Journal of the History of Philosophy

BOOK REVIEWS 261 In Chapter five the author provides good discussions of the syntheticity of the first and second analogies of experience which support his fundamental claim about the covert Kantian theory of judgment and of the synthetic/analytic distinction. A final chapter on "Ontology and the Transcendental Method" is too brief to do justice to its subject. In addition, a passing remark is made which seems to undermine Gram's central claim. That is, it is said that even though metaphysical propositions make some claim about existence. "this does not mean that there are no analytic propositions in metaphysics." This is a curious remark since Gram does not provide an example of what a "metaphysical" analytical proposition would be like nor does he seem to realize that if this is the case, the distinction between metaphysical propositions and synthetic/analytic propositions would be, in some instances, invalid. If a metaphysical proposition (as described by Gram) were indeed analytic, then it could not have any existential reference at all. In the last chapter of his book Mr. Gram makes a casual reference to the ontological implications of Kant's theory of judgment and his conception of metaphysical propositions which reveals the central weakness of his study. He never justifies (as far as this reader is concerned) the use of the term "ontology" in his title. There are, I believe, good reasons for this. And it is Heidegger who offers an explanation of Gram's inability to derive any significant ontology from Kant's Kritik. For, Heidegger points out that Kant could never achieve an insight into the problematic of temporality. There were two things that stood in his way: in the first place, he altogether neglected the problem of Being; and, in connection with this, he failed to provide an ontology with Dasein as its theme or (to put this in Kantian language) to give a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject . . . the decisive connection between time and the 'I think' was shrouded in utter darkness; it did not even become a problem. (Martin Fleidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, New York, 1962, p. 45) Nevertheless, in regard to his central concern to reveal a hidden theory of syntheticity in Kant's Kritik Gram is quite persuasive and, in addition, shows himself to be a meticulous cicerone for a tour of the interior labyrinths of Kant's arguments. This is a sympathetic study of Kant which, though occasionally overly condensed, is a fine contribution to Kantian scholarship which merits serious attention from those who discern the shadow of Kant on the writings of at least two of the dominant philosophical movements of the present. GEORGE J. STACK State University of New York at Brockport Die Europiiische ldee der Freiheit. Hegels Logik und die Tradition der Selbstbestimmung . By Bernhard Lakebrink. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968. Pp. 537) In its early stages, philosophy, still bound to cosmological theories, detached itself from the dimension of lafi0og as a purely logical reflection of being; in a larger framework , however, the justification of empirical reality and human comportment in face of the X6yog can be regarded (in spite of all its tragical aspects) as a leitmotif characterizing ancient, mediaeval and modern philosophy in Europe. Continuity, in this context , means less the unbroken identity of philosophical topics, but rather the constant return and the effort of a reflective recovery of ancient thought as the immanent basis of all European traditions, Hegel's Logic, at the end of the Greek-Christian synthesis, 262 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY develops for the last time the theme of L6yog in its entire range and depth of significations , but as weU, in its fragility. Lakebrink's commentary on the Grand Logic must be seen in the context of his previous studies in mediaeval and Greek ontology. A first, programmatic work pointed out the distance between the dialectical method and the mediaeval Analogia entis with regard to the underlying ideological presuppositions implied in both modes of philosophical understanding (of. Hegels dialektische Ontologie und die Thombtische Analektik , Cologne, 1955). A parallel collection of Studien zur Metaphysik Hegels (Freiburg, 1969) tends to interpret the guiding concepts of Grund...