Skip to main content
Log in

Different Roots of Human Intentionality in Mammalian Mentality

  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Five mental components of human intentionality are distinguished and related to different properties of mammalian orientation. It is proposed that, in the course of evolution, these old properties became integrated and thereby allowed for the development of a new quality: human orientation. The existence of more than 4,000 mammal species with their various forms and levels of mental organization, offering a panorama of different combinations of differently developed components of mentality, provide ample opportunities for comparative studies. The difficulties in assessing specific types are outlined, drawing on over 40 years of observation. Based on this knowledge, an argument is made for the importance of staying in contact with the empirical objects and of considering their ontological status when rising the standards of precision of formal analysis.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Brittan, G.: 1999, ‘The Secrets of Antelope’, Erkenntnis 51, 59-77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. C.: 1996, The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cheney, D. L., R. M. Seyfarth: 1990a, How Monkeys See the World. Inside the Mind of Another Species. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cheney, D. L., R. M. Seyfarth: 1990b, ‘The Representation of Social Relations by Monkeys’, Cognition 37, 167-196.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Condillac, E. B.: 1755, ‘Traité des Animaux, 1798’, in Oeuvres. Arnoux et Mousnier, Paris.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C.: 1987, The Intentional Stance MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donald, M.: 1991, Origins of the Modern Mind. Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dretske, F.: 1999, ‘Machines, Plants, and Animals. The Origins of Agency’, Erkenntnis 51, 19-31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Durner, M.: 1996, ‘Immateriality of Matter’, Theorien der Materie bei Priestley, Kant und Schopenhauer, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 103, 294-322.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edelmann, G. M.: 1989, The Remembered Past. A Biological Theory of Consciousness. Basic Books, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gould, J. L. and C. G. Gould: 1994, The Animal Mind. Freeman, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hendrichs, H.: 1983, ‘On the Evolution of Social Structure in Mammals’, in J. F. Eisenberg and D. G. Kleinman (eds.), Advances in the Study of Mammalian Behavior. The American Society of Mammalogists Special Publications 7, 738-750.

  • Hendrichs, H.: 1997, ‘On the Development of Psychosocial Individualities in Group Living Mammals’, in P. Weingart, S. D. Mitchell, P. J. Richerson and S. Maasen (eds.), Human by Nature. Between Biology and the Social Sciences. Erlbaum, Mahwah, New Jersey.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J.: 1996, Philosophy of Mind. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

    Google Scholar 

  • König, J.: 1994, ‘Probleme des Begriffs der Entwicklung’, in G. Dahms (ed.), Kleine Schriften. Alber, Freiburg-München.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leakey, I. R. and R. Lewin: 1992, Origins Reconsidered. In Search of What Makes us Human. Doubleday, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayr, E.: 1974, ‘Teleological and Teleonomic’, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14, 91-117.

    Google Scholar 

  • Metzinger, T. (ed.): 1995, Bewuβtsein, Beiträge aus der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Schöningh, Paderborn.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pittendrigh, C. S.: 1958, ‘Adaptation, Natural Selection, and Behavior’, in A. Roe and G. G. Simpson (eds.), Behavior and Evolution. Yale University Press, New Haven.

    Google Scholar 

  • Premack, D.: 1983, ‘The Codes of Man and Beast’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6, 125-167.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Quante, M.: 1998, ‘Der Ort des Geistes. Neuere Beitrage zur Philosophie des Geistes’, Teil I', Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 52, 292-313.

    Google Scholar 

  • Radner, D. and M. Radner: 1989, Animal Consciousness. Prometheus, Buffalo, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reimarus, H. S.: 1760, Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Thiere. Bohn, Hamburg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. R.: 1983, Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sommer, V.: 1992, Lob der Lüge, Täuschung und Selbstbetrug bei Tier und Mensch. Beck, München.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stephan, A.: 1998, ‘Varieties of Emergence in Artificial and Natural Systems’, Zeitschrift für Naturforschung C 53, 639-656.

    Google Scholar 

  • Witten, A. and R. Byrne: 1988, ‘Tactical Deception in Primates’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11, 233-273.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Hendrichs, H. Different Roots of Human Intentionality in Mammalian Mentality. Erkenntnis 51, 649–668 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005501626581

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005501626581

Keywords

Navigation