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Dimensions of integration in embedded and extended cognitive systems

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Abstract

The complementary properties and functions of cognitive artifacts and other external resources are integrated into the human cognitive system to varying degrees. The goal of this paper is to develop some of the tools to conceptualize this complementary integration between agents and artifacts. It does so by proposing a multidimensional framework, including the dimensions of information flow, reliability, durability, trust, procedural transparency, informational transparency, individualization, and transformation. The proposed dimensions are all matters of degree and jointly they constitute a multidimensional space in which situated cognitive systems can be located and have certain dimensional configurations. These dimensions provide a new perspective on the conditions for cognitive extension. They are, however, not meant to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but to provide a toolbox for investigating the degree and nature of the integration of agent and artifact into “new systemic wholes”. The higher a situated system scores on the proposed dimensions, the more functional integration occurs, and the more tightly coupled the system is.

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Notes

  1. See also Clark’s (1997) “007 principle” and Mark Rowlands’ (1999) “Barking Dog principle”.

  2. A reviewer pointed out that, in some cases, using a cognitive artifact to perform some task does not always result in a more adaptable and powerful problem-solving system. For example, when the artifact provides too much information, making it hard to decide which information is relevant for performing the task, or when the information is not sufficiently transparent (see Section 3.6). So not all agent-artifact systems are necessarily more adaptable.

  3. For critical discussions of these conditions, see Rupert (2004), Rockwell (2010), Roberts (2011), Adams and Maher (2012), Palermos (2014), Smart (2012), Michaelian (2012), Halpin (2013), Arango-Muñoz (2013), and Ludwig (2014).

  4. The dimension of information flow is somewhat related to Sterelny’s (2010) dimension of individual versus collective use, but is more fine-grained.

  5. A reviewer pointed out that, whether a situated system should be classified as two-way or reciprocal, depends on how the artifact in question is used. For example, in case of a shopping list, it can be classified as a two-way system when its user writes down the needed items and then disposes the list when it is no longer needed. However, it can also be classified as a reciprocal system when its user changes the list while doing the shopping and, consequently, turning a shopping list into a more thorough tool for the next use.

  6. See also John Haugeland (1998) on bandwidth between two entities, and Clark’s (2007) discussion of Haugeland.

  7. See Clark (2008a) for similar ideas on multiple realizability in situated cognitive systems, and see Gallagher and Crisafi (2009) on socially distributed systems exhibiting different composition but with similar functions regarding legal decision-making.

  8. Although Clowes does not distinguish between procedural and representational transparency, I take it he is referring to procedural transparency, as he illustrates his point by making an analogy to Heidegger’s notion of a hammer being ready-to-hand.

  9. A reviewer pointed out that, in some cases, fast information-processing may not be desirable, as it runs the risk of superficiality and lack of understanding. In an educational context, for example, slow information-processing may be advantageous, as it increases understanding of a problem or concept.

  10. Sterelny (2010) presents a similar approach on a multidimensional space, but with only three dimensions.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to John Sutton and Richard Menary for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank the audiences at the Distributed Cognition and Distributed Agency Workshop (Sydney, 2012) and the AISB/IACAP World Congress (Birmingham, 2012) for useful feedback.

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    Richard Heersmink

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Heersmink, R. Dimensions of integration in embedded and extended cognitive systems. Phenom Cogn Sci 14, 577–598 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9355-1

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