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Unpacking the nudge muddle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2023

Joseph Heath Open the ORCID record for Joseph Heath [Opens in a new window]
Joseph Heath*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada joseph.heath@utoronto.ca
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Abstract

Libertarian paternalism initially focused on policy domains in which the state was prohibited from interfering coercively in decision making out of respect for individual autonomy. Because adjustment of the s-frame was not an option, achieving better outcomes through manipulation of the i-frame seemed attractive. This original motivation was unfortunately lost in the transition from libertarian paternalism to the nudge framework.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e160
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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