Kant on causal laws and powers

Henschen, Tobias

Kant on causal laws and powers

Dateien

Henschen_0-279114.pdfGröße: 132.97 KBDownloads: 901

Datum

2014

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Philosophie
Zukunftskolleg

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 2014, 48, pp. 20-29. ISSN 0039-3681. eISSN 1879-2510. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.09.001

Zusammenfassung

The aim of the paper is threefold. Its first aim is to defend Eric Watkins's claim that for Kant, a cause is not an event but a causal power: a power that is borne by a substance, and that, when active, brings about its effect, i.e. a change of the states of another substance, by generating a continuous flow of intermediate states of that substance. The second aim of the paper is to argue against Watkins that the Kantian concept of causal power is not the pre-critical concept of real ground but the category of causality, and that Kant holds with Hume that causal laws cannot be inferred non-inductively (that he accordingly has no intention to show in the Second analogy or elsewhere that events fall under causal laws). The third aim of the paper is to compare the Kantian position on causality with central tenets of contemporary powers ontology: it argues that unlike the variants endorsed by contemporary powers theorists, the Kantian variants of these tenets are resistant to objections that neo-Humeans raise to these tenets.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

100 Philosophie

Zitieren

ISO 690

HENSCHEN, Tobias, 2014. Kant on causal laws and powers. In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 2014, 48, pp. 20-29. ISSN 0039-3681. eISSN 1879-2510. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.09.001

BibTex

@article{Henschen2014causa-29859,
  year={2014},
  doi={10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.09.001},
  title={Kant on causal laws and powers},
  volume={48},
  issn={0039-3681},
  journal={Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A},
  pages={20--29},
  author={Henschen, Tobias}
}

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