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Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games

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Abstract

Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be characterized by means of consistency, one-person rationality, a version of Pareto optimality and a modification of converse consistency. It is shown that, in case of the strong Bayesian equilibrium correspondence, converse consistency can be replaced by non-emptiness. As examples we treat Bayesian potential games and Bayesian congestion games.

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van Heumen, R., Peleg, B., Tijs, S. et al. Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games. Theor Decis 40, 103–129 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133169

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