Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-x5gtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-15T08:55:10.452Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

On the Logic of Interrogative Inquiry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Jaakko Hintikka  and
Stephen Harris
Jaakko Hintikka
Affiliation:
Florida State University
Stephen Harris
Affiliation:
Florida State University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In earlier publications Jaakko Hintikka has introduced the interrogative model of inquiry and studied some of its applications.1 At its simplest, the interrogative model takes the form of a game between a player known as the Inquirer and a source of information we call Nature. The inquirer is trying to derive a conclusion C from a given set of premises T by standard deductive means augmented by additional information gained from Nature. (We can think of C as a set of formulas related disjunctively to each other.) The inquirer may obtain this additional information by means of questions put to Nature. The answers to these questions, when available, are then added to the premise set T. When a question is answerable but no true answer is available, Nature may respond with a false answer.

The deductive steps employed are subject to certain limitations. For instance, if the derivation is being carried out in a Beth-style tableau system, we require that the deductive steps obey the subformula principle.2

Type
Part VIII. Formal Sciences
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 232 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Addison, J.W. (1962), “The Theory of Hierarchies,” In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress. Edited by Nagel, E., P. Suppes and Tarski, A. Stanford: Stanford Universtiy Press. Pp. 26–37.Google Scholar
Beth, E.W. (1953). “On Padoa’s Method in the Theory of Definition.” Indigationes Mathematicae 15: 330–339.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beth, E.W. (1955). “Semantic Entailment and Formal Derivability.” Mededelingen van de Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdeling Letterkunde. Volume 18, 13: 309–342.Google Scholar
Craig, W. (1957). “Linear Reasoning.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 22: 250–268.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hintikka, J. (1984). “The Logic of Science as Model-Oriented Logic.” PSA 1984, Volume 1. Edited by Asquith, P. and Kitcher, P. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 177–185.Google Scholar
Hintikka, J. (1988a). “The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interrogative Model of Inquiry.” Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science.Google Scholar
Hintikka, J. (1988b). “Knowledge Representation and the Interrogative Approach to Inquiry.” Edited by Clay, M. and Lehrer, K.Google Scholar
Hintikka, J. (1988c). “What is the Logic of Experimental Inquiry?” Synthese.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hsiao, C. (1983). “Identification.” In Handbook of Econometrics. Edited by Griliches, Z. and Intriligator, M.D. Volume 1. Amsterdam: North HollandGoogle Scholar
Jammer, M. (1961). Concepts of Mass in Classical and Modern Physics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Koopmans, T.C. (1949). “Identification Problems in Economic Model Construction.” Econometrica 17: 125–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKinsey, J.C.C., Sugar, A.C. and Suppes, P. (1953). “Axiomatic Foundations of Classical Particle Mechanics.” Journal of Rational Mechanics and Analysis 2: 253–272.Google Scholar
Rantala, V. (1977). “Aspects of Definability.” Acta Philosophica Fennica 29: 2–3. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica.Google Scholar
Simon, H. A. (1947). “The Axioms of Newtonian Mechanics.” Philosophical Magazine. Series 7, Volume 33, pp. 888–905Google Scholar
Simon, H. A. (1954). “The Axiomatization of Classical Mechanics.” Philosophy of Science 21: 340–343.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simon, H. A. (1959). “Definable Terms and Primitives in Axiom Systems.” In The Axiomatic Method. Edited by Henkin, L., Suppes, P. and Tarski, A. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 443–453.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simon, H. A. (1970). “The Axiomatization of Physical Theories.” Philosophy of Science 37: 16–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Suppes, P. (1957). Introduction to Logic. Princeton: Van Nostrand.Google Scholar
Tuomela, R. (1973). Theoretical Concepts. Vienna and New York: Springer-Verlag.CrossRefGoogle Scholar