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Dispositions

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Abstract

Appeals to dispositionality in explanations of phenomena in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, require that we first agree on what we are talking about. I sketch an account of what dispositionality might be. That account will place me at odds with most current conceptions of dispositionality. My aim is not to establish a weighty ontological thesis, however, but to move the discussion ahead in two respects. First, I want to call attention to the extent to which assumptions philosophers have made about dispositionality are far from innocent. The assumptions incorporate substantive theses that, by constraining the space of ‘acceptable’ answers to particular philosophical questions, have inhibited the search for answers to those questions. Second, and more positively, I hope to open up the space of possibilities by offering an alternative way of conceiving dispositionality developed by C. B. Martin.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Davidson College, Box 6954, Davidson, NC, 28035-6954, U.S.A

    John Heil

  2. School of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, 3800, Australia

    John Heil

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  1. John Heil
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Correspondence to John Heil.

Additional information

This paper was written for a conference on Dispositions and Laws of Nature held at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, 7–8 February 2003; Michael Watkins commented. I have benefited from those comments, from remarks by other participants, and from discussions with David Armstrong and my colleague, David Robb, on the topic. The account sketched here is based on C. B. Martin’s work on dispositions. See Martin (1992, 1993, 1994, 1997), Martin and Heil (1999), and Martin’s contribution to Armstrong et al. (1996). The position is developed in detail in Heil (2003).

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Heil, J. Dispositions. Synthese 144, 343–356 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-5864-3

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