Abstract
Donald Davidson’s classic argument for the impossibility of reducing mental events to physicallistic ones is analyzed and formalized in relational logic. This makes evident the scope of Davidson’s argument, and shows that he is essentially offering a negative transcendental argument, i.e., and argument to the impossibility of certain kinds of logical relations. Some final speculations are offered as to why such a move might, nevertheless, have a measure of plausibility.
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Herstein, G.L. Davidson on the Impossibility of Psychophysical Laws. Synthese 145, 45–63 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-5866-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-5866-6