Abstract
In this paper, I discuss the aetiological account of biological interests, developed by Varner (1998), in the context of artefactual organisms envisioned by current research in synthetic biology. In “Sections 2–5”, I present Varner's theory and criticise it for being incapable of ascribing non-derivative interests to artefactual organisms due to their lack of a history of natural selection. In “Sections 6–7”, I develop a new alternative to Varner's account, building on the organisational theory of biological teleology and function. I argue that the organisational account of biological interest is superior to Varner's aetiological account because it (i) can accommodate both artefactual and naturally evolved organisms, (ii) provides a non-arbitrary and practical way of determining biological interests, (iii) supports the claim that organisms have interests in a sense in which artefacts do not, and (iv) avoids the possibility of there being a conflict between what an organismic part is supposed to do and what is in the interest of the organism.
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Notes
Thus, Goodpaster distinguishes between moral considerability and moral significance (1978, p. 313).
In this paper, I will assume that it is a reductio of the biocentrist position if it entails that technical artefacts also have interests, since this seems to be Varner's conclusion, which is the focus of the present discussion: “(…) if identifying some of the interests of human beings with their biologically based needs implies that can openers and cars have interests, then surely we should abandon the biological portion of the psycho-biological theory of welfare” (Varner 1998, p. 62).
In his influential article on moral considerability, Goodpaster (1978, p. 319) discusses Feinberg's argument, and so does Varner (1990, 1998, p. 63). Singer (1979) has a similar criticism: all we mean when we say it is in the interests of a tree to be watered is that the tree needs water if it is to continue to live and grow normally; if we regard this as evidence that the tree has interests, we may as well say that it is in the interests of a car to be lubricated regularly because the car needs lubrication if it is to run properly.
My focus in this paper is on whether biocentrists have provided a sound argument in favour of an account of non-derivative interests that applies to non-sentient organisms. Whether such interests are morally considerable is a further question that I will not discuss here.
Varner (1998, pp. 57–62) invokes the distinction between having and taking an interest in something in connection with his argument for what he calls “the psycho-biological theory of welfare”, according to which having an interest in something need not be based on actual or hypothetical desires, but may merely be a biological fact about an organism. This distinction was first made in Regan (1976) and is also featured in Taylor (1986). Feinberg (1974) takes interests to presuppose cognitive awareness.
It should be noted that Varner's psycho-biological account of interests is disjunctive (see 1998, p. 68). In addition to having biological interests, conscious organisms may have interest derived from their (informed) desires. In other words, Varner's account of interest is pluralistic. In this paper, my focus is on Varner's explication of the notion of biological interest. Varner recognises that biological and psychological interests may conflict, e.g., when he discusses the case of Maude, who has an informed desire to smoke, though it is not in her biological interest (1998, p. 62). However, he does not offer a principle for how to resolve this sort of conflict.
I interpret Varner's use of “was adaptive for” as a requirement that there has been natural selection for a trait. I think this interpretation is justified by the fact that Varner illustrates the view by pointing out that the reason why sight is the function of eyes is that sight has been naturally selected for (1998, p. 68).
The literature on aetiological theories of function is vast and addresses many issues that I cannot cover here. I will focus on what I take to be the virtues of aetiological theory most often appealed to by those who defend it, with a particular emphasis on Neander's aetiological account.
It is worth noting that when aetiologists claim that functions are normative, they do not mean that functions supply agents with reasons for action (or belief). Nothing about what agents should do follows from the fact that leaves are supposed to contribute to photosynthesis.
For a vigorous and influential defence of the importance of Cummins's account in biological research, see Amundson and Lauder (1994).
For an interesting criticism of the claim that the systemic capacity account must ascribe the function of filling rivers and streams to clouds, see Davies (2001, p. 75 ff.).
For an excellent, recent discussion of Boorse's biostatistical theory of function, see Kingma (2010).
A similar characterisation can be found in Douglas and Savulescu (2010). Another influential definition of synthetic biology is that it is “the design and construction of new biological parts, devices and systems, and the redesign of existing, natural biological systems for useful purposes” (SynBERC 2012).
It is also important to note that synthetic organisms will be subject to natural selection. When they reproduce, they will, in the appropriate circumstances, bring forth descendants that will constitute a population of organisms with members that vary with respect to traits that have an impact on fitness. See Sandler and Simons (2012) for similar criticisms of Preston.
My presentation relies on information found at http://flint.sdu.dk/index.php?page=protocell. For a recent overview of protocell research, see Rasmussen et al. (2009).
Strictly speaking, it will not be correct to assert that Arto's membrane is damaged when it ceases to filter matter because this presupposes that there is something it is supposed to do, and according to the aetiological account there is not.
Arto's membrane might still be said to have a normative function according to the aetiological account, but in that case, it would be an artifactual function, i.e., a function that has been conferred on the membrane by the intentions of the bioengineers who have created Arto. However, artifactual functions do not give rise to non-derivative biological interests as defined by Varner.
Furthermore, as I have pointed out, Arto might replicate itself, and in case the replication process results in a population that varies with respect to fitness-enhancing traits, Arto's descendants will come to possess normative functions and biological interests. However, it is also worthy to observe that in case Arto's descendants do not come to form such a population, then they will not acquire interests of their own. Thus, whether or not Arto's descendants will come to possess interests of their own depends on whether and when variation with respect to the right kind of traits arises in the population.
I will assume that, while Varner and other biocentrists may not consider the partiality of his account to present a knock-down objection to it, they would prefer an account that is complete.
The following presentation is not intended as an argument for the organisational approach, which I will assume is a plausible alternative to the well-known aetiological and dispositional analyses of function. Mossio et al. (2009) and Saborido et al. (2011) provide a detailed defence of the view. For important developments and critical discussions of the organizational approach, see Schlosser (1998), McLaughlin (2001) and Delancey (2006). Saborido et al. (2011) distinguish two versions of the organisational account in terms of whether they focus on the self-reproduction of traits (Schlosser 1998; McLaughlin 2001) or on the organisation of the system (Collier 2000; Christensen and Bickhard 2002; Mossio et al. 2009; Saborido et al. 2011).
In order for the parts of a self-maintaining system to have functions, the system of which they are a part must also realise a specific kind of organisation, what Saborido et al. (2011, p. 593) call organizational closure. For a more detailed and valuable discussion of the contrast between the organisational and the aetiological approach to analysing function, see Christensen and Bickhard (2002).
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to clarify this point.
A similar claim is made in Delancey (2004).
I owe this significant point to an anonymous referee.
See also Delancey for a discussion of the case of oncomice in relation to Varner's aetiological theory of biological interest.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments and the participants in the SYBHEL Project for valuable discussions. The research for this paper has been supported by the Danish Research Council (FKK) and Center for Synthetic Biology at University of Copenhagen funded by the UNIK research initiative of the Danish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Higher Education.
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Holm, S. Biological Interests, Normative Functions, and Synthetic Biology. Philos. Technol. 25, 525–541 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-012-0075-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-012-0075-6