The legitimacy of protecting intellectual property rights: The irrelevance of two conceptions of an information commons
Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society
ISSN: 1477-996X
Article publication date: 25 November 2013
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to consider arguments both for and against intellectual property (IP) rights that are premised on each of two conceptions of the information commons that attributes either moral value or disvalue to its preservation.
Design/methodology/approach
The methodology is the philosophically standard one of reflective equilibrium. The author considers the argument for a morally protected information commons that is grounded in Locke's famous proviso limiting original acquisition of material property to situations that leave enough of the resource to others and Hardin's famous argument that holding material property in common leads to overuse and depletion – a Tragedy of the commons. In particular, the arguments are evaluated according to whether they cohere with ordinary foundational commitments.
Findings
The author argues that neither conception of the commons is directly applicable to information objects and hence is relevant with respect to the issue of whether legal protection of IP rights is morally justified.
Originality/value
The identification of key differences between material objects and information objects that shows the irrelevance of these two leading conceptions in resolving the general issue of whether legal protection of IP rights is justified.
Keywords
Citation
Himma, K. (2013), "The legitimacy of protecting intellectual property rights: The irrelevance of two conceptions of an information commons", Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 210-232. https://doi.org/10.1108/JICES-10-2013-0041
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2013, Emerald Group Publishing Limited