-
Representation and Mind-Body Identity in Spinoza’s Philosophy
- Journal of the History of Philosophy
- Johns Hopkins University Press
- Volume 60, Number 1, January 2022
- pp. 47-77
- 10.1353/hph.2022.0002
- Article
- Additional Information
- Purchase/rental options available:
Buy Issue for $25 at JHUP
Abstract
abstract:
The paper offers a new reading of Spinoza’s claim that minds and bodies are “one and the same thing,” commonly understood as a claim about the identity of a referent under two different descriptions. This paper proposes instead that Spinoza’s texts and his larger epistemological commitments show that he takes mind-body identity to be (1) an identity grounded in an intentional relation, and (2) an identity of one thing existing in two different ways.
collapse
You are not currently authenticated.
If you would like to authenticate using a different subscribed institution or have your own login and password to Project MUSE
Authenticate
- Purchase/rental options available:
