Abstract
Ideas about freedom and related concepts like autonomy and self-determination play a prominent role in the moral debate about human enhancement interventions. However, there is not a single understanding of freedom available, and arguments referring to freedom are simultaneously used to argue both for and against enhancement interventions. This gives rise to misunderstandings and polemical arguments. The paper attempts to disentangle the different distinguishable concepts, classifies them and shows how they relate to one another in order to allow for a more structured and clearer debate. It concludes in identifying the individual underpinnings and the social conditions of choice and decision-making as particularly salient dimensions of freedom in the ethical debate about human enhancement.
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Notes
In the philosophical debate the words “freedom”, “liberty”, and “free will” are used rather as interchangeable. The conceptual distinctions made are independent of the terminology chosen. Attempts to introduce substantial distinctions between “liberty” and “freedom” were unsuccessful. Cf. Carter 2012.
For the distinction between first- and second-order volitions cf. Frankfurt 1971.
“Responsible creativity is playing human as God intends us to.” Peters (2003, 198).
See the discussion whether using cognitive enhancements constitutes cheating, for example in Bostrom and Roache 2011.
If at all one could only imagine “liberal eugenics” in this context Agar (2004).
Cf. the frequent references to Aldous Huxley’s distopian novel Brave New World in the literature (e.g. in The President's Council on Bioethics 2003). However, this is not a well-chosen example to express concern about restrictions for freedom through enhancement, since the biotechnical interventions in the novel aim primarily at decreasing the abilities of some in order to have enough people doing unsatisfying work.
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The authors thank Holger Baumann, Oliver Kaftan, Johann Roduit and the anonymous reviewers for the journal for their helpful comments on the paper.
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Heilinger, JC., Crone, K. Human freedom and enhancement. Med Health Care and Philos 17, 13–21 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-013-9479-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-013-9479-z