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Explanation and Two Conceptions of the Physical

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Abstract

Any position that promises genuine progress on the mind-body problem deserves attention. Recently, Daniel Stoljar has identified a physicalist version of Russell’s notion of neutral monism; he elegantly argues that with this type of physicalism it is possible to disambiguate on the notion of physicalism in such a way that the problem is resolved. The further issue then arises of whether we have reason to believe that this type of physicalism is in fact true. Ultimately, one needs to argue for this position by inference to the best explanation, and I show that this new type of physicalism does not hold promise of more explanatory prowess than its relevant rivals, and that, whether it is better than its rivals or not, it is doubtful whether it would furnish us with genuine explanations of the phenomenal at all.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Aarhus University, Ndr. Ringgade, Aarhus, 8000 , Denmark

    Jakob Hohwy

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  1. Jakob Hohwy
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Hohwy, J. Explanation and Two Conceptions of the Physical. Erkenntnis 62, 71–89 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-5862-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-5862-8

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