Abstract
The controversy over the old ideal of “value-free science” has cooled significantly over the past decade. Many philosophers of science now agree that even ethical and political values may play a substantial role in all aspects of scientific inquiry. Consequently, in the last few years, work in science and values has become more specific: Which values may influence science, and in which ways? Or, how do we distinguish illegitimate from illegitimate kinds of influence? In this paper, I argue that this problem requires philosophers of science to take a new direction. I present two case studies in the influence of values on scientific inquiry: feminist values in archaeology and commercial values in pharmaceutical research. I offer a preliminary assessment of these cases, that the influence of values was legitimate in the feminist case, but not in the pharmaceutical case. I then turn to three major approaches to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate influences of values, including the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values and Heather Douglas’ distinction between direct and indirect roles for values. I argue that none of these three approaches gives an adequate analysis of the two cases. In the concluding section, I briefly sketch my own approach, which draws more heavily on ethics than the others, and is more promising as a solution to the current problem. This is the new direction in which I think science and values should move.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I am not interested in the scientific realism vs. antirealism debate here, or the nature of truth as such. Rather, my interest is in our attitudes towards truth, the ways in which we pursue it, and how these pursuits relate to other activities. That is, I’m interested in these relational properties of truth rather than its intrinsic properties. Throughout this paper, I generally use “truth” as a generic term for the epistemic aim or aims of scientific inquiry, especially when and insofar as these are “purely epistemic,” that is, independent of or contrasting with the aims of “applied science” and engineering.
Truth in the sense usually connected to scientific realism is one such aim, but other such aims include Bas van Fraassen’s empirical adequacy (1980) and Michael Friedman’s communicative rationality (2001). Daniel Steel seems to use “truth” in something like the narrower, scientific realist sense, and so when I discuss his views in Sect. 4 I follow his lead; however, little or nothing in the argument of that section turns on the nature of truth or scientific realism vs. antirealism. Truth in the Deweyan sense of “effectively resolves the current problematic situation” is not covered by “truth” as I use it there, since this sense of “truth” ties it closely to the pragmatic, not “purely epistemic” aims of “applied science” and engineering (Brown 2012).
Throughout this paper, I speak of truth “as a value,” and discuss how this value relates to ethical and political values. Again, my interest is in our attitude towards truth—how we value it—and how this relates to other things that we value. Speaking of truth in this way does not imply that it is “merely” a value, that truth as such is entirely subjective, and so on. Indeed, presumably we value truth (in any of the senses given in the last paragraph) because it is not entirely subjective. Talking about truth as a value is entirely consistent with taking truth or some necessary condition for truth to be a necessary condition for accepting a theory. For instance, it is entirely consistent with taking internal consistency to be necessary for accepting a theory on the grounds that internal consistency is necessary for truth. Indeed, in this case we are attaching a great deal of value to truth; this is what I have in mind by the lexical priority of truth, discussed below. This way of using “value” differs somewhat from Douglas (2009, pp. 94–5), though not so much from Douglas (2013). See also note 13. I thank several readers, including an anonymous reviewer at Synthese, for encouraging me to clarify my use of “truth” and “truth as a value.”
I use such terms as “hypotheses,” “theories,” “models,” and “accounts” roughly interchangeably throughout this paper, and take no position in the debates over the syntactical and semantic views or the status and role of models.
I thank an anonymous reviewer at Synthese for pushing me to present the terminology in this section more precisely.
Since isolationism and transactionism are defined in terms of specifically “ethical and political” values, for the sake of presentation I often simply abbreviate this as “values.” In Sect. 4, where I focus on the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values, I am more careful about this.
To be clear, I don’t think that these three sets of tools are mutually exclusive. While the second and third—the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values and the distinction between direct and indirect roles for values, respectively—seem to be taken as rivals by their proponents, both involve the first, which is an assumption that Matthew Brown calls the lexical priority of evidence and which I generalize as the lexical priority of truth.
Hicks (2012, Sect. 5.2).
On my use of “truth as a value,” see note 1.
Recall from note 1 that I am not assuming any specific conception of truth, or even whether “truth” is a more appropriate term than, say, “empirical adequacy”; and by “truth as a value” I mean truth regarded as good and worth having (by us), whatever truth is as such.
I thank Charles Pence for pressing this point.
The Knobe Effect suggests that the value we assign to the consequences of the Paxil trial will influence our assessment of the role of commercial values in the researchers’ intentions and reasoning, and so our assessment of the case according to Douglas’ account. Specifically, the effect predicts that we, insofar as we take these consequences to be bad, we will probably say that the researchers intended to bring them about (Knobe 2003). And it is reasonable to interpret this as an illegitimate direct role for values in the epistemic phase. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
The terminology of constitutive and contextual values is due to Longino (1990, 4ff), and these concepts have not enjoyed much further development in recent years. An anonymous reviewer suggests that Kitcher’s account of broad, cognitive, and probative values is a development of Longino’s concepts (Kitcher 2011, pp. 37–39; see also Brown 2013a).
Up to this point in the paper, I have generally used “values” because it is the term used in the literature that I am discussing, viz., the “science and values” literature. However, my approach is better put in the language of various goods, which are the aims or ends or goals of various activities or social practices. Some of these goods are the constitutive aims of these activities; for example, truth and useful technology are two goods that are among the constitutive aims of the activity of scientific inquiry. For the sake of continuity with the rest of this paper, in the text I will stick with “values,” though occasionally this makes for some awkward phrasing. Compare the language of this note with Longino (1990, pp. 17–19).
References
Amsterdam, J., & McHenry, L. (2012). The Paroxetine 352 bipolar trial: A study in medical ghostwriting. International Journal of Risk and Safety in Medicine, 24, 221–231. doi:10.3233/JRS-2012-0571.
Anderson, E. (2004). Uses of value judgments in science. Hypatia, 19(Winter), 1–24.
Anderson, E. (2005, 2008). Dewey’s moral philosophy. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Dordrecht: Reidel. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/dewey-moral/.
Aristotle, (1984). Nicomachean ethics. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The complete works of Aristotle (pp. 1729–1867). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Baird, D. (2004). Thing knowledge: A philosophy of scientific instruments. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Barnes, B., & Bloor, D. (1982). Relativism, rationalism and the sociology of knowledge. In M. Hollis & S. Lukes (Eds.), Rationality and relativism (pp. 21–47). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Berenson, A. (2005). Evidence in Vioxx suits shows intervention by Merck officials. New York Times, April 24.
Betz, G. (2013). In defence of the value free ideal. European Journal of Philosophy of Science, 3(2), 20–207. doi:10.1007/s13194-012-0062-x.
Biddle, J. (2007). Lessons from the Vioxx Debacle: What the privatization of science can teach us about social epistemology. Social Epistemology, 21(1), 21–39.
Biddle, J. (2009). Advocates or unencumbered selves? On the role of mill’s political liberalism in Longino’s sociopragmatism. Philosophy of Science, 76(5), 612–623.
Brown, M. (2011). Inquiry and evidence: From the experimenter’s regress to evidence-based policy. Unpublished manuscript. Retrieved August 20, 2012. http://utdallas.academia.edu/MatthewBrown/Papers/300331/Inquiry_and_Evidence_From_the_Experimenters_Regress_to_Evidence-Based_Policy
Brown, M. (2012). John Dewey’s logic of science. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2(2), 258–306.
Brown, M. (2013a). Review of Philip Kitcher, science in a democratic society. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Retrieved March 12, 2014. http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/29284-science-in-a-democratic-society/.
Brown, M. (2013b). The source and status of values for socially responsible science. Philosophical Studies, 163(1), 67–76.
Brown, M. (2013c). Values in science beyond underdetermination and inductive risk. Philosophy of Science, 80(5), 39–829.
Callaway, E. (2010). Questions over ghostwriting in drug industry. Nature News Blog. doi:10.1038/news.2010.453. Retrieved August 22, 2011, from http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100907/full/news.2010.453.html.
Cartwright, N. (2006). Well-ordered science: Evidence for use. Philosophy of Science, 73(5), 981–990.
Dewey, J. (1988). Theory of valuation. In J. A. Boydston (Ed.), John Dewey: The later works, 1925–1953 (Vol. 13: 1938–1939, pp. 189–251). Southern Illinois University Press: Carbondale and Edwardsville.
Douglas, H. (2000). Inductive risk and values in science. Philosophy of Science, 67(4), 559–579.
Douglas, H. (2009). Science, policy, and the value-free ideal. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Douglas, H. (2013). The value of cognitive values. Philosophy of Science, 80(5), 796–806.
Douglas, H. (2014). Pure science and the problem of progress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.02.001.
Elliott, C. (2004). Pharma goes to the laundry: Public relations and the business of medical education. Hastings Center Report, 34(5), 18–23.
Elliott, Kevin. (2011). Is a little pollution good for you? Incorporating societal values in environmental research. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Elliott, K. (2012). Epistemic and methodological iteration in scientific research. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 43, 82–376. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.12.034.
Elliott, K., & McKaughan, D. (2009). How values in scientific discovery and pursuit alter theory appraisal. Philosophy of Science, 76(5), 598–611. doi:10.1086/605807.
Fehr, C. (2012). Feminist engagement with evolutionary psychology. Hypatia, 27(1), 1–23. Winter.
Feyerabend, P. (1993). Against method (3rd ed.). London and New York: Verso.
Foot, P. (1972). Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives. Philosophical Review, 81(3), 305–316.
Friedman, M. (2001). Dynamics of reason. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language/Information.
Fugh-Berman, A. (2010). The Haunting of medical journals: How ghostwriting sold ‘HRT’. PLoS Medicine, 7(9), e1000335. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000335.
Hicks, D. (2012). Scientific practices and their social context. Phd thesis, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame.
Julious, S. (2013). Efficacy and suicidal risk for antidepressants in paediatric and adolescent patients. Statistical Methods in Medical Research, 22(2), 190–218. doi:10.1177/0962280211432210.
Jureidini, J., McHenry, L., & Mansfield, P. (2008). Clinical trials and drug promotion: Selective reporting of study 329. International Journal of Risk and Safety in Medicine, 20, 73–81. doi:10.3233/JRS-2008-0426.
Kindcaid, H., Dupré, J., & Wylie, A. (2007). Value-free science?. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Kitcher, P. (2001). Science, truth, and democracy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Kitcher, P. (2011). Science in a democratic society. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Knobe, J. (2003). Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis, 63(279), 190–194. doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00419.
Kuhn, T. (1977). Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice. The essential tension (pp. 320–339). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lacey, H. (1999). Is science value free? Values and scientific understanding. London and New York: Routledge.
Lacey, H. (2005a). On the interplay of the cognitive and the social in scientific practices. Philosophy of Science, 72(5), 88–977.
Lacey, H. (2005b). Values and objectivity in science: The current controversy about transgenic crops. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Lacey, H. (2013). Rehabilitating neutrality. Philosophical Studies, 163(1), 77–83. doi:10.1007/s11098-012-0074-6.
Lacey, H., & Mariconda, P. R. (2012). The Eagle and the Starlings: Galileo’s argument for the autonomy of science: How pertinent is it today? Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 43(1), 31–122. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2011.10.012.
Ledford, H. (2013). Virtual reality. Nature, 498, 9–127.
Longino, H. (1990). Science as social knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Longino, H. (1995). Gender, politics, and the theoretical virtues. Synthese, 104(3), 97–383.
Longino, H. (1996). Cognitive and Non-Cognitive values in science: Rethinking the dichotomy. In L. H. Nelson & J. Nelson (Eds.), Feminism, science, and the philosophy of science (pp. 39–58). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
MacIntyre, A. (1984). After virtue (2nd ed.). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
MacIntyre, A. (2006). Moral relativism, truth, and justification. Selected essays: The task of philosophy (pp. 52–73). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Magnus, P. D. (2013). What scientists know is not a function of what scientists know. Philosophy of Science, 80(5), 9–840.
McHenry, L. (2009). Ghosts in the machine: Comment on Sismondo. Social Studies of Science, 39(6), 943–947.
McHenry, L., & Jureidini, J. (2008). Industry-sponsored ghostwriting in clinical trial reporting: A case study. Accountability in Research: Policies and Quality Assurance, 15, 152–167. doi:10.1080/08989620802194384.
McKaughan, D. (2007). Toward a Richard vocabulary for epistemic attitudes: Mapping the cognitive landscape. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame.
McMullin, E. (1983). Values in science. In P. Asquith & T. Nickles (Eds.), Proceedings of the 1982 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (PSA 1982) (Vol. 2, pp. 3–28). Chicago: Philosophy of Science Association.
McMullin, E. (1985). Galilean idealization. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 16(3), 247–273.
Mirowski, P., & Van Horn, R. (2005). The contract research organization and the commercialization of scientific research. Social Studies of Science, 35(4), 48–503. doi:10.1177/0306312705052103.
Okruhlik, K. (1994). Gender and the biological sciences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplement), 20, 21–42.
Okruhlik, K. (2004). Logical empiricism, feminism, and Neurath’s auxiliary motive. Hypatia, 19(1), 48–72.
Psaty, B., & Kronmal, R. (2008). Reporting mortality findings in trials of Rofecoxib for Alzheimer disease or cognitive impairment: A case study based on documents from Rofecoxib litigation. Journal of the American Medical Association, 299(15), 1813–1817. doi:10.1001/jama.299.15.1813.
Radder, H. (Ed.). (2010). Mertonian values, scientific norms, and the commodification of academic research, Chap. 10. In The commodification of academic research. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Resnik, D. (2010). Financial interests and the norms of academic science, Chap. 4. In Radder (Ed.).
Richardson, H. (1994). Practical reasoning about final ends. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rooney, P. (1992). On values in science: Is the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction useful. In D. Hull, M. Forbes, & K. Okruhlik (Eds.) Proceedings of the 1992 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (PSA 1992) (Vol. 2, pp. 13–22). Chicago: Philosophy of Science Association.
Rorty, R. (1991). The priority of democracy to philosophy. Objectivity, relativism and truth (pp. 175–195). Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ross, J., Hill, K., Egilman, D., & Krumholz, H. (2008). Guest authorship and ghostwriting in publications related to Rofecoxib: A case study of industry documents from Rofecoxib litigation. Journal of the American Medical Association, 299(15), 1800–1812. doi:10.1001/jama.299.15.1800.
Rouse, J. (2007). Social practices and normativity. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 37(1), 46–56. doi:10.1177/0048393106296542.
Sandel, M. (1998). Liberalism and the limits of justice (2nd ed.). Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Schiebinger, L. (1999). Has feminism changed science?. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
Sismondo, S. (2009a). Ghosts in the machine: Publication planning in the medical sciences. Social Studies of Science, 39(2), 98–171.
Sismondo, S. (2009). Ghosts in the machine: Reply to McHenry (2009). Social Studies of Science, 39(6), 52–949.
Steel, D. (2010). Epistemic values and the argument from inductive risk. Philosophy of Science, 77, 14–34.
Steel, D., & Whyte, K. P. (2012). Environmental justice, values, and scientific expertise. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 22(2), 163–182.
Sung, S. C., Wisniewski, S. R., Balasubramani, G. K., Zisook, S., Kurian, B., Warden, D., et al. (2013). Does early-onset chronic or recurrent major depression impact outcomes with antidepressant medications? A CO-MED trial report. Psychological Medicine, 43(5), 945–960. doi:10.1017/S0033291712001742.
Talisse, R. (2010). An epistemological defense of democracy. Critical Review, 22(2–3), 281–291. doi:10.1080/08913811.2010.508636.
Tuana, N. (2012). Embedding philosophers in the practices of science: Bringing humanities to the sciences. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0171-2.
van den Belt, H. (2010). Robert Merton, intellectual property, and open science, Chap. 9. In Radder (Ed.).
Van Fraassen, B. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Wadman, M. (2011). Paxil study under fire. Nature, 475, 153. doi:10.1038/475153a.
Wylie, A. (2001). Doing social science as a feminist: The engendering of archeology. In A. Creager, E. Lunbeck, & L. Schiebinger (Eds.), Feminism in twentieth-century science, technology, and medicine. Women in culture and society (pp. 23–45). Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Wylie, A. (2002). Thinking from things: Essays in the philosophy of archaeology. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Wylie, A., & Nelson, L. H. (2007). Chap. 3. In H. Kindcaid, J. Dupré, & A. Wylie (Eds.), Coming to terms with the values of science: Insights from feminist science studies scholarship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Kevin Elliott, Heather Douglas, Charles Pence, Robert Audi, Amelia Hicks, Kenny Boyce, Aaron Segal, Rachael Brown, Kerry McKenzie, and Keizo Matsurbara for comments on earlier versions.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hicks, D.J. A new direction for science and values. Synthese 191, 3271–3295 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0447-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0447-9