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The Bane of Two Truths

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The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science

Part of the book series: The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective ((PSEP,volume 1))

Abstract

A common view among methodologists is that truth and convergence are related in such a way that scientific theories in their historical order of appearance contribute to the convergence to an ultimate ideal theory. It is not a fact that science develops accordingly but rather a hypothetical thought experiment to explain why science develops at all. Here, a simple formal model is presented for scrutinizing the relations between two truths and convergence.

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Correspondence to Vincent F. Hendricks .

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Hendricks, V.F. (2010). The Bane of Two Truths. In: Stadler, F. (eds) The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9115-4_8

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