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Brazilian Studies in Philosophy and History of Science pp 141–150Cite as

Natural Kinds as Scientific Models

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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 290))

Abstract

The concept of natural kind is center stage in the debates about scientific realism. Champions of scientific realism such as Richard Boyd hold that our most developed scientific theories allow us to “cut the world at its joints” (Boyd, 1981, 1984, 1991). In the long run we can disclose natural kinds as nature made them, though as science progresses improvements in theory allow us to revise the extension of natural kind terms.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Kuhn, 2002. Cf. also Kuhn, 1990, not included in The Road since Structure.

  2. 2.

    Cf. Goodman, 1983. Cf. also Quine’s comments in “Natural Kinds” about Goodman’s problem and its solution.

  3. 3.

    Quine has no problem in accepting Darwin’s evolutionary view of natural kinds, and, obviously, Kuhn couldn’t do it, since such acceptance would amount to viewing things from the point of view of a paradigm, and in the papers collected in The Road since Structure Kuhn tries to keep the position of the historian of science, someone who understands and speaks the language of a paradigm, but who doesn’t belong to it.

  4. 4.

    Cf. Bernard, 1879. Working on mammals Bernard discovered the glycogenic function of the liver and conceived his theory of the inner medium, i.e. the blood and other liquid media in which the cells and the whole (superior) organism can live. For details cf. Bernard, 1984.

  5. 5.

    I am aware that there are a lot of philosophical disputes as to the meaning of the terms I use here. For one, Davidson (1980) argues that events are different from facts; for another, Austin (1979 [1961], p. 156), not only identifies facts with phenomena but also phenomena and facts with states of affairs. I take for granted Austin’s position and avoid Davidson’s.

  6. 6.

    Cf. Black, 1962, 1986; Hesse, 1966; Nagel, 1961; Hempel, 1977; Suppe, 1977b, 1989; Giere, 1988, 1992, 2001; and Cartwright, 1983, 1989, 1999a, b.

  7. 7.

    I discussed the differences and convergences of the views of such philosophers on scientific models in Dutra, 2008. I mention here just the most general convergent aspects of such views. For details in connection with my own view of models as abstract replicas, cf. that same paper (Dutra, 2008).

  8. 8.

    In this sense, the term “abstract” is also used by Suppe (1977b, 1989) and Giere (1992, 2001).

  9. 9.

    This is a point I discuss at length in Dutra, 2008.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Federal University of Santa Catarina, and CNPq, Florianópolis, Brazil

    Luiz Henrique Dutra

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  1. Luiz Henrique Dutra
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Correspondence to Luiz Henrique Dutra .

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  1. , Department of Philosophy, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Altamiro Guimaraes 360ap. 1001, Florianopolis, 88015-510, Santa Catarina, Brazil

    Décio Krause

  2. , Department of Philosophy, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Machada de Assis 17/101, Rio de Janeiro, 2220-060, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

    Antonio Videira

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Dutra, L.H. (2011). Natural Kinds as Scientific Models. In: Krause, D., Videira, A. (eds) Brazilian Studies in Philosophy and History of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 290. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9422-3_9

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