohesion may require varying levels of inclusivity depending on the context and time period. The proposed analysis accommodates various forms of participation, ranging from complete exclusion to full inclusion, without necessarily compromising an individual's integration within, or the cohesion of, the associated social structure. This underscores the variable nature of inclusivity required for effective social cohesion. I will argue that integration directly depends on inclusion when participation in the corresponding social position is considered valuable for its own sake. In such cases, inclusion itself becomes a key factor in achieving social integration. Conversely, the relationship between integration and inclusion is indirect when participation is solely pursued as a means to obtain external goods. As we will see shortly, "integration" and "inclusion" connote two interrelated yet distinct dimensions of social order that cannot be substituted or reduced to each other. "Integration" refers to the process of acknowledging and complying with a specific normative order or social structure, while "inclusion" pertains to the ability to participate in the roles and positions within that order or structure.

Yet, there are opposing views. Especially in the realm of Special Education Research, an eliminative element in the differentiation between integration and inclusion is prevalent (cf. Uditsky 1993; Daniels and Garner 1999; Lise 2003; Dixon 2005; Farrell 2005; Hinz 2006; Kronauer 2010; Jahnukainen 2015; Rodriguez and Garro-Gill 2015). The proposal suggests a shift from the practice of integration to inclusion, indicating that the conventional approach to integration falls short in attaining genuine social belonging and equity. Instead, the focus should lie on fostering an inclusive society, wherein social norms and structures are actively adapted to embrace a diverse spectrum of individuals and groups. By way of illustration, take an excerpt

[10] Walker and Wigfield (2003) suggest a similar though slightly different distinction. They claim that social cohesion concerns the structure of social relations whereas social inclusion focuses on the access to and level of integration in those relations.

from Kronauer's work. From his perspective, "the most obvious difference between the concept of integration and that of inclusion [...] is that integration starts from a given society into which integration can and should take place, while inclusion requires that social relations that exclude must be overcome" (Kronauer 2010: 56, my trans.). Paraphrasing the author, if an existing order is to become more inclusive, its norms must change. If, on the other hand, a current order is to be socially integrated, this does not require a change in its norms but rather an adjustment of the potential participants as the norms require. According to this position, integration requires an effort by the individuals (or groups) to be integrated. Put differently, all those who lack the required attitudes and motivations are supposed to assimilate into the given structure. In contrast, inclusion is considered a collective process that can only be achieved by the associated members of a social group as a whole by changing their normative expectations and the deontic structure itself.

Proponents' main argument for replacing integration with inclusion is that, allegedly, traditional forms of integration often lead to segregation and marginalization. One significant objection to integration, as they conceive it, is that integration often leads to a one-size-fits-all approach, where the integrated individuals or groups are expected to conform to the dominant societal norms and values. This can further exclude those who do not fit within these norms. In contrast, inclusion focuses on actively addressing and dismantling the barriers that exclude certain individuals or groups from participating fully in society rather than expecting them to conform to the existing norms. Inclusion aims to create an inclusive environment where all members, regardless of their abilities, are valued and have equal opportunities to participate. For proponents of this eliminativist view, conventional forms of integration often lack the essential support and accommodations required for members of more vulnerable groups to participate fully. Instead, the focus may be primarily on compliance with laws and regulations rather than on creating an inclusive culture and environment.

This outlook contains both truth and falsehood. From a normative point of view, I subscribe to prioritizing equal opportunities and active participation for vulnerable groups and valuing the contributions of all members of society as necessary for social justice. However, this perspective is mistaken in its characterization of the underlying non-eliminative view, as proposed here, and its assertions regarding its implications. The assumption that a distinction between inclusion and integration will lead to the harmful assimilation or marginalization of vulnerable groups is incorrect. My approach does not contradict the normative goals of an eliminative view; rather, it is applicable to various normative ideals of participation. But this should not be confused with a strictly scientific approach, which allows for the empirical

examination of various social contexts and historical periods. In other words, inclusion must be understood firstly as an empirical fact that the social sciences can accurately diagnose and secondly as a normative value that justifies inclusion claims and aims to achieve political inclusion goals.

The eliminativist view needs to be revised and emphasized differently to provide a more nuanced analysis of specific instances of social participation across diverse contexts of social reality and to determine when social participation and cohesion are achieved. While it is not inherently incoherent or false to use these concepts differently, the eliminative approach undermines important distinctions in social theory, such as the distinction between cohesion and participation or role allocation and role acceptance. As can be gleaned from the preceding discussion, it is analytically more beneficial to approach the implementation of integration in a manner that renders the norms perceived as legitimate by a greater number of participants and to a greater extent. This can be achieved either by adapting the norms to the legitimacy expectations of the members or, conversely, by adjusting the expectations of members to align with the existing norms. Inclusion can similarly be attained through at least two analogous methods: by altering inclusion mechanisms to accommodate more participation or by including those previously excluded by the existing inclusion mechanism, provided they adapt their characteristics accordingly. This differentiation between structure-persistent and structure-transformative modes of integration and inclusion allows for a more fine-grained understanding of social participation and cohesion. The eliminativist view's focus on the distinction between changing norms versus changing subjects fails to account for important cases, such as exclusive but integrated or inclusive yet disintegrated contexts, which I will discuss shortly. It also overlooks the fact that social affiliation is a two-fold property, with the degree of inclusiveness expressing a specific idea of the nature of the social structure. This structure is stabilized and reproduced through successful integration by collectively accepting the corresponding values and norms as legitimate.[11]

4.1 Inclusion and Integration at the Structure-Centered Macro Level

A more nuanced understanding of the relationship between social participation and cohesion can be achieved by distinguishing inclusion and integration based on their goals. A successfully integrated order is characterized by the collective acceptance of social norms, but this does not necessarily imply an inclusive order. The level of inclusiveness or exclusiveness of a normative

[11] It is again another question whether the values in question are actually valid. From the factual acceptance of an order, it is not easy to conclude that it is normatively acceptable. One must differentiate here between validity and validity, that is, between the question of whether a social order is legitimate or is only considered legitimate. Speaking with Rawls (1993: xlii), the problem here is one of "stability for the right reasons".

order may vary depending on the social context and time. Focusing on the resulting state of affairs, rather than the process, allows for a clear distinction between four different types of orders with varying levels of inclusion and integration. In the range of four extremes, one can assert without conceptual confusion that a particular normative order might be gradually more or less

a) inclusive and integrated: social positions are highly accessible, and this fact is collectively accepted, or

b) exclusive and integrated: access to social positions is severely restricted, and this fact is collectively accepted, or

c) inclusive and disintegrated: social positions are highly accessible, and this fact is collectively rejected, or

d) exclusive and disintegrated: access to social positions is severely restricted, and this fact is collectively rejected.

This fourfold differentiation allows for a more precise analysis of specific cases, highlighting the relationship between levels of social inclusion and forms of social integration for promoting enduring social orders.[12]

Role Structure/ Social Norms	*Unrestricted participation opportunities*	*Restricted participation opportunities*
Collective acceptance	a) Inclusive and integrated order	b) Exclusive and integrated order
Collective rejection	c) Inclusive and disintegrated order	d) Exclusive and disintegrated order

Figure 2. Forms of normative orders (structure-centered)

Among the options presented in my typology, b) and c) are the most controversial. In the case of a normative order that is inclusive but disintegrated (type c), the existing role structure for different participants has few restrictions, yet the members involved reject them precisely because of their openness. This implies that individuals are dissatisfied with the normative order due to its excessive openness and insufficient restrictiveness. In such cases, successful integration requires a more exclusive structure (type b). Consider the modern working world and the inclusion structure in the labor market. Young children and pensioners are predominantly excluded from gainful employment, but it would be inappropriate to describe

[12] There can indeed be other reasons for rejecting social norms that are unrelated to the inclusiveness of social positions. In this context, however, my focus is on the interrelation between inclusion and integration that is participation and cohesion.

this fact as economically disintegrating. Instead, it is widely accepted as a necessary precondition for the general acceptance of the labor market – at least in Western industrialized countries. Now, imagine a scenario where the level of inclusiveness in the labor market would be so high that even young children and pensioners were required to participate. In this case, the labor market would likely face much deviant behavior and contestation, meaning that people would stop following the norm, and there would be a lot of resistance to the new level of inclusiveness.[13] While inclusiveness is generally viewed as a positive attribute, an excess of it can lead to disintegration, and a more exclusive structure may be required for successful integration. More generally, equating participation with cohesion is exceedingly doubtful if the underlying positions are precarious from the viewpoint of those affected. When people feel compelled to fulfill social expectations they perceive as unjustified personal impositions, participation tends to cause dissolution rather than promote social cohesion. In such cases, a high level of inclusiveness in a social arrangement does not improve its integration – on the contrary. Consider Frankena's (1962: 17) prominent thought experiment of a ruler who has all his subjects fried in boiling oil and then puts himself in the oil. The complete inclusion of all members of society in this barbaric practice can clearly not, in and of itself, serve as proof of its integration. Instead, exclusion seems to be the universally preferable option. To be sure, the point is not that there will be no society at all once the ruler succeeds. The point is that despite a maximum level of inclusiveness, this constellation will hardly generate acceptance and voluntary compliance with the participants beforehand. As these hypothetical considerations suggest, a cohesive normative order does not presuppose a fixed level of inclusiveness, nor does exclusion necessarily lead to its disintegration. Excluding certain groups, such as refugees and immigrants in xenophobic societies, can even promote cohesion among in-group members. This means that excluding certain people can strengthen the bond between those who are not excluded.[14]

Several researchers and organizations have argued against this assumption, contending that reducing exclusion is crucial for building social cohesion. They directly link social cohesion to

[13] Please note that this passage is not intended as an analysis of the inclusiveness of the real existing labor market but rather as a thought experiment designed to illustrate that greater inclusiveness does not necessarily lead to greater cohesion. The argument presented suggests that if we were to imagine a working environment that demanded the participation of even children and the elderly, such inclusion in the workforce might not enhance cohesion; instead, it could potentially lead to contention. It's worth noting that there might exist a middle ground between these two extremes. Envision a more inclusive professional landscape than what is present today, where children and the elderly possess the liberty to participate without being compelled to do so. Nevertheless, in this scenario, it's not the heightened inclusivity within a singular practice that cultivates cohesion, but rather the amplified freedom of choice that plays a role in its development.

[14] As this indicates, social cohesion is nothing worth pursuing for its own sake. Normatively, we should be cautious about creating a stable order by excluding certain people or building social cohesion at the expense of exclusion (cf. Deitelhoff et al. 2020: 18).

participation opportunities (cf. Phillips 2008; Oxoby 2009). Gough and Olofsson (1999), Bernard (1999), and Berger-Schmitt (2000) argue that building social cohesion involves reducing exclusion. Duhaime et al. (2004) and Jenson (1998: 15-17) also believe that social inclusion is a necessary condition for social cohesion and that social integration relies on a high degree of inclusiveness. Putnam (2000) argues that social trust and civic engagement are key components of social cohesion and that social inclusion is necessary for developing these components. Likewise, the European Union's "Social Inclusion Strategy" (2010-2020) has strongly emphasized social inclusion and active participation as a means to improve social cohesion, and the EU policy document produced by the European Commission highlights that social cohesion depends on the inclusion of diverse groups and the ability to create common ground among them (European Commission 2019). Similarly, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also emphasizes the importance of social inclusion and active participation (OECD 2019). Against this, Chan et al. (2006: 287) have pointed out that inclusion/exclusion is not constitutive of social cohesion/dissolution in the strict sense. At most, participation opportunities might be a condition "that may promote it".

Following up on this thought, greater inclusiveness can promote social cohesion in two ways: directly and indirectly. In addition to unequal distributions of social resources, such as wealth, security, or power, which often lead to conflicts related to social recognition and affiliation, the allocation of participation opportunities is also a well-known cause of social conflict and disintegration (cf. Honneth 1995). To use a metaphor, disintegrating disputes may not only be about who gets to eat how much but also about who gets to sit at the table in the first place and on which chairs, which is closely related to the former. When integration relies directly on inclusion, participants will only consider the corresponding norms and expectations legitimate if they allow for a specific set of participation opportunities. In such cases, redistributing other resources will not be enough to maintain social cohesion, particularly when participation is associated with prestige or social standing. On the other hand, when participation is not seen as desirable in itself but rather as a means to acquire other resources, such as a job that provides financial stability, redistributing other resources, such as wealth or power, could generate general acceptance without changing the level of inclusiveness. To determine whether the relationship between inclusiveness and integration is direct or indirect, it is essential to consider whether acceptance can only be achieved by changing the degree of inclusiveness or if redistributing other resources would be sufficient. If the latter is true, the relationship is indirect. However, if participation opportunities directly affect a structure's integration and only a particular degree of inclusiveness generates acceptance and conformity,

then the connection is direct. These "participatory goods" (Réume 1988) refer to resources, opportunities, or benefits tied to active participation in a particular social structure, such as political or economic participation. When individuals feel they have access to these goods and can participate in society, they are more likely to feel a sense of belonging and acceptance. However, if access to these goods is limited, it can lead to feelings of rejection, which can undermine social cohesion. Ensuring that all members of society have access to participatory goods and that these goods are distributed fairly and equitably can promote a sense of belonging and acceptance among all members of society, regardless of their background or status.

By way of illustration, consider the issue of unemployment. Individuals who are employed are included in the workforce, while those who are unemployed are excluded.[15] The increasing digitization of previously analog areas in working life is often seen as a threat, as it raises concerns that highly connected and autonomous machines could eliminate many jobs or even replace humans entirely (LaGrandeur and Hughes 2017). This raises the question of whether welfare state measures, such as an unconditional basic income, can effectively ensure more significant inclusion in wage labor practices and the general workforce and how this affects citizens' social integration into society (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2019). The effectiveness of unconditional basic income as a means of integrating a highly exclusive working world depends on the value placed on participation in the wage-labor system (Gheaus and Herzog 2016). Specifically, successful integration depends on whether participation in the wage-labor system is viewed as valuable in and of itself or only as a means to other goods, such as economic welfare. While welfare state measures may reallocate economic resources, they do not necessarily increase access to employment and may not guarantee inclusion in the workforce. The success of these measures depends on whether they are considered participatory goods. On another level, an unconditional basic income may address material exclusion by increasing access to other social positions, such as the consumer role. However, this can also lead to dependency on government aid and create conflict between being a welfare state client and a free, equal citizen. Though the basic income may remove material barriers, it does not guarantee inclusion in the workforce and may not be enough to ensure equal work participation.

[15] Note that the unemployed are considered part of the labor market, but concurrently, they are excluded from work, given that they are not employed. A meticulous analysis of the economic sphere reveals the existence of numerous distinct practices in which one can either participate or be excluded from. One such practice is the general labor market, while another pertains to the specific wage-employment relationship within a particular context. If we were to accept that even the unemployed are included and participate in the working world, this implication would pose a challenge because we could no longer assert that unemployment is a social problem, as it seems to exclude individuals from professional participation. This suggests that redefining or broadening the concept of "included" to encompass even the unemployed (as potentially included) would challenge the traditional notion that unemployment is a social problem (as not actually included). This reinterpretation implies that unemployment doesn't inherently exclude individuals from professional participation, which contrasts with the prevailing view that unemployment is indeed a social issue due to the exclusion it entails from the workforce.

Therefore, welfare state measures alone may not be sufficient to fully integrate society. However, whether these considerations are collectively shared among those affected is an empirical question that cannot be predetermined theoretically.

4.2 Inclusion and Integration at a Subject-Centered Micro Level

Let me highlight one more time the importance of considering both the structure-centered and subject-centered perspectives to comprehensively understand the relationship between social participation and cohesion. From a structure-centered perspective, a social order can be evaluated based on the inclusivity of its social positions and the degree to which members accept its norms. From a subject-centered perspective, a dichotomic distinction between membership and no membership in a normative order does not meet analytical needs. Within the proposed framework, we must distinguish three different types of social affiliation. Accordingly, a person might be

a) included and integrated: she occupies at least one social position within a given social context, and both the agent and the (majority of) other group members act according to this, or

b) excluded and integrated: she occupies no social position within a given social context, and both the agent and the (majority of) other group members act according to this, or

c) excluded and disintegrated: she occupies no social position within a given social context, and this fact is rejected either by the agent or the (majority of) other group members, or both.

Role allocation / Role acceptance	*Access to social roles within a given context*	*No access to social roles within a given context*
Mutual acceptance	a) Included and integrated	b) Excluded and integrated
Mutual rejection	---	c) Excluded and disintegrated

Figure 3. Forms of normative orders (subject-centered)

It's important to recognize that, when viewed from a subject-centered perspective, it's impossible for individuals or groups to experience both inclusion and disintegration simultaneously. Effective participation inherently presupposes a foundational level of cohesion at the micro-level of agents' integration into society. For instance, consider the integration of black students into American high schools following desegregation. While these students could attend the same schools as their white peers (which constitutes institutional inclusion), they were not always accepted by other members of the school community, including some teachers

and students (resulting in intersubjective exclusion). This demonstrates that, from a subject-centered perspective, successful participation in a practice necessitates mutual acceptance among interaction partners (cf. Searle 2003) or what I have called the external component of integration“ (see p. 8–9 above). When a person's presence in a social position is rejected, they are excluded from participating in that practice, even if they institutionally hold it. In such cases, social disintegration leads to (a unique form of) social exclusion ("intersubjective exclusion", see sec. 3 above) that can potentially provoke conflicts. To effectively participate, mutual recognition and trust are essential. Intersubjective inclusion strives to achieve this by reducing prejudices and aversions on cognitive, affective, or practical levels and fostering mutual understanding.

Another interesting and perhaps original implication of this proposal is that individuals can be excluded yet remain integrated members of society (option b). This implies that they are recognized as valid members of society, even if they lack specific opportunities for participation. Once we acknowledge that exclusion denotes marginalization within a given context through limited participation opportunities, not the physical absence or literally standing outside of society, it becomes apparent that members can be excluded and, at the same time, integrated. Suppose one subscribes to the view of society as an arrangement of social practices as proposed here. In that case, it might be true that someone cannot participate in a performative role that constitutes full membership but still supports the normative order through norm acceptance. Put differently, individuals or groups may be excluded from certain roles or opportunities, but this exclusion is considered legitimate and accepted by society. By way of illustration, let's consider a purely hypothetical scenario: a slave-owning society in which all enslaved people view their social position as justified based on a shared cosmological worldview and, therefore, willingly comply with their corresponding role expectations beyond any doubt.[16] Although their social status excludes them from participating in most of society's goods and positions, thereby denying full and equal membership, they nevertheless act voluntarily and, with firm conviction, willingly fulfilling their part, hence cooperatively reproducing the existing order. In this scenario, enslaved people would be – ex hypothesi – largely excluded yet well-integrated members of society. They are permanently excluded from social goods and positions necessary to be regarded as full and equal members of society. At the same time, the social order is undoubtedly characterized by high stability or social cohesion. In other words, conceptually, successful integration does not imply inclusion.

[16] I am aware that there is a long history of historical injustice related to slavery. This example is not intended to comment on this historical context but rather to illustrate a theoretical point.

From a subject-centered perspective, one must further assess whether individuals or groups are effectively included, taking into account the different types of exclusions that may occur, such as a) intrinsic, b) contingent, and c) fortuitous exclusions (Williams 1973: 243). a) Some positions are *intrinsically exclusive* by their internal structure, such as leadership positions. Only specific individuals can hold them, while most are excluded due to the nature of the position's function. b) Other positions exclude individuals purely *contingently*, such as the role of a student, which requires certain conditions of access that not everyone meets for empirical reasons but which, in principle, everyone could meet. c) Third, social positions are empirically limited when, despite many people meeting the necessary conditions for participation, there are not enough resources to include everyone effectively. This is known as *fortuitous* exclusion. In this case, society is forced to add additional restrictions on access to regulate access in an orderly fashion. "A good can, of course, be both contingently and fortuitously limited at once: when, due to shortage of supply, not even the people who are qualified to have it, limited in numbers though they are, can in every case have it" (Williams 1973: 243). For instance, certain courses of study might implement a numerus clausus to control the restricted availability of sought-after study positions.

Even if a social structure is generally inclusive, it is important to examine the extent to which individuals or groups are able to participate effectively within it. This can be demonstrated by looking at pairs of roles that are essential to the success of a practice but cannot be performed simultaneously by the same person. For example, one cannot be both the host and a guest at the same time at a birthday party. The logical structure of the host/guest role pair makes it impossible for an individual to appear as a guest at their own party. In this case, inclusion in one role can be inferred to result in exclusion from other roles within the same practice, even if both roles are inclusive in principle. A second type of exclusion occurs when an individual is unable to fulfill multiple roles at the same time due to practical limitations such as personal circumstances. For example, someone may be unable to attend different parties as a guest because they are required to work. This type of exclusion is not caused by a logical or systematic reason but rather by specific and contingent factors in the individual's life. It is not inherent in the nature of the roles themselves but results from external constraints that limit the individual's ability to participate in them. This second type of exclusion is distinct from the first type, which is caused by logical or systematic factors such as the incompatibility of certain roles with one another. A third form of exclusion can be identified as one in which holding a particular position within a social practice not only limits the availability of other roles within the same practice but also has a lasting and comprehensive effect on one's ability to participate in other social

practices and roles. This can be seen in situations such as the master-servant dynamic, where belonging to the subordinate group means not only facing immediate discrimination from the dominant group but also being systematically excluded from participating in the majority of other social practices and roles. It would undermine the meaning of a corresponding practice form (type) if someone were a master today and a servant tomorrow in individual practice instantiations (tokens). This type of exclusion is particularly difficult to accept as it is both enduring and all-encompassing. An example of this can be found in the United States during the Jim Crow era, where strict racial segregation meant that belonging to a marginalized group meant both facing immediate persecution and also being prevented from participating in most other aspects of society.

Discussing incompatible role pairs, or "mutually exclusive positions," highlights the limitations of full social participation within a given practice. This means that individuals may not be able to permanently hold all roles within a certain type of practice, hindering their ability to fully participate in society. Rather than viewing social participation as a binary of inclusion or exclusion, it is important to consider the temporary and limited nature of an individual's participation in relation to their life experiences and roles in other practices. From a structural perspective, social order can also be understood as multipolar, as individuals may hold multiple roles in the overall practice structure of society. The limits of inclusion in a society vary depending on the specific context and cannot be predetermined. Social orders can include multiple models of inclusion, and the boundaries are established through mutual agreement and acceptance of the conditions for accessing certain roles, as well as mutual expectations for behavior within those roles.

I have conducted a descriptive analysis of the inclusion structure and social integration of normative orders without offering an evaluative framework. In a stable social order, the majority of its members must accept its norms. This anchors the modalities of social coexistence, consolidating the social order in a relatively stable manner. However, a social order is only legitimate if it draws its "stability for the right reasons", as Rawls (1993: xlii) emphasizes. This highlights the importance of a normative concept of social integration, where all those affected by the social order give reasonable consent. This insight prompts further discussion on the justified claims to inclusion that can be derived from it in the context of this debate. An important normative aspect of inclusion is the principle that those affected by the norms of a social order should have a say in determining its content and structure. As Stahl (2021) notes, everyone must recognize each other as "standard authorities" with the right to question the normative validity of socially established rules and their correct application.

5. Conclusion

This article aimed to address the potential confusion between social participation and cohesion. It argued that "integration" and "inclusion" are two related but distinct concepts often used in social theory, policy, and practice. Integration refers to the process and outcome of becoming a part of a group or society and being accepted as a member, while inclusion refers to the process and outcome of providing access and opportunities for participation for members of a group or society. Both concepts are important for promoting enduring social orders, as integration ensures that individuals and groups share common norms and values, and inclusion ensures that individuals and groups have access and opportunities for participation, which can help promote social justice and reduce social conflicts. The levels of inclusiveness necessary for social cohesion may vary considerably across different social contexts. Integration depends directly on participation opportunities if the corresponding social positions themselves are considered valuable, whereas the relation is indirect if inclusion is only contingently relevant as a means for allocating other goods and burdens. This differentiation allows for an account that distinguishes between members' social participation and social cohesion, making the relationship between levels of social inclusion and forms of social integration accessible to empirical analysis. However, it is important to note that these concepts are not always aligned, as integration can sometimes require individuals and groups to conform to dominant norms and values, leading to assimilation and marginalization. Therefore, a normative evaluation of these two concepts is necessary to promote valuable social cohesion.

My analysis suggests that theory-building and empirical studies regarding social cohesion and participation should be conducted along the proposed dimensions. In terms of social theory, the findings suggest that further research should be conducted on the relationship between levels of social inclusion and forms of social integration in different areas of society to inform and shape social theories on how to promote social cohesion. From a normative perspective, it is important to examine which claims to participation can be justified and whether it is morally justifiable to accept exclusive integration in certain contexts. Concerning policy and practice, the findings suggest that policymakers should be aware of the difference between integration and inclusion. Promoting social cohesion may involve providing access and opportunities for participation for marginalized groups while also fostering shared norms and values. Additionally, it's crucial to ensure that integration does not lead to the assimilation and marginalization of certain groups but rather promotes modern pluralistic orders across differences.

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